Taliban

The Taliban,Template:Efn which also refers to itself by its state name, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Efn is an Afghan political and militant movement with an ideology comprising elements of the Deobandi movement of Islamic fundamentalism.<ref name="Whine 54–72">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name="Maley 1998 14"/><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="dni.gov">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Bokhari-Senzai 2013">Template:Cite book</ref> It ruled approximately 75% of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, before it was overthrown by an American invasion after the September 11 attacks carried out by the Taliban's ally al-Qaeda. The Taliban recaptured Kabul in August 2021 following the departure of coalition forces, after 20 years of Taliban insurgency, and now controls the entire country. The Taliban government is not recognized by any country and has been condemned for restricting human rights, including women's rights to work and have an education.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

The Taliban emerged in 1994 as a prominent faction in the Afghan Civil War and largely consisted of students from the Pashtun areas of east and south Afghanistan, who had been educated in traditional Islamic schools (Template:Transliteration). Under the leadership of Mullah Omar (Template:Reign), the movement spread through most of Afghanistan, shifting power away from the Mujahideen warlords. In 1996, the group established the First Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban's government was opposed by the Northern Alliance militia, which seized parts of northeast Afghanistan and maintained international recognition as a continuation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law,Template:Sfn and were widely condemned for massacres against Afghan civilians, harsh discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, denial of UN food supplies to starving civilians, destruction of cultural monuments, banning women from school and most employment, and prohibition of most music.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022"/> The Taliban committed a cultural genocide against Afghans by destroying their historical and cultural texts, artifacts and sculptures.<ref name="RAWA2022"/> The Taliban held control of most of the country until the United States invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001. Many members of the Taliban fled to neighboring Pakistan.

After being overthrown, the Taliban launched an insurgency to fight the US-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the War in Afghanistan. In May 2002, exiled members formed the Council of Leaders based in Quetta, Pakistan. Under Hibatullah Akhundzada's leadership, in May 2021, the Taliban launched a military offensive, that culminated in the fall of Kabul in August 2021 and the Taliban regaining control. The Islamic Republic was dissolved and the Islamic Emirate reestablished. Following their return to power, the Afghanistan government budget lost 80% of its funding and food insecurity became widespread.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022">Template:Cite magazine</ref> The Taliban returned Afghanistan to many policies implemented under its previous rule, including banning women from holding almost any jobs, requiring women to wear head-to-toe coverings such as the burqa, blocking women from travelling without male guardians, banning female speech and banning all education for girls.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news </ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Etymology

The word Taliban is Pashto, Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration), meaning "students", the plural of Template:Transliteration. This is a loanword from Arabic Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration), using the Pashto plural ending -ān Template:Lang.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> (In Arabic Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration) means not "students" but rather "two students", as it is a dual form, the Arabic plural being Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration)—occasionally causing some confusion to Arabic speakers.) Since becoming a loanword in English, Taliban, besides a plural noun referring to the group, has also been used as a singular noun referring to an individual. For example, John Walker Lindh has been referred to as "an American Taliban" rather than "an American Talib" in domestic media. This is different in Afghanistan, where a member or a supporter of the group is referred to as a Talib (طَالِبْ) or its plural Talib-ha (طَالِبْهَا). In other definitions, Taliban means 'seekers'.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref>

In English, the spelling Taliban has gained predominance over the spelling Taleban.<ref name="Arabic Dictionary">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In American English, the definite article is used, the group is referred to as "the Taliban", rather than "Taliban". In English-language media in Pakistan, the definite article is always omitted.<ref>Template:Citation</ref> Both Pakistani and Indian English-language media tend to name the group "Afghan Taliban",<ref>Template:Citation</ref><ref>Template:Citation</ref> thus distinguishing it from the Pakistani Taliban. Additionally, in Pakistan, the word Talibans is often used when referring to more than one Taliban member.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban is frequently called the Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration), Dari term which means 'Taliban group'.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> As per Dari/Persian grammar, there is no "the" prefix. Meanwhile, in Pashto, a determiner is normally used and as a result, the group is normally referred to as per Pashto grammar: Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration) or Template:Lang (Template:Transliteration).

Background

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1978–1992)

File:Reagan sitting with people from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in February 1983.jpg

President Ronald Reagan meeting with Afghan Mujahideen leaders in the Oval Office in 1983

After the Soviet Union intervened and occupied Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic mujahideen fighters waged a war against Soviet forces. During the Soviet–Afghan War, nearly all of the Taliban's original leaders had fought for either the Hezb-i Islami Khalis or the Harakat-i Inqilab-e Islami factions of the Mujahideen.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Pakistan's President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq feared that the Soviets were also planning to invade Balochistan, Pakistan, so he sent Akhtar Abdur Rahman to Saudi Arabia to garner support for the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation forces. A while later, the US CIA and the Saudi Arabian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) funnelled funding and equipment through the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) to the Afghan mujahideen.<ref name="Price">Template:Cite web</ref> About 90,000 Afghans, including Mullah Omar, were trained by Pakistan's ISI during the 1980s.<ref name="Price" />

Afghan Civil War (1992–1996)

Template:See also In April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed régime of Mohammad Najibullah, many Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accord, which created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Hezbe Wahdat, and Ittihad-i Islami did not participate. The state was paralysed from the start, due to rival groups contending for total power over Kabul and Afghanistan.<ref name="photius, peshawar">'The Peshawar Accord, 25 April 1992'. Website photius.com. Text from 1997, purportedly sourced on The Library of Congress Country Studies (US) and CIA World Factbook. Retrieved 22 December 2017.</ref>Template:Better source needed

Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin party refused to recognise the interim government, and in April infiltrated Kabul to take power for itself, thus starting this civil war. In May, Hekmatyar started attacks against government forces and Kabul.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)" /> Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan's ISI.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi">Template:Cite bookTemplate:ISBN?</ref> With that help, Hekmatyar's forces were able to destroy half of Kabul.<ref name="Amin Saikal" /> Iran assisted the Hezbe Wahdat forces of Abdul-Ali Mazari. Saudi Arabia supported the Ittihad-i Islami faction.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Amin Saikal">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Roy Gutman">Gutman, Roy (2008): How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan, Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.Template:ISBN?Template:Page needed</ref> The conflict between these militias also escalated into war.

Due to this sudden initiation of civil war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals inside different factions.<ref>"Blood-Stained Hands, Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity". Human Rights Watch. 6 July 2005.</ref> Ceasefires, negotiated by representatives of the Islamic State's newly appointed Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and later President Burhanuddin Rabbani (the interim government), or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)" /> The countryside in northern Afghanistan, parts of which were under the control of Defense Minister Massoud, remained calm and some reconstruction took place. The city of Herat under the rule of Islamic State ally Ismail Khan also witnessed relative calm.Template:Citation needed Meanwhile, southern Afghanistan was neither under the control of foreign-backed militias nor the government in Kabul, but was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias.

History

The Taliban movement originated in Pashtun nationalism, and its ideological underpinnings are with that of broader Afghan society. The Taliban's roots lie in the religious schools of Kandahar and were influenced significantly by foreign support, particularly from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, during the Soviet–Afghan War. They emerged in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, capturing Kandahar and expanding their control across the country; they became involved in a war with the Northern Alliance. The international response to the Taliban varied, with some countries providing support while others opposed and did not recognize their regime.

During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban implemented strict religious regulations, notably affecting women's rights and cultural heritage. This period included significant ethnic persecution and the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. After the US-led invasion in 2001, the Taliban were ousted from power but regrouped and launched an insurgency that lasted two decades.

The Taliban returned to power in 2021 following the US withdrawal. Their efforts to establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan continue, with education policies and international relations, including internal and external challenges faced by the Taliban regime.

2021 offensive and return to power

File:2021 Taliban Offensive.png

A map of Afghanistan showing the 2021 Taliban offensive

In mid 2021, the Taliban led a major offensive in Afghanistan during the withdrawal of US troops from the country, which gave them control of over half of Afghanistan's 421 districts as of 23 July 2021.<ref name="Taliban Consolidation and Foothold">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> By mid-August 2021, the Taliban controlled every major city in Afghanistan; following the near seizure of the capital Kabul, the Taliban occupied the Presidential Palace after the incumbent President Ashraf Ghani fled Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Ghani's Asylum was confirmed by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on 18 August 2021.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Remaining Afghan forces under the leadership of Amrullah Saleh, Ahmad Massoud, and Bismillah Khan Mohammadi retreated to Panjshir to continue resistance.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2021–present)

File:Taliban Humvee in Kabul, August 2021 (cropped).png

Taliban Humvee in Kabul, August 2021

File:Taliban member with chest flags.png

A Taliban member with chest flags in Kabul, September 2022

The Taliban had "seized power from an established government backed by some of the world's best-equipped militaries"; and as an ideological insurgent movement dedicated to "bringing about a truly Islamic state" its victory has been compared to that of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 or Iranian Revolution of 1979, with their "sweeping" remake of society. However, as of 2021–2022, senior Taliban leaders have emphasized the "softness" of their revolution and how they desired "good relations" with the United States, in discussions with American journalist Jon Lee Anderson.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Anderson notes that the Taliban's war against any "graven images", so vigorous in their early rule, has been abandoned, perhaps made impossible by smartphones and Instagram. One local observer (Sayed Hamid Gailani) has argued the Taliban have not killed "a lot" of people after returning to power. Women are seen out on the street, Zabihullah Mujahid (acting Deputy Minister of Information and Culture) noted there are still women working in a number of government ministries, and claimed that girls will be allowed to attend secondary education when bank funds are unfrozen and the government can fund "separate" spaces and transportation for them.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

When asked about the slaughter of Hazara Shia by the first Taliban régime, Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban nominee for Ambassador to the U.N. told Anderson "The Hazara Shia for us are also Muslim. We believe we are one, like flowers in a garden."<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> In late 2021, journalists from The New York Times embedded with a six-man Taliban unit tasked with protecting the Shi'ite Sakhi Shrine in Kabul from the Islamic State, noting "how seriously the men appeared to take their assignment." The unit's commander said that "We do not care which ethnic group we serve, our goal is to serve and provide security for Afghans."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In response to "international criticism" over lack of diversity, an ethnic Hazara was appointed deputy health minister, and an ethnic Tajik appointed deputy trade minister.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

On the other hand, the Ministry of Women's Affairs has been closed and its building is the new home of Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. According to Anderson, some women still employed by the government are "being forced to sign in at their jobs and then go home, to create the illusion of equity"; and the appointment of ethnic minorities has been dismissed by an "adviser to the Taliban" as tokenism.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Reports have "circulated" of

"Hazara farmers being forced from their land by ethnic Pashtuns, of raids of activists' homes, and of extrajudicial executions of former government soldiers and intelligence agents".<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

According to a Human Rights Watch's report released in November 2021, the Taliban killed or forcibly disappeared more than 100 former members of the Afghan security forces in the three months since the takeover in just the four provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz. According to the report, the Taliban identified targets for arrest and execution through intelligence operations and access to employment records that were left behind. Former members of the security forces were also killed by the Taliban within days of registering with them to receive a letter guaranteeing their safety.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Despite Taliban claims that the ISIS has been defeated, IS carried out suicide bombings in October 2021 at Shia mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar, killing over 115 people. As of late 2021, there were still "sticky bomb" explosions "every few days" in the capital Kabul.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Explanations for the relative moderation of the new Taliban government and statements from its officials such as – "We have started a new page. We do not want to be entangled with the past,"<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> –?include that it did not expect to take over the country so quickly and still had "problems to work out among" their factions";<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> that $7 billion in Afghan government funds in US banks has been frozen, and that the 80% of the previous government's budget that came from "the United States, its partners, or international lenders", has been shut off, creating serious economic crisis; according to the U.N. World Food Program country director, Mary Ellen McGroarty, as of late 2021, early 2022 "22.8 million Afghans are already severely food insecure, and seven million of them are one step away from famine"; and that the world community has "unanimously" asked the Taliban "to form an inclusive government, ensure the rights of women and minorities and guarantee that Afghanistan will no more serve as the launching pad for global terrorist operations", before it recognizes the Taliban government.<ref name="Geo News-2021">Template:Cite news</ref> In conversation with journalist Anderson, senior Taliban leaders implied that the harsh application of sharia during their first era of rule in the 1990s was necessary because of the "depravity" and "chaos" that remained from the Soviet occupation, but that now "mercy and compassion" were the order of the day.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> This was contradicted by former senior members of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, one of which who told Anderson, "they will do anything to convince the international community to give them financing, but eventually I'll be forced to wear the burqa again. They are just waiting."<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

After Taliban retook power in 2021, border clashes erupted between the Taliban with its neighbors includes Iran and Pakistan, leading to casualties on both sides.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In the early months of Taliban rule, international journalists have had some access to Afghanistan. In February 2022, several international journalists, including Andrew North were detained. The Committee to Protect Journalists described their detention as "a sad reflection of the overall decline of press freedom and increasing attacks on journalists under Taliban rule."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The journalists were released after several days.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Subsequently, watchdog organizations have continued to document a number of arrests of local journalists, as well as barring access to international journalists.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The country's small community of Sikhs - who form Afghanistan's second largest religion<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> - as well as Hindus, have reportedly been prevented from celebrating their holidays as of 2023 by the Taliban government.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Despite this, the Taliban in a later statement praised the communities and assured that their private land and property will be secured.<ref name="Bhattacherjee">Template:Cite news</ref> In April 2024, the former sole Sikh member of parliament, Narendra Singh Khalsa, returned to Afghanistan for the first time since the collapse of the Republic.<ref name="Bhattacherjee" />

Current education policy

In September 2021, the government ordered primary schools to reopen for both sexes and announced plans to reopen secondary schools for male students, without committing to do the same for female students.<ref name="Graham-Harrison 09/17/21">Template:Cite news</ref> While the Taliban stated that female college students will be able to resume higher education provided that they are segregated from male students (and professors, when possible),<ref name="Reuters 09/12/21">Template:Cite web</ref> The Guardian noted that "if the high schools do not reopen for girls, the commitments to allow university education would become meaningless once the current cohort of students graduated."<ref name="Graham-Harrison 09/17/21"/> Higher Education Minister Abdul Baqi Haqqani said that female university students will be required to observe proper hijab, but did not specify if this required covering the face.<ref name="Reuters 09/12/21"/>

Kabul University reopened in February 2022, with female students attending in the morning and males in the afternoon. Other than the closure of the music department, few changes to the curriculum were reported.<ref name="AP Reopening">Template:Cite web</ref> Female students were officially required to wear an abaya and a hijab to attend, although some wore a shawl instead. Attendance was reportedly low on the first day.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In March 2022, the Taliban abruptly halted plans to allow girls to resume secondary school education even when separated from males.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> At the time, The Washington Post reported that apart from university students, "sixth is now the highest grade girls may attend". The Afghan Ministry of Education cited the lack of an acceptable design for female student uniforms.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

On December 20, 2022, in violation of their prior promises, the Taliban banned female students from attending higher education institutions with immediate effect.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The following day, December 21, 2022, the Taliban instituted a ban on all education for all girls and women around the country alongside a ban on female staff in schools, including teaching professions. Teaching was one of the last few remaining professions open to women.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Ideology and aims

Template:Deobandi The Taliban's ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia combining Pashtun tribal codes",<ref name="Muslim World 2004">Template:Cite book</ref> or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favoured by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and its splinter groups.<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref> Their ideology was a departure from the Islamism of the anti-Soviet mujahideen rulersTemplate:Clarify and the radical IslamistsTemplate:Clarify inspired by the Sayyid Qutb (Ikhwan).<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref> The Taliban have said they aim to restore peace and security to Afghanistan, including Western troops leaving, and to enforce Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

According to journalist Ahmed Rashid, at least in the first years of their rule, the Taliban adopted Deobandi and Islamist anti-nationalist beliefs, and they opposed "tribal and feudal structures", removing traditional tribal or feudal leaders from leadership roles.<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref>

The Taliban strictly enforced their ideology in major cities like Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar. But in rural areas, the Taliban had little direct control, and as a result, they promoted village jirgas, so in rural areas, they did not enforce their ideology as stringently as they enforced it in cities.<ref>Griffiths 227.</ref>

Ideological influences

The Taliban's religious/political philosophy, especially during its first régime from 1996 to 2001, was heavily advised and influenced by Grand Mufti Rashid Ahmed Ludhianvi and his works. Its operating political and religious principles since its founding, however, were modeled on those of Abul A'la Maududi and the Jamaat-e-Islami movement.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Pashtun cultural influences

The Taliban, being largely Pashtun tribespeople, frequently follow a pre-Islamic cultural tribal code that is focused on preserving honor. Pashtunwali strongly influences decisions regarding other social matters. It is best described as subconscious social values and attitudes promoting various qualities such as bravery, preserving honor, being hospitable to all guests, seeking revenge and justice if one has been wronged, and providing sanctuary to anyone who seeks refuge, even an enemy. However, non-Pashtuns and others usually criticize some of the values, such as the Pashtun practice of equally dividing inheritances among sons, even though the Qur'an clearly states that women are supposed to receive one-half of a man's share.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

According to Ali A. Jalali and Lester Grau, the Taliban "received extensive support from Pashtuns across the country who thought that the movement might restore their national dominance. Even Pashtun intellectuals in the West, who differed with the Taliban on many issues, expressed support for the movement on purely ethnic grounds."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Islamic rules under Deobandi philosophy

File:Darul Uloom Deoband.jpg

The Darul Uloom Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, India, where the Deobandi movement began

Written works published by the group's Commission of Cultural Affairs, including Islami Adalat, De Mujahid ToorahTemplate:Snd De Jihad Shari Misalay, and Guidance to the Mujahideen outlined the core of the Taliban Islamic Movement's philosophy regarding jihad, sharia, organization, and conduct.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Taliban régime interpreted the Sharia law in accordance with the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence and the religious edicts of Mullah Omar.Template:Sfn The Taliban, Mullah Omar in particular, emphasised dreams as a means of revelation.<ref>Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 239.</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Prohibitions

The Taliban forbade the consumption of pork and alcohol, the use of many types of consumer technology such as music with instrumental accompaniments,Template:Sfn television,Template:Sfn filming,Template:Sfn and the Internet, as well as most forms of art such as paintings or photography,Template:Sfn participation in sports,Template:Sfn including football and chess;Template:Sfn recreational activities such as kite-flying and the keeping of pigeons and other pets were also forbidden, and the birds were killed according to the Taliban's rules.Template:Sfn Movie theatres were closed and repurposed as mosques.Template:Sfn The celebration of the Western and Iranian New Years was also forbidden.Template:Sfn Taking photographs and displaying pictures and portraits were also banned because the Taliban considered them forms of idolatry.Template:Sfn This extended even to "blacking out illustrations on packages of baby soap in shops and painting over road-crossing signs for livestock.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Women were banned from working,Template:Sfn girls were forbidden to attend schools or universities,Template:Sfn were required to observe purdah (physical separation of the sexes) and awrah (concealing the body with clothing), and to be accompanied by male relatives outside their households; those who violated these restrictions were punished.Template:Sfn Men were forbidden to shave their beards, and they were also required to let them grow and keep them long according to the Taliban's rules, and they were also required to wear turbans outside their households.Template:Sfn<ref name="cr">Template:Cite web</ref> Prayer was made compulsory. Those men who did not respect the religious obligation after the azaan were arrested.Template:Sfn Gambling was banned,Template:Sfn and the Taliban punished thieves by amputating their hands or feet.Template:Sfn In 2000, the Taliban's leader Mullah Omar officially banned opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan;Template:Sfn<ref name="drugpolicy2005">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name="Maziyar2019">Template:Cite book</ref> the Taliban succeeded in nearly eradicating the majority of the opium production (99%) by 2001.<ref name="drugpolicy2005" /><ref name="Maziyar2019" /><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> During the Taliban's governance of Afghanistan, drug users and dealers were both severely persecuted.Template:Sfn

Views on the Bamyan Buddhas

File:Taller Buddha of Bamiyan before and after destruction.jpg

Taller Buddha in 1963 and in 2008 after destruction

In 1999, Mullah Omar issued a decree in which he called for the protection of the Buddha statues at Bamyan, two 6th-century monumental statues of standing buddhas which were carved into the side of a cliff in the Bamyan valley in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan. But in March 2001, the Taliban destroyed the statues, following a decree by Mullah Omar, which stated: "All the statues around Afghanistan must be destroyed."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Yahya Massoud, brother of the anti-Taliban and resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, recalls the following incident after the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamyan:

Views on bacha bazi

The Afghan custom of bacha bazi, a form of pederastic sexual slavery, child sexual abuse and pedophilia which is traditionally practiced in various provinces of Afghanistan between older men and young adolescent "dancing boys", was also forbidden under the six-year rule of the Taliban régime.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Under the rule of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it carried the death penalty.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The practice remained illegal during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's rule, but the laws were seldom enforced against powerful offenders, and police had reportedly been complicit in related crimes.<ref>Quraishi, Najibullah Uncovering the world of "bacha bazi" at The New York Times 20 April 2010</ref><ref name="ABCfeb2010">Bannerman, Mark The Warlord's Tune: Afghanistan's war on children at Australian Broadcasting Corporation 22 February 2010</ref><ref name="theweek">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A controversy arose during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's rule, after allegations surfaced that US government forces in Afghanistan after the invasion of the country deliberately ignored bacha bazi.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The US military responded by claiming the abuse was largely the responsibility of the "local Afghan government".<ref name="Washington Post 09/15">Template:Cite news</ref> The Taliban has criticized the US role in the abuse of Afghan children.

Attitudes towards other Muslim communities

Unlike other Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the Taliban are not Salafists. Although wealthy Arab nations had brought Salafist Madrasas to Afghanistan during the Soviet war in the 1980s, the Taliban's strict Deobandi leadership suppressed the Salafi movement in Afghanistan after it first came to power in the 1990s. Following the 2001 US invasion, the Taliban and Salafists joined forces to wage a common war against NATO forces. Still, Salafists were relegated to small groups which were under the Taliban's command.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

The Taliban are averse to debating doctrine with other Muslims and "did not allow even Muslim reporters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the Qur'an."<ref name="rashid 107">Template:Harvnb.</ref>

Opposition to Salafism

Following the Taliban victory, a nationwide campaign was launched against influential Salafi factions suspected of past ties to the ISIS–K. The Taliban closed most Salafi mosques and seminaries in 16 provinces, including Nangarhar, and detained clerics it accused of supporting the Islamic State.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Shia Islam

During the period of the first Taliban rule (1996 to 2001), the Taliban attempted to sway Shias, particularly Hazaras, to their side, making deals with a number of Shia political figures, as well as securing the support of some Shia religious scholars.<ref name=":022">Template:Cite web</ref> One of these was Ustad Muhammad Akbari, a Shia Hazara politician who separated from Abdul-Ali Mazari's Islamic Unity Party to form the National Islamic Unity Party, thereafter politically aligning himself and his group, which gained the support of the majority of Islamic Unity Party members in the Hazara hinterland,<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> with the Taliban.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Another significant Shia political figure in the administration of the first Islamic Emirate was Sayed Gardizi, a Sayed Hazara from Gardiz, who was appointed as the wuluswal (district governor) of Yakawlang district, being the only Shia to hold the position of district governor during the period of the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

At the same time, however, certain incidents caused distrust between the Taliban and Afghan Shias. The 1998 Mazar-i-Sharif massacre was the most significant, having taken place in response to ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdur-Rashid Dustum's betrayal and subsequent massacre of Taliban fighters, as well as false rumors that Hazaras had beheaded senior Taliban leader Mawlawi Ihsanullah Ihsan at the grave of Abdul-Ali Mazari, which led to the massacre of a significant number of Hazaras.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The commander responsible for the massacre, Abdul-Manan Niazi, later became notable for his opposition to the Taliban's leadership, having formed the rebellious High Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2015, before being killed, reportedly by the Taliban themselves.<ref name=":12">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=":022" />

The desire of the Taliban leadership to expand the group's relations with Afghan Shias continued after the American invasion of Afghanistan and the group's return to insurgency. Some time following the American Invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Taliban published "A Message to the Mujahid People of Iraq and Afghanistan" by Mullah Omar, in which he condemned sectarianism whilst jointly addressing the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, saying:<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

"It's incumbent upon all Muslims to thwart all the cursed plots of the cunning enemy, and to not give him the opportunity to light the fires of disagreement amongst the Muslims. A major component of American policy is to categorize the Muslims in Iraq with the labels of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and in Afghanistan with the labels of Pashtun, Tājīk, Hazārah and Uzbek, in order to decrease the severity and strength of the popular uprisings and the accompanying armed resistance. […] As such, I request the brothers in Iraq to put behind them the differences that exist in the name of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and to fight in unity against the occupying enemy, for victory is not possible without unity."

Multiple Hazara Shia Taliban commanders took part in the Taliban insurgency, primarily from Bamyan and Daikundi provinces. Among the Qarabaghi tribe of Shia Hazaras, a number of fighters voluntarily joined the Taliban due to their close relations with the nearby Taliban-supporting Sunni Pashtun population. Additionally, a pro-government Shia Hazara militia from Gizab district of Daikundi province, called Fedayi, defected and pledged allegiance to the Taliban a few years before 2016, with a reported size of 50 fighters.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

In reaction to the 2011 Afghanistan Ashura bombings, which targeted Shia Afghans in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban published "Sectarian Killings; A Dangerous Enemy Conspiracy" by Taliban official Abdul-Qahhar Balkhi, in which he stated:<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

"In Afghanistan, Sunnis and Shias have co-existed for centuries. They live communal lives and participate in their mutual festivities. And for centuries they have fought shoulder to shoulder against foreign invaders. [...] The majority of Shia populations in Bamyan, Daikundi and Hazarajat [have] actively aided and continue to support the Mujahideen against the foreigners and their puppets. The foreign occupiers seek to ignite the flames of communal hatred and violence between Sunnis and Shias in Afghanistan. [...] The followers of Islam will only ever reclaim their rightful place in this world if they forgo their petty differences and unite as a single egalitarian body."

In recent years, the Taliban have once again attempted to court Shiites, appointing a Shia cleric as a regional governor and recruiting Hazaras to fight against ISIS–K, in order to distance themselves from their past reputation and improve their relations with the Shia-led Government of Iran.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> After the 2021 Taliban offensive, which led to the restoration of the Islamic Emirate, senior Taliban officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, have stressed the importance of unity between Shiites and Sunnis in Afghanistan and promised to protect the Shiite community.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The Ministry of Virtue and Vice have also agreed to hire Shia Ulama in order to implement the ministry's religious edicts.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In general, the Taliban has maintained peace with most Muslims in the Shiite community,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> although the 2022 Balkhab uprising resulted in the deaths of some Hazaras.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Consistency of the Taliban's ideology

The Taliban's ideology is not static. Before its capture of Kabul, members of the Taliban talked about stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power and once law and order were restored. The decision-making process of the Taliban in Kandahar was modelled on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what was believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by the building of a consensus by the believers.<ref name="Rashid 2000 95">Template:Harvnb.</ref>

As the Taliban's power grew, Mullah Omar made decisions without consulting the jirga or visiting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

Another sign that the Taliban's ideology was evolving was Mullah Omar's 1999 decree in which he called for the protection of the Buddha statues at Bamyan and the destruction of them in 2001.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Evaluations and criticisms

The author Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation and hardship which resulted from the Soviet invasion and the period which followed it influenced the Taliban's ideology.<ref name="rashid 32">Template:Harvnb.</ref> It is said that the Taliban did not include scholars who were learned in Islamic law and history. The refugee students brought up in a totally male society had no education in mathematics, science, history, or geography, no traditional skills of farming, herding, or handicraft-making, or even knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.<ref name="rashid 32" /> In such an environment, war meant employment, peace meant unemployment. Dominating women affirmed manhood. For their leadership, rigid fundamentalism was a matter of principle and political survival. Taliban leaders "repeatedly told" Rashid that "if they gave women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they would lose the support of their rank and file."<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref>

File:Taliban execute Zarmeena in Kabul in1999 RAWA.jpg

November 1999 public execution in Kabul of a mother of five who was found guilty of killing her husband with an axe while he slept.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Antonowicz, Anton. 'Zarmina's story", Daily Mirror, 20 June 2002</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The Taliban have been criticized for their strictness towards those who disobeyed their imposed rules, and Mullah Omar has been criticized for titling himself Amir al-Mu'minin.

Mullah Omar was criticized for calling himself Amir al-Mu'minin because he lacked scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the Prophet's family. The sanction for the title traditionally required the support of all of the country's ulema, whereas only some 1,200 Pashtun Taliban-supporting Mullahs had declared that Omar was the Amir. According to Ahmed Rashid, "no Afghan had adopted the title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan assumed the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh kingdom in Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners, while Omar had declared jihad against other Afghans."<ref name="rashid 41-42" />

Another criticism was that the Taliban called their 20% tax on truckloads of opium "zakat," which is traditionally limited to 2.5% of the zakat payers' disposable income (or wealth).<ref name="rashid 41-42">Template:Harvnb.</ref>

The Taliban have been compared to the 7th-century Kharijites who developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shiʿa Muslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfir, whereby they declared that other Muslims were unbelievers and deemed them worthy of death.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In particular, the Taliban have been accused of takfir towards Shia. After the August 1998 slaughter of 8,000 mostly Shia Hazara non-combatants in Mazar-i-Sharif, Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, the Taliban commander of the attack and the new governor of Mazar, who the Taliban later killed after forming the rebellious High Council of the Islamic Emirate,<ref name=":12" /> declared from Mazar's central mosque:

Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you. The Hazaras are not Muslims and now have to kill Hazaras. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. Wherever you go we will catch you. If you go up we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Carter Malkasian, in one of the first comprehensive historical works on the Afghan war, argues that the Taliban are oversimplified in most portrayals. While Malkasian thinks that "oppressive" remains the best word to describe them, he points out that the Taliban managed to do what multiple governments and political players failed to: bring order and unity to the "ungovernable land". The Taliban curbed the atrocities and excesses of the Warlord period of the civil war from 1992Template:En dash1996. Malkasian further argues that the Taliban's imposing of Islamic ideals upon the Afghan tribal system was innovative and a key reason for their success and durability. Given that traditional sources of authority had been shown to be weak during the long period of civil war, only religion had proved decisive in Afghanistan. In a period of 40 years of constant conflict, the traditionalist Islam of the Taliban proved to be far more stable, even if the order they brought was "an impoverished peace".<ref name=":5">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp

Condemned practices

Template:See alsoThe Taliban have been internationally condemned for their harsh enforcement of their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law, which has resulted in their brutal treatment of many Afghans. During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law.Template:Sfn The Taliban and their allies committed massacres against Afghan civilians, denied UN food supplies to 160,000 starving civilians, and conducted a policy of scorched earth, burning vast areas of fertile land and destroying tens of thousands of homes. While the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, they banned activities and media including paintings, photography, and movies that depicted people or other living things. They also prohibited music with instrumental accompaniments, with the exception of the daf, a type of frame drum.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite news</ref> The Taliban prevented girls and young women from attending school, banned women from working jobs outside of healthcare (male doctors were prohibited from treating women), and required that women be accompanied by a male relative and wear a burqa at all times when in public. If women broke certain rules, they were publicly whipped or executed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The Taliban harshly discriminated against religious and ethnic minorities during their rule and they have also committed a cultural genocide against the people of Afghanistan by destroying numerous monuments, including the famous 1500-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan. According to the United Nations, the Taliban and their allies were responsible for 76% of Afghan civilian casualties in 2010, and 80% in 2011 and 2012.<ref>ISAF has participating forces from 39 countries, including all 26 NATO members. See Template:Citation</ref> The group is internally funded by its involvement in the illegal drug trade which it participates in by producing and trafficking in narcotics such as heroin,<ref name="FPdrug">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Stateterrorismdrugs">Template:Cite web</ref> extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.<ref name="VOAmoney">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Sufizada" /> They also seized control of mining operations in the mid-2010s that were illegal under the previous government.<ref name="BBCmoney">Template:Cite news</ref>

Massacre campaigns

According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. They also said, that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself." "These are the same type of war crimes as were committed in Bosnia and should be prosecuted in international courts", one UN official was quoted as saying. The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians. The report by the United Nations quotes "eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people". The Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, in late 2011 stated that cruel behaviour under and by the Taliban had been "necessary".<ref name="Newsday 2001">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="papillonsartpalace.com">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Ahmed Rashid/The Telegraph">Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In 1998, the United Nations accused the Taliban of denying emergency food by the UN's World Food Programme to 160,000 hungry and starving people "for political and military reasons".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The UN said the Taliban were starving people for their military agenda and using humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war.<ref name="Skaine">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Shanty1">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="UNAMA">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Haddon">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="The Weekly Standard">Template:Cite news</ref>

On 8 August 1998, the Taliban launched an attack on Mazar-i-Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to kill people indiscriminately. At first shooting people in the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suffocate. This ethnic cleansing left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 people dead. At this time ten Iranian diplomats and a journalist were killed. Iran assumed the Taliban had murdered them, and mobilised its army, deploying men along the border with Afghanistan. By the middle of September there were 250,000 Iranian personnel stationed on the border. Pakistan mediated and the bodies were returned to Tehran towards the end of the month. The killings of the diplomats had been carried out by Sipah-e-Sahaba, a Pakistani Sunni group with close ties to the ISI. They burned orchards, crops and destroyed irrigation systems, and forced more than 100,000 people from their homes with hundreds of men, women and children still unaccounted for.<ref name="Armajani-207">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Riedel-66-7">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Clements3">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Gutman">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Tripathi">Template:Cite book</ref>

In a major effort to retake the Shomali Plains to the north of Kabul from the United Front, the Taliban indiscriminately killed civilians, while uprooting and expelling the population. Among others, Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, reported on these and other war crimes. In Istalif, a town famous for handmade potteries and which was home to more than 45,000 people, the Taliban gave 24 hours' notice to the population to leave, then completely razed the town leaving the people destitute.<ref name="NPR">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Coburn">Template:Cite book</ref>

In 1999, the town of Bamian was taken, hundreds of men, women and children were executed. Houses were razed and some were used for forced labour. There was a further massacre at the town of Yakaolang in January 2001. An estimated 300 people were murdered, along with two delegations of Hazara elders who had tried to intercede.<ref name="Maley2-240">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Clements4">Template:Cite book</ref>

By 1999, the Taliban had forced hundreds of thousands of people from the Shomali Plains and other regions conducting a policy of scorched earth burning homes, farm land and gardens.<ref name="NPR" />

Human trafficking

Several Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders ran a network of human trafficking, abducting ethnic minority women and selling them into sex slavery in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<ref name="Time Magazine">Template:Cite magazine</ref> Time magazine writes: "The Taliban often argued that the restrictions they placed on women were actually a way of revering and protecting the opposite sex. The behavior of the Taliban during the six years they expanded their rule in Afghanistan made a mockery of that claim."<ref name="Time Magazine" />

The targets for human trafficking were especially women from the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Some women preferred to commit suicide over slavery, killing themselves. During one Taliban and al-Qaeda offensive in 1999 in the Shomali Plains alone, more than 600 women were kidnapped.<ref name="Time Magazine" /> Arab and Pakistani al-Qaeda militants, with local Taliban forces, forced them into trucks and buses.<ref name="Time Magazine" /> Time magazine writes: "The trail of the missing Shomali women leads to Jalalabad, not far from the Pakistan border. There, according to eyewitnesses, the women were penned up inside Sar Shahi camp in the desert. The more desirable among them were selected and taken away. Some were trucked to Peshawar with the apparent complicity of Pakistani border guards. Others were taken to Khost, where bin Laden had several training camps." Officials from relief agencies say, the trail of many of the vanished women leads to Pakistan where they were sold to brothels or into private households to be kept as slaves.<ref name="Time Magazine" />

Oppression of women

File:Taliban beating woman in public RAWA.jpg

Taliban religious police beating a woman in Kabul on 26 August 2001<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

File:RAWA protest rally against Taliban in Peshawar April28-1998.jpg

Members of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan protesting against the Taliban, in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1998

Brutal repression of women was widespread under the Taliban and it received significant international condemnation.<ref name="Forsythe3">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Maley3">Dupree Hatch, Nancy. "Afghan Women under the Taliban" in Maley, William. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. London: Hurst and Company, 2001, pp. 145–166.</ref><ref name="Wertheime">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Cooke">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Moghadam">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Massoumi">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Skaine1">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. Yale Nota Bene Books, 2000, pp. 70, 106 Template:ISBN?.</ref><ref name="Skain">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>* Template:Cite news * Template:Cite web</ref> Abuses were myriad and violently enforced by the religious police.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> For example, the Taliban issued edicts forbidding women from being educated, forcing girls to leave schools and colleges.<ref name="Women-Amnesty">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="women-StateDepartment">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Rashid2">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Newsday 2001" /><ref name="papillonsartpalace.com" /><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="NPR" /> Women who were leaving their houses were required to be accompanied by a male relative and were obligated to wear the burqa,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> a traditional dress covering the entire body except for a small slit out of which to see.<ref name="Women-Amnesty" /><ref name="women-StateDepartment" /> Those women who were accused of disobedience were publicly beaten. In one instance, a young woman named Sohaila was charged with adultery after she was caught walking with a man who was not a relative; she was publicly flogged in Ghazi Stadium, receiving 100 lashes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Female employment was restricted to the medical sector, where male medical personnel were prohibited from treating women and girls.<ref name="Women-Amnesty" /><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> This extensive ban on the employment of women further resulted in the widespread closure of primary schools, as almost all teachers prior to the Taliban's rise had been women, further restricting access to education not only to girls but also to boys. Restrictions became especially severe after the Taliban took control of the capital. In February 1998, for instance, religious police forced all women off the streets of Kabul and issued new regulations which ordered people to blacken their windows so that women would not be visible from outside.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref>

Ban on women's participation in the healthcare sector

In December 2024, the Taliban's health ministry banned women from being trained in nursing and midwifery, according to media reports confirmed by The Guardian.<ref name="Guardian midwife ban">Template:Cite web</ref> This was a reversal of an earlier February 2024 decision to permit basic medical training for women.<ref name="NPR midwife ban">Template:Cite web</ref> According to NPR, the health ministry had lobbied for an exemption from the general ban on women's education in the healthcare sector because "in some provinces, the Taliban does not allow women to seek treatment from male medical professionals."<ref name="NPR midwife ban"/> The Taliban's ban on basic medical training for women was widely condemned by human rights organizations as a danger to the health and well-being of Afghan women and children, with Afghanistan already having among the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world according to 2020 data, before the Taliban's 2021 seizure of power.<ref name="Guardian midwife ban"/><ref name="NPR midwife ban"/> For example, Heather Barr of Human Right Watch stated: "If you ban women from being treated by male healthcare professionals, and then you ban women from training to become healthcare professionals, the consequences are clear: women will not have access to healthcare and will die as a result."<ref name="Guardian midwife ban"/> The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that the ban "is profoundly discriminatory, short-sighted and puts the lives of women and girls at risk in multiple ways."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Violence against civilians

According to the United Nations, the Taliban and its allies were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 80% in 2011.<ref name="UNAMA" /><ref name="Kegley">Template:Cite book</ref>

According to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban's bombings and other attacks which have led to civilian casualties "sharply escalated in 2006" when "at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally launched at non-combatants."<ref name="hrw-cbceia">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

File:Demonstration gegen den Taliban-Krieg in Afghanistan (51380125214).jpg

Afghans in Germany protesting against Taliban violence, 14 August 2021

The United Nations reported that the number of civilians killed by both the Taliban and pro-government forces in the war rose nearly 50% between 2007 and 2009. The high number of civilians killed by the Taliban is blamed in part on their increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), "for instance, 16 IEDs have been planted in girls' schools" by the Taliban.<ref name="Arnoldy">Template:Cite journal</ref>

In 2009, Colonel Richard Kemp, formerly Commander of British forces in Afghanistan and the intelligence coordinator for the British government, drew parallels between the tactics and strategy of Hamas in Gaza to those of the Taliban. Kemp wrote:

Discrimination against Hindus and Sikhs

Hindus and Sikhs have lived in Afghanistan since historic times and they were prominent minorities in Afghanistan, well-established in terms of academics and businesses.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> After the Afghan Civil War they started to migrate to India and other nations.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> After the Taliban established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, they imposed strict Sharia laws which discriminated against Hindus and Sikhs and caused the size of Afghanistan's Hindu and Sikh populations to fall at a very rapid rate because they emigrated from Afghanistan and established diasporas in the Western world.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The Taliban issued decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship but allowed them to worship at existing holy sites, forbade non-Muslims from criticizing Muslims, ordered non-Muslims to identify their houses by placing a yellow cloth on their rooftops, forbade non-Muslims from living in the same residence as Muslims, and required that non-Muslim women wear a yellow dress with a special mark so that Muslims could keep their distance from them (Hindus and Sikhs were mainly targeted).Template:Sfn The Taliban announced in May 2001 that it would force Afghanistan's Hindu population to wear special badges, which has been compared to the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany.<ref name="wired.com">Associated Press (22 May 2001). "Taliban to Enforce Hindu 'Badges.'" Wired. Retrieved 22 July 2020.</ref> In general, the Taliban treated the Sikhs better than Afghan Shiites, Hindus and Christians.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Relationship with other religious groups

Template:Further Along with Hindus, the small Christian community was also persecuted by the Taliban.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Violence against Western aid workers and Christians was common during the Afghan conflict.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

On several occasions between 2008 and 2012, the Taliban claimed that they assassinated Western and Afghani medical or aid workers in Afghanistan, because they feared that the polio vaccine would make Muslim children sterile, because they suspected that the 'medical workers' were really spies, or because they suspected that the medical workers were proselytizing Christianity.

In August 2008, three Western women (British, Canadian, US) who were working for the aid group 'International Rescue Committee' were murdered in Kabul. The Taliban claimed that they killed them because they were foreign spies.<ref name="BBC, Oct008">Template:Cite news</ref> In October 2008, the British woman Gayle Williams working for Christian UK charity 'SERVE Afghanistan' – focusing on training and education for disabled persons – was murdered near Kabul. Taliban claimed they killed her because her organisation "was preaching Christianity in Afghanistan".<ref name="BBC, Oct008" /> In all 2008 until October, 29 aid workers, 5 of whom non-Afghanis, were killed in Afghanistan.<ref name="BBC, Oct008" />

In August 2010, the Taliban claimed that they murdered 10 medical aid workers while they were passing through Badakhshan Province on their way from Kabul to Nuristan Province – but the Afghan Islamic party/militia Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin has also claimed responsibility for those killings. The victims were six Americans, one Briton, one German and two Afghanis, working for a self-proclaimed "non-profit, Christian organization" which is named 'International Assistance Mission'. The Taliban stated that they murdered them because they were proselytizing Christianity and possessing which were translated into the Dari language when they were encountered. IAM contended that they "were not missionaries".<ref>'Hizb-i-Islami, Taliban both claim killing 10 medical workers in northern Afghanistan'. FDD's Long War Journal, 7 August 2010. Retrieved 5 October 2017.</ref>

In December 2012, unidentified gunmen killed four female UN polio-workers in Karachi in Pakistan; the Western news media suggested that there was a connection between the outspokenness of the Taliban and objections to and suspicions of such 'polio vaccinations'.<ref>"Gunmen kill 4 female polio workers in Pakistan" (18 December 2012), Yahoo! News, The Associated Press. Retrieved 10 September 2013.</ref> Eventually in 2012, a Pakistani Taliban commander in North Waziristan in Pakistan banned polio vaccinations,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and in March 2013, the Afghan government was forced to suspend its vaccination efforts in Nuristan Province because the Taliban was extremely influential in the province.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> However, in May 2013, the Taliban's leaders changed their stance on polio vaccinations, saying that the vaccine is the only way to prevent polio and they also stated that they will work with immunization volunteers as long as polio workers are "unbiased" and "harmonized with the regional conditions, Islamic values and local cultural traditions."<ref name="poliotelegraph">Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Template:Further During the first period of Taliban rule, only two known Jews were left in Afghanistan, Zablon Simintov and Isaac Levy (c. 1920–2005). Levy relied on charity to survive, while Simintov ran a store selling carpets and jewelry until 2001. They lived on opposite sides of the dilapidated Kabul synagogue. They kept denouncing each other to the authorities, and both spent time in jail for continuously "arguing". The Taliban also confiscated the synagogue's Torah scroll. However, the two men were later released from prison when Taliban officials became annoyed by their arguing.<ref>Adkins, Laura E. (31 October 2019). "'Last Afghani Jews' kicked out of Taliban prison for being too annoying." The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 5 October 2020.</ref> After August 2021, the last Jew Simintov and his relative left Afghanistan, ended centuries of Jewish presence in the country.<ref name="apnews">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Restrictions on modern education

Before the Taliban came to power, education was highly regarded in Afghanistan and Kabul University attracted students from Asia and the Middle East. However, the Taliban imposed restrictions on modern education, banned the education of females, only allowed Islamic religious schools to stay open and only encouraged the teaching of the Qur'an. Around half of all of the schools in Afghanistan were destroyed.<ref name="BBC-education" /> The Taliban have carried out brutal attacks on teachers and students and they have also threatened parents and teachers.<ref name="HRW">Template:Cite web</ref> As per a 1998 UNICEF report, 9 out of 10 girls and 2 out of 3 boys did not enroll in schools. By 2000, fewer than 4–5% of all Afghan children were being educated at the primary school level and even fewer of them were being educated at higher secondary and university levels.<ref name="BBC-education">Template:Cite news</ref>

Attacks on educational institutions, students and teachers and the forced enforcement of Islamic teachings have even continued after the Taliban were deposed from power. In December 2017, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that over 1,000 schools had been destroyed, damaged or occupied and 100 teachers and students had been killed by the Taliban.<ref name="RefWorld-Education">Template:Cite web</ref>

Cultural genocide

The Taliban have committed a cultural genocide against the Afghan people by destroying their historical and cultural texts, artifacts and sculptures.<ref name="RAWA2022">Template:Cite web</ref>

In the early 1990s, the National Museum of Afghanistan was attacked and looted numerous times, resulting in the loss of 70% of the 100,000 artifacts of Afghan culture and history which were then on display.<ref name="NYT">Template:Cite news</ref>

On 11 August 1998, the Taliban destroyed the Puli Khumri Public Library. The library contained a collection of over 55,000 books and old manuscripts, one of the most valuable and beautiful collections of Afghanistan's cultural works according to the Afghan people.<ref name="Acta Academia">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="antoon">Censorship of historical thought: a world guide, 1945–2000, Antoon de Baets</ref>

On 2 March 2001, the Buddhas of Bamiyan were destroyed with dynamite, on orders from the Taliban's leader Mullah Omar.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In October of the same year, the Taliban "took sledgehammers and axes to thousands of years’ worth of artifacts"<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> in the National Museum of Afghanistan, destroying at least 2,750 ancient works of art.<ref>Template:Cite webTemplate:Cbignore</ref>

Afghanistan has a rich musical culture, where music plays an important part in social functions like births and marriages and it has also played a major role in uniting an ethnically diverse country.<ref name="The Guardian" /> However, since it came to power and even after it was deposed, the Taliban has banned most music, including cultural folk music, and it has also attacked and killed a number of musicians.<ref name="The Guardian" /><ref name="Free Muse">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="The Guardian-music">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="RFERL">Template:Cite news</ref>

Ban on entertainment and recreational activities

During their first rule of Afghanistan which lasted from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban banned many recreational activities and games, such as association football, kite flying, and chess. Mediums of entertainment such as televisions, cinemas, music with instrumental accompaniments, VCRs and satellite dishes were also banned.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Also included on the list of banned items were "musical instruments and accessories" and all visual representation of living creatures.<ref name="The Guardian">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> However, the daf, a type of frame drum, wasn't banned.<ref name=":0" />

It was reported that when Afghan children were caught kiting, a highly popular activity, they were beaten.<ref name="rferl.org">Template:Cite news</ref> When Khaled Hosseini learned through a 1999 news report that the Taliban had banned kite flying, a restriction he found particularly cruel, the news "struck a personal chord" for him, as he had grown up with the sport while living in Afghanistan. Hosseini was motivated to write a 25-page short story about two boys who fly kites in Kabul that he later developed into his first novel, The Kite Runner.

Forced conscription and conscription of children

Template:Main According to the testimony of Guantanamo captives before their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Taliban, in addition to conscripting men to serve as soldiers, also conscripted men to staff its civil service – both done at gunpoint.<ref name="Flee Taliban">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="CsrtNasrullahConscription40">[[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized transcripts (.pdf)], from Nasrullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, p. 40</ref><ref name="CsrtShabirAhmed">Summarized transcripts (.pdf) Template:Webarchive, from Shabir Ahmed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, pp. 80–90</ref>

According to a report from Oxford University, the Taliban made widespread use of the conscription of children in 1997, 1998 and 1999.<ref name="OxfordJanuary2002">Template:Cite web</ref> The report states that during the civil war that preceded the Taliban régime, thousands of orphaned boys joined various militia for "employment, food, shelter, protection and economic opportunity." The report said that during its initial period, the Taliban "long depended upon cohorts of youth". Witnesses stated that each land-owning family had to provide one young man and $500 in expenses. In August of that year 5000 students aged between 15 and 35 left madrassas in Pakistan to join the Taliban.

Leadership and organization

Kandahar faction and Haqqani network

According to Jon Lee Anderson the Taliban government is "said to be profoundly divided" between the Kandahar faction and the Haqqani network, with a mysterious dispearance of deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar for "several days" in mid-September 2021 explained by rumours of injury after a brawl with other Taliban.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> The Kandahar faction is named for the city that Mullah Omar came from and where he founded the Taliban, and is described as "insular" and "rural", interested "primarily" with "ruling its home turf". It includes Haibatullah Akhundzada, Mullah Yaqoob, Abdul Ghani Baradar (see below).

The family-based Haqqani network, by contrast are "closely linked to Pakistan's secret services", "interested in global jihad", with its founder (Jalaluddin Haqqani) "connected" the Taliban with Osama bin Laden.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> It is named for its founder Jalaluddin Haqqani and is currently led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, and includes Khalil Haqqani, Mawlawi Mohammad Salim Saad.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> With Sirajuddin Haqqani as acting interior minister, as of February 2022, the network has control of "a preponderance of security positions in Afghanistan".<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Taliban leadership have denied tension between factions. Suhail Shaheen states "there is one Taliban", and Zabihullah Mujahid (acting Deputy Minister of Information and Culture), even maintains "there is no Haqqani network."<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />

Current leadership

The top members of the Taliban as an insurgency, as of August 2021, are:<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

• Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban's Supreme Leader since 2016, a religious scholar from Kandahar province.
• Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the movement alongside Mullah Omar, was deputy Prime Minister as of March 2022.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" /> From Uruzgan province, he was imprisoned in Pakistan before his release at the request of the United States.
• Mullah Yaqoob, the son of the Taliban's founder Mullah Omar and leader of the group's military operations.
• Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network is acting interior minister as of February 2022, with authority over police and intelligence services. He oversees the group's financial and military assets between the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S. government has a $10 million bounty for his arrest brought on by several terrorist attacks on hotels and the Indian Embassy.<ref name="Anderson-2-2022" />
• Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, former head of the group's political office in Doha. From Logar province, he holds a university master's degree and trained as a cadet at the Indian Military Academy.
• Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai, chief negotiatior of the group's political office in Doha, replacing Stanikzai in 2020. Heads the Taliban's powerful council of religious scholars.
• Suhail Shaheen, Taliban nominee for Ambassador to the U.N.; former spokesperson of the Taliban's political office in Doha. University educated in Pakistan, he was editor of the English language Kabul Times in the 1990s and served as a deputy ambassador to Pakistan at the time.
• Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban's spokesperson since 2007. He revealed himself to the public for the first time after the group's capture of Kabul in 2021.

All the top leadership of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns, more specifically those belonging of the Ghilzai confederation.<ref name="USMA">Template:Cite web</ref>

Overview

Until his death in 2013, Mullah Mullah Omar was the supreme commander of the Taliban. Mullah Akhtar Mansour was elected as his replacement in 2015,<ref name="Mansoor-elected">* Template:Cite news

• Template:Cite web
• Mullah Omar: Taliban choose deputy Mansour as successor, BBC News, 30 July 2015</ref> and following Mansour's killing in a May 2016 US drone strike, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada became the group's leader.<ref name="Akhundzada">Template:Cite web</ref>

The Taliban initially enjoyed goodwill from Afghans weary of the warlords' corruption, brutality, and incessant fighting.<ref>Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world / editor in chief, Richard C. Martin, Macmillan Reference US : Thomson/Gale, 2004</ref> This popularity was not universal, particularly among non-Pashtuns.

In 2001, the Taliban, de jure, controlled 85% of Afghanistan. De facto the areas under its direct control were mainly Afghanistan's major cities and highways. Tribal khans and warlords had de facto direct control over various small towns, villages, and rural areas.<ref>Griffiths 226.</ref>

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Taliban police patrolling the streets of Herat in a pick-up truck

Rashid described the Taliban government as "a secret society run by Kandaharis ... mysterious, secretive, and dictatorial."<ref name="Rashid 2000 98" /> They did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:

They modelled their decision-making process on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what they believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the "believers".<ref name="Rashid 2000 95" /> Before capturing Kabul, there was talk of stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power, and law and order were restored.

As the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the jirga and without consulting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from an oath of allegiance ("Bay'ah"), in imitation of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed" taken from its shrine for the first time in 60 years. Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted "Amir al-Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a pledge of support. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

The Taliban were very reluctant to share power, and since their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtun they ruled as overlords over the 60% of Afghans from other ethnic groups. In local government, such as Kabul city council<ref name="Rashid 2000 98">Template:Harvnb.</ref> or Herat,<ref name="rashid 39-40">Template:Harvnb.</ref> Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when the Pashto-speaking Taliban could not communicate with the roughly half of the population who spoke Dari or other non-Pashtun tongues.<ref name="rashid 39-40" /> Critics complained that this "lack of local representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force."<ref name="rashid 101-102" />

Organization and governance

Consistent with the governance of the early Muslims was the absence of state institutions and the absence of "a methodology for command and control", both of which are standard today, even in non-Westernized states. The Taliban did not issue press releases or policy statements, nor did they hold regular press conferences. The basis for this structure was Grand Mufti Rashid Ahmed Ludhianvi's Obedience to the Amir, as he served as a mentor to the Taliban's leadership.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The outside world and most Afghans did not even know what their leaders looked like, because photography was banned.<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref> The "regular army" resembled a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force with only 25,000 men (of whom 11,000 were non-Afghans).

Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrasah education". Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and the Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts and fought whenever they were needed. Military reverses that trapped them behind enemy lines or led to their deaths increased the chaos in the national administration.<ref>Template:Harvnb.</ref> At the national level, "all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not". Consequently, the ministries "by and large ceased to function".<ref name="rashid 101-102">Template:Harvnb.</ref>

The Ministry of Finance did not have a budget nor did it have a "qualified economist or banker". Mullah Omar collected and dispersed cash without bookkeeping.

Economic activities

The Kabul money markets responded positively during the first weeks of the Taliban occupation (1996). But the Afghani soon fell in value. They imposed a 50% tax on any company operating in the country, and those who failed to pay were attacked. They also imposed a 6% import tax on anything brought into the country, and by 1998 had control of the major airports and border crossings which allowed them to establish a monopoly on all trade. By 2001, the per capita income of the 25 million population was under $200, and the country was close to total economic collapse. As of 2007 the economy had begun to recover, with estimated foreign reserves of three billion dollars and a 13% increase in economic growth.<ref name="Skaine1" /><ref name="Lansford-147">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Marsden">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Pugh1">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Castillo">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Skaine2">Template:Cite book</ref>

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Opium in Taliban safehouse in Helmand

Under the Transit treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a massive network for smuggling developed. It had an estimated turnover of 2.5 billion dollars with the Taliban receiving between $100 and $130 million per year. These operations along with the trade from the Golden Crescent financed the war in Afghanistan and also had the side effect of destroying start up industries in Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid also explained that the Afghan Transit Trade agreed on by Pakistan was "the largest official source of revenue for the Taliban."<ref name="Nojum1">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Nojum2">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Chouvy1">Template:Cite book</ref>

Between 1996 and 1999, Mullah Omar reversed his opinions on the drug trade, apparently as it only harmed kafirs. The Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistan's poppy fields and made opium its largest source of taxation. Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban income and their war economy. According to Rashid, "drug money funded the weapons, ammunition and fuel for the war." In The New York Times, the Finance Minister of the United Front, Wahidullah Sabawoon, declared the Taliban had no annual budget but that they "appeared to spend US$300 million a year, nearly all of it on war." He added that the Taliban had come to increasingly rely on three sources of money: "poppy, the Pakistanis and bin Laden."<ref name="Chouvy1" />

In an economic sense it seems he had little choice, as the war of attrition continued with the Northern Alliance the income from continued opium production was all that prevented the country from starvation. By 2000, Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of the world's supply and in 2000 grew an estimated 3276 tonnes of opium from poppy cultivation on 82,171 hectares. At this juncture Omar passed a decree banning the cultivation of opium, and production dropped to an estimated 74 metric tonnes from poppy cultivation on 1,685 hectares. Many observers say the ban – which came in a bid for international recognition at the United Nations – was only issued in order to raise opium prices and increase profit from the sale of large existing stockpiles. 1999 had yielded a record crop and had been followed by a lower but still large 2000 harvest. The trafficking of accumulated stocks by the Taliban continued in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, the UN mentioned the "existence of significant stocks of opiates accumulated during previous years of bumper harvests." In September 2001 – before the 11 September attacks against the United States – the Taliban allegedly authorised Afghan peasants to sow opium again.<ref name="Chouvy1" /><ref name="Shaffer3">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Thourni">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Lyman">Template:Cite book</ref>

There was also an environmental toll to the country, heavy deforestation from the illegal trade in timber with hundreds of acres of pine and cedar forests in Kunar Province and Paktya being cleared. Throughout the country millions of acres were denuded to supply timber to the Pakistani markets, with no attempt made at reforestation, which has led to significant environmental damage. By 2001, when the Afghan Interim Administration took power the country's infrastructure was in ruins, Telecommunications had failed, the road network was destroyed and Ministry of Finance buildings were in such a state of disrepair some were on the verge of collapse. On 6 July 1999, then president Bill Clinton signed into effect executive order 13129. This order implemented a complete ban on any trade between America and the Taliban régime and on 10 August they froze £5,000,000 in Ariana assets. On 19 December 2000, UN resolution 1333 was passed. It called for all assets to be frozen and for all states to close any offices belonging to the Taliban. This included the offices of Ariana Afghan Airlines. In 1999, the UN had passed resolution 1267 which had banned all international flights by Ariana apart from preapproved humanitarian missions.<ref name="Griffin">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Wehr">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Rashid">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Clements">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Bennett">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Farah">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Askari">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Pillar">Template:Cite book</ref>

According to the lawsuit, filed in December 2019 in the D.C. District Court on behalf of Gold Star families, some US defense contractors involved in Afghanistan made illegal "protection payments" to the Taliban, funding a "Taliban-led terrorist insurgency" that killed or wounded thousands of Americans in Afghanistan.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the "protection money" was "one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

It is estimated that in 2020 the Taliban had an income of $1.6 billion, mostly from drugs, mining, extortion and taxes, donations and exports.<ref name="Sufizada">Template:Cite news</ref>

On 2 November 2021, the Taliban required that all economic transactions in Afghanistan use Afghanis and banned the use of all foreign currency.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In 2022 construction on the Qosh Tepa Canal began in northern Afghanistan.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

On 20 April 2024, the Taliban decided to abolish Afghanistan's pension system as Hibatullah Akhundzada claimed it was “un-Islamic”, which prompted protests by retirees and older veterans of the Afghan Armed Forces in Kabul. The protest was dispersed by the Taliban.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

International relations

Template:MainTemplate:More sources During the war, the Taliban were supported by several militant outfits which include the Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Several countries like China, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia and Saudi Arabia allegedly support the Taliban.Template:Citation needed However, all of their governments deny providing any support to the Taliban. Likewise, the Taliban also deny receiving any foreign support from any country.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> At its peak, formal diplomatic recognition of the Taliban's government was acknowledged by three nations: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the past, the United Arab Emirates and Turkmenistan were also alleged to have provided support to the Taliban. It is designated by some countries as a terrorist organization.

During its time in power (1996–2001), at its height ruling 90% of Afghanistan, the Taliban régime, or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all of which provided substantial aid. The most other nations and organizations, including the United Nations, recognised the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992–2002) (parts of whom were part of the United Front, also called Northern Alliance) as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Regarding its relations with the rest of the world, the Taliban's Emirate of Afghanistan held a policy of isolationism: "The Taliban believe in non-interference in the affairs of other countries and similarly desire no outside interference in their country's internal affairs".Template:Sfn

Traditionally, the Taliban were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while Iran, Russia, Turkey, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed an anti-Taliban alliance and supported the Northern Alliance.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> After the fall of the Taliban régime at the end of 2001, the composition of the Taliban supporters changed. According to a study by scholar Antonio Giustozzi, in the years 2005 to 2015 most of the financial support came from the states Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, and Qatar, as well as from private donors from Saudi Arabia, from al-Qaeda and, for a short period of time, from the Islamic State.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> About 54 percent of the funding came from foreign governments, 10 percent from private donors from abroad, and 16 percent from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In 2014, the amount of external support was close to $900 million.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Following the Taliban's ascension to power, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's model of governance has been widely criticized by the international community, despite the government's repeated calls for international recognition and engagement. Acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund stated that his interim administration has met all conditions required for official recognition.<ref name="Voice of America">Template:Cite web</ref> In a bid to gain recognition, the Taliban sent a letter in September 2021 to the UN to accept Suhail Shaheen as Permanent Representative of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – a request that had already been rejected by the UN Credentials Committee in 2021.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

With regards to international relations after the Taliban seizure of Afghanistan in 2021, Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told the Russian news agency Sputnik: "Of course, we won't have any relations with Israel. We want to have relations with other countries; Israel is not among these countries. We would like to have relations with all the regional countries and neighbouring countries as well as Asian countries."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

On 10 October 2021, Russia hosted the Taliban for talks in Moscow in an effort to boost its influence across Central Asia. Officials from 10 different countries – Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and five formerly Soviet Central Asian states – attended the talks, which were held during the Taliban's first official trip to Europe since their return to power in mid-August 2021.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Taliban won backing from the 10 regional powers for the idea of a United Nations donor conference to help the country stave off economic collapse and a humanitarian catastrophe, calling for the UN to convene such a conference as soon as possible to help rebuild the country. Russian officials also called for action against Islamic State (IS) fighters, who Russia said have started to increase their presence in Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover. The Taliban delegation, which was led by Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, said that "Isolating Afghanistan is in no one's interests," arguing that the extremist group did not pose any security threat to any other country. The Taliban asked the international community to recognize its government,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> but no country has yet recognized the new Afghan government.<ref name="Voice of America"/>

On 23 January 2022, a Taliban delegation arrived in Oslo, and closed-door meetings were held during the Taliban's first official trip to Western Europe and second official trip to Europe since their return to power.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Western diplomats told the Taliban that humanitarian aid to Afghanistan would be tied to an improvement in human rights.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Taliban delegation, led by acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, met senior French foreign ministry officials, Britain's special envoy Nigel Casey, EU Special Representative for Afghanistan and members of the Norwegian foreign ministry. This followed the announcement by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee that the committee would extend a travel ban exemption until 21 March 2022 for 14 listed Taliban members to continue attending talks, along with a limited asset-freeze exemption for the financing of exempted travel.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> However, the Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said that the international community's call for the formation of an inclusive government was a political "excuse" after the 3-day Oslo visit.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

At the United Nations Security Council meeting in New York on 26 January 2022, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said the Oslo talks appeared to have been "serious" and "genuine". Norway says the talks do "not represent a legitimisation or recognition of the Taliban".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In the same meeting, the Russian Federation's delegate said attempts to engage the Taliban through coercion are counter-productive, calling on Western states and donors to return frozen funds.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> China's representative said the fact that aid deliveries have not improved since the adoption of UNSC 2615 (2021) proves that the issue has been politicized, as some parties seek to use assistance as a bargaining chip.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, the Russian Federation, and China were the first countries to accept the diplomatic credentials of Taliban-appointed envoys, although this is not equivalent to official recognition.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

On 4 July 2024, the Russian president Vladimir Putin stated that Taliban is an ally of Russia in the fight against terrorism.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In November 2024, Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry announced that Taliban officials would attend the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), marking the country's first participation since the Taliban regained control in 2021. Afghanistan had been unable to attend previous climate summits due to the lack of international recognition of the Taliban government. Despite this, the Taliban's environmental officials emphasized that climate change should be viewed as a humanitarian issue rather than a political one, arguing that addressing it transcends political disputes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the Taliban congratulated the Syrian opposition and "the people of Syria", hoping for "a peaceful, unified and stable system".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In April 2025, Russia's supreme court lifts the Taliban's designation as a terrorist organization.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Designation as a terrorist organization

Template:Further The Taliban movement is officially illegal in the following countries to date:

• Template:CAN<ref name="Terror2021">Template:Cite web</ref>
• Template:Flag<ref name="nz-list" />
• Template:Flag<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
• Template:Flag<ref name="bozbas" />
• Template:Flag<ref name="uae-2017-18" />
• Template:Flag,<ref name="USDT">Template:Cite web</ref> though not on the United States Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Former:

• Template:KAZ (2005–2023)<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
• Template:Flag (2006–2024)<ref name="kg-list">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
• Template:Flag (2003–2025)<ref name="ru">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

United Nations and NGOs

Despite the aid of United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) given (see § Afghanistan during Taliban rule), the Taliban's attitude in 1996–2001 toward the UN and NGOs was often one of suspicion. The UN did not recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, most foreign donors and aid workers were non-Muslims, and the Taliban vented fundamental objections to the sort of 'help' the UN offered. As the Taliban's Attorney General Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada put it in 1997:

In July 1998, the Taliban closed "all NGO offices" by force after those organisations refused to move to a bombed-out former Polytechnic College as ordered.<ref name="bmj">Aid agencies pull out of Kabul The building had neither electricity or running water.</ref> One month later the UN offices were also shut down.<ref name="rashid,71">Template:Harvnb.</ref>

Around 2000, the UN drew up sanctions against officials and leaders of Taliban, because of their harbouring Osama bin Laden. Several of the Taliban leaders have subsequently been killed.<ref name=telegraphJan2010 />

In 2009, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband and US Secretary Hillary Clinton called for talks with 'regular Taliban fighters' while bypassing their top leaders who supposedly were 'committed to global jihad'. Kai Eide, the top UN official in Afghanistan, called for talks with Taliban at the highest level, suggesting Mullah OmarTemplate:Sndeven though Omar dismissed such overtures as long as foreign troops were in Afghanistan.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In 2010, the UN lifted sanctions on the Taliban, and requested that Taliban leaders and others be removed from terrorism watch lists. In 2010 the US and Europe announced support for President Karzai's latest attempt to negotiate peace with the Taliban.<ref name="telegraphJan2010">Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Designated terrorist organisations

Many designated terror groups have pledged their allegiance<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> to the new Taliban government, these groups include: Al Qaeda, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

According to some reports Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have allegedly close ties to Pakistan's intelligence agency, have joined ISIS-K and ended their allegiance to Mullah Hibatullah.

The East Turkestan Movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan both distanced themself from the Taliban and ended their allegiance after the Talibans Zabul operation against Uyghurs in 2014, however newer reports indicate that those groups still have good relations with the Taliban.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In popular media

The Taliban were portrayed in Khaled Hosseini's popular 2003 novel The Kite Runner<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and its 2007 film adaption. The Taliban have also been portrayed in American film, most notably in Lone Survivor (2013) which is based on a real-life story.Template:Citation needed Hindi cinema have also portrayed the Taliban in Kabul Express (2006),<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and Escape from Taliban (2003) which is based on a real-life novel A Kabuliwala's Bengali Wife,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> whose author Sushmita Banerjee was shot dead by the Taliban in 2013.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Sources

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Further reading

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• One Year of Taliban Rule Over Afghanistan
• "Afghan Women and the Taliban: An Exploratory Assessment" (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 2014)
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External links

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