Begging the question

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: Template:Lang) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. Historically, begging the question refers to a fault in a dialectical argument in which the speaker assumes some premise that has not been demonstrated to be true. In modern usage, it has come to refer to an argument in which the premises assume the conclusion without supporting it. This makes it an example of circular reasoning.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Herrick248">Herrick (2000) 248.</ref>

Some examples are:

• "People have known for thousands of years that the earth is round. Therefore, the earth is round."
• "Drugs are illegal so they must be bad for you. Therefore, we ought not legalize drugs because drugs are bad for you."<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The phrase beg the question can also mean "strongly prompt the question", a usage that is distinct from the sense in logic but is widespread,<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref><ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref><ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref><ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> though incorrect.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

History

File:Aristotle Altemps Inv8575.jpg

Bust of Aristotle, whose Prior Analytics contained an early discussion of this fallacy

The original phrase used by Aristotle from which begging the question descends is Template:Lang, or sometimes Template:Lang, Template:Gloss. Aristotle's intended meaning is closely tied to the type of dialectical argument he discusses in his Topics, book VIII: a formalized debate in which the defending party asserts a thesis that the attacking party must attempt to refute by asking yes-or-no questions and deducing some inconsistency between the responses and the original thesis.

In this stylized form of debate, the proposition that the answerer undertakes to defend is called Template:Gloss (Template:Langx) and one of the rules of the debate is that the questioner cannot simply ask (beg) for it Template:Clarify (that would be trivial and uninteresting). Aristotle discusses this in Sophistical Refutations and in Prior Analytics book II, (64b, 34–65a 9, for circular reasoning see 57b, 18–59b, 1).

The stylized dialectical exchanges Aristotle discusses in the Topics included rules for scoring the debate, and one important issue was precisely the matter of asking for the initial thing—which included not just making the actual thesis adopted by the answerer into a question, but also making a question out of a sentence that was too close to that thesis (for example, PA II 16).

The term was translated into English from Latin in the 16th century. The Latin version, Template:Lang Template:Gloss, can be interpreted in different ways. Template:Lang (from Template:Lang), in the post-classical context in which the phrase arose, means Template:Gloss or Template:Gloss, but in the older classical sense means Template:Gloss, Template:Gloss or Template:Gloss.<ref name="Liberman">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Kretzmann1988">Template:Cite book</ref> Template:Lang, genitive of Template:Lang, means Template:Gloss, Template:Gloss or Template:Gloss (of an argument). Literally Template:Lang means Template:Gloss or Template:Gloss.

The Latin phrase comes from the Greek Template:Lang (Template:Lang Template:Gloss)<ref name="Schreiber2003">Template:Cite book</ref> in Aristotle's Prior Analytics II xvi 64b28–65a26:

Aristotle's distinction between apodictic science and other forms of nondemonstrative knowledge rests on an epistemology and metaphysics wherein appropriate first principles become apparent to the trained dialectician: Template:Blockquote

Thomas Fowler believed that Template:Lang would be more properly called Template:Lang, which is literally Template:Gloss.<ref name="Fowler145">Fowler, Thomas (1887). The Elements of Deductive Logic, Ninth Edition (p. 145). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.</ref>

Definition

To Template:Gloss (also called Template:Lang) is to attempt to support a claim with a premise that itself restates or presupposes the claim.<ref name="Welton279">Welton (1905), 279., "Template:Lang is, therefore, committed when a proposition which requires proof is assumed without proof."</ref> It is an attempt to prove a proposition while simultaneously taking the proposition for granted.

When the fallacy involves only a single variable, it is sometimes called a hysteron proteron<ref name="Davies572">Davies (1915), 572.</ref><ref name="Welton280">Welton (1905), 280–282.</ref><ref>In Molière's Le Malade imaginaire, a quack "answers" the question of "Why does opium cause sleep?" with "Because of its soporific power." In the original: Template:Lang Le Malade imaginaire in French Wikisource</ref> (Greek for Template:Gloss), a rhetorical device, as in the statement: Template:Blockquote

Reading this sentence, the only thing one can learn is a new word (soporific) that refers to a more common action (inducing sleep); it does not explain why opium causes that effect. A sentence that explains why opium induces sleep (or the same, why opium has soporific quality) could be the following one:

A less obvious example from Fallacies and Pitfalls of Language: The Language Trap by S. Morris Engel:

This form of the fallacy may not be immediately obvious. Linguistic variations in syntax, sentence structure, and the literary device may conceal it, as may other factors involved in an argument's delivery. It may take the form of an unstated premise which is essential but not identical to the conclusion, or is "controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion":<ref>Kahane and Cavender (2005), 60.</ref>

For example, one can obscure the fallacy by first making a statement in concrete terms, then attempting to pass off an identical statement, delivered in abstract terms, as evidence for the original.<ref name="Welton281" /> One could also "bring forth a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin",<ref>Gibson (1908), 291.</ref> as here:

When the fallacy of begging the question is committed in more than one step, some authors dub it Template:Lang Template:Gloss,<ref name="Davies572" /><ref name="Dowden">Bradley Dowden, "Fallacies" in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</ref> or more commonly, circular reasoning.

Begging the question is not considered a formal fallacy (an argument that is defective because it uses an incorrect deductive step). Rather, it is a type of informal fallacy that is logically valid but unpersuasive, in that it fails to prove anything other than what is already assumed.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref><ref name="Walton">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Petitio Principii">The reason Template:Lang is considered a fallacy is not that the inference is invalid (because any statement is indeed equivalent to itself), but that the argument can be deceptive. A statement cannot prove itself. A premissTemplate:Sic must have a different source of reason, ground or evidence for its truth from that of the conclusion: Lander University, "Petitio Principii".</ref>

Related fallacies

Template:Main Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning (Template:Lang), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance. However, circular reasoning is not persuasive because a listener who doubts the conclusion also doubts the premise that leads to it.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Begging the question is similar to the complex question (also known as trick question or fallacy of many questions): a question that, to be valid, requires the truth of another question that has not been established. For example, "Which color dress is Mary wearing?" may be fallacious because it presupposes that Mary is wearing a dress. Unless it has previously been established that her outfit is a dress, the question is fallacious because she could be wearing pants instead.<ref name="Meyer1988">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Walton1989">Template:Cite book</ref>

Another related fallacy is ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant conclusion: an argument that fails to address the issue in question, but appears to do so. An example might be a situation where A and B are debating whether the law permits A to do something. If A attempts to support his position with an argument that the law Template:Em to allow him to do the thing in question, then he is guilty of Template:Lang.<ref>H.W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. Entry for Template:Lang.</ref>

Vernacular

In vernacular English,<ref name="Garner1995">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="HoughtonMifflin2005">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Brians, Common Errors in English Usage: Online Edition (full text of book: 2nd Edition, November 2008, William, James & Company) [1] (accessed 1 July 2011)</ref><ref>Follett (1966), 228; Kilpatrick (1997); Martin (2002), 71; Safire (1998).</ref> begging the question (or equivalent rephrasing thereof) is sometimes used in place of "raises the question", "invites the question", "suggests the question", "leaves unanswered the question" etc. Such preface is then followed with the question, as in:<ref name="Corbett">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=m-w>Template:Cite news</ref>

• "[...]Template:Nbsppersonal letter delivery is at an all-time lowTemplate:Nbsp... Which begs the question: are open letters the only kind the future will know?"<ref name=m-w/>
• "Hopewell's success begs the question: why aren't more companies doing the same?"<ref name=collins>"beg the question". Collins Cobuild Advanced English Dictionary online, accessed on 2019-05-13</ref>
• "Spending the summer traveling around India is a great idea, but it does beg the question of how we can afford it."<ref name=camb>"beg the question" Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus online, accessed on 2019-05-13</ref>

Sometimes it is further confused with "dodging the question", an attempt to avoid it, or perhaps more often begging the question is simply used to mean leaving the question unanswered.<ref name="Liberman"/>

See also

• Ambiguity
• Catch-22 (logic)
• Circular definition
• Template:Lang
• Euphemism treadmill
• Template:Slink
• Fallacies of definition
• Loaded question
• Open-question argument
• Polysyllogism
• Presuppositional apologetics
• Regress argument (Template:Lang)
• Spin (propaganda)

References

• Cohen, Morris Raphael, Ernest Nagel, and John Corcoran. An Introduction to Logic. Hackett Publishing, 1993. Template:ISBN.
• Davies, Arthur Ernest. A Text-book of Logic. R.G. Adams and Company, 1915.
• Follett, Wilson. Modern American Usage: A Guide. Macmillan, 1966. Template:ISBN.
• Gibson, William Ralph Boyce, and Augusta Klein. The Problem of Logic. A. and C. Black, 1908.
• Herrick, Paul. The Many Worlds of Logic. Oxford University Press, 2000. Template:ISBN
• Kahane, Howard, and Nancy Cavender. Logic and contemporary rhetoric: the use of reason in everyday life. Cengage Learning, 2005. Template:ISBN.
• Kilpatrick, James. "Begging Question Assumes Proof of an Unproved Proposition". Rocky Mountain News (CO) 6 April 1997. Accessed through Access World News on 3 June 2009.
• Martin, Robert M. There Are Two Errors in the Template:Sic Title of This Book: A sourcebook of philosophical puzzles, paradoxes, and problems. Broadview Press, 2002. Template:ISBN.
• Mercier, Charles Arthur. A New Logic. Open Court Publishing Company, 1912.
• Mill, John Stuart. A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation. J.W. Parker, 1851.
• Safire, William. "On Language: Take my question please!". The New York Times 26 July 1998. Accessed 3 June 2009.
• Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott. Formal logic, a scientific and social problem. London: Macmillan, 1912.
• Welton, James. "Fallacies incident to the method". A Manual of Logic, Vol. 2. London: W.B. Clive University Tutorial Press, 1905.