Editing Will (philosophy)

{{Short description|Faculty that selects among a being's desires}}
'''Will''', within [[philosophy]], is a faculty of the [[mind]]. Will is important as one of the parts of the mind, along with [[reason]] and [[nous|understanding]]. It is considered central to the field of [[ethics]] because of its role in enabling deliberate [[Action (philosophy)|action]].

A recurring question in [[Western philosophical tradition]] is about [[free will]]{{emdash}}and the related, but more general notion of [[fate]]{{emdash}}which asks how the will can truly be free if a person's actions have either natural or divine causes [[determinism|determining]] them. In turn, this is directly connected to discussions on the nature of freedom and to the [[problem of evil]].

==Classical philosophy==
The classical treatment of the ethical importance of will is to be found in the ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'' of [[Aristotle]], in [[Nicomachean Ethics#Book III. Chapters 1–5: Moral virtue as conscious choice|Books III (chapters 1–5)]], and [[Nicomachean Ethics#Book VII. Chapters 1–10: Self mastery|Book VII (chapters 1–10)]]. These discussions have been a major influence in the development of ethical and legal thinking in [[Western philosophy|Western civilization]].

In Book III Aristotle divided actions into three categories instead of two:
* Voluntary (''ekousion'') acts.
* Involuntary or unwilling (''akousion'') acts, which are in the simplest case where people do not praise or blame. In such cases a person does not choose the wrong thing, for example if the wind carries a person off, or if a person has a wrong understanding of the particular facts of a situation. Note that ignorance of what aims are good and bad, such as people of bad character always have, is not something people typically excuse as ignorance in this sense. "Acting on account of ignorance seems different from acting while being ignorant".
* "Non-voluntary" or "non willing" actions (''ouk ekousion'') which are bad actions done by choice, or more generally (as in the case of animals and children when desire or spirit causes an action) whenever "the source of the moving of the parts that are instrumental in such actions is in oneself" and anything "up to oneself either to do or not". However, these actions are not taken because they are preferred in their own right, but rather because all options available are worse.

It is concerning this third class of actions that there is doubt about whether they should be praised or blamed or condoned in different cases.

[[Virtue]] and [[vice]], according to Aristotle, are "up to us". This means that although no one is willingly unhappy, vice by definition always involves actions which were decided upon willingly. Vice comes from bad habits and aiming at the wrong things, not deliberately aiming to be unhappy. The vices then, are voluntary just as the virtues are. He states that people would have to be unconscious not to realize the importance of allowing themselves to live badly, and he dismisses any idea that different people have different innate visions of what is good.

In Book VII, Aristotle discusses self-mastery, or the difference between what people decide to do, and what they actually do. For Aristotle, ''[[akrasia]]'', "unrestraint", is distinct from animal-like behavior because it is specific to humans and involves conscious rational thinking about what to do, even though the conclusions of this thinking are not put into practice. When someone behaves in a purely animal-like way, then for better or worse they are not acting based upon any conscious choice.

Aristotle also addresses a few questions raised earlier, on the basis of what he has explained:
* Not everyone who stands firm on the basis of a rational and even correct decision has self-mastery. Stubborn people are actually more like a person without self-mastery, because they are partly led by the pleasure coming from victory.
* Not everyone who fails to stand firm on the basis of his best deliberations has a true lack of self mastery. As an example he gives the case of [[Neoptolemus]] (in [[Sophocles]]' ''[[Philoctetes]]'') refusing to lie despite being part of a plan he agreed with.
* A person with practical wisdom (''[[phronesis]]'') can not have ''akrasia''. Instead it might sometimes seem so, because mere cleverness can sometimes recite words which might make them sound wise, like an actor or a drunk person reciting poetry. A person lacking self-mastery can have knowledge, but not an active knowledge to which they are paying attention. For example, when someone is in a state such as being drunk or enraged, people may have knowledge, and even show that they have that knowledge, like an actor, but not be using it.

==Medieval European philosophy==
Inspired by [[Islamic]] philosophers [[Avicenna]] and [[Averroes]], [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] philosophy became part of a standard approach to all legal and ethical discussion in [[Europe]] by the time of [[Thomas Aquinas]]<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Popkin|first1=Richard Henry|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ok4F_SawQaEC&q=Inspired+by+Islamic+philosophers+Avicenna+and+Averroes,+Aristotelian+philosophy+became+part+of+a+standard+approach+to+all+legal+and+ethical+discussion+in+Europe+by+the+time+of+Thomas+Aquinas.|title=The Columbia History of Western Philosophy|last2=Brown|first2=Stephen F.|date=1999|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-10129-5|language=en}}</ref> His philosophy can be seen as a synthesis of [[Aristotle]] and early [[Christian doctrine]] as formulated by [[Boethius]] and [[Augustine of Hippo]], although sources such as [[Maimonides]] and [[Plato]] and the aforementioned Muslim scholars are also cited.

With the use of [[Scholasticism]], [[Thomas Aquinas]]'s ''[[Summa Theologica]]'' makes a structured treatment of the concept of will. A very simple representation of this treatment may look like this:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1082.htm |title=Summa Theologica: The will (Prima Pars, Q. 82) |publisher=Newadvent.org |access-date=2012-11-07}}</ref>
* Does the will desire nothing? (''No.'')
* Does it desire all things of necessity, whatever it desires? (''No.'')
* Is it a higher power than the intellect? (''No.'')
* Does the will move the intellect? (''Yes.'')
* Is the will divided into irascible and concupiscible? (''No.'')

This is related to the following points on [[free will]]:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm |title=Summa Theologica: Free-will (Prima Pars, Q. 83) |publisher=Newadvent.org |access-date=2012-11-07}}</ref>
* Does man have free-will? (''Yes.'')
* What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit? (''A power.'')
* If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? (''Appetitive.'')
* If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct? (''The same'', with contingencies).

==Early modern philosophy==
The use of English in philosophical publications began in the [[early modern]] period, and therefore the English word "will" became a term used in philosophical discussion. During this same period, Scholasticism, which had largely been a Latin language movement, was heavily criticized. Both [[Francis Bacon]] and [[René Descartes]] described the human [[nous|intellect]] or understanding as something which needed to be considered limited, and needing the help of a [[methodology|methodical]] and [[skepticism|skeptical]] approach to learning about nature. Bacon emphasized the importance of analyzing experience in an organized way, for example [[experimentation]], while Descartes, seeing the success of [[Galileo]] in using mathematics in [[physics]], emphasized the role of methodical reasoning as in mathematics and geometry. Descartes specifically said that error comes about because the will is not limited to judging things which the understanding is limited to, and described the possibility of such judging or choosing things ignorantly, without understanding them, as free will. Dutch theologian [[Jacobus Arminius]], considered the freedom of human will is to work toward individual salvation and constrictions occur due to the work of passion that a person holds. Augustine calls will as "the mother and guardian of all virtues".<ref>[[Fourth Meditation|Meditation IV: Concerning the True and the False]]</ref>

Under the influence of Bacon and Descartes, [[Thomas Hobbes]] made one of the first attempts to systematically analyze ethical and political matters in a modern way. He defined will in his ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'' [http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=585&layout=html#chapter_89828 Chapter VI], in words which explicitly criticize the medieval scholastic definitions:
<blockquote>In [[deliberation]], the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act, not the faculty, of willing. And beasts that have deliberation, must necessarily also have will. The definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. But if instead of a [[reason|rational]] appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. For if the intervenient appetites, make any action voluntary; then by the same reason all intervenient aversions, should make the same action involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both voluntary and involuntary.</blockquote>

<blockquote>By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.</blockquote>

Concerning "free will", most early modern philosophers, including Hobbes, [[Spinoza]], [[John Locke|Locke]] and [[David Hume|Hume]] believed that the term was frequently used in a wrong or illogical sense, and that the philosophical problems concerning any difference between "will" and "free will" are due to verbal confusion (because all will is free):

<blockquote>a FREEMAN, ''is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to''. But when the words ''free'', and ''liberty'', are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we ''speak freely'', it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word ''free-will'', no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.."<ref name="Hobbes">Hobbes, T. (1651) ''Leviathan'' [http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php&title=585&search=%22finds+no+stop%22&chapter=89860&layout=html#a_2025807 Chapter XXI: "Of the liberty of subjects"] (1968 edition). London: Penguin Books.</ref></blockquote>

Spinoza argues that seemingly "free" actions aren't actually free, or that the entire concept is a [[wikt:chimera|chimera]] because "internal" beliefs are necessarily caused by earlier external events. The appearance of the internal is a mistake rooted in ignorance of causes, not in an actual volition, and therefore the will is always determined. Spinoza also rejects [[teleology]], and suggests that the causal nature along with an originary orientation of the universe is everything we encounter.

Some generations later, David Hume made a very similar point to Hobbes in other words:

<blockquote>But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean a ''power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will''; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.<ref name="Hume">Hume, D. (1740). ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' Section VIII: "[http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php&title=341&search=%22prisoner+chains%22&chapter=61966&layout=html#a_606067 Of liberty and necessity]" (1967 ed.). [[Oxford University Press]], Oxford. {{ISBN|0-87220-230-5}}</ref></blockquote>

==Rousseau==
{{Main|General will}}
[[File:Jean-Jacques Rousseau (painted portrait).jpg|thumb|306x306px|Jean-Jacques Rousseau conceived and popularised the general will]]
[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] added a new type of will to those discussed by philosophers, which he called the "[[general will]]" (''volonté générale''). This concept developed from Rousseau's considerations on the [[social contract]] theory of Hobbes, and describes the shared will of a whole citizenry, whose agreement is understood to exist in discussions about the legitimacy of governments and laws.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|url=http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf|title=The Social Contract|year=2017|pages=54|orig-year=1762}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/#IdeaGeneWill|title=Jean-Jacques Rousseau|last=Bertram|first=Christopher|date=May 26, 2017|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

The general will consists of a group of people who believe they are in unison, for which they have one will that is concerned with their collective well-being.<ref name=":5" /> In this group, people maintain their autonomy to think and act for themselves—to much concern of libertarians, including "[[John Locke]], [[David Hume]], [[Adam Smith]], and [[Immanuel Kant]],"<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/|title=Libertarianism|last=van der Vossen|first=Bas|date=January 28, 2019|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=February 7, 2020}}</ref> who proclaim an emphasis of individuality and a separation between "public and private spheres of life."<ref name=":6" /> Nonetheless, they also think on behalf of the community of which they are a part.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7">{{Cite journal|last=Thompson|first=Michael J.|title=Autonomy and the Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau's General Will|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313681668|journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies|volume=2|issue=2|pages=267|via=Philpapers}}</ref>

This group creates the [[Social contract|social compact]], that is supposed to voice cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal activity.<ref name=":7" /> As a result of the general will being expressed in the social contract, the citizens of the community that composes the general will consent to all laws, even those that they disagree with, or are meant to punish them if they disobey the law<ref name=":5" />—the aim of the general will is to guide all of them in social and political life.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thompson|first=Michael J.|title=Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau's General Will|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313681668|journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies|volume=25|issue=2|pages=274|via=Philpapers}}</ref> This, in other words, makes the general will consistent amongst the members of the state, implying that every single one of them have citizenship and have freedom<ref name=":5" /> as long as they are consenting to a set of norms and beliefs that promote equality, the common welfare, and lack servitude.<ref name=":7" />
[[File:House of Commons Voting on the Family Protection Action Plan.jpg|left|thumb|250x250px|The House of Commons Voting on the Family of Action Plan in Budapest, Hungary—an example of the general will espoused by Rousseau.]]
According to Thompson, the general will has three rules that have to be obeyed in order for the general will to function as intended: (1) the rule of equality—no unequal duties are to be placed upon any other community member for one's personal benefit or for that of the community;<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Thompson|first=Michael J.|title=Autonomy and the Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau's General Will|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313681668|journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies|volume=25|issue=2|pages=277|via=Philpapers}}</ref> (2) the rule of generality—the general will's end must be applicable to the likewise needs of citizens, and all the members' interests are to be accounted for;<ref name=":10" /> (3) the rule of non-servitude—no one has to relinquish themselves to any other member of the community, corporation, or individual, nor do they have to be subordinate to the mentioned community's, corporation's, or individuals' interests or wills.<ref name=":10" />

Nonetheless, there are ways in which the general will can fail, as Rousseau mentioned in ''[[The Social Contract]]''. If the will does not produce a consensus amongst a majority of its members, but has a minority consensus instead, then liberty is not feasible.<ref name=":11">{{Cite book|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|url=http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf|title=The Social Contract|year=2017|pages=56|orig-year=1762}}</ref> Also, the general will is weakened consequent to altruistic interests becoming egoistical, which manifests into debates, further prompting the citizenry to not participate in government, and bills directed for egotistical interests get ratified as "'laws.'"<ref name=":5" /> This leads into the distinction between the ''will of all'' versus the ''general will'': the former is looking after the interests of oneself or that of a certain faction, whereas the latter is looking out for the interests of society as a whole.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/rousseau/|title=Jean-Jacques Rousseau|last=Delany|first=James|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=February 13, 2020}}</ref>

Although Rousseau believes that the general will is beneficial, there are those in the libertarian camp who assert that the will of the individual trumps that of the whole.<ref name=":6" /> For instance, [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|G.W.F Hegel]] criticized Rousseau's general will, in that it could lead to tension. This tension, in Hegel's view is that between the general will and the subjective particularity of the individual.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|title=Universal and General Wills: Hegel and Rousseau|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=451|via=[[EBSCO Information Services|EBSCO]]}}{{Incomplete short citation|date=March 2025}}</ref> Here is the problem: when one consents to the general will, then individuality is lost as a result of one having to be able to consent to things on behalf of the populace, but, paradoxically, when the general will is in action, impartiality is lost as a result of the general will conforming to one course of action alone, that consented to by the populace.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|title=Universal and General Wills: Hegel and Rousseau|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=454|via=EBSCO}} {{Incomplete short citation|date=March 2025}}</ref>

Another problem that Hegel puts forth is one of arbitrary contingency.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|title=Universal and General Wills: Hegel and Rousseau|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=455|via=Ebsco}}</ref> For Hegel, the problem is called "'the difference that action implies,'"<ref name=":12" /> in which a doer's description of an action varies from that of others, and the question arises, "Who [chooses] which [action] description is appropriate?"<ref name=":12" /> To Rousseau, the majority is where the general will resides,<ref name=":11" /> but to Hegel that is arbitrary.<ref name=":13">{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|date=August 1994|title=Universal and General Wills|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=456|doi=10.1177/0090591794022003004|s2cid=170567224}}</ref> Hegel's solution is to find universality in society's institutions<ref name=":13" />—this implies that a decision, a rule, etc. must be understandable and the reasoning behind it cannot rest on the majority rules over the minority alone.<ref name=":13" /> Universality in societies' institutions is found via reflecting on historical progress and that the general will at present is a part of the development from history in its continuation and improvement.<ref name=":13" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|date=August 1994|title=Universal and General Wills|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=457|doi=10.1177/0090591794022003004|s2cid=170567224}}</ref> In terms of the general will, universality from looking at historical development can allow the participants composing the general will to determine how they fit into the scheme of being in an equal community with others, while not allowing themselves to obey an arbitrary force.<ref name=":14" /> The people of the general will see themselves as superior to their antecedents who have or have not done what they are doing, and judge themselves in retrospect of what has happened in the course of occurrences in the present in order to from an equal community with others that is not ruled arbitrarily.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ripstein|first=Arthur|date=August 1994|title=Universal and General Wills|journal=Political Theory |volume=22|issue=3|pages=459|doi=10.1177/0090591794022003004|s2cid=170567224}}</ref>

Besides Hegel, another philosopher who differed in the Rousseauian idea of the general will was [[John Locke]]. Locke, though a [[social contract]]arian, believed that individualism was crucial for society, inspired by reading [[Cicero|Cicero's]] [[De Officiis|''On Duties'']], in which Cicero proclaimed that all people "desire preeminence and are consequently reluctant to subject themselves to others."<ref name=":17">{{Cite book|last=Wood|first=Neal|title=The Politics of Locke's Philosophy|publisher=University of California Press|year=1983|isbn=0-520-04457-6|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=29–30 and 34–39}}</ref> Also, Cicero mentioned how every person is unique in a special way; therefore, people should "accept and tolerate these differences, treating all with consideration and upholding the [dignity]... of each."<ref name=":17" /> In addition, Locke was inspired by Cicero's idea of rationally pursuing one's self-interest, from his book ''[[De Officiis|On Duties]].'' Locke wrote how people have a duty to maximize their personal good while not harming that of their neighbor.<ref name=":17" /> For Locke, another influence was [[Francis Bacon|Sir Francis Bacon]]. Locke started to believe, and then spread, the ideas of "freedom of thought and expression" and having "a... questioning attitude towards authority"<ref name=":17" /> one is under and opinions one receives<ref name=":17" /> because of [[Francis Bacon|Sir Francis Bacon]].<ref name=":17" />
{{multiple image
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For Locke, land, money, and labor were important parts of his political ideas.<ref name=":17" /> Land was the source of all other products that people conceived as property.<ref name=":17" /> Because there is land, money can cause property to have a varying value, and labor starts.<ref name=":17" /> To Locke, labor is an extension of a person<ref name=":17" /> because the laborer used his body and hands in crafting the object, which him- or herself has a right to only, barring others from having the same.<ref name=":19">{{Cite book|last=Locke|first=John|chapter=Second Treatise of Civil Government: An Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government|title=Western Philosophy: An Anthology|publisher=Blackwell Publishing|year=2008|isbn=978-1-4051-2478-2|editor-last=Cottingham|editor-first=John|edition=2|pages=636–641}}</ref> Nonetheless, land is not possessed by the owner one-hundred percent of the time. This is a result of a "fundamental law of nature, the preservation of society...takes precedence over self-preservation."<ref name=":20">{{Cite book|last=Wood|first=Neal|title=The Politics of Locke's Philosophy|publisher=University of California Press|year=1983|isbn=0-520-04457-6|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=29, 30, 36, 37, 38}}</ref>

In Locke's ''Second Treatise,'' the purpose of government was to protect its citizens' "life, liberty, and property<ref name=":20" /><ref name=":19" />-- these he conceived as people's natural rights.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":17" /> He conceived a legislature as the top sector in power, which would be beholden to the people, that had means of enforcing against transgressors of its laws, and for law to be discretionary when it did not clarify, all for the common good.<ref name=":17" /> As a part of his political philosophy, Locke believed in consent for governmental rule at the ''individual'' level, similar to Rousseau, as long as it served the common good, in obedience with the law and [[natural law]].<ref name=":17" /> Furthermore, Locke advocated for freedom of expression and thought and religious toleration as a result of that allowing for commerce and economy to prosper.<ref name=":17" /> In other words, Locke believed in the common good of society, but there are also certain natural rights that a government is bound to protect, in the course of maintaining law and order—these were the mentioned: life, liberty, and property."<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" />

==Kant==
[[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant considered the will to be guided by laws and maxims]]
Immanuel Kant's theory of the will consists of the will being guided subjectively by maxims and objectively via laws. The former, maxims, are precepts.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> On the other hand, laws are objective, apprehended ''a priori''—prior to experience.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thefreedictionary.com/a+priori|title=A priori|website=The Free Dictionary|access-date=10 February 2020}}</ref> In other words, Kant's belief in the ''a priori'' proposes that the will is subject to a before-experience practical law—this is, according to Kant in the ''Critique of Practical Reason'', when the law is seen as "valid for the will of every rational being",<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=17|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> which is also termed as "universal laws"<ref>{{Cite book|last=Watson|first=John|title=The Philosophy of Kant Explained|publisher=Maclehose & Sons|year=1908|location=Glasgow|pages=350}}</ref>

Nonetheless, there is a hierarchy of what covers a person individually versus a group of people. Specifically, laws determine the will to conform to the maxims before experience is had on behalf of the subject in question.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=Critique of Pure Reason|year=2019|pages=39|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> Maxims, as mentioned, only deal with what one subjectively considers.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracticalReason.pdf|title=Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref>

This hierarchy exists as a result of a universal law constituted of multi-faceted parts from various individuals (people's maxims) not being feasible.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|title=Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=33|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref>

Because of the guidance by the universal law that guides maxims, an individual's will is free. Kant's theory of the will does not advocate for [[determinism]] on the ground that the laws of nature on which determinism is based prompts for an individual to have only one course of action—whatever nature's prior causes trigger an individual to do.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2015|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|journal=Ethics|volume=125|issue=2|pages=331–356|doi=10.1086/678370|s2cid=143461907}}</ref> On the other hand, Kant's [[categorical imperative]] provides "objective ''oughts"'',<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2015|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|journal=Ethics|volume=125|issue=2|pages=332|doi=10.1086/678370|s2cid=143461907}}</ref> which exert influence over us ''a priori'' if we have the power to accept or defy them.<ref name=":110">{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMNHr7ESep7Q4xNvgOLCmsEiep7FSrqy4SbaWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=337|via=Ebsco}}</ref> Nonetheless, if we do not have the opportunity to decide between the right and the wrong option in regard to the universal law, in the course of which our will is free, then natural causes have led us to one decision without any alternative options.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=337–338|via=Ebsco}}</ref>

There are some objections posited against Kant's view. For instance, in Kohl's essay "Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative", there is the question about the imperfect will, if one's will compels them to obey the universal law, but not for "recognizing the law's force of reason."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|page=338|via=Ebsco}}</ref> To this, Kant would describe the agent's will as "impotent rather than... imperfect since... the right reasons cannot [compel] her to act."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=338|via=Ebsco}}</ref>[[File:John Stuart Mill by London Stereoscopic Company, c1870.jpg|thumb|256x256px|John Stuart Mill proposed a version of the will congruent with his ethics of utilitarianism]]
Besides the objections in Kohl's essay, [[John Stuart Mill]] had another version of the will, as written in his [[Utilitarianism (book)|''Utilitarianism'']] book. John Stuart Mill, as his ethical theory runs, proposes the will operates in the same fashion, that is following the greatest happiness principle: actions are morally right as long as they advocate for happiness and morally wrong if they advocate for pain<ref name=":182">{{Cite book|last=Mill|first=John Stuart|title=Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society|publisher=University of Toronto|year=1969|isbn=0-8020-1521-2|editor-last=Robson|editor-first=J.M.|location=Toronto|pages=210, 238–239}}</ref> The will is demonstrated when someone executes their goals without pleasure from incentivizing their contemplation or the end of fulfilling them, and he or she continues to act according to his or her goals,<ref name=":182" /> even if the emotions one had felt in the beginning of fulfilling their goals has decreased over time, whether it be from changes in their personality or desires, or their goals become counterbalanced by the pains of trying to fulfill them.<ref name=":182" /> Also, John Stuart Mill mentioned that the process of using one's will can become unnoticeable.<ref name=":182" /> This is a consequence of habit making volition—the act "of choosing or determining"<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volition|title=Definition of VOLITION|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2020-02-21}}</ref>—second nature.<ref name=":182" /> Sometimes, using the will, according to Mill, becomes so habitual that it opposes any deliberate contemplation of one's options.<ref name=":182" /> This, he believes, is commonplace among those who have sinister, harmful habits.<ref name=":182" />

Although the will can seem to become second nature because of habit, that is not always the case since the habit is changeable to the will, and the "will is [changeable] to habit."<ref name=":182" /> This could happen when one wills away from habit what he or she no longer desires for their self,<ref name=":182" /> or one could desire from willing to desire something.<ref name=":182" /> In the case of someone who does not have a virtuous will, Mill recommends to make that individual "''desire'' virtue".<ref name=":182" /> In this, Mill means desiring virtue because of the pleasure it brings over the pain that not having it would bring, in accordance with the greatest happiness principle: actions are morally right as long as they advocate for happiness and morally wrong if they advocate for pain.<ref name=":182" /> Then, one has to routinely "will what is right"<ref name=":182" /> in order to make their will instrumental in achieving more pleasure than pain.<ref name=":182" />

==Schopenhauer==
{{main|Will to live}}
[[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]] disagreed with Kant's critics and stated that it is absurd to assume that phenomena have no basis. Schopenhauer proposed that we cannot know the thing in itself as though it is a cause of phenomena. Instead, he said that we can know it by knowing our own body, which is the only thing that we can know at the same time as both a phenomenon and a thing in itself.

When we become conscious of ourself, we realize that our essential qualities are endless urging, craving, striving, wanting, and desiring. These are characteristics of that which we call our will. Schopenhauer affirmed that we can legitimately think that all other phenomena are also essentially and basically will. According to him, will "is the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man...."<ref>''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', vol. I, § 21</ref> Schopenhauer said that his predecessors mistakenly thought that the will depends on knowledge. According to him, though, the will is primary and uses knowledge in order to find an object that will satisfy its craving. That which, in us, we call will is Kant's "thing in itself", according to Schopenhauer.

Arthur Schopenhauer put the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in these terms:
<blockquote>Everyone believes himself ''a priori'' to be perfectly free, even in his individual actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence another manner of life ... But ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'', through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subjected to necessity, that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must carry out the very character which he himself condemns...<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur, ''The Wisdom of Life'', p 147</ref></blockquote>
In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."<ref>[[Schopenhauer]], Arthur, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell {{ISBN|0-631-14552-4}}</ref>

==Nietzsche==
{{further|Friedrich Nietzsche|The Will to Power (manuscript)|l2=The Will to Power|Intrinsic motivation}}

[[Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche]] was influenced by Schopenhauer when younger, but later felt him to be wrong. However, he maintained a modified focus upon will, making the term "[[will to power]]" famous as an explanation of human aims and actions.

==Psychology/psychiatry==
{{further|Self control|Volition (psychology)}}

[[Psychologist]]s also deal with issues of will and "willpower". They investigate the ability of people to affect their will in behaviour. Some people are highly intrinsically motivated and do whatever seems best to them, while others are "weak-willed" and easily suggestible (extrinsically motivated) by society or outward inducement. Apparent failures of the will and volition have also reportedly been associated with a number of mental and neurological disorders.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Berrios | first1 = G.E. | last2 = Gili | first2 = M. | year = 1995 | title = Will and its disorders. A conceptual history | journal = History of Psychiatry | volume = 6 | issue = 21| pages = 87–104 | doi=10.1177/0957154x9500602105| s2cid = 145097744 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Berrios | first1 = G.E. | last2 = Gili | first2 = M. | year = 1995 | title = Abulia and impulsiveness revisited | journal = Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica | volume = 92 | issue = 3| pages = 161–167 | doi=10.1111/j.1600-0447.1995.tb09561.x| pmid = 7484191 | s2cid = 8085353 }}</ref> They also study the phenomenon of [[Akrasia]], wherein people seemingly act against their best interests and know that they are doing so (for instance, restarting cigarette smoking after having intellectually decided to quit). Advocates of [[Sigmund Freud]]'s psychology stress the importance of the influence of the [[unconscious mind]] upon the apparent conscious exercise of will. [[Abraham Low]], a critic of psychoanalysis,<ref name="SAGARINMENTAL1969">{{cite book |last=Sagarin |first=Edward |author-link=Edward Sagarin |title=Odd Man In: Societies of Deviants in America |year=1969 |publisher=Quadrangle Books |location=[[Chicago, Illinois]] |isbn=0-531-06344-5 |oclc=34435 |pages=210–232 |chapter=Chapter 9. Mental patients: are they their brothers' therapists?}}</ref> stressed the importance of will, the ability to control thoughts and impulses, as fundamental for achieving [[mental health]].<ref name="WECHSLER1960">{{cite journal |title=The self-help organization in the mental health field: Recovery, Inc., a case study |journal=The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease |volume=130 |date=April 1960 |pages=297–314 |last=Wechsler |first=Henry |pmid=13843358 |oclc=13848734 |issn=0022-3018 |doi=10.1097/00005053-196004000-00004|s2cid=43558073 }}</ref>

== See also ==
* [[Aboulia]]
* [[Akinetic mutism]]
* [[Akrasia]]
* [[Categorical imperative]]
* [[Neuroscience of free will]]
* [[Time management]]
* [[True Will]]
* [[Vīrya]]
* [[Volition (psychology)]]
* [[Voluntarism (philosophy)]]
* [[Will of God]]

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

==Bibliography==
* [https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantscr03mlgoog ''Critique of Pure Reason'']
* ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', vol. 1, Dover edition, 1966, {{ISBN|0-486-21761-2}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite book
 |last=St. Augustine
|author-link = Augustine of Hippo
 |year=1993
 |title=On Free Choice of the Will
 |publisher=Hackett Pub. Co
 |isbn=0-87220-188-0
 }}
* Dorschel, Andreas, 'The Authority of Will', ''The Philosophical Forum'' XXXIII (2002), nr. 4, pp.&nbsp;425–441.
* {{cite book
 |last=Luther
 |first=Martin
 |author-link=Martin Luther
 |year=1990
 |title=The Bondage of the Will
 |publisher=Revell
 |language=de
 |isbn=0-8007-5342-9
 |url=https://archive.org/details/bondageofwill00mart_0
 }}
* {{cite book
 |last=Nietzsche
 |first=Friedrich
|author-link = Friedrich Nietzsche
 |year=1968
 |orig-year=1901
 |title=[[The Will to Power (manuscript)|The Will to Power]]
 |publisher=Vintage
 |language=de
 |isbn=0-394-70437-1
 }}

==External links==
{{wikiquote}}
* {{Cite EB1911|wstitle = Will (philosophy)|display=Will|pages=648–654|volume=28|first=Henry Herbert |last=Williams}}
* [http://iautistic.com/autism-theory-of-mind-revisited.php Autistics may not experience will as we understand it]
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ''Free Will'' entry]
* [http://www.willproject.org/ The Will Project] was a project proposed by [[Roberto Assagioli]] to explore all aspects and manifestations of the Will.

{{Philosophy topics}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Action (philosophy)]]
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]
[[Category:Concepts in social philosophy]]
[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind]]
[[Category:Consciousness]]
[[Category:Free will]]
[[Category:Mental processes]]
[[Category:Metaphysics of mind]]
[[Category:Psychological concepts]]