United States federal government continuity of operations
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Template:Short descriptionContinuity of Operations (COOP) is a United States federal government initiative, required by U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 40 (PPD-40), to ensure that agencies can continue performance of essential functions under a broad range of circumstances. PPD-40 specifies particular requirements for continuity plan development, including the requirement that all federal executive branch departments and agencies develop an integrated, overlapping continuity capability that supports the eight National Essential Functions described in the document.
These measures included construction of underground facilities such as "Mount Weather", a putatively nuclear-weapon-proof facility in a hollowed-out mountain in northeastern Virginia; and Raven Rock Mountain Complex near Camp David in Maryland. The public can now tour one such facility, intended to house the entire United States Congress, on the grounds of the Greenbrier Resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Other provisions of the plans included executive orders designating certain government officials to assume Cabinet and other executive-branch positions and carry out the position's responsibilities if the primary officeholders are killed.<ref name=graff/>
Continuity of government plans are not limited to the federal government. The majority of states have constitutional provisions that provide for the succession of government in the event of an "enemy attack".<ref>Eric R. Daleo, State Constitutions and Legislative Continuity in a 9/11 World: Surviving an Enemy Attack, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 919 (2009). Accessed May 23, 2011.</ref>
The George W. Bush administration put the Continuity of Operations plan into effect for the first time directly following the September 11 attacks. Their implementation involved a rotating staff of 75 to 150 senior officials and other government workers from every federal executive department and other parts of the executive branch in two secure bunkers on the East Coast. Friends, family, and co-workers could reach them only through a toll-free number and personal extensions. The Bush administration did not acknowledge the implementation of the COG plan until March 1, 2002.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In 2007, Larry Sabato, a professor at the University of Virginia, criticized the incomplete nature of the plan in his book A More Perfect Constitution. In particular, he objected to the fact that there is no constitutional procedure for replacing U.S. House members in the case of a large-scale disaster that could potentially kill many representatives. Regarding the Continuity of Operations Plan, Sabato said it "failed outright" during the September 11 attacks.
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On July 18, 2007, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR), a member of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security at that time, requested the classified and more detailed version of the government's continuity-of-operations plan in a letter signed by him and the chairperson of the House Homeland Security Committee, which is supposed to have access to confidential government information.
To the surprise of the congressional committee, the president refused to provide the information.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>AMERICA NEEDS A PLAN TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT, Congressional Record: August 2, 2007, Page H9548.</ref> Template:As of, efforts by the committee to secure a copy of the plan continued.<ref>"[1]", Curry County Reporter. Accessed September 7, 2007.</ref><ref>The Oregonian, 2007 July 27, "DeFazio Demands Access to Classified Information," http://blog.oregonlive.com/politics/2007/07/defazio_demands_access_to_clas.html</ref>
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A document named in italics supersedes a previously published document.
Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1) is a 2017 directive released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that provides doctrine and guidance to all federal organizations regarding the development of continuity program plans and capabilities. FCD 1 also serves as guidance to state, local, and tribal governments.
The Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2) of June 2017 is a directive to assist federal Executive Branch organizations in identifying their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and candidate Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs).<ref>Federal Continuity Directives and Continuity of Operations documents collection https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/86284.</ref>
In July 2013, the DHS, together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and in coordination with other non-federal partners, developed the Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (CGC 1) and CGC 2.
The preamble of the CGC 1 states that its function is to provide "direction to the non-Federal Governments (NFGs) for developing continuity plans and programs. Continuity planning facilitates the performance of essential functions during all-hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. By continuing the performance of essential functions through a catastrophic emergency, the State, territorial, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector support the ability of the Federal Government to perform National Essential Functions (NEFs)."
CGC 1 closely parallels the information in FCD 1 but is geared toward states, territories, tribal and local governments, and private-sector organizations.
Template:ExecutiveOrder, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities", November 18, 1988
Section 202
The head of each Federal department and agency shall ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities.
Template:ExecutiveOrder, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions", April 3, 1984
NSD 69 NSDD 55, "Enduring National Leadership" September 14, 1982
PDD 67 National Security Directive 69, "Enduring Constitutional Government", June 2, 1992
FPC 65 Federal Preparedness Circular 61, "Emergency Succession to Key Positions of the Federal Departments and Agencies", August 2, 1991
FPC 65 Federal Preparedness Circular 62, "Delegation of Authorities for Emergency Situations", August 1, 1991
Federal Preparedness Circular 60, "Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government at the Headquarters Level During National Security Emergencies", November 20, 1990
NSD 69 National Security Directive 37, "Enduring Constitutional Government", April 18, 1990
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The Continuity of Operations Plan involves numerous bunkers, special airplanes, and communication systems. Much of the information about them is classified; however, the government has released information on various systems or described them to the public by reporters and writers. Since many of the details are classified, the public information may be incorrect. Also, they are subject to change without public notice, so this list may not reflect current plans.
During the Cold War, the United States constructed bunkers to help military command and government officials survive. Some have been decommissioned since then, but the ones that are still considered to be in operation are listed here.
The United States Congress was formerly housed in the Greenbrier Bunker, but since it was discovered in the early 1990s, the new location of the Congressional bunker is unknown.
Cheyenne Mountain Complex - This underground facility is the former home of NORAD. Becoming fully operational on April 20, 1966, it is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Currently, the military has the goal of placing the operations center on "warm stand-by", meaning that the facility will be maintained and ready for use on short notice as necessary, but not used on a daily basis.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In the event of an emergency deemed serious enough, NORAD and USNORTHCOM would use the bunker for C4ISTAR (command and control) of the United States military.
Air Force One is the radio call sign of any Air Force plane the President of the United States travels on. However, the term typically refers to a Boeing VC-25A, which the president typically uses. While the VC-25A is equipped with numerous systems to ensure its survival, in an emergency, it is recommended that the president use the National Airborne Operations Center.
Looking Glass is United States Strategic Command's Airborne Command Post, designed to take over in case U.S. Strategic Command is destroyed or incapable of communicating with strategic forces. Beginning February 3, 1961, an Air Force Looking Glass aircraft was in the air at all times, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. On July 24, 1990, Looking Glass ceased continuous airborne alert but remained on ground or airborne alert 24 hours a day. On October 1, 1998, the U.S. Navy replaced the U.S. Air Force in this duty.Template:Clarify In addition, a battle staff now flies with the TACAMO crew.<ref>TACAMO - Take Charge And Move Out</ref>
The Defense Communication Agency was tasked in 1963 with maintaining an active backup of all communications for any event that could disrupt communications and the management of command and control communications systems, as the National Communications System. This mission was partially transferred to Defense Information Systems Agency, in charge of supporting command, control, communications, and information systems for the military in the 1990s. It would support the National Command Authority. These functions were later transferred to Joint Forces Command and STRATCOM, but the backup contingency systems continue to operate. It is assumed that the various bunkers and airplanes have been equipped with special communication equipment to survive a catastrophe.
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Internet - The Internet began as the ARPANET, a program funded by the U.S. military. The Internet is designed with the capability to withstand losses of large portions of the underlying networks, but was never designed to withstand a nuclear attack. Due to the huge number of people using it would likely be jammed and unable to handle communication if it suffered a large amount of damage.Template:Citation needed During a localized emergency, it is beneficial. However, losing electrical power to an area can make accessing the Internet difficult or impossible.
Communications satellites—Basically immune to any ground catastrophe, military communication satellites are expected to provide the government with the ability to communicate in any situation other than one that includes a direct attack upon the satellites.
National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive Subject: National Continuity Policy May 9, 2007 - Revocation. Presidential Decision Directive 67 of October 21, 1998 ("Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations"), including all Annexes thereto, is hereby revoked.
"AFI 10-208" USAF Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program
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