Editing Tragedy of the commons

{{Short description|Self-interests causing depletion of a shared resource}}
[[File:DARK_CLOUDS_OF_FACTORY_SMOKE_OBSCURE_CLARK_AVENUE_BRIDGE_-_NARA_-_550179.jpg|alt=Image shows atmospheric pollution caused by uncontrolled industrial emissions|thumb|[[Industrial pollution]] is one of the consequences of operators ignoring [[Externality|their effect]] on the shared environment.]]
{{Economics sidebar}}
The '''tragedy of the commons''' is the concept that, if many people enjoy unfettered access to a finite, valuable resource, such as a [[pasture]], they will tend to overuse it and may end up destroying its value altogether. Even if some users exercised voluntary restraint, the other users would merely replace them, the predictable result being a "[[tragedy]]" for all. The concept has been widely discussed, and criticised, in [[economics]], [[ecology]] and other sciences.

The [[#Metaphoric meaning|metaphorical term]] is the title of a 1968 essay by ecologist [[Garrett Hardin]]. The concept itself did not originate with Hardin but rather extends back to classical antiquity, being discussed by [[Aristotle]]. The principal concern of Hardin's essay was overpopulation of the planet. To prevent the inevitable tragedy (he argued) it was necessary to reject the principle (supposedly enshrined in the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]]) according to which every family has a right to choose the number of its offspring, and to replace it by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon".

Some scholars have argued that over-exploitation of the common resource is by no means inevitable, since the individuals concerned may be able to achieve mutual restraint by consensus. Others have contended that the metaphor is [[wikt:inapposite|inapposite]] or inaccurate because its exemplar{{snd}} unfettered access to common land{{snd}} did not exist historically, the right to exploit common land being controlled by law. The work of [[Elinor Ostrom]], who received the [[Nobel Prize in Economics]], is seen by some economists as having refuted Hardin's claims.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.4.211|access-date=19 May 2024|date=2019|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|last1=Frischmann|first1=Brett|last2=Marciano|first2=Alain|last3=Ramello|first3=Giordano| volume=33 | issue=4 | pages=211–228 | doi=10.1257/jep.33.4.211 }}</ref> Hardin's views on over-population  have been criticised as simplistic<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-019-0230-5 |title=Hardin's oversimplification of population growth|newspaper=Nature Sustainability |date=2019 |access-date=19 May 2024|last1=Hunter |first1=Lori |last2=Prakash|first2=Aseem }}</ref> and racist.<ref name="SPLC">{{cite web |title=Garrett Hardin |url=https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/garrett-hardin |website=Southern Poverty Law Center |access-date=30 August 2024}}</ref>

==Expositions==

[[File:Cows on Selsley Common - geograph.org.uk - 192472.jpg|thumb|Cows on [[Selsley#Selsley Common|Selsley Common]], [[UK]]. Lloyd used shared grazing of common land as an illustration of where abuse of rights could occur.]]

===Classical===
The concept of unrestricted-access resources becoming spent, where personal use does not incur personal expense, was discussed by the philosopher [[Aristotle]],<ref name="garretthardinsociety.org">{{Cite web |title=An Ecolate View of the Human Predicament by Garrett Hardin |publisher=The Garrett Hardin Society |url=https://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_ecolate_view_human_predicament.html |access-date=2022-11-24 |website=Garrett Hardin Society}}</ref> who observed in his ''[[Politics (Aristotle)|Politics]]'' that{{quote|"That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual."<ref name="classics.mit.edu">{{Cite web |title=Aristotle, Politics, Book 2 Ch 3 |publisher=MIT |url=https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.2.two.html|access-date=13 April 2025 |website=Internet Classics Archive}}</ref>}}

===Lloyd's pamphlet===
In 1833, the English economist [[William Forster Lloyd]] published "Two Lectures on the Checks to Population",{{sfn|Lloyd|1833}} a pamphlet that included a hypothetical example of over-use of a common resource.<ref>{{Cite ODNB|last=Thompson|first=Noel|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/27284|title=Thompson, William (1775–1833), socialist and economist|date=2004-09-23|series=Oxford Dictionary of National Biography|doi=10.1093/ref:odnb/27284}}</ref> This was the situation of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they were each entitled to let their cows graze.

He postulated that if a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, [[overgrazing]] could result. For each additional animal, a herder could receive additional benefits, while the whole group shared the resulting damage to the commons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Shields|first=Morgan William|date=2016|title=Enhancing insect diversity in agricultural landscapes while providing multiple additional benefits|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1603/ice.2016.111463|journal=2016 International Congress of Entomology|publisher=Entomological Society of America|doi=10.1603/ice.2016.111463|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 }}</ref> If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all.{{sfn|Lloyd|1833}}

Lloyd's pamphlet was written after the [[enclosure]] movement had eliminated the open field system of common property as the standard model for land exploitation in England (though there remained, and still remain, millions of acres of "common land": see 
{{section link|#Commons in historical reality}}). Carl Dahlman and others have asserted that his description was historically inaccurate, pointing to the fact that the system endured for hundreds of years without producing the disastrous effects claimed by Lloyd.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dahlman |first1=Carl Johan |title=The open field system and beyond: a property rights analysis of an economic institution |date=1980 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge; New York |isbn=9780521228817}}</ref>

===Garrett Hardin's article===
In 1968, [[ecology|ecologist]] [[Garrett Hardin]] explored this [[social dilemma]] in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons", published in the journal ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]''.<ref name="hardin6822">{{harvnb|Hardin|1968}}</ref> The essay derived its title from the pamphlet by [[William Forster Lloyd|Lloyd]], which he cites, on the over-grazing of common land:<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Zhong|first1=Xianxin|last2=He|first2=Shaotang|editor1-first=Richard B|editor1-last=Hoover|editor2-first=Arthur B. C|editor2-last=Walker Ii|date=1996-07-19|title=<title>High-resolution grazing incidence x-ray spectrometer and its characteristics</title>|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.245087|journal=Multilayer and Grazing Incidence X-Ray/EUV Optics III|volume=2805|pages=156–157|publisher=SPIE|doi=10.1117/12.245087|bibcode=1996SPIE.2805..156Z |s2cid=119679290}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|text=Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit{{snd}} in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.|author=Garrett Hardin|title=The Tragedy of the Commons}}
Hardin discussed problems that cannot be solved by technical means, as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the techniques of the [[natural science]]s,<ref>{{Citation|title=Problems Solved by Means of the Lagrangian Formalism|date=2014-08-26|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b17232-9|work=Analytical Mechanics|pages=165–235|publisher=CRC Press|doi=10.1201/b17232-9|isbn=978-0-429-06861-4|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> demanding little or nothing in the way of change in [[Value (personal and cultural)|human values]] or ideas of [[morality]]". Hardin focused on human [[population growth]], the use of the Earth's [[natural resource]]s, and the welfare state.<ref name="Intolerable">{{harvnb|Hardin |1968|p=1248|ps=: "it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons?"}}</ref>

Hardin argued that if individuals relied on themselves alone, and not on the relationship between society and man, then people will treat other people as resources, which would lead to the world population growing and for the process to continue.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Decoupled maternal and zygotic genetic effects shape the evolution of development (Table 3. A number of individuals from each family were used in mapping crosses.) |journal=eLife|date=10 September 2018|volume=7|pages=e37143|doi=10.7554/elife.37143.009|last1=Zakas|first1=Christina|last2=Deutscher|first2=Jennifer M.|last3=Kay|first3=Alex D.|last4=Rockman|first4=Matthew V.|editor1=Nordborg, Magnus|editor2=Tautz, Diethard|editor3=Nordborg, Magnus|editor4=Tessmar, Kristin |doi-access=free }}</ref> Parents breeding excessively would leave fewer descendants because they would be unable to provide for each child adequately. Such negative feedback is found in the animal kingdom.<ref name="Intolerable" /> Hardin said that if the children of improvident parents starved to death, if overbreeding was its own punishment, then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families.<ref name="Intolerable" />

====Political inferences====

Hardin blamed the [[welfare state]] for allowing the tragedy of the commons; where the state provides for children and supports over breeding as a fundamental human right, a [[Malthusian catastrophe]] is inevitable. Consequently, in his article, Hardin lamented the following proposal from the [[United Nations]]:<ref name="HARDIN 202–212">{{Citation|last=Hardin |first=Garrett |title=Excerpts from 'The Tragedy of the Commons'|work=Environment and Society|year=2017 |pages=202–212|publisher=NYU Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctt1ht4vw6.33|isbn=978-1-4798-4474-6|doi-access=free}}</ref>

{{blockquote|text= The [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]] describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. [Article 16]<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ |title=The Universal Declaration of Human Rights |newspaper=United Nations |date=10 December 1948 |access-date=4 September 2011|last1=Nations |first1=United }}</ref> It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else. |source= Statement on Population by the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]]<ref name="U Thant Statement">{{Cite book |title=Levels and trends of contraceptive use as assessed in 2002 |publisher=United Nations Publications |last=United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division |quote=some have argued that it may be inferred from the rights to privacy, conscience, health and well-being set forth in various United Nation's conventions […] Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children (United Nations, 1968) |year=2004 |page=126 |isbn=978-92-1-151399-8|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BNkRbI8EAJgC }}</ref> |sign= [[U Thant]]}}

In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be depleted. Overall, Hardin argued against relying on [[conscience]] as a means of policing commons, suggesting that this favors [[selfish]] individuals&nbsp;– often known as [[Free-rider problem|free riders]]&nbsp;– over those who are more altruistic.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Touch-screen-guided task reveals a prosocial choice tendency by chimpanzees (''Pan troglodytes'') {{!}} Figure 4: Proportion of the cumulative mean for combinations of two options: S-A, (selfish and altruistic), P-A (prosocial and altruistic) and P-S (prosocial and selfish) in Experiment 2 for five individuals (A) and Pan (B).|journal=PeerJ|date=31 July 2018|volume=6|pages=e5315|doi=10.7717/peerj.5315/fig-4|last1=Mendonça|first1=Renata S.|last2=Dahl|first2=Christoph D.|last3=Carvalho|first3=Susana|last4=Matsuzawa|first4=Tetsuro|last5=Adachi|first5=Ikuma |doi-access=free }}</ref>

In the context of avoiding [[over-exploitation]] of [[Common-pool resource|common resources]], Hardin concluded by restating [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]'s [[Maxim (saying)|maxim]] (which was quoted by [[Friedrich Engels|Engels]]), "freedom is the recognition of necessity".<ref>{{Citation|last=James|first=David|title=Hegel and Marx on the Historical Necessity of the Terror|date=2021-03-04|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198847885.003.0005|work=Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History|pages=101–124|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/oso/9780198847885.003.0005|isbn=978-0-19-884788-5|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> He suggested that "freedom" completes the tragedy of the commons. By recognizing resources as commons in the first place, and by recognizing that, as such, they require management, Hardin believed that humans "can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms".<ref name="HARDIN 202–212"/>

===The "Commons" as a modern resource concept===
Hardin's article marked the mainstream acceptance of the term "commons" as used to connote a shared resource.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Xepapadeas|first=Anastasios|date=June 1995|title=Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00691575|journal=Environmental & Resource Economics|volume=5|issue=4|pages=375–391|doi=10.1007/bf00691575|bibcode=1995EnREc...5..375X |s2cid=153630734|issn=0924-6460}}</ref> As [[Frank van Laerhoven]] and [[Elinor Ostrom]] have stated: "Prior to the publication of Hardin’s article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles containing the words 'the commons', 'common pool resources', or 'common property' were very rare in the academic literature."<ref name="Nagle 2018">{{Cite journal|last=Nagle|first=Frank|date=2018|title=The Digital Commons: Tragedy or Opportunity? A Reflection on the 50th Anniversary of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301005|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3301005|s2cid=158249954|issn=1556-5068}}</ref> They go on to say: "In 2002, Barrett and Mabry conducted a major survey of biologists to determine which publications in the twentieth century had become classic books or benchmark publications in biology.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barrett|first1=Gary W.|last2=Mabry |first2=Karen E.|date=2002|title=Twentieth-Century Classic Books and Benchmark Publications in Biology|journal=BioScience|volume=52|issue=3|pages=282|doi=10.1641/0006-3568(2002)052[0282:tccbab]2.0.co;2|s2cid=86354323 |issn=0006-3568|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Lisa|first=Lucas|title=The research game in academic life|date=2006|publisher=Open University Press|isbn=978-0-335-22997-0|oclc=245532963}}</ref> They report that Hardin’s 1968 article was the one having the greatest career impact on biologists and is the most frequently cited".<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.18352/ijc.76| title=Traditions and Trends in the Study of the Commons| year=2007| last1=van Laerhoven| first1=Frank| last2=Ostrom| first2=Elinor| journal=International Journal of the Commons| volume=1| issue=1|pages=3–28| s2cid=18897696|url=https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3137/7.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y}}</ref> However, the Ostroms point out that Hardin's analysis was based on crucial misconceptions about the nature of common property systems.

=== System archetype ===
[[File:Tragedy_of_the_commons.PNG|thumb|[[Causal loop diagram]] of the "tragedy of the commons"]]
In [[systems theory]], the commons problem is one of the ten most common [[system archetype]]s. The Tragedy of the Commons archetype can be illustrated using a causal loop diagram.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Senge |first1=Peter M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bVZqAAAAMAAJ |title=The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization |last2=Senge |first2=Peter M. |date=1990 |publisher=Doubleday/Currency |isbn=978-0-385-26094-7 |language=en}}</ref>

==Application==

===Metaphoric meaning===
Like Lloyd and [[Thomas Malthus]] before him, Hardin was primarily interested in the problem of [[Human overpopulation|human population growth]]. But in his essay, he also focused on the use of larger (though finite) resources such as the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, as well as pointing out the "negative commons" of pollution (i.e., instead of dealing with the deliberate privatization of a positive resource, a "negative commons" deals with the deliberate commonization of a negative cost, pollution).

As a [[metaphor]], the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The "tragedy" is not in the word's conventional or theatric sense, nor a condemnation of the processes that lead to it. Similarly, Hardin's use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading him to later remark that he should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons".<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2006/07/26/life/will-commons-sense-dawn-again-in-time/ |title=Will commons sense dawn again in time? |publisher=Search.japantimes.co.jp |date=2006-07-26 |access-date=22 October 2013|newspaper=The Japan Times Online |last1=Hesse |first1=Stephen }}</ref>{{sfn|Hardin|1998}}

The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through [[over-exploitation]], temporarily or permanently. This occurs because the benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to maximize the use of the resource to the point in which they become reliant on it, while the costs of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available (which may be a wider class of individuals than those who are exploiting it). This, in turn, causes demand for the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball until the resource collapses (even if it retains a capacity to recover). The rate at which depletion of the resource is realized depends primarily on three factors: the number of users wanting to consume the common in question, the consumptive nature<!-- Can we find a better word? This is super awkward. --> of their uses, and the relative robustness of the common.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 43267404|title = Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions|last1 = Daniels|first1 = Brigham|journal = Environmental Law|volume = 37|issue = 3|pages = 515–571 [536]|year = 2007|ssrn=1227745}}</ref>

The same concept is sometimes called the "tragedy of the fishers", because fishing too many fish before or during breeding could cause stocks to plummet.<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HAiMDU4qv0IC&pg=PA27 | title=Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution| isbn=978-1-4008-2931-6| last1=Bowles| first1=Samuel| date=2004|publisher=Princeton University Press|pages=27–29}}</ref>

===Modern commons===
[[File:Fat tailed sheep, Afghanistan, 1976.jpg|thumb|An over-grazed landscape]]
The ''tragedy of the commons'' can be considered in relation to environmental issues such as [[sustainability]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hawkshaw|first1=Robert|last2=Hawkshaw|first2=Sarah|last3=Sumaila|first3=U.|date=2012-11-15|title=The Tragedy of the 'Tragedy of the Commons': Why Coining Too Good a Phrase Can Be Dangerous|journal=Sustainability|volume=4|issue=11|pages=3141–3150|doi=10.3390/su4113141|issn=2071-1050|doi-access=free|hdl=10535/8775|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water, forests,<ref>{{cite news|first=K.|last=Andersson|date=1996|title=The Tragedy of the Common Forest: Why the Pacific Northwest Forest Conflict is a 'No Technical Solution' Problem|work=Oregon Daily Emerald|url= http://www.wildfirenews.com/oregon/commons.html }}</ref> fish, and [[non-renewable energy]] sources such as oil, gas, and coal.

Hardin's model posits that the tragedy of the commons may emerge if individuals prioritize self-interest.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Berkes |first1=F. |last2=Feeny |first2=D. |last3=McCay |first3=B. J. |last4=Acheson |first4=J. M. |date=July 1989 |title=The benefits of the commons |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/340091a0 |journal=Nature |volume=340 |issue=6229 |pages=91–93 |doi=10.1038/340091a0 |bibcode=1989Natur.340...91B |s2cid=4310769 |issn=0028-0836}}</ref> {{citation needed span|Government regulations have been instituted to avert resource degradation. However, extensive research spanning decades highlights instances where community-level resource management, operating independently of government intervention, has effectively overseen common resources. In the United States, fishing communities employ a strategy wherein access to local fishing areas is restricted to accepted members, resembling a private, members-only club. Membership is sustained through fee payments, and outsiders are met with resistance, showcasing a quasi-privatized system.|date=November 2023}}

Another case study involves beavers in Canada, historically crucial for natives who, as stewards, organized to hunt them for food and commerce. Non-native trappers, motivated by fur prices, contributed to resource degradation, wresting control from the indigenous population. Conservation laws enacted in the 1930s in response to declining beaver populations led to the expulsion of trappers, legal acknowledgment of natives, and enforcement of customary laws. This intervention resulted in productive harvests by the 1950s.<ref>{{cite journal | author-link = Harvey A. Feit | title = Re-cognizing Co-management as Co-governance: Visions and Histories of Conservation at James Bay | journal = Anthropologica | volume = 47 | pages = 267–288 | date = 2005 | issue = 2 | jstor = 25606240 | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/25606240 | last1 = Feit | first1 = Harvey A. }}</ref>

Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction of the [[Grand Banks of Newfoundland]], the destruction of [[salmon]] runs on rivers that have been dammed<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hsu|first=Shi-Ling|date=2005|title=What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.668723|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.668723 |s2cid=142253315 |issn=1556-5068}}</ref> (most prominently in modern times on the [[Columbia River]] in the [[Northwest United States]] and historically in [[North Atlantic]] rivers), and the devastation of the sturgeon fishery (in modern Russia, but historically in the United States as well). In terms of water supply, another example is the limited water available in arid regions (e.g., the area of the [[Aral Sea]] and the [[Los Angeles]] water system supply, especially at [[Mono Lake]] and [[Owens Lake]]).

In economics, an [[externality]] is a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit.<ref>{{Citation|last=Trumbull|first=William N.|title=Who has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis?|date=2009-04-22|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444307177.ch4|work=Cost-Benefit Analysis and Public Policy|pages=37–51|place=Oxford, UK|publisher=Blackwell Publishing Ltd.|doi=10.1002/9781444307177.ch4|isbn=978-1-4443-0717-7|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Price, Richard|title=Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution and the means of making it a benefit to the world|date=2018|publisher=Hansebooks |isbn=978-3-337-53529-2|oclc=1189696999}}</ref> Negative externalities are a well-known feature of the "tragedy of the commons". For example, driving cars has many negative externalities; these include [[pollution]], [[carbon emissions]], and traffic accidents. Every time Person A gets in a car, it becomes more likely that Person Z will suffer in each of those areas.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/magazine/20wwln-freakonomics-t.html |title=Not-So-Free Ride |last1=Dubner |first1=Stephen J. |last2=Levitt |first2=Steven D. |date=2008-04-20 |website=The New York Times |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-25}}</ref> Economists often urge the government to adopt policies that "internalize" an externality.<ref>Jaeger, William. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=uhBkp5rmrXgC&pg=PA80 Environmental Economics for Tree Huggers and Other Skeptics]'', p. 80 (Island Press 2012): "Economists often say that externalities need to be 'internalized,' meaning that some action needs to be taken to correct this kind of market failure."</ref>

The ''tragedy of the commons'' can also refer to the idea of [[open data]].<ref>{{Citation|last=Haire |first=Sandra |title=What Can SourceForge.net Data Alone Tell Us about Open-Source Software Commons? |date=2012-06-08 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262017251.003.0008|work=Internet Success|pages=143–178|publisher=The MIT Press|doi=10.7551/mitpress/9780262017251.003.0008|isbn=978-0-262-01725-1|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> Anonymised data are crucial for useful social research and represent therefore a public resource{{snd}} better said, a common good{{snd}} which is liable to exhaustion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Taylor |first=Linnet|date=2018-06-19|title=The ethics of big data as a public good: which public? Whose good?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/r49yp |access-date=2021-05-24 |doi=10.31228/osf.io/r49yp|s2cid=242083314 |journal=Philosophical Transactions. Series A, Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences|volume=374 |issue=2083 |pmid=28336800 |pmc=5124068}}</ref> Some feel that the law should provide a safe haven for the dissemination of research data, since it can be argued that current data protection policies overburden valuable research without mitigating realistic risks.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yakowitz Bambauer |first=Jane|date=2011 |title=Tragedy of the Data Commons |ssrn=1789749 |journal=Harvard Journal of Law and Technology |language=en |volume=25|issue=1}}</ref>

An expansive application of the concept can also be seen in Vyse's<ref name="SI Vyse">{{cite journal |last1=Vyse |first1=Stuart |title=The tragedy of our commons |journal=[[Skeptical Inquirer]] |date=2021 |volume=45 |issue=2 |pages=20–24}}</ref> analysis of differences between countries in their responses to the [[COVID-19 pandemic]].<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2020-11-06|title=COVID-19 crisis response in MENA countries|journal=OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19)|doi=10.1787/4b366396-en|s2cid=240621499|issn=2708-0676|doi-access=free}}</ref>  Vyse argues that those who defy public health recommendations can be thought of as spoiling a set of common goods,<ref>{{Citation|title=Common Goods and Public Goods|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474240062.ch-005|work=Global Ethics and Global Common Goods|year=2015|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|doi=10.5040/9781474240062.ch-005|isbn=978-1-4725-8084-9|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> "the economy, the healthcare system, and the very air we breathe,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Vyaznikov|first=V.E.|date=2018 |chapter=Reformation Of Public Healthcare System As Measure To Improve Healthcare And Economy |series=The European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences |title=Research Paradigms Transformation in Social Sciences |pages=1379–1385 |publisher=Future Academy |editor-first1=I. B. |editor-last1=Ardashkin |editor-first2=B. Vladimir |editor-last2=Iosifovich |editor-first3=N. V. |editor-last3=Martyushev|doi=10.15405/epsbs.2018.12.168 |s2cid=170065825}}</ref> for all of us. In a similar vein, it has been argued that higher sickness and mortality rates from COVID-19 in individualistic cultures with less obligatory collectivism,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Maaravi |first1=Yossi |last2=Levy |first2=Aharon |last3=Gur |first3=Tamar |last4=Confino |first4=Dan |last5=Segal |first5=Sandra |date=2021-02-11 |title="The Tragedy of the Commons": How Individualism and Collectivism Affected the Spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic |journal=Frontiers in Public Health |volume=9 |page=627559 |doi=10.3389/fpubh.2021.627559 |issn=2296-2565 |pmc=7905028 |pmid=33643992 |doi-access=free}}</ref> is another instance of the "tragedy of the commons".

=== Tragedy of the digital commons ===
In the past two decades, scholars have been attempting to apply the concept of the tragedy of the commons to the digital environment. However, between scholars there are differences on some very basic notions inherent to the tragedy of the commons: the idea of finite resources and the extent of pollution.<ref name="Nagle 2018"/> On the other hand, there seems to be some agreement on the role of the [[digital divide]] and how to solve a potential tragedy of the digital commons.<ref name="Nagle 2018"/>

==== Resources ====
Many digital resources have properties that make them vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons, including [[Knowledge commons|data]],<ref>{{cite book|doi=10.7551/mitpress/6980.001.0001 |title=Understanding Knowledge as a Commons |date=2006 |isbn=9780262256346 |editor-last1=Hess |editor-last2=Ostrom |editor-first1=Charlotte |editor-first2=Elinor }},</ref> virtual artifacts<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.338500 | journal=SSRN| title=On Virtual Economies | date=2002 | last1=Castronova | first1=Edward | s2cid=263755316 }},</ref> and even [[Attention economy|limited user attention]].<ref>{{cite book|chapter-url=https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/books/9789027285669-pbns.39.10kol |title=Computer-Mediated Communication |chapter=Managing the virtual commons: Cooperation and conflict in computer communities |date=26 June 1996 |page=109 |publisher=John Benjamins }}</ref> Closely related are the physical computational resources, such as [[CPU]], [[RAM]], and [[Bandwidth (computing)|network bandwidth]], that digital communities  on [[Shared web hosting service|shared servers]] rely upon and govern.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0216335| doi-access=free| title=Emergence of integrated institutions in a large population of self-governing communities| date=2019| last1=Frey| first1=Seth| last2=Sumner| first2=Robert W.| journal=PLOS ONE| volume=14| issue=7| pages=e0216335| pmid=31295260| pmc=6622466| arxiv=1804.10312| bibcode=2019PLoSO..1416335F}}</ref> Some scholars argue that digital resources are infinite, and therefore immune to the tragedy of the commons, because downloading a file does not constitute the destruction of the file in the [[Digital environments|digital environment]],<ref>{{Citation|last1=Tzitzikas |first1=Yannis |last2=Marketakis |first2=Yannis |title=The File MyContacts.con: On Reading Unknown Digital Resources|date=2018|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98488-9_15|work=Cinderella's Stick|pages=147–153|place=Cham|publisher=Springer International Publishing|isbn=978-3-319-98487-2|access-date=2021-05-24|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-98488-9_15}}</ref> and because it can be replicated and disseminated throughout the digital environment.<ref name="Greco-2004">{{Cite journal|last1=Greco|first1=Gian Maria|last2=Floridi|first2=Luciano|date=2004|title=The tragedy of the digital commons|url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10676-004-2895-2|journal=Ethics and Information Technology|language=en|volume=6|issue=2|pages=73–81|doi=10.1007/s10676-004-2895-2|s2cid=5990776|issn=1388-1957}}</ref> However, it can still be considered a finite resource within the context of privacy laws and regulations that limit access to it.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Yakowitz Bambauer |first=Jane |date=2011 |title=Tragedy of the Data Commons |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789749|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.1789749|issn=1556-5068}}</ref>

Finite digital resources can thus be [[Digital commons (economics)|digital commons]]. An example is a [[database]] that requires persistent maintenance, such as [[Wikipedia]]. As a non-profit, it survives on a network of people contributing to maintain a knowledge base without expectation of direct compensation. This digital resource will deplete as Wikipedia may only survive if it is contributed to and used as a commons. The motivation for individuals to contribute is reflective of the theory because, if humans act in their own immediate interest and no longer participate, then the resource becomes misinformed or depleted. Arguments surrounding the regulation and mitigation requirements for digital resources may become reflective of natural resources.<ref>D. Anthony, S. W. Smith, and T. Williamson, "[http://web.mit.edu/iandeseminar/Papers/Fall2005/anthony.pdf Explaining quality in internet collective goods: zealots and good samaritans in the case of ''Wikipedia'']", THanover : Dartmouth College, Technical Report, November 2005.</ref><ref>{{Citation |url=http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2007-606.pdf |title=The Quality of Open Source Production: Zealots and Good Samaritans in the Case of ''Wikipedia'' |first1=Denise |last1=Anthony |first2=Sean W. |last2=Smith |first3=Tim |last3=Williamson |journal=Technical Report TR2007-606 |publisher=Dartmouth College |date=April 2007 |access-date=2011-05-29 |archive-date=2011-06-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606072402/http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2007-606.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

This raises the question whether one can view access itself as a finite resource in the context of a digital environment. Some scholars argue this point, often pointing to a proxy for access that is more concrete and measurable.<ref>{{Cite journal|doi=10.1002/leap.1093 |title=Authors from the periphery countries choose open access more often |date=2017 |last1=Kieńć |first1=Witold |journal=Learned Publishing |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=125–131 |s2cid=20237315 |doi-access=free }}</ref> One such proxy is [[Bandwidth (computing)|bandwidth]], which can become congested when too many people try to access the digital environment.<ref name="Greco-2004" /><ref name="Springer-2009">{{Cite journal|last=C. D.|first=Springer|date=2009|title=Avoiding a Tragedy: Information Literacy and the Tragedy of the Digital Commons|journal=Library Philosophy and Practice|volume=5}}</ref> Alternatively, one can think of the network itself as a common resource which can be exhausted through overuse.<ref name="Gupta-1997">{{Cite journal|last1=Gupta|first1=A.|last2=Jukic|first2=B.|last3=Parameswaran|first3=M.|last4=Stahl|first4=D.O.|last5=Whinston|first5=A.B.|date=November–December 1997|title=Streamlining the digital economy: how to avert a tragedy of the commons|url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/643935|journal=IEEE Internet Computing |volume=1 |issue=6 |pages=38–46 |doi=10.1109/4236.643935}}</ref> Therefore, when talking about resources running out in a digital environment, it could be more useful to think in terms of the access to the digital environment being restricted in some way; this is called [[information entropy]].<ref>{{Citation|title=Chapter 5. Organizing Access to Digital Information Sources|date=2004-01-28|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783598440052.109 |work=Digital Libraries |pages=109–128|place=Berlin, New York |publisher=Walter de Gruyter{{snd}} K. G. Saur |doi=10.1515/9783598440052.109|isbn=978-3-598-44005-2|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>

==== Pollution ====

In terms of pollution, there are some scholars who look only at the pollution that occurs in the digital environment itself.<ref>{{Citation|last=Weis|first=Judith S.|title=Introduction to the Marine Environment and Pollution|date=2015-01-08|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780199996698.003.0001|work=Marine Pollution|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/wentk/9780199996698.003.0001|isbn=978-0-19-999669-8|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources can cause an overproduction of redundant data which causes noise and corrupts communication channels within the digital environment.<ref name="Greco-2004" /> Others argue that the pollution caused by the overuse of digital resources also causes pollution in the physical environment.<ref>{{Citation|title=Does pollution overrun anti-pollution?: Pollution efficiency and environmental management in Bangladesh|date=2015-11-17|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b19079-26|work=Water Resources and Environment|pages=147–150|publisher=CRC Press|doi=10.1201/b19079-26|isbn=978-0-429-22563-5|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref> They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources causes misinformation, fake news, crime, and terrorism, as well as problems of a different nature such as confusion, manipulation, insecurity, and loss of confidence.<ref>{{Citation|title=Fake News Fingerprints|date=2020|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11807.003.0019|work=Fake News|publisher=The MIT Press|doi=10.7551/mitpress/11807.003.0019|isbn=978-0-262-35738-8|s2cid=241063966|access-date=2021-05-24 |last1=Faltesek |first1=Dan |pages=165–178 }}</ref><ref name="Almeida-2020">{{Cite journal|last1=Almeida|first1=Virgilio|last2=Filgueiras|first2=Fernando|last3=Gaetani|first3=Francisco|last4=Almeida|first4=Virgilio|date=2020-07-01|title=Digital Governance and the Tragedy of the Commons|url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9195909|journal=IEEE Internet Computing|volume=24|issue=4|pages=41–46|doi=10.1109/MIC.2020.2979639|s2cid=221845343|issn=1089-7801}}</ref>

==== Digital divide and solutions ====
Scholars disagree on the particularities underlying the tragedy of the digital commons; however, there does seem to be some agreement on the cause and the solution.<ref name="Nagle 2018"/> The cause of the tragedy of the commons occurring in the digital environment is attributed by some scholars to the digital divide.<ref name="Nagle 2018"/> They argue that there is too large a focus on bridging this divide and providing unrestricted access to everyone. Such a focus on increasing access without the necessary restrictions causes the exploitation of digital resources for individual self-interest that is underlying any tragedy of the commons.<ref name="Greco-2004" /><ref name="Springer-2009" />

In terms of the solution, scholars agree that cooperation rather than regulation is the best way to mitigate a tragedy of the digital commons.<ref name="Nagle 2018"/> The digital world is not a closed system in which a central authority can regulate the users, as such some scholars argue that voluntary cooperation must be fostered.<ref name="Springer-2009" /> This could perhaps be done through [[digital governance]] structure that motivates multiple stakeholders to engage and collaborate in the decision-making process.<ref name="Almeida-2020" /> Other scholars argue more in favor of formal or informal sets of rules, like a code of conduct, to promote ethical behaviour in the digital environment and foster trust.<ref name="Greco-2004" /><ref>{{Citation|last1=Curien |first1=Nicolas |last2=Fauchart |first2=Emmanuelle |last3=Laffond |first3=Gilbert |last4=Moreau |first4=François |editor1-last=Brousseau |editor1-first=Eric |editor2-last=Curien |editor2-first=Nicolas |title=Online consumer communities: escaping the tragedy of the digital commons |date=2007|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9780511493201A017/type/book_part|work=Internet and Digital Economics|pages=201–219|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511493201.006 |isbn=978-0-511-49320-1|access-date=2020-12-23}}</ref> Alternative to managing relations between people, some scholars argue that it is access itself that needs to be properly managed, which includes expansion of network capacity.<ref name="Gupta-1997" />

==== Patents and technology ====
[[Patent]]s are effectively a limited-time exploitation monopoly given to inventors. Once the period has elapsed, the [[invention]] is in principle free to all, and many companies do indeed commercialize such products, now market-proven. However, around 50% of all [[patent]] applications do not reach successful commercialization at all, often due to immature levels of components or marketing failures by the innovators. Scholars have suggested that since investment is often connected to [[patentability]], such inactive patents form a rapidly ''growing'' category of underprivileged technologies and ideas that, under current market conditions, are effectively unavailable for use.<ref name="RID">Sariel, Aviram, Daniel Mishori, and Joseph Agassi. [https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article-abstract/10/10/759/830141 "The re-inventor's dilemma: a tragedy of the public domain."] Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 10 (2015).</ref> 
Thus, "Under the current system, people are encouraged to register new patents, and are discouraged from using publicly available patents."{{r|RID|p=765}} The case might be particularly relevant to technologies that are relatively more environmentally/human damaging but also somewhat costlier than other alternatives developed contemporaneously.{{r|RID|p=766}}

==Examples==
More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:

[[File:Lacanja burn.JPG|thumb|right|Clearing rainforest for agriculture in southern Mexico]]
* '''Physical resources'''
** Uncontrolled human [[population growth]] leading to [[Human overpopulation|overpopulation]].<ref name="hardin6822"/>
** [[Atmosphere]]: through the release of pollution that leads to [[ozone depletion]], [[global warming]], [[ocean acidification]] (by way of increased atmospheric {{CO2}} being absorbed by the sea), and [[particulate pollution]].<ref>{{Citation|title=Global Warming and Ocean Acidification|date=2020-07-09|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108395021.008|work=Understanding Environmental Pollution|pages=133–165|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108395021.008|isbn=978-1-108-39502-1|s2cid=241103265|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>
** [[Light pollution]]: with the loss of the night sky for research and cultural significance, affected human, flora and fauna health, nuisance, trespass and the loss of enjoyment or function of private property.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://theecologist.org/2010/aug/31/dark-nights-global-effort-tackle-light-pollution |title=Dark nights: the global effort to tackle light pollution |website=The Ecologist |language=en |access-date=2020-02-24|first=Carrie |last=Madren|date= August 31, 2010}}</ref>
** [[Water]]: [[Water pollution]], [[Water security|water crisis]] of over-extraction of groundwater and wasting water due to [[Irrigation#Technical challenges|overirrigation]].<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1080/02508060008686794 |title = Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources|year = 2000|last1 = Shiklomanov|first1 = Igor A.|s2cid = 4936257|journal = Water International|volume = 25|issue=1|pages = 11–32| bibcode=2000WatIn..25...11S }}</ref>
** [[Forests]]: Frontier [[logging]] of [[old growth forest]] and [[slash and burn]].<ref>Wilson, E.O., 2002, ''The Future of Life'', Vintage {{ISBN|0-679-76811-4}}</ref>
** [[Energy resources]] and [[climate]]: Environmental residue of mining and drilling, burning of [[fossil fuels]] and consequential [[global warming]].<ref>{{Citation|last=Adler|first=Linus|title=Fossil Fuels|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452218564.n285|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Global Warming & Climate Change|year=2012|location=Thousand Oaks, CA|publisher=Sage Publications, Inc.|doi=10.4135/9781452218564.n285|isbn=978-1-4129-9261-9|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>
** [[Animal]]s: [[Habitat destruction]] and [[poaching]] leading to the [[Holocene extinction event|Holocene mass extinction]].<ref>Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996, ''The Sixth Extinction : Patterns of Life and the Future of Humankind'', Anchor, {{ISBN|0-385-46809-1}}</ref>
** [[Oceans]]: [[Overfishing]]<ref>Hogan, C. Michael (2014). [https://editors.eol.org/eoearth/wiki/Overfishing ''Overfishing'']. [[Encyclopedia of Earth]]. National Council for Science and the Environment. eds. Sidney Draggan and C. Cleveland. Washington, D.C.</ref><ref>ch 11–12. Mark Kurlansky, 1997. ''Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World'', New York: Walker, {{ISBN|0-8027-1326-2}}.</ref>
**[[Space debris]] in Earth's surrounding space leading to limited locations for new satellites and the obstruction of universal observations.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-50870117|title=Satellite constellations: Astronomers warn of threat to view of Universe|access-date=February 3, 2020|date=December 27, 2019|publisher=[[BBC]]}}</ref>
*'''Health'''
** [[Antibiotics]]{{spaced ndash}}[[antibiotic resistance]]: Misuse of antibiotics anywhere in the world may eventually result in the global antibiotic resistance, both in human and agricultural settings, which would cause an irreparable harm to the societal health, seen as a common goods. The survey of Kieran S. O'Brien ''et al.'' stated that many consider the misuse of antibiotics to be the case  of the "tragedy of the commons", however the research results in this respect were inconclusive (as of 2014).<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1155/2014/837929 | title=Antibiotic Use as a Tragedy of the Commons: A Cross-Sectional Survey | date=2014 | last1=O'Brien | first1=Kieran S. | last2=Blumberg | first2=Seth | last3=Enanoria | first3=Wayne T. A. | last4=Ackley | first4=Sarah | last5=Sippl-Swezey | first5=Nicolas | last6=Lietman | first6=Thomas M. | journal=Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine | pages=1–8 | doi-access=free | pmid=24587818 | pmc=3920666 | hdl=10535/9382 | hdl-access=free }}</ref>
** [[Vaccines]]{{spaced ndash}}[[Herd immunity]]: Avoiding a vaccine shot and relying on the established herd immunity instead will avoid potential vaccine risks, but if everyone does this, it will diminish herd immunity and bring risk to people who cannot receive vaccines for medical reasons. The analogy with the "tragedy of the commons" is based on the interpretation that the common goods here is the pool of the vaccinated people, and avoiding vaccination diminishes it.<ref>{{Cite journal |pmc = 4815604|year = 2016|last1 = Hendrix|first1 = K. S.|last2 = Sturm|first2 = L. A.|last3 = Zimet|first3 = G. D.|last4 = Meslin|first4 = E. M.|title = Ethics and Childhood Vaccination Policy in the United States|journal = American Journal of Public Health|volume = 106|issue = 2|pages = 273–278|pmid = 26691123|doi = 10.2105/AJPH.2015.302952}} Section 3: [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4815604/#__sec2title The tragedy of the (herd immunity) commons].</ref>
* '''Other'''
** [[Knowledge commons]] encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods in the information age, including, for example:
*** [[Source code]] and [[software documentation]] in software projects that can get "polluted" with messy code or inaccurate information.<ref name="reputation self-management">{{Cite book | doi=10.1145/2025113.2025166 |isbn = 978-1-4503-0443-6|chapter = Reputation-based self-management of software process artifact quality in consortium research projects|title = Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT symposium and the 13th European conference on Foundations of software engineering – SIGSOFT/FSE '11|year = 2011|last1 = Prause|first1 = Christian R.|s2cid = 3101839|pages = 380–383|chapter-url=https://www.drprause.de/files/ESEC2011-ReputationbasedSelfmanagementQuality.pdf}}</ref>
*** Skills acquisition and training, when all parties involved [[Buck passing|pass the buck]] on implementing it.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/skill-reskill-prepare-for-future-of-work/|title=Skill, re-skill and re-skill again. How to keep up with the future of work|author=Stephane Kasriel|date=2017-07-31|publisher=World Economic Forum}}</ref>

===Application to evolutionary biology===
A parallel was drawn in 2006 between the tragedy of the commons and the competing behaviour of parasites that, through acting selfishly, eventually diminish or destroy their common host.<ref>{{cite journal|hdl=10400.7/88|issn=1522-0613|url=http://eao.igc.gulbenkian.pt/ENS/dionisio_evol_econ_rivalry_excludability.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927000452/http://eao.igc.gulbenkian.pt/ENS/dionisio_evol_econ_rivalry_excludability.pdf|archive-date=2007-09-27|title=The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology|journal=Evolutionary Ecology Research|volume=8|pages= 321–332|first1=Francisco |last1=Dionisio|first2=Isabel |last2=Gordo|year=2006}}</ref> The idea has also been applied to areas such as the evolution of [[virulence]] or [[sexual conflict]], where males may fatally harm females when competing for matings.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/j.tree.2006.02.013 |pmid = 16697906|title = Sex, death and tragedy|year = 2006|last1 = Rankin|first1 = Daniel J.|last2 = Kokko|first2 = Hanna|journal = Trends in Ecology & Evolution|volume = 21|issue = 5|pages = 225–226| bibcode=2006TEcoE..21..225R |url=http://www.kokkonuts.org/p/Sexdeathtragedy.pdf}}</ref>

The idea of [[evolutionary suicide]], where adaptation at the level of the individual causes the whole species or population to be driven [[extinct]], can be seen as an extreme form of an evolutionary tragedy of the commons.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1600-0706.2005.14541.x | volume=111 | issue=3 | title=Can adaptation lead to extinction? | year=2005 | journal=Oikos | pages=616–619 | last1 = Rankin | first1 = Daniel J.| bibcode=2005Oikos.111..616R | citeseerx=10.1.1.692.9713 |url=http://www.socialgenes.org/publications/Pub_Oikos1.pdf|url-status=usurped | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110503175506/http://www.socialgenes.org/publications/Pub_Oikos1.pdf | archive-date=2011-05-03 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009 |pmid = 17981363|hdl = 1975/7498|title = The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology|year = 2007|last1 = Rankin|first1 = Daniel J.|last2 = Bargum|first2 = Katja|last3 = Kokko|first3 = Hanna|journal = Trends in Ecology & Evolution|volume = 22|issue = 12|pages = 643–651| bibcode=2007TEcoE..22..643R |url=http://www.kokkonuts.org/wp-content/uploads/Rankin_ToC.pdf}}</ref> From an evolutionary point of view, the creation of the tragedy of the commons in pathogenic microbes may provide us with advanced therapeutic methods.<ref>{{Cite journal | url=https://figshare.com/articles/The_tragedy_of_the_commons_and_prisoner/1533109 |title = The tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma may improve our realization of the theory of life and provide us with advanced therapeutic ways|journal = Figshare|date = 2015|first=Ahmed|last= Ibrahim|doi = 10.6084/m9.figshare.1533109.v8| s2cid=155620390 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis|last=Oosterhout|first=Gretchen|date=2000|title=An Evolutionary Simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons|type=PhD dissertation |publisher=Portland State University |doi=10.15760/etd.1250|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Microbial ecology studies have also addressed if resource availability modulates the cooperative or competitive behaviour in bacteria populations. When resources availability is high, bacterial populations become competitive and aggressive with each other, but when environmental resources are low, they tend to be cooperative and [[Mutualism (biology)|mutualistic]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hoek|first1=Tim A.|last2=Axelrod|first2=Kevin|last3=Biancalani|first3=Tommaso|last4=Yurtsev|first4=Eugene A.|last5=Liu|first5=Jinghui|last6=Gore|first6=Jeff|date=2016-08-24|title=Resource Availability Modulates the Cooperative and Competitive Nature of a Microbial Cross-Feeding Mutualism|journal=PLOS Biology|volume=14|issue=8|pages=e1002540|doi=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002540|pmid=27557335|pmc=4996419|issn=1545-7885 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

Ecological studies have hypothesised that [[Competition|competitive]] forces between animals are major in high [[carrying capacity]] zones (i.e., near the Equator), where biodiversity is higher, because of natural resources abundance. This abundance or excess of resources, causes animal populations to have [[r/K selection theory#r-selection|{{notatypo|''r''}} reproduction strategies]] (many offspring, short gestation, less parental care, and a short time until sexual maturity), so competition is affordable for populations. Also, competition could select populations to have {{notatypo|''r''}} behaviour in a [[positive feedback]] regulation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cardillo|first=Marcel|date=January 2002|title=The life-history basis of latitudinal diversity gradients: how do species traits vary from the poles to the equator?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.0021-8790.2001.00577.x|journal=Journal of Animal Ecology|volume=71|issue=1|pages=79–87|doi=10.1046/j.0021-8790.2001.00577.x|bibcode=2002JAnEc..71...79C |issn=0021-8790}}</ref>

Contrarily, in low [[carrying capacity]] zones (i.e., far from the equator), where environmental conditions are harsh, [[K strategist|''K'' strategies]] are common (longer life expectancy, produce relatively fewer offspring and tend to be altricial, requiring extensive care by parents when young) and populations tend to have cooperative or [[Mutualism (biology)|mutualistic]] behaviours. If populations have a competitive behaviour in hostile environmental conditions, they mostly are filtered out (die) by environmental selection; hence, populations in hostile conditions are selected to be cooperative.<ref>{{Cite report|last1=Moore|first1=Christopher M.|last2=Catella|first2=Samantha A.|last3=Abbott|first3=Karen C.|date=2017-02-13|title=Population dynamics of mutualism and intraspecific density dependence: howθ-logistic density dependence affects mutualistic positive feedback|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/108175|access-date=2021-10-01|page=108175|doi=10.1101/108175|s2cid=196627760}}</ref>

===Climate change===
{{main|Climate change}}
The effects of climate change have been given as a mass example of the tragedy of the commons.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ansari |first1=Shahzad |last2=Wijen |first2=Frank |last3=Gray |first3=Barbara |title=Constructing a Climate Change Logic: An Institutional Perspective on the 'Tragedy of the Commons' |journal=Organization Science |location=Providence, R.I. |date=August 2013|volume=24 |issue=4 |pages=1014–1040 |doi=10.1287/orsc.1120.0799 |s2cid=18277351 |url=https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/153657f4-16b9-455e-bd5b-17a8f6c97d6d |hdl=1765/41166 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> This perspective proposes that the earth, being the commons, has suffered a depletion of [[natural resource]]s without regard to the [[externalities]], the impact on neighboring and future populations. The collective actions of individuals, organisations, and governments continue to contribute to [[environmental degradation]]. Mitigation of the long-term impacts and [[Tipping point (sociology)|tipping point]]s require strict controls or other solution, but this may come as a loss to different industries. The sustainability of population and industry growth is the subject of climate change discussion. The global commons of environmental resource consumption or selfishness, as in the fossil fuel industry has been theorised as not realistically manageable. This is due to the crossing of irreversible thresholds of impact before the costs are entirely realised.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=Katrina |last2=Adger |first2=W. Neil |last3=Cinner |first3=Joshua E |title=Moving climate change beyond the tragedy of the commons |journal=Global Environmental Change |date=January 2019 |volume=54 |pages=61–63 |doi=10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.11.009 |bibcode=2019GEC....54...61B |hdl=10871/35075 |s2cid=158760049 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

==Commons dilemma==
{{anchor|The Commons Dilemma}}
The ''commons dilemma'' is a specific class of [[social dilemma]] in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the [[common good]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Druzin |first=Bryan |title=A Plan to strengthen the Paris Agreement |url=https://works.bepress.com/bryan_druzin/18/ |journal=Fordham Law Review |volume=84 |pages=19–20|year=2016 }}</ref> In academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including ''resource dilemma'', ''take-some dilemma'', and ''[[common pool resource]]''.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Talloen|first1=Joachim|last2=Chapman|first2=Gretchen B.|date=2014|title=From Red Potato Chips to Greener Forests: Tackling a Common Pool Resource Dilemma with Partitions|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/e573552014-013|access-date=2021-05-24|website=PsycEXTRA Dataset|doi=10.1037/e573552014-013}}</ref>

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or [[over-harvest]] common resources in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to management of commons.<ref>{{Citation|title=The open source software movement, the commons movement and seeds: what they have in common{{snd}} biological open source and protected commons|date=2012-03-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203155257-18|work=Agrobiodiversity and the Law|pages=277–290|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203155257-18|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |isbn=978-0-203-15525-7|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>

In [[game theory]], which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs&nbsp;– Privatize Profits Game ([[CC–PP game]]).<ref>{{Citation|title=Game Theory and the Law Introduction|date=2016-04-19|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781584888444-14|work=Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior|pages=191–214|publisher=Chapman and Hall/CRC|doi=10.1201/9781584888444-14|isbn=978-0-429-13663-4|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>

===Psychological factors===
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames.<ref>{{Citation|last=Kopelman|first=Shirli|title=The Herdsman and the Sheep, Mouton, or Kivsa? The Influence of Group Culture on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas|date=2008|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_11|work=New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas|pages=177–188|place=Boston|publisher=Springer US|doi=10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_11|hdl=2027.42/49422|isbn=978-0-387-72595-6|access-date=2021-05-25|hdl-access=free}}</ref> They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goryńska|first1=Ewa|last2=Winiewski|first2=Mikołaj|last3=Zajenkowski|first3=Marcin|date=April 2015|title=Situational factors and personality traits as determinants of college students' mood|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.12.027|journal=Personality and Individual Differences|volume=77|pages=1–6|doi=10.1016/j.paid.2014.12.027|issn=0191-8869}}</ref> Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task.{{sfn|Kopelman| Weber|Messick|2002}}

Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hartgen|first=David T.|date=December 1974|title=Attitudinal and situational variables influencing urban mode choice: Some empirical findings|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00167967|journal=Transportation|volume=3|issue=4|pages=377–392|doi=10.1007/bf00167967|s2cid=154764280|issn=0049-4488}}</ref><ref>Gelfand & Dyer, 2000</ref> Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework.{{sfn|Weber|Kopelman|Messick|2004}} An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness,{{sfn|Kopelman|2009}}<ref name="Myers2012">{{cite journal |last1=Myers |first1=Christopher G. |last2=Kopelman |first2=Shirli |title=Cooperation between Cultures in the Commons: Implications for Cross-Cultural Interactions |journal=Academy of Management Proceedings |date=2012 |volume=2012 |issue=1 |page=11042 |doi=10.5465/AMBPP.2012.11042abstract |url=https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.11042abstract |location=Briarcliff Manor, NY |issn=2151-6561}}</ref> suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"

===Strategic factors===
[[Strategy|Strategic]] factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence&nbsp;– first, second, third, etc.<ref>{{Citation|last=Manheim|first=Jarol B.|title=All of the People All the Time|chapter=All of the People, All the Time |date=2020-09-10|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003069768-11|pages=235–241|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781003069768-11|isbn=978-1-003-06976-8|s2cid=242175297|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first&nbsp;– the leaders&nbsp;– are higher than the harvest of those coming later&nbsp;– the followers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Doebel |first=Sabine |journal=Psychological Science |type=preprint |date=2019-04-24 |title=Good things come to those who wait: Delaying gratification likely does matter for later achievement |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kbyna |access-date=2021-05-25 |doi=10.31234/osf.io/kbyna |s2cid=241276961}}</ref> The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule.<ref>{{cite book | doi=10.1007/1-4020-0612-8_330 | chapter=First Come/First Served Rule (FCFS) | title=Encyclopedia of Production and Manufacturing Management | date=2000 | page=207 | isbn=978-0-7923-8630-8 | last1=Swamidass | first1=P. M. }}</ref> Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=December 2004|title=India's conventional build-up|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788041002|journal=Strategic Comments|volume=10|issue=10|pages=1–2|doi=10.1080/1356788041002|s2cid=219695926|issn=1356-7888}}</ref> Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=July 1956|title=Table 14. Graduates of each public and private medical college in private practice in the United States who are practicing in communities of less than 25,000 and those whose prior residence was in communities of less than 25,000, 1945 class|journal=Academic Medicine|volume=1|issue=Supplement|pages=51–53|doi=10.1097/00001888-195607001-00015|issn=1040-2446|doi-access=free}}</ref>

===Structural factors===
Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."{{sfn|Hardin|1968|p=1244}} One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=July 2014|title=Access Audiology Tackles Auditory Processing and Common Core|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/leader.an2.19072014.58|journal=The ASHA Leader|volume=19|issue=7|pages=58|doi=10.1044/leader.an2.19072014.58|issn=1085-9586}}</ref> Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Clarke|first=Harry|title=Optimal Depletion when Development Makes an Unused Resource Stock More Valuable|date=March 1995|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00194.x|journal=Natural Resource Modeling|volume=9|issue=2|pages=99–119|doi=10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00194.x|bibcode=1995NRM.....9...99C |issn=0890-8575}}</ref> Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=ZHANG|first1=Zheming|last2=JIN|first2=Shenghua|last3=WU|first3=Song|last4=ZHOU|first4=Xiang|date=2013-12-09|title=The Influence of Leader on Group Member's Cooperation in Common Resource Dilemmas|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1041.2013.00453|journal=Acta Psychologica Sinica|volume=45|issue=4|pages=453–465|doi=10.3724/sp.j.1041.2013.00453|s2cid=147561539 |issn=0439-755X}}</ref> A general aversion to autocratic [[leadership]] exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vassileva|first=Radosveta|date=2021|title=COVID-19 in Autocratic Bulgaria: How the Anti-Corruption Protests Temporarily Limited the Abuse of Questionable Legislation|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807883|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3807883|s2cid=233708722|issn=1556-5068}}</ref>

The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources.<ref name="Rewards and punishments">{{Citation|title=Rewards and punishments|date=2002-01-04|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203130087-12|work=Effective Classroom Management|pages=107–122|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203130087-12|isbn=978-0-203-13008-7|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation&nbsp;– for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses.<ref name="Rewards and punishments"/> Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Van Vugt |first1=M. |title=How a Structural Solution to a Real-World Social Dilemma Failed: A Field Experiment on the First Carpool Lane in Europe |last2=Van Lange |first2=P. A. M. |last3=Meertens |first3=R. M. |last4=Joireman |first4=J. A. |year=1996 |url=http://www.professormarkvanvugt.com/images/files/HowaStructuralSolutiontoaRealWorldSocialDilemmaFailed-SocialPsychologyQuarterly-1996.pdf |journal=Social Psychology Quarterly |volume=59 |issue=4 |pages=364–374 |doi=10.2307/2787077 |jstor=2787077 |citeseerx=10.1.1.318.656 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809021751/http://www.professormarkvanvugt.com/images/files/HowaStructuralSolutiontoaRealWorldSocialDilemmaFailed-SocialPsychologyQuarterly-1996.pdf |archive-date=2017-08-09 }}</ref> The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood.<ref>{{Cite news |url= http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2009/06/14/9791526-sun.html |title=Put on a happy face, lower your electric bill |newspaper= Toronto Sun |date=2009-06-17 |access-date=2020-02-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090617071015/http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2009/06/14/9791526-sun.html |archive-date=2009-06-17 }}</ref>

==Solutions==
{{see also|Externality#Possible solutions}}
Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of [[political philosophy]].<ref>{{Citation|title=One Man One Tree|date=2020-05-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv12pnnrp.37|work=Tragedy of the Commons (Poetry)|pages=54|publisher=Langaa RPCIG|doi=10.2307/j.ctv12pnnrp.37|isbn=978-9956-551-52-1|s2cid=243293265|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Anukwonke |first1=Charles |title=The Concept of Tragedy of the Commons: Issues and Applications |date=2015 |doi=10.13140/RG.2.1.4977.9362 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277708953 }}</ref> In some situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well.<ref name="OECD SE 2017">{{Cite book |title=OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2017 {{!}} Figure 2.9. Many women work part time, often involuntarily |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933446195|access-date=2021-05-25|doi=10.1787/888933446195}}</ref> When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.<ref name="OECD SE 2017" />

===Non-governmental solution===
[[Robert Axelrod (political scientist)|Robert Axelrod]] contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests.<ref>{{cite book |last=Axelrod |first=Robert |year=1984 |title=The Evolution of Cooperation |location=New York |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0-465-02121-5|url=https://archive.org/details/evolutionofcoop00axel |url-access=registration }}</ref> Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticised those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge."<ref>{{Cite report |last=Appell |first=George N. |date=1993 |title=Hardin's Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions. With Appendix: Diagrams of Forms of Co-ownership |location=Phillips, ME |publisher=Social Transformation and Adaptation Research Institute|type=Working Paper|hdl=10535/4532|hdl-access=free|url=http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4532/HARDIN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y}}</ref>

Political scientist [[Elinor Ostrom]], who was awarded 2009's [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]] for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ostrom |first1=Elinor |last2=Burger |first2=Joanna |last3=Field |first3=Christopher B. |last4=Norgaard |first4=Richard B. |last5=Policansky |first5=David |year=1999 |title=Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges |url=http://dusk2.geo.orst.edu/prosem/Ostrom_etal1999.pdf |journal=Science |volume=284 |issue=5412 |pages=278–282 |doi=10.1126/science.284.5412.278 |pmid=10195886 |bibcode=1999Sci...284..278. |citeseerx=10.1.1.510.4369 |s2cid=19472705 |access-date=2018-07-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809075854/http://dusk2.geo.orst.edu/prosem/Ostrom_etal1999.pdf |archive-date=2017-08-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref> They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves.<ref name="urlOstrom revisits the commons in Science">{{cite web |url=http://www.iuinfo.indiana.edu/HomePages/041699/text/ostrom.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120305182446/http://www.iuinfo.indiana.edu/HomePages/041699/text/ostrom.htm |archive-date=2012-03-05 |title=Ostrom 'revisits the commons' in 'Science' }}</ref> For example, another group found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mathevet|first1=Raphaël|last2=Vuillot|first2=Carole|last3=Sirami|first3=Clélia|date=2013-09-17|title=Effective Nature Conservation on Farmland: Can We Change Our Own Models, Not Just the Farmers?|journal=Conservation Letters|volume=7|issue=6|pages=575–576|doi=10.1111/conl.12064|s2cid=83309993 |issn=1755-263X|doi-access=free}}</ref> In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency.<ref name=beyond /><ref name="forbes">{{Cite web |url=https://www.forbes.com/2009/10/12/elinor-ostrom-commons-nobel-economics-opinions-contributors-vernon-l-smith.html|title=Governing The Commons |last=Smith |first=Vernon L. |website=Forbes |language=en |access-date=2020-02-25|date=October 12, 2009}}</ref> Another prominent example of this is the deliberative process of granting legal personhood to a part of nature, for example rivers, with the aim of preserving their water resources and prevent environmental degradation. This process entails that a river is regarded as its own legal entity that can sue against environmental damage done to it while being represented by an independently appointed guardian advisory group.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Charpleix |first=Liz |date=March 2018 |title=The Whanganui River as Te Awa Tupua: Place-based law in a legally pluralistic society |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/geoj.12238 |journal=The Geographical Journal |language=en |volume=184 |issue=1 |pages=19–30 |doi=10.1111/geoj.12238|bibcode=2018GeogJ.184...19C }}</ref> This has happened as a bottom-up process in New Zealand: Here debates initiated by the Whanganui Iwi tribe have resulted in legal personhood for the river. The river is considered as a living whole, stretching from mountain to sea and even includes not only the physical but also its metaphysical elements.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=O'Donnell |first1=Erin L. |last2=Talbot-Jones |first2=Julia |date=2018 |title=Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from Australia, New Zealand, and India |url=https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss1/art7/ |journal=Ecology and Society |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=art7 |doi=10.5751/ES-09854-230107 |issn=1708-3087|doi-access=free |hdl=1885/265550 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many [[nomadic pastoralism|nomadic pastoralist]] societies of Africa and the Middle East in fact "balanced local stocking ratios against seasonal rangeland conditions in ways that were ecologically sound", reflecting a desire for lower risk rather than higher profit; in spite of this,<ref>{{Citation|title=Index|date=2006-01-01|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789047417750_040|journal=Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa|pages=1035–1060|publisher=Brill|doi=10.1163/9789047417750_040|isbn=978-90-474-1775-0|access-date=2021-05-24|last1=Chatty|first1=Dawn}}</ref> it was often the case that "the nomad was blamed for problems that were not of his own making and were a product of alien forces."<ref name="johnson1993">{{cite journal |last=Johnson |first=Douglas L. |date=1993 |title=Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East |journal=GeoJournal |volume=31 |issue=1 |pages=51–66 |doi=10.1007/bf00815903|bibcode=1993GeoJo..31...51J |s2cid=153445920 }}</ref> Independently finding precedent in the opinions of previous scholars such as [[Ibn Khaldun]] as well as common currency in antagonistic cultural attitudes towards non-sedentary peoples,<ref name="johnson1993" /> governments and international organizations have made use of Hardin's work to help justify restrictions on land access and the eventual [[sedentarization]] of pastoral nomads despite its weak empirical basis.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=October 2009|title=Sedentarization of Tibetan Nomads|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01312.x|journal=Conservation Biology|volume=23|issue=5|pages=1074|doi=10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01312.x|pmid=19765031|issn=0888-8892|last1=Lu|first1=T.|last2=Wu|first2=N.|last3=Luo|first3=P.|bibcode=2009ConBi..23.1074L |s2cid=19173099 }}</ref> Examining relations between historically nomadic [[Bedouin]] Arabs and the [[Syria]]n state in the 20th century, [[Dawn Chatty]] notes that "Hardin's argument was curiously accepted as the fundamental explanation for the degradation of the [[steppe]] land"<ref>{{Cite book|date=2006-01-01|editor-last=Chatty|editor-first=Dawn|title=Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789047417750|doi=10.1163/9789047417750|isbn=978-90-474-1775-0}}</ref> in development schemes for the arid interior of the country, downplaying the larger role of agricultural [[overexploitation]] in [[desertification]] as it melded with prevailing nationalist ideology which viewed nomads as socially backward and economically harmful.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Chatty |first=Dawn |s2cid=143487962 |date=2010 |title=The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=29–69 |url=https://www.academia.edu/4240985 |doi=10.3751/64.1.12}}</ref>

[[Elinor Ostrom]] and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ostrom|first1=Vincent|last2=Ostrom|first2=Elinor|date=1972|title=Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3145634|journal=Land Economics|volume=48|issue=1|pages=1–14|doi=10.2307/3145634|jstor=3145634|s2cid=152485064 |issn=0023-7639}}</ref> One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g. land) can be preserved much more easily.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=September 1975|title=Can glass recycling pay for itself?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0301-4207(75)90060-4|journal=Resources Policy|volume=1|issue=5|pages=298|doi=10.1016/0301-4207(75)90060-4|issn=0301-4207}}</ref> A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of [[resource depletion]], and it must be difficult to find substitutes.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Resource development in western Canada: Indigenous peoples' human rights must be respected|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-5411-2014011|access-date=2021-05-25|website=Human Rights Documents online|doi=10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-5411-2014011}}</ref> The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better.<ref name=beyond>Elinor Ostrom: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByXM47Ri1Kc ''Beyond the tragedy of commons'']. Stockholm whiteboard seminars. (Video, 8:26 min.)</ref> A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse.<ref>{{Citation|title=Introduction: Defining Community-Built|date=2016-11-25|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315545066-7|work=Community-Built|pages=15–34|location=New York|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315545066-7|isbn=978-1-315-54506-6|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used.<ref name="urlOstrom revisits the commons in Science" />

Many of the economic and social structures recommended by Ostrom coincide with the structures recommended by [[anarchism|anarchists]], particularly [[green anarchism]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://c4ss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Anarchist-Themes-in-the-Work-of-Elinor-Ostrom.pdf |publisher=Center for a Stateless Society |title=Governance, Agency and Autonomy: Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom |last=Carson |first=Kevin |year=2013}}</ref> The largest contemporary societies that use these organizational strategies are the [[Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities]] and the [[Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria]] which have heavily been influenced by [[anarchism]] and other versions of [[libertarian socialism|libertarian]] and [[ecosocialism|ecological]] socialism.

Individuals may act in a deliberate way to avoid consumption habits that deplete natural resources. This consciousness promotes the [[boycotting]] of products or brands and seeking alternative, more sustainable options.

==== Altruistic punishment ====
Various well-established theories, such as theory of kin selection and direct reciprocity, have limitations in explaining patterns of cooperation emerging between unrelated individuals and in non-repeatable short-term interactions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hamilton |first=W. D. |date=1964-07-01 |title=The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193%2864%2990038-4 |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=1–16 |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 |pmid=5875341 |bibcode=1964JThBi...7....1H |s2cid=5310280 |issn=0022-5193}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Trivers |first=Robert L. |date=1971 |title=The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2822435 |journal=The Quarterly Review of Biology |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=35–57 |doi=10.1086/406755 |jstor=2822435 |s2cid=19027999 |issn=0033-5770}}</ref> Studies have shown that punishment is an efficacious motivator for cooperation among humans.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fehr |first1=Ernst |last2=Gächter |first2=Simon |date=2002 |title=Altruistic punishment in humans |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/415137a |journal=Nature |language=en |volume=415 |issue=6868 |pages=137–140 |doi=10.1038/415137a |pmid=11805825 |bibcode=2002Natur.415..137F |s2cid=4310962 |issn=1476-4687}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Balliet |first1=Daniel |last2=Mulder |first2=Laetitia B. |last3=Van Lange |first3=Paul A. M. |date=2011 |title=Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21574679/ |journal=Psychological Bulletin |volume=137 |issue=4 |pages=594–615 |doi=10.1037/a0023489 |issn=1939-1455 |pmid=21574679|s2cid=2057071 }}</ref>

Altruistic punishment entails the presence of individuals that punish defectors from a cooperative agreement, although doing so is costly and provides no material gain. These punishments effectively resolve tragedy of the commons scenarios by addressing both first-order free rider problems (i.e. defectors free riding on cooperators) and second-order free rider problems (i.e. cooperators free riding on work of punishers).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Greenwood |first=Garrison W. |title=2016 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG) |chapter=Altruistic punishment can help resolve tragedy of the commons social dilemmas |date=2016 |chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7860402 |location=Santorini, Greece |publisher=IEEE |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1109/CIG.2016.7860402 |isbn=978-1-5090-1883-3|s2cid=14183178 |url=https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1417&context=ece_fac }}</ref> Such results can only be witnessed when the punishment levels are high enough.

While defectors are motivated by self-interest and cooperators feel morally obliged to practice self-restraint, punishers pursue this path when their emotions are clouded by annoyance and anger at free riders.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Seip |first1=Elise C. |last2=van Dijk |first2=Wilco W. |last3=Rotteveel |first3=Mark |date=2009 |title=On Hotheads and Dirty Harries: The Primacy of Anger in Altruistic Punishment |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x |journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences |language=en |volume=1167 |issue=1 |pages=190–196 |doi=10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x|pmid=19580565 |s2cid=11960190 }}</ref>

===Governmental solutions===
Governmental solutions are used when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being larger than the cohesion of its social network).<ref>{{Citation|date=2011|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/9780471723172.ch18|work=It Sounded Good When We Started|publisher=IEEE|doi=10.1109/9780471723172.ch18|isbn=978-0-471-72317-2|access-date=2021-05-25 |title=Being Too Big for Your Britches: So Much Confidence with So Little Talent (Experience) }}</ref> Examples of government regulation include population control, privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.<ref>{{Citation|last=Moosa|first=Imad A.|title=Bad Regulation: Too Big to Fail, Bail-Out and Bail-In|date=2015|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137447104_10|work=Good Regulation, Bad Regulation|pages=192–211|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|doi=10.1057/9781137447104_10|isbn=978-1-349-68593-6|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref>

====Population control====

In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, ''Managing the Commons,'' co-written with [[John A. Baden]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chaddha|first=Shane|date=2011|title=Hardin Goes to Outer Space{{snd}} 'Mutual Coercion, Mutually Agreed Upon By The Majority of People Affected'|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763740|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1763740|s2cid=154257809|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecobooks.com/books/commons.htm |title=Managing the Commons by Garrett Hardin and John Baden |publisher=Ecobooks.com |access-date=22 October 2013}}</ref> He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the "[[reproductive rights|reproductive right]]", to safeguard all other [[rights]]. Several countries have a variety of [[Antinatalistic politics|population control laws]] in place.<ref>{{Citation|title=Reproductive Rights as an International Norm|date=2017-07-05|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315254180-5|work=Global Population Policy|pages=135–166|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315254180-5|isbn=978-1-315-25418-0|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref>

In the context of United States policy debates, Hardin advocated restrictions on migration, particularly of non-whites. In a 1991 article, he stated

{{blockquote |text =  Popular anthropology came along with its dogma that all cultures are equally good, equally valuable. To say otherwise was to be narrow-minded and prejudiced, to be guilty of the sin of ethnocentrism. In time, a sort of Marxist-Hegelian dialectic took charge of our thinking: ethnocentrism was replaced by what we can only call ethnofugalism—a romantic flight away from our own culture. That which was foreign and strange, particularly if persecuted, became the ideal. Black became beautiful, and prolonged bilingual education replaced naturalization. Immigration lawyers grew rich serving their clients by finding ways around the law of the land to which they (the lawyers) owe their allegiance. Idealistic religious groups, claiming loyalty to a higher power than the nation, openly shielded and transported illegal immigrants.
<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hardin |first1=Garrett |title=Conspicuous Benevolence and the Population Bomb |url=https://chroniclesmagazine.org/web/conspicuous-benevolence-and-the-population-bomb/ |website=Chronicles |date=October 1991 |access-date=30 August 2024}}</ref>}}

====Privatization====
One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property (Coase 1960), giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability.<ref>{{Cite thesis|title=Owner Incorporation : a trick or a solution to private residential property management|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b3196942|publisher=The University of Hong Kong Libraries|first=Hiu-yeung, Tony|last=Li|year=2003 |doi=10.5353/th_b3196942}}</ref> [[libertarianism|Libertarians]] and [[classical liberalism|classical liberals]] cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when [[John Locke|Lockean]] property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government.<ref>{{Citation |first=Robert J. |last=Smith |title=Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife |url=http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1981/11/cj1n2-7.pdf |publisher=[[Cato Institute]] |series=[[Cato Journal]] |volume=1 |issue=2 |date=Fall 1981 |pages=439–468}}</ref> They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it.<ref>[[John Locke]], "Sect. 27" and following sections in [https://web.archive.org/web/20070304114414/http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke2/locke2nd-a.html#Sect.%2025.#Sect.%2027. ''Second Treatise of Government''] (1690). Also available [https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370 here.]</ref>

In England, this solution was attempted in the [[inclosure act]]s. According to [[Karl Marx]] in {{lang|de|[[Das Kapital]]}}, this solution leads to increasing numbers of people being pushed into smaller and smaller pockets of common land which has yet to be privatised, thereby merely displacing and exacerbating the problem while putting an increasing number of people in precarious situations.<ref>{{Citation|first=Karl| last=Marx| date=1867 |title=[[Das Kapital|Capital]] |volume= 1|publisher=Penguin UK|chapter=Twenty-Seven: Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land}}</ref> Economic historian [[Bob Allen (economic historian)|Bob Allen]] coined the term "[[Engels' pause]]" to describe the period from 1790 to 1840, when British working-class wages stagnated and per-capita [[gross domestic product]] expanded rapidly during a technological upheaval.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/j.eeh.2009.04.004 |title = Engels' pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the british industrial revolution |journal = Explorations in Economic History|volume = 46|issue = 4|pages = 418–435|year = 2009|last1 = Allen|first1 = Robert C.}}</ref>

====Regulation====
In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual.<ref>{{Citation|last=Wray|first=HA|title=Chapter 11: U.S. Governmental Regulatory Agencies{{snd}}Governmental Regulations|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1520/mnl10538m|work=Manual on Flash Point Standards and Their Use: Methods and Regulations|year=1992|pages=102–123|location=West Conshohocken, PA|publisher=ASTM International|doi=10.1520/mnl10538m|isbn=978-0-8031-1410-4|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Permit systems for extractive economic activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising, and timber extraction are examples of this approach.<ref>{{Citation|date=2013-10-28|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203039915-11|work=Aegean Civilization|pages=181–191|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203039915-11|isbn=978-0-203-03991-5|access-date=2021-05-25|title=Agriculture, Cattle-Raising, Hunting, and Fishing}}</ref> Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pieraccini|first=Margherita|date=2015-09-18|title=Democratic legitimacy and new commons: examples from English protected areas|journal=International Journal of the Commons|volume=9|issue=2|pages=552|doi=10.18352/ijc.509|issn=1875-0281|doi-access=free}}</ref> This idea is used by the [[United Nations]] [[Moon Treaty]], [[Outer Space Treaty]] and [[Law of the Sea Treaty]] as well as the [[UNESCO]] [[World Heritage Convention]] (treaty) which involves the international law principle that designates some areas or resources the [[Common Heritage of Mankind]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Frakes |first=Jennifer |date=2003 |title=The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise |journal=Wisconsin International Law Journal |volume=21 |issue=2|pages=409–434|id=[[HeinOnline|HOL]] [https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/wisint21&div=18 wisint21_18]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bin|first=Cheng|date=1997-12-18|title=Part III United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, 9 The 1967 Space Treaty|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198257301.003.0010|journal=Studies in International Space Law|doi=10.1093/law/9780198257301.003.0010}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=N.|first=Scheiber, Harry|title=Law of the sea : the common heritage and emerging challenges|date=2000|publisher=Martinus Nijhoff Publishers|isbn=90-411-1401-7|oclc=44019679}}</ref>

German historian [[Joachim Radkau]] thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies.<ref name="Rad">{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mvQYxDG6QkoC | title=Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment| isbn=978-0-521-85129-9| last1=Radkau| first1=Joachim| year=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref> An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict [[Property#Theories|private property]] and espouse expansion of public property.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Socialism and the Tragedy of the Commons: Reflections on Environmental Practice in the Soviet Union and Russia |date=January 1995 |journal= The Journal of Environment & Development|doi=10.1177/107049659500400105 |last1=Mirovitskaya |first1=N. |last2=Soroos |first2=M. S. |volume=4 |number=1 |pages=77–110|s2cid=155028630 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |author-link=Mark J. Perry |first=Mark |last=Perry |title=Why Socialism Failed |date=June 1995 |journal=[[The Freeman]] |url=http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/why-socialism-failed/ |volume=45 |number=6 |access-date=2011-06-08 |archive-url=http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20090629100228/http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/why-socialism-failed/ |archive-date=2009-06-29 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Giving legal rights of personhood to objects in nature is another proposed solution. The idea of giving land a legal personality is intended to enable the democratic system of the rule of law to allow for prosecution, sanction, and reparation for damage to the earth.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hermitte |first=Marie-Angèle |date=2011 |title=La nature, sujet de droit ? |url=https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-2011-1-page-173.htm?contenu=article |journal=Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales |volume=66 |issue=1 |pages=173–212 |doi=10.1017/S0395264900005503 |s2cid=162165853 |via=CAIRN}}</ref> For example, this has been put into practice in Ecuador in the form of a constitutional principle known as "Pacha Mama" (Mother Earth).<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2015-06-10 |title=The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador: Pachamama Has Rights |url=https://doi.org/10.5282/rcc/7131 |journal=Environment & Society Portal |language=en |doi=10.5282/rcc/7131|last1=Berros |first1=María Valeria }}</ref>

====Internalizing externalities====
Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation.<ref>{{Cite book|date=2004-03-22|title=Who owns the intellectual property rights when an invention, copyright work or design is outsourced?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/f2dc0688-en|access-date=2021-05-25|doi=10.18356/f2dc0688-en}}</ref> As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1987-08-01|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/annhyg/31.3.285|journal=The Annals of Occupational Hygiene|doi=10.1093/annhyg/31.3.285|issn=1475-3162|title=Do Negative Air Ions Affect Human Mood and Performance?|pmid=3426028|last1=Hedge|first1=A.|last2=Collis|first2=M. D.|volume=31|issue=3|pages=285–290}}</ref> ''Internalizing the externalities'', in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://heliocene.org/knowledge-bank/what-is-a-sustainable-business/externalities-and-internalisation/|title= Externalities and Internalisation|work= Heliocene|date= 5 March 2021|accessdate=2 Aug 2022}}</ref> One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Austin|first1=David|title=Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes|date=2018-12-20|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351161084-23|work=Controlling Automobile Air Pollution|pages=449–469|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-351-16108-4|access-date=2021-05-25|last2=Dinan|first2=Terry|doi=10.4324/9781351161084-23}}</ref> This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Fullerton|first1=Don|title=Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions? 1|date=2018-12-20|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351161084-13|work=Controlling Automobile Air Pollution|pages=243–266|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-351-16108-4|access-date=2021-05-25|last2=West|first2=Sarah E.|doi=10.4324/9781351161084-13|s2cid=239069281}}</ref>

=== The mid-way solution ===
One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Quan|first1=Qi|last2=Huyghebaert|first2=Nancy|date=2007|title=Ownership Dynamics After Partial Privatization: Evidence from China|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.966679|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.966679|issn=1556-5068}}</ref> By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only.<ref>{{Citation|title=China: Designing policies and laws to ensure fair access and benefit sharing of genetic resources and participatory plant breeding products|date=2012-03-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203156032-21|work=The Custodians of Biodiversity|pages=120–146|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203156032-21|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |isbn=978-0-203-15603-2|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability, and legal aspects, etc.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315859590|title=Euro-Librarianship: Shared Resources, Shared Responsibilities|date=2018-10-24|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315859590|isbn=978-1-315-85959-0|s2cid=239912609|editor-last=Pisani|editor-first=Assunta}}</ref>

==Criticism==
===Commons in historical reality===
[[File:Joseph Mallord William Turner - Dartmoor- The Source of the Tamar and the Torridge - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|Common land in Dartmoor, England {{circa|1813}} (watercolor, [[J. M. W. Turner]])]]

The status of common land in England as mentioned in Lloyd's pamphlet has been widely misunderstood.

Millions of acres were "common land", but this did not mean public land open to everybody, a popular fallacy.  There was no such thing as ownerless land.  Every parcel of "common" land had a legal owner, who was a private person or corporation.  The owner was called the ''lord of the manor''<ref name="Hoskins 1963 4">{{harvnb|Hoskins|1963|p=4}}</ref> (which, like ''landlord'', was a legal term denoting ownership, not aristocratic status).

It was true that there were local people, called ''commoners'', defined as those who had a legal right to use his land for some purpose of their own, typically grazing their animals.  Certainly their rights were strong, because the lord was not entitled to build on his own land, or fence off any part of it,<ref>{{harvnb|Hoskins|1963|pp=5–6}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|p=60}}</ref> unless he could prove he had left enough pasture for the commoners.<ref>{{harvnb|Halsbury's Laws of England|1903|pp=505–506}}</ref>  But these individuals were not the general public at large: not everyone in the vicinity was a commoner.<ref name="Hoskins 1963 4"/>

Furthermore the commoners' right to graze the lord's land with their animals was restricted by law – precisely in order to prevent overgrazing.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hoskins|first= W. G.|year=2015|chapter=Common land and its origin|title=The Common Lands of England and Wales|editor1-last=Hoskins|editor2-last=Stamp|editor1-first=W. G.|editor2-first=L. Dudley|publisher=HarperCollins|isbn=9780007342228}}</ref> If overgrazing did nevertheless occur, which it sometimes did, it was because of incompetent or weak land management,<ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|pp=121–123}}</ref> and not because of the pressure of an unlimited right to graze, which did not exist.

Hence Christopher Rodgers said that "Hardin's influential thesis on the 'tragedy of the commons' ... has no application to common land in England and Wales. It is based on a false premise". Rodgers, professor of law at [[Newcastle University]], added:

{{blockquote|Far from suffering a tragedy of the commons in Hardin's sense, common land&nbsp;... was subject to common law principles of customary origin that promoted 'sustainable management'. These were expressed through property rights, in the form of qualifications on the resource use conferred by property entitlements, and were administered by local manor courts&nbsp;... Moreover, the administration of customary rules by the manor courts represented a wholly different means for organising the management of common resources than the model posited by Hardin, which stresses the need for exclusive ownership by either individuals or government in order to promote the effective management of the resource.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Rodgers|first=Christopher|year=2010|title=Reversing the 'Tragedy' of the Commons? Sustainable Management and the Commons Act 2006|journal=The Modern Law Review|volume=73|issue=3|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00802.x |jstor=40660736|doi-access=free |pages=462, 463}}</ref> }}

Every productive unit ("manor") had a manorial court; without it, the manor ceased to exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|p=18}}</ref> Manorial courts could fine commoners, and the lord of the manor for that matter,<ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|p=21}}</ref> for breaches of customary law, e.g. grazing too many cattle on the land. Customary law varied locally. It could not be altered without the consent of the whole body of the commoners,<ref name="Hoskins 1963 4"/> except by getting an Act of Parliament.<ref>For the disputed origins of manorial and commons law, and whether it came from ancient folk customs or from grants by early landowners, see {{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|pp=1–41}}; {{harvnb|Hoskins|1963|pp=5–8, 27–34}}.</ref>

By the time of Lloyd's pamphlet (1833) the majority of land in England had been [[enclosure|enclosed]] and had ceased to be common land.<ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|pp=113–114}}</ref> That which remained may not have been good agricultural land anyway,<ref>{{harvnb|Hoskins|1963|p=xv}}.</ref> or the best managed. Lloyd takes for granted that common lands were inferior<ref>"Why are the cattle on a common so puny and stunted? Why is the common itself so bare-worn, and cropped so differently from the adjoining inclosures?": {{harvnb|Lloyd|1833|loc=[30]–[31]}}</ref> and argues his over-grazing theory to explain it. He does not examine other possible causes e.g. common land was difficult to drain, to keep disease-free, and to use for improved cattle breeding.<ref>{{harvnb|Scrutton|1887|pp=115–121}}</ref>

Likewise, Susan Jane Buck Cox argues that the common land example used to argue this economic concept is on very weak historical ground, and misrepresents what she terms was actually the "triumph of the commons":<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cox|first=Susan Jane Buck|date=1985|title=No Tragedy of the Commons|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics1985716|journal=Environmental Ethics|volume=7|issue=1|pages=49–61|doi=10.5840/enviroethics1985716|bibcode=1985EnEth...7...49C |issn=0163-4275}}</ref> the successful common usage of land for many centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not the behaviour of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons.<ref name="dlc.dlib.indiana.edu2">{{Cite journal |last1=Cox |first1=Susan Jane Buck |year=1985 |title=No Tragedy on the Commons |url=http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3113/buck_NoTragedy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y |journal=Environmental Ethics |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=49–61 |doi=10.5840/enviroethics1985716 |bibcode=1985EnEth...7...49C |hdl-access=free |hdl=10535/3113}}</ref> In a similar vein, Carl Dahlman argues that commons were effectively managed to prevent overgrazing.<ref name="urlSpringerLink">{{cite journal |title= The tragedy of the commons that wasn't: On technical solutions to the institutions game| doi=10.1007/BF01357919 |volume=12 |issue= 3|year=1991 |journal=Population and Environment |pages=285–296 | last1 = Dahlman | first1 = Carl J.| bibcode=1991PopEn..12..285D | s2cid=154166211 }}</ref>

===Others===
Hardin's work is criticised as historically inaccurate in failing to account for the [[demographic transition]],<ref name=Dasgupta>{{cite book |author-link=Partha Dasgupta |first=Partha |last=Dasgupta |title=Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-19-924788-2}}</ref> and for failing to distinguish between [[Common-pool resource|common property]] and [[Open access (infrastructure)|open access]] resources.<ref name=Ciriacy>{{Cite journal |last1=Ciriacy-Wantrup |first1=S. |last2=Bishop |first2=Richard |date=1975 |title=Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy |url=https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol15/iss4/7 |journal=Natural Resources Journal |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=713–727 |issn=0028-0739}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rowe |first1=Jonathan |title=The parallel Economy of the Commons |journal=State of the World 2008: Innovation for a Sustainable Development |date=2008 |page=142 |publisher=Earthscan |location=London}}</ref> Radical environmentalist [[Derrick Jensen (activist)|Derrick Jensen]] claims the tragedy of the commons is used as [[propaganda]] for [[private ownership]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Puzon|first1=Klarizze|last2=Willinger|first2=Marc|date=2019|title=Can Common Ownership Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons? An Experimental Investigation|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410383|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3410383|s2cid=201461194|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref>Jensen, Derrick (2007), ''Endgame Vol 1: The Problem of Civilization'' and ''Endgame Vol II: Resistance'' (Seven Stories Press)</ref> He says it has been used by the political [[right wing]] to hasten the final enclosure of the "common resources" of [[third world]] and indigenous people worldwide, as a part of the [[Washington Consensus]].<ref>{{Citation|last=Looney|first=Robert E.|title=Has Indigenous Third-World Arms Production been Effective in Reducing Third-World Arms Imports?|date=1988|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09658-9_6|work=Third-World Military Expenditure and Arms Production|pages=99–113|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|doi=10.1007/978-1-349-09658-9_6|isbn=978-1-349-09660-2|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> He argues that in true situations, those who abuse the commons would have been warned to desist and if they failed would have punitive sanctions against them. He says that rather than being called "The Tragedy of the Commons", it should be called "the Tragedy of the Failure of the Commons".<ref>{{Citation|last=Brennan|first=Jason|title=The Tragedy of the Commons|date=2012-04-29|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691154442.003.0011|work=The Ethics of Voting|publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.23943/princeton/9780691154442.003.0011|isbn=978-0-691-15444-2|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref>

Marxist geographer [[David Harvey]] has a similar criticism: "The dispossession of indigenous populations in North America by 'productive' colonists, for instance, was justified because indigenous populations did not produce value",<ref>{{Cite web|last=Young|first=Kue|date=2012-08-29|title=Indigenous Populations of North America, Australasia, and Circumpolar North|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756797-0039|access-date=2021-05-25|website=Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets|doi=10.1093/obo/9780199756797-0039}}</ref> asking: "Why, for instance, do we not focus in Hardin's metaphor on the [[Private property#Economics|individual ownership]] of the cattle rather than on the pasture as a common?"<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Harvey |first1=David |year=2011 |title=The future of the commons |doi=10.1215/01636545-2010-017 |journal=Radical History Review |volume= 2011|issue=109 |pages=101–107|url=https://davidharvey.org/media/Harvey_on_the_Commons.pdf}}</ref>

Some authors, like [[Yochai Benkler]], say that with the rise of the Internet and digitalisation, an economics system based on commons becomes possible again.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Benkler|first=Yochai|title=Peer production and cooperation|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9780857939852.00012|journal=Handbook on the Economics of the Internet|year=2016|pages=91–119|doi=10.4337/9780857939852.00012|isbn=978-0-85793-985-2}}</ref> He wrote in his book ''[[The Wealth of Networks]]'' in 2006 that cheap computing power plus networks enable people to produce valuable products through non-commercial processes of interaction: "as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system".<ref>{{Citation|title=Chapter 4. Trafficking of Human Beings as a Human Rights Abuse: Obligations and Accountability of Non-State Actors|date=2006-01-01|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.30|work=Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective|pages=121–145|publisher=Brill Nijhoff|doi=10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.30|isbn=978-90-474-1106-2|access-date=2021-05-25|last1=Obokata |first1=Tom }}</ref> He uses the term ''networked [[information economy]]'' to refer to a "system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on market strategies".<ref>{{cite book |last=Benkler |first=Yochai |title=The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven, Connecticut |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-300-11056-2 |page=[https://archive.org/details/wealthofnetworks00benk/page/3 3]|url=https://archive.org/details/wealthofnetworks00benk |url-access=registration }}</ref> He also coined the term ''[[commons-based peer production]]'' for collaborative efforts based on sharing information.<ref>{{cite news |first=Steven |last=Johnson |title=The Internet? We Built That |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/magazine/the-internet-we-built-that.html?src=dayp |quote=The Harvard legal scholar Yochai Benkler has called this phenomenon 'commons-based peer production'. |newspaper=[[New York Times]] |date=September 21, 2012 |access-date=2012-09-24|author-link= Steven Johnson (author)}}</ref> Examples of commons-based peer production are Wikipedia, [[free and open source software]] and [[open-source hardware]].<ref>{{cite book|chapter=Introduction: Open Source Software and the Digital Commons|date=2020-02-26|title=Incorporating the Digital Commons: Corporate Involvement in Free and Open Source Software|pages=1–32|publisher=University of Westminster Press|doi=10.16997/book39.a|isbn=978-1-912656-42-4|s2cid=242428235|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The tragedy of the commons has served as a pretext for powerful [[private companies]] and/or governments to introduce regulatory agents or [[outsourcing]] on less powerful entities or governments, for the exploitation of their natural resources.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Karnani |first=Aneel G. |date=2013 |title=Corporate Social Responsibility Does Not Avert the Tragedy of the Commons – Case Study: Coca-Cola India |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354022 |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.2354022 |hdl=2027.42/100359 |s2cid=155003836 |issn=1556-5068|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sinden |first=Amy |date=2006 |title=The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.895724 |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.895724 |hdl=20.500.12613/7454 |s2cid=154084058 |issn=1556-5068|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rowland |first=Wade |date=2009-09-01 |title=Corporate Social Responsibility and Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons as Myth and Reality |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.9774/gleaf.4700.2009.au.00010 |journal=Journal of Corporate Citizenship |volume=2009 |issue=35 |pages=109–118 |doi=10.9774/gleaf.4700.2009.au.00010 |doi-broken-date=2024-11-11 |issn=1470-5001}}</ref> Powerful companies and governments can easily corrupt and bribe less powerful institutions or governments, to allow them exploit or privatize their resources, which causes more concentration of power and wealth in powerful entities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rajan |first=Sudhir Chella |date=September 2011 |title=Poor little rich countries: another look at the 'resource curse' |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.608530 |journal=Environmental Politics |volume=20 |issue=5 |pages=617–632 |doi=10.1080/09644016.2011.608530 |bibcode=2011EnvPo..20..617R |s2cid=17155966 |issn=0964-4016}}</ref> This phenomenon is known as the [[resource curse]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shaxson  |first=Nicholas |date=2007-10-22 |title=Oil, corruption and the resource curse |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00677.x |journal=International Affairs |volume=83 |issue=6 |pages=1123–1140 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00677.x |s2cid=41888272 |issn=0020-5850}}</ref>

Other criticisms have focused on Hardin's [[Garrett Hardin#Controversies|racist and eugenicist views]], claiming that his arguments are directed towards forcible [[population control]], particularly for [[people of color]].<ref>{{cite magazine |url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/voices/the-tragedy-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ |title=The Tragedy of the Tragedy of the Commons|magazine=Scientific American |date=2019 |access-date=19 May 2024|last1=Mildenberger |first1=Matto }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/garrett-hardin|title=Garrett Hardin|publisher=Southern Povery Law Center  |access-date=19 May 2024 }}</ref>

==Comedy of the commons==
In certain cases, exploiting a resource more may be a good thing. Carol M. Rose, in a 1986 article, discussed the concept of the "comedy of the commons", where the public property in question exhibits "increasing returns to scale" in usage (hence the phrase, "the more the merrier"),<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rose|first=Carol|date=1986|title=The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1599583|journal=The University of Chicago Law Review|volume=53|issue=3|pages=711–781|doi=10.2307/1599583|jstor=1599583|issn=0041-9494}}</ref> in that the more people use the resource, the higher the benefit to each one. Rose cites as examples commerce and group recreational activities. According to Rose, public resources with the "comedic" characteristic may suffer from under-investment rather than over usage.<ref name="rose">{{cite journal |url=http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2827&context=fss_papers |title=The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property |author=Rose, Carol M. |journal=Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale Law School |year=1986 |volume=Paper 1828}}</ref>

A modern example presented by Garrett Richards in [[environmental studies]] is that the issue of excessive [[carbon emissions]] can be tackled effectively only when the efforts are directly addressing the issues along with the collective efforts from the world economies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenthal|first1=Erika|last2=Watson|first2=Robert|date=April 2011|title=Multilateral Efforts to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2011.00705.x|journal=Review of European Community & International Environmental Law|volume=20|issue=1|pages=3–10|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9388.2011.00705.x|issn=0962-8797}}</ref>  Additionally, the more that nations are willing to collaborate and contribute resources, the higher the chances are for successful technological developments.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Richards|first=Garrett|date=2015-12-01|title=Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in an Era of Climate Change|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301495753|journal=[[Alternatives (journal)|Alternatives]]|volume=41|pages=50}}</ref>

==See also==
<!-- Alphabetical order -->
{{Columns-list|colwidth=30em|
* {{annotated link|Bounded rationality}}
* {{annotated link|Collective action problem}}
* {{annotated link|Conflict of interest}}
* {{annotated link|Dutch disease}},  the apparent causal relationship between the increase in the economic development of a specific sector (for example natural resources) and a decline in other sectors (like the manufacturing sector or agriculture).
* {{annotated link|Externality}}
* {{annotated link|Credentialism and educational inflation}}
* {{annotated link|The Evolution of Cooperation|''The Evolution of Cooperation''}}
* {{annotated link|Free-rider problem}}
* {{annotated link|International Association for the Study of the Commons}}
* {{annotated link|Jevons paradox}}
* {{annotated link|Nash equilibrium}}
* {{annotated link|Overfishing}}
** {{annotated link|Shark finning}}
** {{annotated link|Pacific bluefin tuna}}
* {{annotated link|Panic buying}}, when consumers buy unusually large amounts of a product in anticipation of, or after, a disaster or perceived disaster, or in anticipation of an incredibly large price increase or shortage.
* {{annotated link|Parasitism (social offense)}}
* {{annotated link|Prisoner's dilemma}}, wherein two parties may each act in an individually beneficial fashion to the detriment of both
* {{annotated link|Race to the bottom}}
* {{annotated link|Resource curse}}
* {{annotated link|Social trap}}
* {{annotated link|Somebody else's problem}}
* {{annotated link|Stone Soup}}, the inverse of the tragedy
* {{annotated link|Tragedy of the anticommons}}
* {{annotated link|Tyranny of small decisions}}, a situation in which a number of decisions, individually small and insignificant in size and time perspective, cumulatively result in a larger and significant outcome which is neither optimal nor desired.
* {{annotated link|Unscrupulous diner's dilemma}}
* {{annotated link|Unintended consequences}}
* {{annotated link|Universalisability}}
* {{annotated link|Volunteer's dilemma}}, in which each player can either make a small sacrifice that benefits everybody, or instead wait in hope of benefiting from someone else's sacrifice
}}

===Related concepts===
* {{annotated link|Enclosure}}, depriving commoners of their ancient rights
{{Portal bar|Business and economics|Environment}}

==References==
===Notes===
{{Reflist|30em}}

===Bibliography===
{{refbegin}}
* Angus, I. (2008). [https://climateandcapitalism.com/2008/08/25/debunking-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ "The myth of the tragedy of the commons"], ''Climate & Capitalism'' (August 25).
* {{cite journal |last=Chatty |first=Dawn |s2cid=143487962 |date=2010 |title=The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=29–69 |url=https://www.academia.edu/4240985 |doi=10.3751/64.1.12}}
* {{Cite journal | doi=10.5840/enviroethics1985716 | title=No Tragedy on the Commons| year=1985| last1=Cox| first1=Susan Jane Buck| journal=Environmental Ethics| volume=7| issue=1|pages=49–61| bibcode=1985EnEth...7...49C|hdl=10535/3113|hdl-access=free|url=http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3113/buck_NoTragedy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y}}
* {{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Fb39hy6e6KIC | title=Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life| isbn=978-0-393-06979-2| last1=Dixit| first1=Avinash K.| last2=Nalebuff| first2=Barry J.| date=1993|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company}}
* {{cite book |last=Gonner |first=E. C. K |title=Common Land and Inclosure |url=https://archive.org/details/cu31924079597336<!-- https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.223567 --> |place=London |publisher=Macmillan & Co |year=1912}}
* Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., and Hogg, M. (1999). ''Resolving social dilemmas''. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. {{ISBN?}}
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{{refend}}

==External links==
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{{Wikiquote|Garrett Hardin#Tragedy of the Commons (1968)|Tragedy of the Commons}}
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* [http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/ The Digital Library of the Commons]
* [https://mronline.org/2008/08/25/the-myth-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons] by Ian Angus
* [http://www.greens.org/s-r/24/24-26.html "Global Tragedy of the Commons"] by John Hickman and Sarah Bartlett
* [http://www.scq.ubc.ca/tragedy-of-the-commons-explained-with-smurfs/ "Tragedy of the Commons Explained with Smurfs"] by Ryan Somma
* [http://www.conservation-strategy.org/en/csf-econ-video-lessons?term_node_tid_depth=381 Public vs. Private Goods & Tragedy of the Commons]
* [https://localizationpapers.org/averting-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ On averting the Tragedy of the Commons]

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