Editing Abu Zubaydah (section)

== May 30, 2005, memo ==
The final memo mentioned Zubaydah several times. It claimed that due to the enhanced interrogation techniques, Zubaydah "provided significant information on two operatives, [including] José Padilla[,] who planned to build and detonate a '[[dirty bomb]]' in the Washington DC area."<ref name="May302005BradburyMemo"/> This claim is strongly disputed by [[Ali Soufan]], the FBI interrogator who first interrogated Zubaydah following his capture, by traditional means. He said the most valuable information was gained before torture was used. Other intelligence officers have also disputed that claim.<ref name="Soufan 2009" /><ref name="Isikoff 2009" /><ref name="Soufan testimony" /><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/washington/09zubaydah.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin Mark Mazzetti and David Johnston "Inquiry Begins Into Destruction of Tapes"]. ''New York Times'', December 9, 2007</ref> Soufan, when asked in 2009 by Senator [[Sheldon Whitehouse]] during a Congressional hearing if the memo was incorrect, testified that it was.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Benjamin |first=Mark |date=May 14, 2009 |title=Soufan: CIA torture actually hindered our intelligence gathering |url=https://www.salon.com/2009/05/14/torture_24/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101105233745/http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/05/14/torture/ |archive-date=November 5, 2010 |work=[[Salon (website)|Salon]]}}</ref> The memo noted that not all of the waterboarding sessions were necessary for Zubaydah, since the on-scene interrogation team determined he had stopped producing actionable intelligence.<ref name="May302005BradburyMemo"/> The memo reads:
<blockquote>This is not to say that the interrogation program has worked perfectly. According to the IG Report, the CIA, at least initially, could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have the information. See IG Report at 83–85. On at least one occasion, this may have resulted in what might be deemed in retrospect to have been the unnecessary use of enhanced techniques. On that occasion, although the on-scene interrogation team judged Zubaydah to be compliant, elements within CIA Headquarters still believed he was withholding information. See id at 84. At the direction of CIA Headquarters, interrogators therefore used the waterboard one more time on Zubaydah.<ref name="May302005BradburyMemo"/>
</blockquote>

[[John E. McLaughlin|John McLaughlin]], former acting CIA director, stated in 2006, "I totally disagree with the view that the capture of Zubaydah was unimportant. Zubaydah was woven through all of the intelligence prior to 9/11 that signaled a major attack was coming, and his capture yielded a great deal of important information."<ref>[http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0606/20/sitroom.02.html Transcript for ''The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer''] CNN, June 20, 2006</ref>

In his 2007 memoir, former [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA Director]] [[George Tenet]] writes:
<blockquote>A published report in 2006 contended that Zubaydah was mentally unstable and that the administration had overstated his importance. Baloney. Zubaydah had been at the crossroads of many al-Qa'ida operations and was in position to—and did—share critical information with his interrogators. Apparently, the source of the rumor that Zubaydah was unbalanced was his personal diary, in which he adopted various personas. From that shaky perch, some junior Freudians leapt to the conclusion that Zubaydah had multiple personalities. In fact, Agency psychiatrists eventually determined that in his diary he was using a sophisticated literary device to express himself.<ref>George Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA'', HarperCollins, 2007</ref></blockquote>