Problem of other minds

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The problem of other minds is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological question: "Given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds?"<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The problem is that knowledge of other minds is always indirect. The problem of other minds does not negatively impact social interactions due to people having a "theory of mind" – the ability to spontaneously infer the mental states of others – supported by innate mirror neurons,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> a theory of mind mechanism,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> or a tacit theory.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> There has also been an increase in evidence that behavior results from cognition which in turn requires consciousness and the brain.

It is a problem of the philosophical idea known as solipsism: the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist. The problem of other minds maintains that no matter how sophisticated someone's behavior is, that does not reasonably guarantee that someone has the presence of thought occurring within them as when oneself engages in behavior.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> Phenomenology studies the subjective experience of human life resulting from consciousness. The specific subject within phenomenology studying other minds is intersubjectivity.

In 1953, Karl Popper suggested that a test for the other minds problem is whether one would seriously argue with the other person or machine:<ref>'Language and the body-mind problem: a restatement of interactionism', Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy, 7, 1953, reprinted in 'Conjectures and refutations', 1963 ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0.</ref> "This, I think, would solve the problem of 'other minds'....In arguing with other people (a thing which we have learnt from other people), for example about other minds, we cannot but attribute to them intentions, and this means mental states. We do not argue with a thermometer."

Philosophers such as Christian List have argued that there exists a connection between the problem of other minds and Benj Hellie's vertiginous question, i.e. why people exist as themselves and not as someone else. List argues that there exists a "quadrilemma" for metaphysical consciousness theories where at least one of the following must be false: 'first-person realism', 'non-solipsism', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world'.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> List proposes a philosophical model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Caspar Hare has argued for similar ideas with the concept of egocentric presentism, in which other persons can be conscious, but their experiences are simply not Template:Em in the way one's own current experience is.<ref name="JPhil">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> A related concept is perspectival realism, in which things within perceptual awareness have a defining intrinsic property that exists absolutely and not relative to anything.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>