Editing Self

{{Short description|Individual person as the object of its own reflective consciousness}}

{{About|self in reference to individual|other uses|Self (disambiguation)|subjective experience|Qualia|personal identity|Personal identity|the article about mental appearance|Self-image}}

{{Redirect|Selves}}

{{Self sidebar}}

In [[philosophy]], the '''self''' is an [[individual]]'s own [[being]], [[knowledge]], and [[values]], and the relationship between these attributes. 

The first-person perspective distinguishes selfhood from [[personal identity]]. Whereas "identity" is (literally) sameness<ref>Shoemaker, D. (Dec 15, 2015) [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#ConAcc "Personal Identity and Ethics", section "Contemporary Accounts of Personal Identity"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta - "[...] how can identity - ''sameness'' - be based on a relation (consciousness) that changes from moment to moment?"</ref> and may involve [[categorization]] and [[labeling]],<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1 = Cragun
 | first1 = Ryan
 | last2 = Cragun
 | first2 = Deborah
 | chapter = Social Identity Theory
 | title = Introduction to Sociology
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=rJFHTucmPTMC
 | edition = 1
 | publisher = Blacksleet River
 | date = 2006
 | page = 71
 | isbn = 9781449977474
 | access-date = 22 February 2020
 | quote = We often put others (and ourselves) into categories. Labeling someone as a Muslim, a Turk, or ''soccer player'' are ways of saying other things about these people.
}}
</ref>
selfhood implies a first-person perspective and suggests potential uniqueness. Conversely, "person" is used as a third-person reference. Personal identity can be impaired in late-stage [[Alzheimer's disease]] and in other [[neurodegenerative disease]]s. Finally, the self is distinguishable from "others". Including the distinction between sameness and [[Other (philosophy)|otherness]], the self versus other is a research topic in contemporary [[philosophy]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://otherness.dk/journal/otherness-essays-studies-41|title=Otherness: Essays & Studies 4.1|website=otherness.dk}}</ref> and contemporary [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]] (see also [[Phenomenology (psychology)|psychological phenomenology]]), [[psychology]], [[psychiatry]], [[neurology]], and [[neuroscience]].

Although [[subjective experience]] is central to selfhood, the privacy of this experience is only one of many problems in the [[philosophy of self]] and [[research|scientific]] study of [[consciousness]].

==Psychology==
{{main|Psychology of self}}
The psychology of self is the study of either the [[cognitive]] and [[affective]] representation of one's identity or the subject of experience. The earliest formulation of the self in [[History of psychology|modern psychology]] forms the distinction between two elements I and me. The self as ''I'', is the subjective knower. While, the self as ''Me'', is the subject that is known.<ref>James, W. (1891).  ''The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1.'' Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1890)</ref>  Current views of the self in psychology positions the self as playing an integral part in human motivation, cognition, affect, and [[social identity]].<ref>Sedikides, C. & Spencer, S.J. (Eds.) (2007). ''The Self''. New York: Psychology Press</ref> Self, following the ideas of [[John Locke]], has been seen as a product of [[episodic memory]]<ref name="Conway">{{cite journal | pmid = 10789197 | volume=107 | issue=2 | title=The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system | date=April 2000 | journal=Psychol Rev | pages=261–88 | last1 = Conway | first1 = MA | last2 = Pleydell-Pearce | first2 = CW| doi=10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261 | citeseerx=10.1.1.621.9717 }}</ref> but research on people with [[amnesia]] reveals that they have a coherent sense of self based on preserved conceptual autobiographical knowledge.<ref name="Rathbone">{{cite journal | pmid = 19382038 | doi=10.1080/13554790902849164 | volume=15 | issue=5 | title=Autobiographical memory and amnesia: using conceptual knowledge to ground the self | date=October 2009 | journal=Neurocase | pages=405–18 | last1 = Rathbone | first1 = CJ | last2 = Moulin | first2 = CJ | last3 = Conway | first3 = MA| s2cid=205774482 | url=http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/21635/ }}</ref> Hence, it is possible to correlate cognitive and affective experiences of self with neural processes.  A goal of this ongoing research is to provide grounding insight into the elements of which the complex multiple situated selves of human identity are composed.

What the Freudian tradition has subjectively called, "sense of self" is for Jungian analytic psychology, where one's identity is lodged in the persona or [[Ego (Freudian)|ego]] and is subject to change in maturation. [[Carl Jung]] distinguished, "The self is not only the center but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious; it is the center of this totality...".<ref>Jung, Carl. CW 12, ¶44</ref> The [[Self in Jungian psychology]] is "the archetype of wholeness and the regulating center of the psyche ... a transpersonal power that transcends the ego."<ref>Jung, Carl. (1951) CW 9ii, The Self. Princeton University Press.</ref><ref>Sharp, Daryl (1991). Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts. Inner City Books. p. 119</ref> As a [[Jungian archetype]], it cannot be seen directly, but by ongoing individuating maturation and analytic observation, can be experienced objectively by its cohesive wholeness-making factor.<ref>Jung, Emma & von Franz, Marie-Louise. (1998). The Grail Legend, Princeton University Press. p. 98.</ref>

Meanwhile, [[self psychology]] is a set of psychotherapeutic principles and techniques established by the Austrian-born American psychoanalyst [[Heinz Kohut]] upon the foundation of the psychoanalytic method developed by Freud, and is specifically focused on the subjectivity of experience, which, according to self psychology, is mediated by a psychological structure called the self.<ref>Wolf, E. S. (2002). Treating the self: Elements of clinical self-psychology. Guilford Press.</ref> Examples of psychiatric conditions where such "sameness" may become broken include [[depersonalization]], which sometimes occurs in [[schizophrenia]], where the self appears different from the subject.

==Psychiatry==
{{see also|Self-disorder|Depersonalization}}
The 'Disorders of the Self' have also been extensively studied by psychiatrists.<ref>Berrios G.E. & Marková I.S. (2003) The self in psychiatry: a conceptual history. In Kircher T & David A. (eds) ''The Self in Neurosciences and Psychiatry''. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 9–39</ref>

For example, facial and [[Pattern recognition (psychology)|pattern recognition]] take large amounts of brain processing capacity but [[pareidolia]] cannot explain many constructs of self for cases of disorder, such as schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.
One's sense of self can also be changed upon becoming part of a stigmatized group. According to Cox, [[Lyn Yvonne Abramson|Abramson]], [[Patricia Devine|Devine]], and Hollon (2012), if an individual has prejudice against a certain group, like the elderly and then later becomes part of this group. This prejudice can be turned inward causing depression.<ref name="Cox et al. (2012)">{{cite journal |last1= Cox |first1= William T. L. |last2= Abramson |first2= Lyn Y. |last3= Devine |first3= Patricia G. |last4= Hollon |first4= Steven D. |year= 2012 |title= Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Depression: The Integrated Perspective |journal= [[Perspectives on Psychological Science]] |volume= 7 |issue= 5 |pages= 427–49 |doi= 10.1177/1745691612455204 |pmid=26168502|s2cid= 1512121 }}</ref>

The philosophy of a disordered self, such as in [[schizophrenia]], is described in terms of what the psychiatrist understands are actual events in terms of neuron excitation but are delusions nonetheless, and the schizo-affective or a schizophrenic person also believes are actual events in terms of essential being. PET scans have shown that auditory stimulation is processed in certain areas of the brain, and imagined similar events are processed in adjacent areas, but hallucinations are processed in the same areas as actual stimulation. In such cases, external influences may be the source of consciousness and the person may or may not be responsible for "sharing" in the mind's process, or the events which occur, such as visions and auditory stimuli, may persist and be repeated often over hours, days, months or years—and the afflicted person may believe themselves to be in a state of rapture or possession.

==Neuroscience==
{{main|Neural basis of self}}
Two areas of the [[brain]] that are important in retrieving [[self-knowledge (psychology)|self-knowledge]] are the [[medial prefrontal cortex]] and the medial posterior parietal cortex.<ref name="Pfeifer">Pfeifer, J. H., Lieberman, M. D., & Dapretto, M. (2007). "I know you are but what am I?!": Neural bases of self and social knowledge retrieval in children and adults. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(8), 1323-1337.</ref>
The [[posterior cingulate cortex]], the [[anterior cingulate cortex]], and medial prefrontal cortex are thought to combine to provide humans with the ability to self-reflect. The [[insular cortex]] is also thought to be involved in the process of [[self-reference]].<ref name="Modinos">Modinos G, Renken R, Ormel J, Aleman A. Self-reflection and the psychosis-prone brain: an fMRI study. Neuropsychology [serial online]. May 2011;25(3):295-305. Available from: MEDLINE with Full Text, Ipswich, MA. Accessed November 7, 2011.</ref>

==Sociology==
[[Culture]] consists of explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, cognitive and social practices, and artifacts.  Cultural systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other, as conditioning elements of further action.<ref>Kroeber & Kluckholn, 1963, p.&nbsp;357</ref> The way individuals construct themselves may be different due to their culture.<ref name="kanagawa-et-al-2001">{{cite journal |last1=Kanagawa |first1=Chie |last2=Cross |first2=Susan E. |last3=Markus |first3=Hazel Rose |title="Who Am I?": The Cultural Psychology of the Conceptual Self |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin |date=2001 |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=90–103|doi=10.1177/0146167201271008 |s2cid=145634514 }}</ref>

[[Hazel Rose Markus]] and [[Shinobu Kitayama]]'s theory of the interdependent self hypothesizes that representations of the self in human cultures fall on a continuum from ''independent'' to ''interdependent''. The independent self is supposed to be egoistic, unique, separated from the various contexts, critical in judgment, and prone to self-expression. The interdependent self is supposed to be altruistic, similar with the others, flexible according to contexts, conformist, and unlikely to express opinions that would disturb the harmony of his or her group of belonging.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Markus|first1=Hazel R.|last2=Kitayama|first2=Shinobu| date=April 1991| title=Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.|journal=Psychological Review|volume=98| issue=2| pages=224–253| doi=10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.224| s2cid=13606371| issn=1939-1471}}</ref> However, this theory has been criticized by other sociologists, including [[David Matsumoto]]<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Matsumoto|first=David|date=December 1999|title=Culture and self: An empirical assessment of Markus and Kitayama's theory of independent and interdependent self-construals|journal=Asian Journal of Social Psychology| volume=2| issue=3| pages=289–310| doi=10.1111/1467-839x.00042|issn=1367-2223}}</ref> for being based on popular stereotypes and myths about different cultures rather than on rigorous scientific research. A 2016 study<ref name=Vignoles-et-al-2016>{{Cite journal|last=Vignoles|first=Vivian L.|display-authors=etal|date=2016|title=Beyond the 'East–West' Dichotomy: Global Variation in Cultural Models of Selfhood| journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: General| volume=145| issue=8| pages=966–1000| doi=10.1037/xge0000175| pmid=27359126| hdl=11693/36711|s2cid=296518 |url= https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/xge-xge0000175.pdf}}</ref> of 10,203 participants from 55 cultural groups also failed to find a correlation between the postulating series of causal links between culture and self-construals, finding instead that correlations between traits varied both across cultures did not correlate with Markus & Kitayama's identifications of "independent" or "interdependent" self.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Vignoles|first1=Vivian L.|last2=Smith|first2=Peter B.|last3=Becker|first3=Maja|last4=Easterbrook|first4=Matthew J.|date=2018-06-21|title=In Search of a Pan-European Culture: European Values, Beliefs, and Models of Selfhood in Global Perspective|journal=Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology| volume=49| issue=6| pages=868–887| doi=10.1177/0022022117738751| s2cid=149371650| issn=0022-0221| url=http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/70436/1/__smbhome.uscs.susx.ac.uk_ellenaj_Desktop_SRO_after%20august_Europe%20paper%20manuscript%20for%20production.pdf}}</ref>

==Philosophy==
{{main|Philosophy of self}}
The philosophy of self seeks to describe essential qualities that constitute a person's uniqueness or a person's essential being. There have been various approaches to defining these qualities. The self can be considered as the source of consciousness, the [[moral agency |agent]] [[Moral responsibility |responsible]] for an individual's thoughts and actions, or the [[Substance theory| substantial]] nature of a person which endures and unifies consciousness over time.

The self has a particular prominence in the thought of [[René Descartes]] (1596-1650).<ref>
{{cite book
 |author1              = Lesley Cohen Spear
 |year                 = 1979
 |title                = Descartes and Merleau-Ponty on the Self and Self-knowledge
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=ThTnGwAACAAJ
 |publisher            = University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy
 |access-date          = 1 November 2023
}} 
</ref>
In addition to the writings of [[Emmanuel Levinas]] (1906-1995) on "otherness", the distinction between "you" and "me" has been further elaborated in [[Martin Buber]]'s 1923 philosophical work [[I and Thou| ''Ich und Du'']].

In philosophy, the problem of [[personal identity]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/|title=Personal Identity - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|website=www.iep.utm.edu|access-date=30 July 2024|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170903032724/http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/|archive-date=3 September 2017}}</ref> is concerned with how one is able to identify a single person over a time interval, dealing with such questions as, "What makes it true that a person at one time is the same thing as a person at another time?" or "What kinds of things are we persons?"

A question related to the problem of personal identity is Benj Hellie's [[vertiginous question]]. The vertiginous question asks why, of all the subjects of experience out there, ''this'' one—the one corresponding to the human being referred to as Benj Hellie—is the one whose experiences are ''live''? (The reader is supposed to substitute their own case for Hellie's.)<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hellie|first=Benj|year=2013|title=Against egalitarianism|journal=Analysis|volume=73|issue=2|pages=304–320|doi=10.1093/analys/ans101}}</ref> Hellie's argument is closely related to Caspar Hare's theories of [[egocentric presentism]] and [[perspectival realism]], of which several other philosophers have written reviews.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McDaniel|first=Kris|title=''On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects'' by Hare, Caspar - Review|journal=Ethics|date=January 2012|volume=122|issue=2|pages=403–410|url=http://krmcdani.mysite.syr.edu/whymcxmattersmost.pdf|doi=10.1086/663578}}
* {{cite journal|last=Markosian|first=Ned|title=Are You Special? A Review of Caspar Hare's ''On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects''|journal=The Philosophical Review|url=http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/Hare.Review.pdf|access-date=2015-03-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150226073041/http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/Hare.Review.pdf|archive-date=2015-02-26|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Similar questions are also asked repeatedly by [[J. J. Valberg]] in justifying his [[personal horizon|horizonal]] view of the self,<ref>{{cite book|last=Valberg|first=J. J.|title=Dream, Death, and the Self|year=2007|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=9780691128597|url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8416.html}}</ref> and by [[Thomas Nagel]] in ''[[The View from Nowhere]]''.<ref name="MindsAndBodies">{{cite book |last1=McGinn |first1=Colin |title=Minds and Bodies: Philosophers and Their Ideas |date=1997 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-511355-6 }}{{pn|date=January 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Thomas |first1=Alan |title=Thomas Nagel |date=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-49418-8 }}{{pn|date=August 2024}}</ref> Tim S. Roberts refers to the question of why a particular organism out of all the organisms that happen to exist happens to be you as the "Even Harder Problem of Consciousness".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Roberts|first=Tim S.|title=''The Even Harder Problem of Consciousness'' by Roberts. Tim S.|journal=NeuroQuantology|date=September 2007|volume=5|issue=2|pages=214–221|doi=10.14704/nq.2007.5.2.129 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228618472}}</ref>

[[Open individualism]] is a view in the philosophy of self, according to which there exists only one numerically [[Identity (philosophy)|identical]] [[Subject (philosophy)|subject]], who is everyone at all times, in the past, present and future.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Kolak|first=Daniel|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-_JD9NIWBVgC|title=I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics|date=2007-11-03|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=978-1-4020-3014-7|language=en}}</ref>{{Rp|page=617}} It is a theoretical solution to the question of personal identity, being contrasted with "Empty individualism", the view that personal identities correspond to a fixed pattern that instantaneously disappears with the passage of time, and "Closed individualism", the common view that personal identities are particular to subjects and yet survive over time.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=xxii}}

Open individualism is related to the concept of [[anattā]] in Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhism, the term anattā ({{langx|pi|𑀅𑀦𑀢𑁆𑀢𑀸}}) or anātman ({{langx|sa|अनात्मन्}}) is the doctrine of "non-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon. While often interpreted as a doctrine denying the existence of a self, ''anatman'' is more accurately described as a strategy to attain non-attachment by recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of an unchanging essence.{{sfn|Gombrich|2009|p=69–70}}{{sfn|Wynne|2009|p=59–63, 76–77}} In contrast, dominant schools of Hinduism assert the existence of [[Atman (Hinduism)|Ātman]] as [[purusha|pure awareness]] or [[sakshi (Witness)|witness-consciousness]],{{sfn|Deutsch|1973|p=48}}{{sfn|Dalal|2010|p=38}}{{sfn|McClelland|2010|p=34–35}} "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self."{{sfn|Mackenzie|2012}}

One thought experiment in the philosophy of personal identity is the [[teletransportation paradox]]. It deals with whether the concept of one's [[future self]] is a coherent concept. The thought experiment was formulated by [[Derek Parfit]] in his 1984 book ''[[Reasons and Persons]].''<ref>{{Cite book |last=Parfit |first=Derek |url=https://archive.org/details/trent_0116300637661/page/n5/mode/2up |title=Reasons and persons |date=1984 |isbn=0-19-824615-3 |location=Oxford [Oxfordshire] |oclc=9827659}}</ref> Derek Parfit and others consider a hypothetical "teletransporter", a machine that puts you to sleep, records your molecular composition, breaking you down into atoms, and relaying its recording to Mars at the speed of light.  On Mars, another machine re-creates you (from local stores of carbon, hydrogen, and so on), each atom in exactly the same relative position.  Parfit poses the question of whether or not the teletransporter is actually a method of travel, or if it simply kills and makes an exact replica of the user.<ref>Parfit, Derek. "[https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil375/Parfit.pdf Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons],” in ''Mindwaves'', ed. Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield. Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 351–6.</ref> Then the teleporter is upgraded. The teletransporter on Earth is modified to not destroy the person who enters it, but instead it can simply make infinite replicas, all of whom would claim to remember entering the teletransporter on Earth in the first place. Using thought experiments such as these, Parfit argues that any criteria we attempt to use to determine sameness of person will be lacking, because there is no [[Further facts|further fact]].  What matters, to Parfit, is simply "Relation R", psychological connectedness, including memory, personality, and so on.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Badri |first=Adarsh |date=2024-01-23 |title=What is the Teletransportation Problem or the Duplicates Paradox? – Adarsh Badri |url=https://adarshbadri.me/philosophy/teletransportation-paradox/ |access-date=2024-02-19 |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Religion==
{{main|Religious views on the self}}
Religious views on the Self vary widely. The Self is a complex and core subject in many forms of [[spirituality]]. Two types of Self are commonly considered—the Self that is the ego, also called the learned, superficial Self of mind and body, egoic creation, and the Self which is sometimes called the "True Self", the "Observing Self", or the "Witness".<ref>Hall, Manly P. (1942). ''Self Unfoldment by Disciplines of Realization''. Los Angeles, CA: The Philosophical Research Society, Inc. p. 115 "On rare occasions, we glimpse for an instant the tremendous implication of the Self, and we become aware that the personality is indeed merely a shadow of the real."</ref> In [[Hinduism]], the [[Ātman (Hinduism)|Ātman]] (Self), despite being experienced as an individual, is actually a representation of the unified transcendent reality, [[Brahman]].<ref>{{citation |last=Barnett |first=Lincoln |author-link=Lincoln Barnett| display-authors=etal| editor1-last=Welles |editor1-first=Sam |title=The World's Great Religions |year=1957 |publisher=[[Time Inc.|Time Incorporated]] |location=New York |edition=1st}}</ref> Our experience of reality doesn't match the nature of Brahman due to [[Maya (religion)|māyā]].

One description of spirituality is the Self's search for "ultimate meaning" through an independent comprehension of the sacred. Another definition of spiritual identity is: "A persistent sense of Self that addresses ultimate questions about the nature, purpose, and meaning of life, resulting in behaviors that are consonant with the individual’s core values. Spiritual identity appears when the symbolic religious and spiritual value of a culture is found by individuals in the setting of their own life. There can be different types of spiritual Self because it is determined by one's life and experiences."<ref name="ReferenceA">Kiesling, Chris; Montgomery, Marylin; [[Gwendolyn Sorell|Sorell, Gwendolyn]]; Colwell, Ronald. "Identity and Spirituality: A Psychosocial Exploration of the Sense of Spiritual Self"</ref>

Human beings have a Self—that is, they are able to look back on themselves as both subjects and objects in the universe. Ultimately, this brings questions about who we are and the nature of our own importance.<ref>Charon, Joel M. ''Ten Questions: A Sociological Perspective.'' 5th edition. Thomson & Wadsworth. p. 260</ref> Traditions such as in [[Buddhism]] see the [[Raga (Buddhism)|attachment]] to [[Atman (Buddhism)|Self]] is an illusion that serves as the main cause of [[Dukkha|suffering]] and unhappiness.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rogerr.com/galin/papers/roots.htm|title=The concept "Self" and "person" in Buddhism and in western psychology|publisher=NY: Columbia University Press|date=2001|access-date=12 February 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904105541/http://www.rogerr.com/galin/papers/roots.htm|archive-date=2017-09-04|url-status=dead}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{wikiquote}}
{{wikiversity|True Self}}
{{wiktionary|self}}
* [[Anatta]]— "not-self", Buddhist concept stating there is no unchanging, permanent self, [[soul]] or essence in living beings
* [[Attention]]
* [[Ego death]]
* {{section link|Humeanism#Bundle theory of the self}}
* [[I (pronoun)]]
* [[Individuation]]
* [[Jīva (Jainism)]], or Atman, used within Jainism to identify the soul
* [[Meditation]]
* [[Moral psychology]]
* [[Open individualism]]
* [[Outline of self]]
* [[Person (disambiguation)]]
* [[Self remembering]]
* [[Self-awareness]]
* [[Social projection]]
* [[Vertiginous question]]
* [[Will (philosophy)]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

== Sources ==
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite book |last1=Dalal |first1=Roshen |title=The religions of India : a concise guide to nine major faiths |date=2010 |publisher=Penguin Books |location=New Delhi |isbn=978-0-14-341517-6 |edition=Rev.}}
* {{Citation | last =Deutsch | first =Eliot | year =1973  |title =Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction | publisher =University of Hawaii Press}}
* {{cite book|last=Gombrich|first=Richard Francis|author-link=Richard Gombrich|year=2009|title=What the Buddha thought|publisher=Equinox Pub.|isbn=9781845536145|url=https://archive.org/details/WhatTheBuddhaThought/mode/2up}}
* {{Citation| last =McClelland | first =Norman C. |year=2010 |title=Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S_Leq4U5ihkC |publisher=McFarland|isbn=978-0-7864-5675-8}}
* {{cite book |last=Mackenzie |first=Matthew |year=2012 |chapter=Luminosity, Subjectivity, and Temporality: An Examination of Buddhist and Advaita views of Consciousness |editor1-last=Kuznetsova |editor1-first=Irina |editor2-last=Ganeri |editor2-first=Jonardon |editor3-last=Ram-Prasad |editor3-first=Chakravarthi |title=Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self |publisher=Routledge}}
* {{Cite journal|last=Wynne|first=Alexander|year=2009|title=Early Evidence for the 'no self' doctrine?|journal=Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies|pages=59–63, 76–77|url=http://ocbs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/awynne2009atijbs.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602145336/http://ocbs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/awynne2009atijbs.pdf|archive-date=2017-06-02|access-date=2017-04-23}}
{{refend}}
==Further reading==
{{refbegin|30em}}
* Anthony Elliott, ''Concepts of the Self''
* [[Anthony Giddens]], ''Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age''
* Ben Morgan (2013). ''On Becoming God: Late Medieval Mysticism and the Modern Western Self.'' New York: Fordham UP
* [[Bernadette Roberts]], [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2P_M5SRzwPdcDE2Qzg2dHBkMG8/view?usp=sharing ''What is Self?  A Research Paper'']
* Charalambos Tsekeris, [http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/yjmnkigChvMZDpFesE6G/full ''Contextualising the self in contemporary social science'']
* Charles Taylor, ''[[Sources of the Self]]: the making of the modern identity''
* [[Clark Moustakas]], ''The self: explorations in personal growth''	
* [[Fernando Andacht]], Mariela Michel, ''[http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/1/51.abstract A Semiotic Reflection on Selfinterpretation and Identity]''
* [[Jean Dalby Clift]], ''Core Images of the Self: A Symbolic Approach to Healing and Wholeness''
* [[Richard Sorabji]], ''Self: ancient and modern insights about individuality, life, and death''
* Robert Kegan, ''The evolving self: problem and process in human development''
* Thomas M. Brinthaupt, Richard P. Lipka, ''The Self: definitional and methodological issues''
* 1910–1999., Eknath, Easwaran, (2019). The Bhagavad Gita. Nilgiri Press. ISBN 1-58638-130-X. OCLC 1043425057
{{refend}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Self| ]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]