Editing Politics of China

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{{About|the politics of the People's Republic of China|other uses|Politics of China (disambiguation)}}
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{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2017}}
{{Use British English|date=October 2017}}
{{Infobox communist political system
| name                          = Politics of the<br>People's Republic of China
| native_name                   = {{nobold|中华人民共和国政治}}
| image                         = File:National Emblem of the People's Republic of China (2).svg 
| image_size                    = 100px
| background_color              = {{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}
| caption                       = [[National Emblem of the People's Republic of China]]
| type                          = [[Communist state]] under the [[system of people's congress]]
| constitution                  = [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China]]
| formation                     = [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|1 October 1949]]
| communist_party               = [[Chinese Communist Party]]
| general_secretary             = [[Xi Jinping]]
| supreme_organ                 = [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|National Congress]]
| highest_organ_party           = [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee]]
| political_organ               = [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo]]
| executive_organ               = [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party|Secretariat]]
| military_organ                = [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central&nbsp;Military&nbsp;Commission]]
| supervisory_organ             = [[Central Commission for Discipline Inspection]]
| highest_organ                 = [[National People's Congress]]
| highest_organ_type            = [[Unicameralism|Unicameral]] 
| highest_organ_place           = [[Great Hall of the People]], [[Beijing]]
| presiding_body                = [[Presidium of the National People's Congress|Presidium]]
| standing_body                 = [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|Standing Committee]]
| standing_body_chair           = [[Zhao Leji]]
| standing_body_secretary       = [[Liu Qi (politician, born 1957)|Liu Qi]]
| executive_name                = [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]]
| title_hog                     = [[Premier of China|Premier]]
| current_hog                   = [[Li Qiang]]
| appointer_hog                 = [[President of China|President]]
| current_term                  = [[Li Qiang Government|14th State Council]]
| cabinet_hq                    = [[Zhongnanhai]]
| cabinet_ministries            = [[Ministries of the People's Republic of China|26]]
| military                      = [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]]
| leader_military               = [[Xi Jinping]]
| vice_chairmen_military        = [[Zhang Youxia]] and [[He Weidong]]
| supervisory                   = [[National Supervisory Commission]]
| director_supervisory          = [[Liu Jinguo]]
| vice_director_supervisory     = [[Xiao Pei]], [[Yu Hongqiu]], [[Fu Kui]], [[Sun Xinyang]], [[Liu Xuexin]] and [[Zhang Fuhai]]
| judiciary                     = [[Supreme People's Court]]
| chief_judge                   = [[Zhang Jun (politician)|Zhang Jun]] (President)
| court_seat                    = [[Beijing]]
| procuratorate_name            = [[Supreme People's Procuratorate]]
| procuratorate_seat            = [[Beijing]]
| chief_procuratorate           = [[Ying Yong]] (Prosecutor-General)
}}

{{Politics of the People's Republic of China}}
In the [[People's Republic of China]], politics functions within a [[socialist state]] framework based on the [[system of people's congress]] under the leadership of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), with the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC) functioning as the [[highest organ of state power]] and only branch of government per the principle of [[unified power]]. The CCP leads state activities by holding two-thirds of the seats in the NPC, and these party members are, in accordance with [[democratic centralism]], responsible for implementing the policies adopted by the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Central Committee]] and the [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|National Congress]]. The NPC has unlimited state power bar the limitations it sets on itself. By controlling the NPC, the CCP has complete state power. China's two [[Special administrative regions of China|special administrative regions]] (SARs), [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]], are nominally autonomous from this system.

The Chinese political system is considered [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Truex |first=Rory |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |title=Making Autocracy Work |date=2016-10-28 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-17243-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308185625/https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Mattingly |first=Daniel C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FjzADwAAQBAJ |title=The Art of Political Control in China |date=2019-12-05 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-316-99791-8 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308185629/https://books.google.com/books?id=FjzADwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Tang |first=Wenfang |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_uw_CwAAQBAJ |title=Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability |date=2016-01-04 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-049081-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143102/https://books.google.com/books?id=_uw_CwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Nathan |first1=Andrew J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6TnSAQAAQBAJ |title=Will China Democratize? |last2=Diamond |first2=Larry |last3=Plattner |first3=Marc F. |date=2013-09-01 |publisher=[[Johns Hopkins University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4214-1244-3 |language=en |author-link2=Larry Diamond |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143101/https://books.google.com/books?id=6TnSAQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Teets |first=Jessica C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J6-BAwAAQBAJ |title=Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model |date=2014-06-09 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-03875-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143211/https://books.google.com/books?id=J6-BAwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Heurlin |first=Christopher |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F4UwDQAAQBAJ |title=Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making |date=2016-10-27 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-10780-8 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143202/https://books.google.com/books?id=F4UwDQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> There are no freely elected national leaders, political opposition is suppressed, all religious activity is controlled by the CCP, dissent is not permitted, and civil rights are curtailed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Economy |first=Elizabeth C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fc5KEAAAQBAJ |title=The World According to China |date=2021-10-25 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-5095-3751-8 |language=en |oclc=1251737887 |author-link=Elizabeth Economy |access-date=7 August 2022 |archive-date=7 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220807180321/https://books.google.com/books?id=fc5KEAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=China: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021 |access-date=2021-07-17 |website=[[Freedom House]] |language=en |archive-date=24 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230724071501/https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Direct elections]] occur only at the local level, not the national level, with all candidate nominations controlled by the CCP.<ref name=":05">{{Cite journal |last1=Gandhi |first1=Jennifer |last2=Lust-Okar |first2=Ellen |date=2009-06-01 |title=Elections Under Authoritarianism |journal=[[Annual Review of Political Science]] |language=en |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=403–422 |doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434 |issn=1094-2939 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |title=How Dictatorships Work |last2=Wright |first2=Joseph |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |date=2018 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-316-33618-2 |pages=141 |doi=10.1017/9781316336182 |s2cid=226899229}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Landry |first1=Pierre F. |last2=Davis |first2=Deborah |last3=Wang |first3=Shiru |date=2010-06-01 |title=Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties |journal=[[Comparative Political Studies]] |language=en |volume=43 |issue=6 |pages=763–790 |doi=10.1177/0010414009359392 |issn=0010-4140 |s2cid=43175132}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Manion |first=Melanie |date=2017-03-01 |title="Good Types" in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses |journal=[[Comparative Political Studies]] |language=en |volume=50 |issue=3 |pages=362–394 |doi=10.1177/0010414014537027 |issn=0010-4140 |s2cid=155166131}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Ching Kwan |last2=Zhang |first2=Yonghong |date=2013-05-01 |title=The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China |journal=[[American Journal of Sociology]] |volume=118 |issue=6 |pages=1475–1508 |doi=10.1086/670802 |issn=0002-9602 |s2cid=144559373}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wallace |first=Jeremy L. |date=2016 |title=Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China |journal=[[British Journal of Political Science]] |language=en |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=11–29 |doi=10.1017/S0007123414000106 |issn=0007-1234 |s2cid=154275103 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

The nature of the elections is highly constrained by the CCP's monopoly on power in China, [[Censorship in China|censorship]], and party control over elections.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hernández |first=Javier C. |date=2016-11-15 |title='We Have a Fake Election': China Disrupts Local Campaigns |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/asia/beijing-china-local-elections.html |access-date=2021-11-05 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=5 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105023202/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/asia/beijing-china-local-elections.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-01-14 |title=The West once dreamed of democracy taking root in rural China |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/14/the-west-once-dreamed-of-democracy-taking-root-in-rural-china |access-date=2021-11-05 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=5 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105023203/https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/14/the-west-once-dreamed-of-democracy-taking-root-in-rural-china |url-status=live }}</ref> According to academic Rory Truex of the [[Princeton School of Public and International Affairs]], "the CCP tightly controls the nomination and election processes at every level in the people's congress system... the tiered, indirect electoral mechanism in the People's Congress system ensures that deputies at the highest levels face no semblance of electoral accountability to the Chinese citizenry."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Truex |first=Rory |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |title=Making Autocracy Work |date=2016-10-28 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-17243-2 |pages=52, 111 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308185625/https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Overview==
{{Update section|date=June 2023}}
{{See also|Paramount leader|Party and state leaders|Order of precedence in China|Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Generations of Chinese leadership}}

Since the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|founding]] of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government in [[Beijing]] officially asserts to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, which it defines as including [[mainland China]] and [[Taiwan (island)|Taiwan]]. This has been disputed by the Republic of China (ROC) government since the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) fled to [[Taipei]] in 1949. The Republic of China has since undergone significant political reforms.

[[Demographics of China|China's population]], [[Geography of China|geographical vastness]], and social diversity frustrate attempts to rule from Beijing. [[Chinese economic reform|Economic reform]] during the 1980s and the devolution of much central government decision making, combined with the strong interest of local CCP officials in enriching themselves, has made it increasingly difficult for the central government to assert its authority.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=He |first1=Qinglian |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/39847047 |title=Xian dai hua de xian jing : dang dai Zhongguo de jing ji she hui wen ti |last2=何清涟 |date=1998 |publisher=Jin ri Zhongguo chu ban she |isbn=7-5072-0908-3 |edition=Di 1 ban |location=Beijing |oclc=39847047 |access-date=25 October 2022 |archive-date=8 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240508195411/https://search.worldcat.org/title/39847047 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[president of China]] is the [[List of state representatives of the People's Republic of China|state representative]], serving as the ceremonial [[figurehead]] under the [[National People's Congress]].{{NoteTag|The office of the President is largely powerless, with the powers and functions under the [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China|Constitution of 1982]] comparable to that of a [[constitutional monarch]] or a head of state in a [[parliamentary republic]].<ref>[http://www.kkhsou.in/main/polscience/structure_function.html Krishna Kanta Handique State Open University] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502002431/http://www.kkhsou.in/main/polscience/structure_function.html |date=2 May 2014 }}, EXECUTIVE: THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC.</ref>{{Better source needed|date=April 2020}}}} In March 2018, the NPC removed the term limits for the presidency.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Huang |first2=Kristin |date=26 February 2018 |title=End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |url-status=live |access-date=28 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227155138/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |archive-date=27 February 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=4 March 2018 |title=Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180304005848/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |archive-date=4 March 2018 |access-date=4 March 2018 |website=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> As a [[one-party state]], the [[general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]] holds ultimate power and authority over state and government with no term limit.{{NoteTag|[[Xi Jinping]] was elected President of the People's Republic of China on 14 March 2013.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/who-s-who-in-China-s-new-communist-party-leadership-lineup.html |title=Who's Who in China's New Communist Party Leadership Lineup – Bloomberg |website=[[Bloomberg News]] |access-date=24 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141024034823/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/who-s-who-in-china-s-new-communist-party-leadership-lineup.html |archive-date=24 October 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160729201558/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288|archive-date = 29 July 2016|title = China new leaders: Xi Jinping heads line-up for politburo|work = [[BBC News]]|date = 15 November 2012}}</ref>}} The offices of president, general secretary, and chairman of the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] have been held simultaneously by one individual since 1993, granting the [[Paramount leader|individual]] ''[[de jure]]'' and ''de facto'' power over the country.

Central government leaders must, in practice, build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the population at large.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Dali L. |title=Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China |date=2004-07-28 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-1944-9 |doi=10.1515/9781503619449|s2cid=248351747 }}</ref> Even as there have been some moves in the direction of democratization as far as the electoral system at least, in that openly contested People's Congress elections are now held at the village and town levels,<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Dickson |first=Bruce J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y5IIEAAAQBAJ |title=The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century |date=2021 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-21696-6 |language=en |access-date=4 January 2022 |archive-date=8 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240508195431/https://books.google.com/books?id=y5IIEAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> and that legislatures have shown some assertiveness from time to time, the CCP retains effective control over governmental appointments. This is because the CCP wins by default in most electorates.<ref>[http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303364/aib775n_1_.pdf "Does China's Land-Tenure System Discourage Structural Adjustment?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304195013/http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303364/aib775n_1_.pdf|date=4 March 2016}}, Lohmar & Somwaru, USDA Economic Research Service, 1 May 2006. ''Accessed 3 May 2006.''</ref>{{Update inline|date=June 2023}}

The social, cultural, and political as well as economic consequences of market reform have created tensions in Chinese society.<ref>[http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/04/david_cowhig_in.php Part I of summary of Zhou Tianyong's 2004 book Reform of the Chinese Political System] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927011522/http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/04/david_cowhig_in.php |date=27 September 2007 }} Accessed 7 February 2007.</ref><ref>[http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/06/zhou_tianyong_r.php Part II of summary of Zhou Tianyong's 2004 book Reform of the Chinese Political System] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070213234740/http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/06/zhou_tianyong_r.php |date=13 February 2007 }} Accessed 7 February 2007.</ref>

==Self-description==
The Chinese constitution describes China's system of government as a [[people's democratic dictatorship]].<ref name="Constitution">{{cite web |date=20 November 2019 |title=Constitution of the People's Republic of China |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/1f65146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml |access-date=20 March 2021 |website=[[National People's Congress]] |archive-date=2 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230702212731/http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/1f65146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref> The CCP has also used other terms to officially describe China's system of government including "socialist consultative democracy", and  [[whole-process people's democracy]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=4 December 2021 |title=Full Text: China: Democracy That Works |url=http://www.news.cn/english/2021-12/04/c_1310351231.htm |access-date=2022-12-20 |website=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |publisher=[[State Council Information Office]] |archive-date=4 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230604101259/http://www.news.cn/english/2021-12/04/c_1310351231.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> According to the CCP theoretical journal ''[[Qiushi]]'', "[c]onsultative democracy was created by the CPC and the Chinese people as a form of socialist democracy. ... Not only representing a commitment to socialism, it carries forward China's political and cultural traditions. Not only representing a commitment to the organizational principles and leadership mode of democratic centralism, it also affirms the role of the general public in a democracy. Not only representing a commitment to the leadership of the CPC, it also gives play to the role of all political parties and organizations as well as people of all ethnic groups and all sectors of society".<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=The Development of Socialist Consultative Democracy in China |url=http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201301/201302/t20130218_211654.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170309221709/http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201301/201302/t20130218_211654.htm |archive-date=9 March 2017 |access-date=2018-05-13 |website=[[Qiushi]]}}</ref> The semi-official journal ''[[China Today]]'' stated the CCP's view: "Consultative democracy guarantees widespread and effective participation in politics through consultations carried out by political parties, peoples congresses, government departments, CPPCC committees, peoples organizations, communities, and social organizations".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fx361.com/page/2018/0408/3360430.shtml|title=Socialist Consultative Democracy_参考网|website=www.fx361.com|access-date=2018-05-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514064651/http://www.fx361.com/page/2018/0408/3360430.shtml|archive-date=14 May 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> On the other hand, according to the [[V-Dem Democracy indices]] China was 2023 the second least electoral [[democracy in Asia|democratic country in Asia]].<ref name="vdem_dataset">{{cite web |last=V-Dem Institute |date=2023 |title=The V-Dem Dataset |url=https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ |access-date=14 October 2023 |archive-date=8 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208183458/https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Communist Party==
{{Main|Chinese Communist Party}}

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominates the Chinese political landscape. Constitutionally, the party's highest body is the [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|Party Congress]], which meets every five years. Meetings were irregular before the Cultural Revolution but have been periodic since then. The National Congress elects the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee]] and the [[Central Commission for Discipline Inspection]] (CCDI); the Central Committee in turn elects bodies such as:

*The [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|General Secretary]], which is the highest-ranking official within the Party and usually the Chinese [[Paramount leader]].
*The [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo]], consisting of 22 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee);
*The [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]], the most powerful decision-making body in China, which as of June 2020 consists of seven members;<ref>{{cite web |title=Backgrounder: 中国共产党第十九届中央领导机构 |url=http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/dhgjjg/940713685.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200604064416/http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/dhgjjg/940713685.htm |archive-date=2020-06-04 |access-date=2020-07-12 |publisher=[[Government of China]]}}</ref>
*The [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party|Secretariat]], the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the General Secretary;
*The [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]]

In relative [[liberalization]] periods, the influence of people and groups outside the formal party structure has increased, particularly in the economic realm. Nevertheless, in all governmental institutions in the PRC, the party committees at all levels maintain a powerful and pivotal role in the administration.<ref name=":08">{{Cite news |date=March 9, 2023 |title=What party control means in China |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/03/09/what-party-control-means-in-china |access-date=2023-03-11 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311010428/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/03/09/what-party-control-means-in-china |url-status=live }}</ref> According to scholar [[Rush Doshi]], "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Doshi |first=Rush |author-link=Rush Doshi |title=The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order |date=2021-09-30 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-752791-7 |edition=1 |pages=35 |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001 |oclc=1256820870}}</ref> Central party control is tightest in central government offices and urban economic, industrial, and cultural settings; it is considerably looser over the government and party establishments in rural areas, where a significant percentage of mainland Chinese people live. The CCP's most important responsibility comes in the selection and promotion of personnel. They also see that party and state policy guidance is followed and that non-party members do not create autonomous organizations that could challenge party rule. Significant are the [[leading small group]]s which coordinate activities of different agencies. [[State-owned enterprises of China|State-owned enterprises]], private companies and foreign-owned businesses are also required to have internal CCP committees.<ref name=":92">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>

=== Intra-party factions ===
Chinese politics have long been defined by the competition between intra-party factions' ability to place key members and allies in positions of power within the CCP and Chinese government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Huang |first=Jing |title=Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics |date=2000-07-03 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-0-521-62284-4 |edition=1 |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511571688}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Citation |last=Zhiyue |first=Bo |title=Factional politics in the Party-state apparatus |date=2017-08-18 |work=Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party |pages=122–134 |editor-last=Lam |editor-first=Willy Wo-Lap |edition=1 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315543918-8 |isbn=978-1-315-54391-8 |editor-link=Willy Wo-Lap Lam}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite news |last=Lai |first=Alexis |date=2012-10-24 |title='One party, two coalitions' -- China's factional politics |url=https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/index.html |access-date=2023-01-03 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103080556/https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

Under general secretaries [[Jiang Zemin]] and Hu Jintao, the two main factions were thought to be the [[Tuanpai]] and the [[Shanghai clique|Shanghai Clique]].<ref name=":9" /> The Tuanpai were thought to be cadres and officials that originated from the [[Communist Youth League of China]], while the Shanghai Clique were thought to be officials that rose to prominence under Jiang Zemin when he was first [[List of mayors of Shanghai|mayor]], and then [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|CCP committee secretary]], of [[Shanghai]].<ref name=":6" />

Xi Jinping, who became general secretary in 2012, has significantly centralized power, removing the influence of the old factions and promoting his allies, sometimes called the "[[New Zhijiang Army|Xi Jinping faction]]". Due to this, the old factions, including the Tuanpai, are considered extinct,<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep? |url=https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-20th-party-congress-leadership-reshuffle-stasis-or-sweep |access-date=2022-10-14 |website=[[Asia Society]] |date=13 October 2022 |language=en |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103104254/https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-20th-party-congress-leadership-reshuffle-stasis-or-sweep |url-status=live }}</ref> especially since the [[20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|20th CCP National Congress]], in which Xi's allies dominated the new Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |title=China shuffles leadership committee and retains many Xi allies |language=en |website=[[CNBC]] |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/22/china-shuffles-leadership-committee-and-retains-many-xi-allies.html |access-date=2022-10-22 |archive-date=16 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221116074002/https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/22/china-shuffles-leadership-committee-and-retains-many-xi-allies.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Politburo Standing Committee===
{{CPC Politburo Standing Committee}}

===Full Politburo members===
{{CPC Politburo}}

==National People's Congress==
[[File:第十三届全国委员会第四次会议_20210305.png|thumb|Political Consultative Conference]]
Constitutionally, the supreme state authority and legislature of China is the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC). It meets annually for about two weeks to review and approve major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. The NPC elects and appoints important state positions such as the president, the vice president, the chairman and other members of the Central Military Commission, the premier and rest of the State Council, the [[president of the Supreme People's Court]], and procurator general of the [[Supreme People's Procuratorate]].<ref name=":11">{{Citation |last=Gasper |first=Donald |title=The Chinese National People's Congress |date=1982 |work=Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective |pages=160–190 |editor-last=Nelson |editor-first=Daniel |place=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-06086-3_7 |isbn=978-1-349-06088-7 |editor2-last=White |editor2-first=Stephen}}</ref>

The NPC also elects a [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|Standing Committee]] (NPCSC), its permanent body which meets regularly between NPC sessions. Most national legislation in China is adopted by the NPCSC. Most initiatives are presented to the NPCSC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name=":11" />

Members of the State Council include the Premier, a variable number of vice premiers (now four), five state councilors (protocol equal of vice premiers but with narrower portfolios), and 29 ministers and heads of State Council commissions. During the 1980s there was an attempt made to separate CCP and state functions, with the former deciding general policy and the latter carrying it out.<ref name=":010">{{Cite news |last=Ma |first=Josephine |date=17 May 2021 |title=Party-state relations under China's Communist Party: separation of powers, control over government and reforms |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3133672/why-chinas-communist-party-inseparable-state |access-date=27 May 2023 |archive-date=28 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230528070726/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3133672/why-chinas-communist-party-inseparable-state |url-status=live }}</ref> The attempt was abandoned in the 1990s with the result that the political leadership within the state are also the leaders of the CCP.<ref name=":010" />

=== Minor parties ===
{{Main|List of political parties in China}}

No legal political opposition groups exist in China. There are [[List of political parties in China|eight minor political parties in the country]] under the CCP's [[United front (China)|united front]] system. They participate in the [[Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference]] (CPPCC) but have to support the "leading role" of the CCP for their continued existence,<ref>{{Cite book |title=China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century |date=2012-01-02 |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons, Inc.]] |isbn=978-1-119-19931-1 |editor-last=Tselichtchev |editor-first=Ivan |location=Hoboken, NJ, US |language=en |doi=10.1002/9781119199311 |oclc=883259659}}</ref> and their leadership is appointed by the [[United Front Work Department]] (UFWD) of the CCP.<ref name=":22">{{Cite news |last=Baptista |first=Eduardo |date=2021-06-11 |title=Are there other political parties in China? |language=en |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3136835/communist-party-not-chinas-only-political-party-there-are-eight |access-date=2022-12-26 |archive-date=8 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220608004910/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3136835/communist-party-not-chinas-only-political-party-there-are-eight |url-status=live }}</ref> Their original function was to create the impression that the PRC was being ruled by a diverse national front, not a one-party dictatorship. The major role of these parties is to attract and subsequently muzzle niches in society that have political tendencies, such as academia.<ref name=":011">{{Cite web |last=Brady |first=Anne-Marie |author-link=Anne-Marie Brady |date=2017 |title=Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |url-status=live |publisher=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]] |s2cid=197812164 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200612023338/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |archive-date=12 June 2020 |access-date=31 August 2020}}</ref>

Coordination between the eight minor parties and the CCP is done through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which meets annually in Beijing in March at about the same time that the National People's Congress meets. In addition, there are banned political parties that are actively suppressed by the government, such as the [[Maoist Communist Party of China]], [[China Democracy Party]] and [[China New Democracy Party]], which have their headquarters outside of the mainland China.<ref>{{Citation |title=China |date=2023-05-27 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/ |work=The World Factbook |access-date=2023-06-04 |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |language=en |archive-date=20 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211220073104/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

== State Council ==
The [[Premier of China]] is the [[head of government]], presiding over the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]] composed of four [[Vice Premier of China|vice premiers]] and the heads of ministries and commissions.

==Local-level politics==
Each local Bureau or office is under the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level. People's Congress members at the county level are elected by voters. These county-level People's Congresses have the responsibility of oversight of local government and elect members to the Provincial (or Municipal in the case of [[Direct-controlled municipality|independent municipalities]]) People's Congress. The Provincial People's Congress, in turn, elects members to the National People's Congress that meets each year in March in Beijing.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wei |first=Changhao |date=2022-03-29 |title=Explainer: How Seats in China's National People's Congress Are Allocated |url=https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/29/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |access-date=2022-08-05 |website=NPC Observer |language=en-US |archive-date=25 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221025040017/https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/29/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The ruling CCP committee at each level plays a large role in the selection of appropriate candidates for election to the local congress and to the higher levels.{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}

=== Administrative divisions ===
{{See also|Administrative divisions of China}}
{{PRC provinces imagemap}}

== Armed forces ==
{{Main|People's Liberation Army|People's Armed Police|Militia (China)}}
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}The CCP created and leads the People's Liberation Army. After the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA also became a state military. The state's military system upholds the principle of the CCP's absolute leadership over the armed forces, often referred to under Mao's maxim that "[[Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun|the Party commands the gun]]." The CCP and the state jointly established the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] that carries out the task of supreme military leadership over the armed forces.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019 |volume=2 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv941tzj |jstor=j.ctv941tzj |author-link=Taylor Fravel |s2cid=159282413}}</ref>

== Legal system ==
{{Main|Law of the People's Republic of China}}
[[File:余华英拐卖儿童案二审.jpg|thumb|A trial by the [[Guizhou]] [[High People's Court]]]]

=== Nationality and ethnicity law ===
{{See also|Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China|Regional ethnic autonomy system of China}}

Nationality is granted at birth to children with at least one Chinese-national parent, with some exceptions. In general, [[naturalization]] or the obtainment of the People's Republic of China nationality is difficult. The Nationality Law prescribes only three conditions for the obtainment of PRC nationality (marriage to a PRC national is one, permanent residence is another). PRC nationals who acquire a foreign nationality automatically lose Chinese nationality.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China {{!}} Immigration Department |url=https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/residents/immigration/chinese/law.html |access-date=2023-01-13 |website=www.immd.gov.hk |archive-date=13 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230113112934/https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/residents/immigration/chinese/law.html |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}} State functionaries and military personnel on active service are not permitted to renounce their Chinese nationality. If a citizen wishes to resume PRC nationality, foreign nationality is no longer recognized.<ref>{{cite web |title=Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm |website=www.mfa.gov.cn |access-date=11 December 2021 |archive-date=11 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211211192813/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}}

==== Policies toward Uyghurs ====
{{Main|Persecution of Uyghurs in China}}
{{Further|Xinjiang internment camps}}
In 2020, widespread public reporting detailed the Chinese government's pattern of [[human rights violations]] in its continuing maltreatment of [[Uyghurs]].<ref name="indy">{{Cite web |date=5 July 2019 |title='Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200422051855/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |archive-date=22 April 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=[[The Independent]]}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=17 December 2019 |title='Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs |work=[[The Times]] |url=https://www.thetimes.com/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200425012712/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |archive-date=25 April 2020}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |date=28 November 2019 |title=China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide' |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200121105242/https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |archive-date=21 January 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=[[Der Spiegel]]}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=12 September 2019 |title=Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture |url=https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414154451/https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |archive-date=14 April 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=[[Financial Times]]}}</ref> These abuses include forced labor, [[Xinjiang internment camps|arbitrary detainment]], forced political indoctrination, destruction of cultural heritage, and forced abortions and sterilization.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c|title = China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization|website = [[Associated Press]]|date = 20 April 2021|access-date = 9 October 2020|archive-date = 16 December 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201216200613/https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c|url-status = live}}</ref><ref name="bbc">{{Cite news |date=2020-06-29 |title=China 'using birth control' to suppress Uighurs |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713 |url-status=live |access-date=2020-07-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200629222610/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713 |archive-date=2020-06-29}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-10-06 |title=China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208075342/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html |archive-date=2019-12-08 |access-date=2019-12-09 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en}}</ref> Critics of the policy have described it as the [[sinicization]] of [[Xinjiang]] and called it an [[ethnocide]] or [[cultural genocide]], with many activists, [[NGO]]s, human rights experts, government officials, and the [[U.S. government]] calling it a [[genocide]].<ref name="fore_Mene">{{Cite web|date=27 October 2020|title=Menendez, Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Resolution to Designate Uyghur Human Rights Abuses by China as Genocide|url=https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-resolution-to-designate-uyghur-human-rights-abuses-by-china-as-genocide|access-date=18 December 2020|work=foreign.senate.gov|publisher=[[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]]|archive-date=26 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201226160250/https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-resolution-to-designate-uyghur-human-rights-abuses-by-china-as-genocide|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="icij_Brit">{{Cite web|last=Alecci|first=Scilla|date=14 October 2020|title=British lawmakers call for sanctions over Uighur human rights abuses|url=https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/british-lawmakers-call-for-sanctions-over-uighur-human-rights-abuses/|access-date=18 December 2020|publisher=[[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]]|archive-date=5 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201205093005/https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/british-lawmakers-call-for-sanctions-over-uighur-human-rights-abuses/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="ourc_Comm">{{Cite web|date=21 October 2020|title=Committee News Release – October 21, 2020 – SDIR (43–2)|url=https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/news-release/10903199|access-date=18 December 2020|publisher=[[House of Commons of Canada]]|archive-date=24 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024021902/https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/news-release/10903199|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="wsj._U.S._says">{{Cite news |last1=Gordon |first1=Michael R. |last2=Xiao |first2=Eva |date=2021-01-19 |title=U.S. Says China Is Committing Genocide Against Uighur Muslims |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-declares-chinas-treatment-of-uighur-muslims-to-be-genocide-11611081555 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-06-24 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119184426/https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-declares-chinas-treatment-of-uighur-muslims-to-be-genocide-11611081555 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Quartz-genocide">{{cite news|last=Steger|first=Isabella|date=20 August 2020|title=On Xinjiang, even those wary of Holocaust comparisons are reaching for the word "genocide"|work=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]]|url=https://qz.com/1892791/a-consensus-is-growing-that-chinas-uyhgurs-face-genocide/|url-status=live|access-date=20 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023143016/https://qz.com/1892791/a-consensus-is-growing-that-chinas-uyhgurs-face-genocide/|archive-date=23 October 2020}}</ref> The Chinese government denies it is committing human rights violations in Xinjiang.<ref name="cnn-fax">{{cite news |author=Ivan Watson, Rebecca Wright and Ben Westcott |date=21 September 2020 |title=Xinjiang government confirms huge birth rate drop but denies forced sterilization of women |publisher=[[CNN]] |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/21/asia/xinjiang-china-response-sterilization-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=26 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200927111925/https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/21/asia/xinjiang-china-response-sterilization-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=27 September 2020}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|doi=10.3390/laws9010001|doi-access=free|title=The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction |year=2020 |last1=Finnegan |first1=Ciara |journal=Laws |volume=9 |page=1}}</ref>

==Foreign relations==
{{Main|Foreign relations of China|Foreign policy of China}}
[[File:Bushhujintao.jpg|thumb|right|upright=0.9|Chinese leader [[Hu Jintao]] and US president [[George W. Bush]], with first ladies [[Liu Yongqing]] and [[Laura Bush]], wave from the White House. The [[Sino-American relations|relationship]] between the world's sole [[superpower]] [[United States]] and the [[emerging superpower]] status of the PRC is closely watched by international observers.]][[File:Karakorum-carretera-d08.jpg|right|thumb|upright=0.9|The [[Karakoram Highway]] connecting China and [[Pakistan]] is an example of China's international development involvements.]]
The PRC maintains diplomatic relations with most countries in the world. In 1971, the PRC replaced the [[Republic of China]], commonly known as "Taiwan" since the 1970s, as the sole representative of China in the [[United Nations]] and as one of the five permanent members of the [[United Nations Security Council]].<ref>Eddy Chang (22 Aug 2004). [http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/08/22/2003199768 Perseverance will pay off at the UN] {{Webarchive| url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070806100002/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/08/22/2003199768 |date=6 August 2007 }}, The Taipei Times, 22 August 2004</ref> China had been represented by the Republic of China at the time of the UN's founding in 1945. (See also [[China and the United Nations]].)

Under the [[One-China policy]], the PRC has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to all of China, including [[Taiwan]], and severs any official ties with the Republic of China (ROC) government. The government actively opposes foreign government meetings with the [[14th Dalai Lama]] in a political capacity, as the spokesperson for a separatist movement in Tibet.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-02-22 |title=Ignoring China's protest, Obama hosts Dalai Lama |url=https://apnews.com/28e972fcf7734e21af0ab1f5ffabb3c8 |access-date=2025-03-03 |website=AP News |language=en-US}}</ref>

The PRC has been playing a leading role in calling for [[free trade area]]s and security pacts amongst its Asia-Pacific neighbours. In 2004, the PRC proposed an entirely new [[East Asia Summit]] (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues that pointedly excluded the United States.<ref>Dillon, Dana and John Tkacik Jr, [http://www.policyreview.org/134/dillon.html "China's Quest for Asia"] {{Webarchive| url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060210135228/http://www.policyreview.org/134/dillon.html |date=10 February 2006 }}, ''Policy Review'', December 2005 and January 2006, Issue No. 134. Accessed 22 April 2006.</ref> The EAS, which includes [[ASEAN Plus Three]], [[India]], [[Australia]] and [[New Zealand]], held its inaugural summit in 2005. China is also a founding member of the [[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation]] (SCO), alongside [[Russia]], [[Kazakhstan]], [[Kyrgyzstan]], [[Tajikistan]], and [[Uzbekistan]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Scott-Smith |first=Giles |title=The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation |date=2020 |work=The Changing Global Order: Challenges and Prospects |series=United Nations University Series on Regionalism |volume=17 |pages=177–191 |editor-last=Hosli |editor-first=Madeleine O. |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_10 |access-date=2024-06-28 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer International Publishing |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_10 |isbn=978-3-030-21603-0 |editor2-last=Selleslaghs |editor2-first=Joren}}</ref>

Much of the current{{when|date=April 2020}} foreign policy is based on the concept of "[[China's peaceful development]]".{{Update inline|date=April 2020|reason=Policy seems outdated according to the linked article}} Nonetheless, crises in relations with foreign countries have occurred at various times in its recent history, particularly with the United States; e.g., the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in [[Belgrade]] during the [[Kosovo War|Kosovo conflict]] in May 1999 and the [[Hainan Island incident]] in April 2001. China's foreign relations with many Western nations suffered for a time following the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]]. A much troubled foreign relationship is that between [[Sino-Japanese relations|China and Japan]], which has been strained at times by Japan's refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of the PRC, such as [[Historical negationism|revisionistic]] comments made by prominent Japanese officials, and insufficient details given to the [[Nanking Massacre|Nanjing Massacre]] and other [[Japanese war crimes|atrocities]] committed during [[World War II]] in [[Japanese history textbook controversies|Japanese history textbooks]]. Another point of conflict between the two countries is the frequent visits by Japanese government officials to the [[Yasukuni Shrine]], which honors not only Japanese World War II dead but also many convicted World War II war criminals, including 14 Class A convictions.{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}

=== Foreign aid ===
{{Main|Chinese foreign aid|Belt and Road Initiative}}
After the establishment of the [[People's Republic of China]] under the CCP in 1949, China joined the international community in providing foreign aid. In the past few decades, the international community has seen an increase in Chinese foreign aid. Specifically, a recent example is the [[Belt and Road Initiative]] (BRI), a global infrastructure project that was launched in 2013 by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative |access-date=2021-05-14 |website=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |language=en |archive-date=26 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526233755/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative |url-status=live }}</ref> The stated goal of the program is to expand maritime routes and land infrastructure networks connecting China with Asia, Africa, and Europe, boosting trade and economic growth.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Belt and Road Initiative|url=https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative|access-date=2021-05-14|website=World Bank|language=en|archive-date=18 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220518134904/https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative|url-status=live}}</ref> It involves a massive development of trade routes that will create a large expansion of land transportation infrastructure and new ports in the Pacific and Indian oceans to facilitate regional and intercontinental trade flow and increase oil and gas supply.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ascensão |first1=Fernando |last2=Fahrig |first2=Lenore |last3=Clevenger |first3=Anthony P. |last4=Corlett |first4=Richard T. |last5=Jaeger |first5=Jochen A. G. |last6=Laurance |first6=William F. |last7=Pereira |first7=Henrique M. |date=May 2018 |title=Environmental challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0059-3 |journal=[[Nature Sustainability]] |language=en |volume=1 |issue=5 |pages=206–209 |doi=10.1038/s41893-018-0059-3 |bibcode=2018NatSu...1..206A |issn=2398-9629 |s2cid=133850310 |access-date=14 May 2021 |archive-date=18 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210618162814/https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0059-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== International territorial disputes ===
{{Main|Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China}}
The PRC is in a number of [[Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China|international territorial disputes]], several of which involved the Sino-Russian border. Although the great majority of them are now resolved,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Kironska |first1=Kristina |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003350064 |title=Contemporary China: A New Superpower? |last2=Turcsanyi |first2=Richard Q. |date=2023-07-10 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-003-35006-4 |edition=1 |location=London |pages=225 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781003350064}}</ref> China's territorial disputes have led to several localized wars in the last 50 years, including the [[Sino-Indian War]] in 1962, the [[Sino-Soviet border conflict]] in 1969 and the [[Sino-Vietnam War]] in 1979. In 2001, China and Russia signed the [[2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship|Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation]],<ref>[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/21/content_548330.htm Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060826175727/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/21/content_548330.htm |date=26 August 2006 }} (21 March 2006). Retrieved 16 April 2006.</ref>{{Better source needed|date=April 2020}} which ended the conflict. Other territorial disputes include islands in the [[East China Sea|East]] and [[South China Sea]]s, and undefined or disputed borders with India, [[Bhutan]] and [[North Korea]].{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}

==International organizations==
On 26 October 1971, the [[United Nations General Assembly|UN General Assembly]] adopted [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758|Resolution 2758]] to transfer the seat from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC).<ref name=":02">{{Citation |last=Kent |first=Ann |title=China's participation in international organisations |date=2013 |work=Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy |pages=132–166 |editor-last=Zhang |editor-first=Yongjin |publisher=ANU Press |isbn=978-1-925021-41-7 |jstor=j.ctt5vj73b.11 |editor2-last=Austin |editor2-first=Greg |jstor-access=free}}</ref>

=== United Nations ===
{{Main|China and the United Nations}}
Today, not only is China a part of many UN organizations, it is also one of the five [[Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council|permanent members]] of the UN Security Council. A memo done by the [[United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission|U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission]] identified Chinese nationals serving in leadership position within international organizations signifies China's increasing involvement in the international arena.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web |title=PRC Representation in International Organizations |url=https://www.uscc.gov/prc-international-orgs |access-date=2021-05-15 |website=[[United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission]] |language=en |archive-date=14 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210514143153/https://www.uscc.gov/prc-international-orgs |url-status=live }}</ref> For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), [[International Civil Aviation Organization|International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)]], [[United Nations Industrial Development Organization|United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)]], Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and so on are all organizations that Chinese nationals are currently in position of (The memo is updated on a semi-annual basis).<ref name=":03" />

=== Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ===
{{See also|List of non-governmental organizations in China}}
Although NGO development in China is relatively slow compared to other countries, a Harvard University academic study reveals that China had NGOs as early as during the Dynasties. Specifically in the forms of American missionaries, which assisted in rural reconstruction programs and ideological reforms locally.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Thomson |first=James Claude |title=While China faced West : American reformers in Nationalist China, 1928–1937. James C. Thomson, Jr. |date=1969 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=0-674-95135-2 |oclc=462172943}}</ref> After the establishment of The People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao banned any NGOs that were related to counter revolutionary goals. During the reform era under Deng beginning the 1970s, NGOs although not completely banned, three laws were implemented to keep relatively tight control over them––the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Foundations, and the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China.<ref name=":04">{{Cite web |last=Ye |first=Zhang |date=1 Aug 2003 |title=China's Emerging Civil Society |url=https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-emerging-civil-society/ |access-date=2021-05-15 |website=[[Brookings Institution]] |language=en-US |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308221843/https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-emerging-civil-society/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The latter two were implemented after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, and the general tone of all the regulations emphasized government control. For instance, the regulations require a two-tiered management system, in which before being legally registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a government agency must sponsor the organization; thus, two governmental agencies must be monitoring the day-to-day operations of the NGO.<ref name=":04" /> However, in the 1990s, NGOs began to regain momentum despite restrictions in place.<ref name=":04" /> Today, the number of registered organizations in China has grown to over 700,000, "... including many professional and friendship associations, foundations working in the fields of education, science, and culture, and a large number of nonprofits engaged in poverty alleviation, social work with people with disabilities, children, and the elderly. The number of nonprofits and environmental education and climate action groups has also significantly grown".<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kuhn|first=Berthold|date=11 June 2019|title=Civil society in China: A snapshot of discourses, legislation, and social realities|url=https://doc-research.org/2019/06/civil-society-in-china-a-snapshot-of-discourses-legislation-and-social-realities/|access-date=2021-05-15|website=Dialogue of Civilization (DOC) Research Institute|language=en-US|archive-date=3 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210603214810/https://doc-research.org/2019/06/civil-society-in-china-a-snapshot-of-discourses-legislation-and-social-realities/|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2017, a policy called "Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland China Law" (FNGO Law) was enacted, which creates registration barriers that, for instance, require a Chinese partner organization to sign on. The reaction from the West has widely been that the space for NGOs to conduct work in may be shrinking.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Lang |first1=Bertram |last2=Holbig |first2=Heike |date=2018 |title=Civil Society Work in China:: Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs |url=https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/civil-society-work-in-china-trade-offs-and-opportunities-for-european-ng-os |publisher=[[German Institute of Global and Area Studies]] |jstor=resrep24803 |jstor-access=free |access-date=16 January 2024 |archive-date=16 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116230230/https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/civil-society-work-in-china-trade-offs-and-opportunities-for-european-ng-os/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Many NGOs in the PRC have been described as [[government-organized non-governmental organization]] (GONGOs) that are organized under the CCP's [[United front (China)|united front]] system.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fedasiuk |first=Ryan |date=2022-04-13 |title=How China's united front system works overseas |url=https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-united-front-system-works-overseas/ |access-date=2022-04-15 |website=The Strategist |publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] |language=en-AU |archive-date=13 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220413020633/https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-united-front-system-works-overseas/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":07">{{Cite news |last1=Sotoudeh |first1=Nazpari |last2=Stefano |first2=Erica |date=September 29, 2021 |title=Free speech risky as China keeps close tabs on its overseas students |work=[[Eurasianet]] |url=https://eurasianet.org/free-speech-risky-as-china-keeps-close-tabs-on-its-overseas-students |access-date=October 2, 2021 |archive-date=29 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929190510/https://eurasianet.org/free-speech-risky-as-china-keeps-close-tabs-on-its-overseas-students |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=French |first=Paul |date=February 4, 2012 |title=China Briefing Part 3: Civil society - The land of the Gongo |url=https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/stakeholder-engagement/china-briefing-part-3-civil-society-land-gongo |access-date=2022-09-11 |website=[[Reuters]] |language=en-GB |archive-date=1 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221001153217/https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/stakeholder-engagement/china-briefing-part-3-civil-society-land-gongo |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce]] (ACFIC) is a [[people's organization]] and [[chamber of commerce]] established in 1953.<ref name=":Zhang">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001}}</ref>{{Rp|page=167}} The ACFIC was established to advance the CCP's interests and promote the party's policies among private entrepreneurs.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=167}} It seeks to influence policy through submitting proposals to the CPPCC, a process which requires relevant government ministries to investigate the proposals and prepare a formal response.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=167}}

The [[All-China Federation of Trade Unions]] (ACFTU) advocates for workers' interests within the CCP and the government.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=130}} It also seeks to address occupational health and safety issues and carries on industrial policy oversight.<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=84}} It is the country's sole legal workers union.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=161}} The CCP controls the appointment of ACFTU officials at the regional and national levels.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=161}}

== Civil society ==
Academic debates on whether China has a [[civil society]] are ongoing.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chunfeng |title=Red Tourism in China: Commodification of Propaganda |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=9781032139609}}</ref>{{Rp|page=62}}

Within China, academic debate regarding theories of the [[public sphere]] began in the 1980s.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=62}} There is no consensus and academic debates involve disagreements in the applicability of concepts like "civil society," "private sphere," and "state" in the Chinese context.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=62}} Among the issues is that the terminology developed by [[Jürgen Habermas]] was developed in discourse on German [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] society.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=|pages=63–64}} The major groups in Habermasian theory include merchants, bankers, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs, which is not consistent with Chinese views of the "general public."<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=64}}

The majority of research on Chinese civil society from the early 1990s to the early 2010s has been to examine "the organizational independence of civic associations from the state".<ref name=":06">{{Cite journal |last=Salmenkari |first=Taru |date=2013 |title=Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23359834 |journal=[[Modern Asian Studies]] |volume=47 |issue=2 |pages=682–711 |doi=10.1017/S0026749X12000273 |issn=0026-749X |jstor=23359834 |s2cid=145320886 |access-date=15 May 2021 |archive-date=15 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210515011118/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23359834 |url-status=live }}</ref> Researchers have argued that the western driven definition of "civil society" is too narrowly fixed, which does not allow for a full understanding of Chinese civil society. Taru Salmenkari, an associate professor specializing in contemporary China and issues of democracy and civil society in East Asia at Tallinn University, has argued in her "Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society" that to understand Chinese civil society, one must "...go beyond the question of the degree of autonomy from the state. It must address the nature of horizontal contacts through which civil society is constituted".<ref name=":06" />

=== Advocacy ===
A 2013 study by Harvard University found that while the censorship exists, the purpose of the censorship is not to silence all comments made about the state or any particular issues, but rather to prevent and reduce the probability of [[collective action]].<ref name=":14">{{Cite journal |last1=King |first1=Gary |last2=Pan |first2=Jennifer |last3=Roberts |first3=Margaret E. |date=2013 |title=How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression |journal=[[American Political Science Review]] |volume=107 |issue=2 |pages=326–343 |doi=10.1017/S0003055413000014 |issn=0003-0554 |jstor=43654017 |s2cid=53577293|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11878767 }}</ref> As the study illustrates, allowing social media to flourish also has allowed negative and positive comments about the state and its leaders to exist.<ref name=":14" /> According to another study, the development of [[Science and technology in China|technology]] and the [[Internet in China|internet]] has also allowed certain civil society advocacy, such as the [[Weiquan movement]], to flourish.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Biao |first1=Teng |last2=Mosher |first2=Stacy |date=2012 |title=Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan): The Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline |journal=[[China Perspectives]] |volume=3 |issue=91 |pages=29–41 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.5943 |issn=2070-3449 |jstor=24055481 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

=== Protests ===
{{See also|Mass incidents in China}}{{Excerpt|Protest and dissent in China}}

=== Citizen surveys ===
Surveys have shown a high level of the Chinese public's satisfaction with their government.<ref name=":09">{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York |author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=137}}<ref name=":62">{{Cite book |last=Lan |first=Xiaohuan |title=How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |year=2024 |isbn=978-981-97-0079-0 |translator-last=Topp |translator-first=Gary |doi=10.1007/978-981-97-0080-6}}</ref>{{Rp|page=116}} These views are generally attributed to the material comforts and security available to large segments of the Chinese populace as well as the government's attentiveness and responsiveness.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=136}} Academic Klára Dubravčíková writes that a majority of the Chinese middle class are satisfied with the CCP and are among those who tend to credit it for the increase of living standards in China since reform and opening up.<ref name=":922">{{Cite book |last=Dubravčíková |first=Klára |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |pages=58–70 |chapter=Living Standards and Social Issues |doi=10.4324/9781003350064-7 |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=61}}

A 2009 study by academic Tony Sachs found that 95.9% of Chinese citizens were relatively satisfied or extremely satisfied with the central government, with the figure dropping to 61.5% for their local governments.<ref name=":052">{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Peace: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem |pages=57}}</ref> A study published in ''[[The China Quarterly]]'' on attitudes from 2003 to 2016 found that people in coastal regions were particularly satisfied with government performance.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|pages=|page=301}}

Survey data compiled by academic Bruce Dickson and published in 2016 concludes that approximately 70% of China's population supports the [[Chinese Dream]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=148}}

According to the [[World Values Survey]] covering 2017 to 2020, 95% of Chinese respondents have significant confidence in their government.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=13}} Confidence decreased to 91% in the survey's 2022 edition.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=13}}

A 2020 survey by [[Harvard University]] found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China's government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey's history.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url= |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages= |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao}}</ref>{{Rp|page=163}} The survey also showed that trust in government had increased since 2003, particularly following the [[Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping|anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping]].<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Alfred M. |url=https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/vx021h696 |title=China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power |last2=Araral |first2=Eduardo |last3=Huang |first3=Andbiao |date=2024 |publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]] |isbn=978-0-472-07635-2 |editor-last=Zhong |editor-first=Yang |series=China Understandings Today series |location=Ann Arbor, Michigan |chapter=Mapping the Changes of Trust in Transitional China |format=EPUB |editor-last2=Inglehart |editor-first2=Ronald }}</ref>{{Rp|page=300}} Satisfaction with interactions with local officials had also increased from 47.9% in 2011 to 75.1% by 2016.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|pages=300-301}} Publishing in 2024, academics Alfred Wu et al. conclude that survey data show that Chinese people in all segments of society tend to trust the government.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|page=301}} 

A 2020 study by [[University of Southern California]] researchers affiliated with the [[Hoover Institution]] found that more anonymous surveys show 50 to 70 percent support for the CCP, much lower than what direct surveys show at above 90 percent.<ref>{{Cite news |date=January 16, 2024 |title=China's leaders are less popular than they might think |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/16/chinas-leaders-are-less-popular-than-they-might-think |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-01-16 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |quote=The results suggest that when the survey was conducted in June and November 2020 between 50% and 70% of Chinese people supported the party. (This is an upper bound, say the researchers, because concerns about online surveillance may still have spooked some respondents into giving positive responses.) |archive-date=16 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116225645/https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/16/chinas-leaders-are-less-popular-than-they-might-think |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last=Wachtel |first=Ileana |date=January 29, 2024 |title=When Chinese citizens are surveyed anonymously, support for party and government plummets |url=https://phys.org/news/2024-01-chinese-citizens-surveyed-anonymously-party.html |access-date=2024-01-31 |website=[[Phys.org]] |language=en |archive-date=31 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240131043010/https://phys.org/news/2024-01-chinese-citizens-surveyed-anonymously-party.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The same survey found that [[Han Chinese]] are more supportive of the CCP than are [[Ethnic minorities in China|ethnic minorities]] and that minorities tend to conceal their views of the CCP.<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Carter |first1=Erin Baggott |last2=Carter |first2=Brett L. |last3=Schick |first3=Stephen |date=2024-01-10 |title=Do Chinese Citizens Conceal Opposition to the CCP in Surveys? Evidence from Two Experiments |journal=[[The China Quarterly]] |volume=259 |language=en |pages=804–813 |doi=10.1017/S0305741023001819 |issn=0305-7410 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

According to a survey by [[Pew Research Center]] in 2020, Chinese citizens are among the most optimistic in the world.<ref name=":012">{{Cite book |last1=He |first1=Lingnan |url=https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/vx021h696 |title=China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power |last2=Yang |first2=Dali L. |date=2024 |publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]] |isbn=978-0-472-07635-2 |editor-last=Zhong |editor-first=Yang |series=China Understandings Today series |location=Ann Arbor, Michigan |chapter=Political Participation in China: Social Surveys as Windows to Chinese Political Attitude and Behavior |format=EPUB |editor-last2=Inglehart |editor-first2=Ronald }}</ref>{{Rp|page=130}}

Survey results from 2014 to 2020 show no clear alignment along the left-right spectrum or pro-government or anti-government positions. Wealthier and more educated Chinese tend to prefer market liberalization, political democratization, and are less nationalistic, while poorer and less educated citizens show the opposite trend. This may be a reflection of how the former group has benefited more from China's market reforms.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 15, 2022 |title=Is there a Political "Left" or "Right" in China? Charting China's |url=https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/there-political-left-or-right-china-charting-chinas-ideological-spectrum |access-date=2024-12-18 |website=sccei.fsi.stanford.edu |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Pan |first1=Jennifer |last2=Xu |first2=Yiqing |date=2020 |title=Gauging Preference Stability and Ideological Constraint under Authoritarian Rule |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |language=en |doi=10.2139/ssrn.3679076 |issn=1556-5068 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

Summarizing survey data developed from 2003 to 2020, academic Lan Xiaohuan writes that overall satisfaction is approximately 83% for the central government, 78% for provincial governments, and 70% for county and township governments.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=116}} Lan also concludes that the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping was successful in raising public confidence in the ethics of government officials.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=116}} 

==See also==
*[[Politics of Hong Kong]]
*[[Politics of Macau]]

== Notes ==
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== References ==
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