Editing Pleasure

{{Short description|Experience that feels good or is enjoyable}}
{{Other uses}}
{{pp-semi-indef|small=yes}}
{{Use American English|date=July 2023}}
{{emotion}}

'''Pleasure''' is experience that feels good, that involves the [[enjoyment]] of something.<ref name="Pallies"/><ref name="Lopez"/> It contrasts with [[pain]] or [[suffering]], which are forms of feeling bad.<ref name="Katz"/> It is closely related to value, desire and action:<ref name="CraigPleasure"/> humans and other conscious animals find pleasure enjoyable, positive or worthy of seeking. A great variety of activities may be experienced as pleasurable, like eating, having sex, listening to music or playing games. Pleasure is part of various other mental states such as [[Ecstasy (emotion)|ecstasy]], [[euphoria]] and [[Flow (psychology)|flow]]. [[Happiness]] and [[well-being]] are closely related to pleasure but not identical with it.<ref name="CraigHappiness"/><ref name="Crisp"/> There is no general agreement as to whether pleasure should be understood as a sensation, a quality of experiences, an attitude to experiences or otherwise.<ref name="Borchert"/> Pleasure plays a central role in the family of philosophical theories known as [[hedonism]].

== Definition ==
"Pleasure" refers to experience that feels good, that involves the enjoyment of something.<ref name="Pallies">{{cite journal |last1=Pallies |first1=Daniel |title=An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2021 |volume=178 |issue=3 |pages=887–907 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5 |s2cid=219440957 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PALAHL}}</ref><ref name="Lopez">{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOPTEO-2 |chapter=Pleasure|year=2009 }}</ref> The term is primarily used in association with ''sensory pleasures'' like the [[sexual pleasure|enjoyment of sex]] or food.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Pleasure}}</ref> But in its most general sense, it includes all types of positive or pleasant experiences including the enjoyment of sports, seeing a beautiful sunset or engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity. 

Pleasure contrasts with pain or suffering, which are forms of feeling bad.<ref name="Katz">{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2016}}</ref> Both pleasure and pain come in degrees and have been thought of as a dimension going from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees. This assumption is important for the possibility of comparing and aggregating the degrees of pleasure of different experiences, for example, in order to perform the [[Utilitarian calculus]].<ref name="Borchert"/>

===Related concepts===
The concept of pleasure is similar but not identical to the concepts of [[well-being]] and of [[happiness]].<ref name="CraigHappiness">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Happiness}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Haybron |first1=Dan |title=Happiness |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref name="Crisp"/> These terms are used in overlapping ways, but their meanings tend to come apart in technical contexts like philosophy or psychology. ''Pleasure'' refers to a certain type of experience while ''well-being'' is about what is good for a person.<ref name="Tiberius">{{cite book |last1=Tiberius |first1=Valerie |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIROHO |chapter=Prudential value|year=2015 }}</ref><ref name="Crisp">{{cite web |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Well-Being |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> Many philosophers agree that ''pleasure'' is good for a person and therefore is a form of ''well-being''.<ref name="Weijers"/><ref name="Crisp"/> But there may be other things besides or instead of pleasure that constitute ''well-being'', like health, virtue, knowledge or the fulfillment of desires.<ref name="Tiberius"/> On some conceptions, ''happiness'' is identified with "the individual's balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience".<ref name="Haybron">{{cite web |last1=Haybron |first1=Dan |title=Happiness: 2.1 The chief candidates |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref> ''Life satisfaction theories'', on the other hand, hold that ''happiness'' involves having the ''right attitude towards one's life as a whole''. ''Pleasure'' may have a role to play in this attitude, but it is not identical to ''happiness''.<ref name="Haybron"/>

Pleasure is closely related to value, desire, motivation and right action.<ref name="CraigPleasure">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Pleasure}}</ref> There is broad agreement that pleasure is valuable in some sense.{{citation needed|date=February 2025}}

==Sources and types==
===Sources===
Many pleasurable experiences are associated with satisfying basic biological drives, such as [[eating]], [[exercise]], [[hygiene]], [[sleep]], and [[Human sexual activity|sex]].<ref name=pmid26109341>{{cite journal |last1=Schultz |first1=Wolfram |title=Neuronal Reward and Decision Signals: From Theories to Data |journal=Physiological Reviews |date=July 2015 |volume=95 |issue=3 |pages=853–951 |doi=10.1152/physrev.00023.2014 |pmid=26109341 |pmc=4491543 }}</ref> Pleasure may come from the enjoyment of food, sex, sports, seeing a beautiful [[sunset]] or engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity.<ref name="Borchert"/> The appreciation of cultural artifacts and activities such as [[art]], [[music]], [[dancing]], and [[literature]] is often pleasurable.<ref name=pmid26109341/> 

===Types===
Pleasure is sometimes subdivided into fundamental pleasures that are closely related to survival (food, sex, and social belonging) and higher-order pleasures (e.g., viewing art and altruism).<ref>{{Cite book|title = The Pleasure Center : Trust Your Animal Instincts: Trust Your Animal Instincts|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=4vrnEQDiNXcC|publisher = Oxford University Press, US|date = 2008-10-15|isbn = 9780199717392|language = en|first = Morten L.|last = Kringelbach}}</ref> 

[[Jeremy Bentham]] listed 14 kinds of pleasure; sense, wealth, skill, amity, a good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, pleasures dependent on association, and the pleasures of relief.<ref>Chapter V, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham, 1789, http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Philosophers/Bentham/principlesofMoralsAndLegislation.pdf#page30 https://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html</ref> 

Some commentators see 'complex pleasures' including wit and sudden realisation,<ref>Complex Pleasure: Forms of Feeling in German Literature, [[Stanley Corngold]], Stanford Press, 1998</ref> and some see a wide range of pleasurable feelings.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Smuts |first1=Aaron |title=The feels good theory of pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=September 2011 |volume=155 |issue=2 |pages=241–265 |doi=10.1007/s11098-010-9566-4 |s2cid=170258796 }}</ref>

[[Nick Bostrom]] listed 3 types of pleasure;
* pleasant or voluptuous bodily sensations.
* thrills from high-energy socialising, consumerism, and indulgence.
* positive hedonic tone, meaning an unmediated liking of the ways things present in the moment.<ref>This positive hedonic tone 'fills our spirit with a warm affirming joy', and 'some core part of us cannot help but really like it'. [[Nick_Bostrom#Deep_Utopia:_Life_and_Meaning_in_a_Solved_World|Deep Utopia]], p282, 2024</ref>

== Theories of pleasure ==
''Theories of pleasure'' try to determine what pleasurable experiences have in common, what is essential to them.<ref name="Pallies"/> They are traditionally divided into 
* quality theories; that pleasure is a quality of pleasurable experiences themselves,
* attitude theories;<ref name="Bramble">{{cite journal |last1=Bramble |first1=Ben |title=The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2013 |volume=162 |issue=2 |pages=201–217 |doi=10.1007/s11098-011-9755-9 |s2cid=170819498 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRATDF}}</ref> that pleasure is in some sense external to the experience since it depends on the subject's attitude to the experience.<ref name="Pallies"/><ref name="Bramble"/> An alternative terminology refers to these theories as ''phenomenalism'' and ''intentionalism''.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Moore |first1=Andrew |title=Hedonism: 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/#EthHed |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 February 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> 
* hybrid or dispositional theories, that incorporate elements of both quality and attitude approaches.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/>

=== Quality theories ===
In everyday language, the term "pleasure" is primarily associated with sensory pleasures like the enjoyment of food or sex.<ref name="Borchert"/> One traditionally important ''quality-theory'' closely follows this association by holding that pleasure is a sensation. On the simplest version of the sensation theory, whenever we experience pleasure there is a distinctive pleasure-sensation present.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Katz"/> So a pleasurable experience of eating [[chocolate]] involves a sensation of the taste of chocolate together with a pleasure-sensation. An obvious shortcoming of this theory is that many impressions may be present at the same time.<ref name="Borchert"/> For example, there may be an itching sensation as well while eating the chocolate. But this account cannot explain why the enjoyment is linked to the taste of the chocolate and not to the itch.<ref name="Borchert"/> Another problem is due to the fact that sensations are usually thought of as localized somewhere in the body. But considering the pleasure of seeing a beautiful sunset, there seems to be no specific region in the body at which we experience this pleasure.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Myers |first1=Gerald E. |title=Ryle on Pleasure |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=1957 |volume=54 |issue=March |pages=181–187 |doi=10.2307/2022655 |jstor=2022655 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MYEROP}}</ref>

These problems can be avoided by felt-quality-theories, which see pleasure not as a sensation but as an aspect qualifying sensations or other mental phenomena.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/><ref name="Smuts"/> As an aspect, pleasure is dependent on the mental phenomenon it qualifies, it cannot be present on its own.<ref name="Borchert"/> Since the link to the enjoyed phenomenon is already built into the pleasure, it solves the problem faced by sensation theories to explain how this link comes about.<ref name="Borchert"/> It also captures the intuition that pleasure is usually pleasure ''of'' something: enjoyment ''of'' drinking a milkshake or ''of'' playing chess but not just pure or object-less enjoyment. According to this approach, pleasurable experiences differ in content (drinking a milkshake, playing chess) but agree in feeling or hedonic tone. Pleasure can be localized, but only to the extent that the impression it qualifies is localized.<ref name="Borchert"/>

One objection to both the sensation theory and the felt-quality theory is that there is no one quality shared by all pleasure-experiences.<ref name="Bramble"/><ref name="Pallies"/><ref name="Smuts">{{cite journal |last1=Smuts |first1=Aaron |title=The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2011 |volume=155 |issue=2 |pages=241–265 |doi=10.1007/s11098-010-9566-4 |s2cid=170258796 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SMUTFG}}</ref> The force of this objection comes from the intuition that the variety of pleasure-experiences is just too wide to point out one quality shared by all, for example, the quality shared by ''enjoying a milkshake'' and ''enjoying a chess game''. One way for quality theorists to respond to this objection is by pointing out that the hedonic tone of pleasure-experiences is not a regular quality but a higher-order quality.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/> As an analogy, a vividly green thing and a vividly red thing do not share a regular color property but they share "vividness" as a higher-order property.<ref name="Pallies"/>

=== Attitude theories ===
''Attitude theories'' propose to analyze pleasure in terms of attitudes to experiences.<ref name="Smuts"/><ref name="Katz"/> So to enjoy the taste of chocolate it is not sufficient to have the corresponding experience of the taste. Instead, the subject has to have the right attitude to this taste for pleasure to arise.<ref name="Borchert"/> This approach captures the intuition that a second person may have exactly the same taste-experience but not enjoy it since the relevant attitude is lacking. Various attitudes have been proposed for the type of attitude responsible for pleasure, but historically the most influential version assigns this role to [[desire]]s.<ref name="Pallies"/> On this account, pleasure is linked to experiences that fulfill a desire had by the experiencer.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/> So the difference between the first and the second person in the example above is that only the first person has a corresponding desire directed at the taste of chocolate.

One important argument against this version is that while it is often the case that we desire something first and then enjoy it, this cannot always be the case. In fact, often the opposite seems to be true: we have to learn first that something is enjoyable before we start to desire it.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/> This objection can be partially avoided by holding that it does not matter whether the desire was there before the experience but that it only matters what we desire while the experience is happening. This variant, originally held by [[Henry Sidgwick]], has recently been defended by Chris Heathwood, who holds that an experience is pleasurable if the subject of the experience wants the experience to occur for its own sake while it is occurring.<ref name="Heathwood">{{cite journal |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |title=The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2007 |volume=133 |issue=1 |pages=23–44 |doi=10.1007/s11098-006-9004-9 |s2cid=170419589 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HEATRO}}</ref><ref name="Bramble"/> But this version faces a related problem akin to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]: it seems that we usually desire things because they are enjoyable, not the other way round.<ref name="Smuts"/><ref name="Katz"/> So desire theories would be mistaken about the direction of explanation. Another argument against desire theories is that desire and pleasure can come apart: we can have a desire for things that are not enjoyable and we can enjoy things without desiring to do so.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/>

=== Dispositional theories ===
''Dispositional theories'' try to account for pleasure in terms of [[Disposition (philosophy)|dispositions]], often by including insights from both the quality theories and the attitude theories. One way to combine these elements is to hold that pleasure consists in being disposed to desire an experience in virtue of the qualities of this experience.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/> Some of the problems of the regular desire theory can be avoided this way since the disposition does not need to be realized for there to be pleasure, thereby taking into account that desire and pleasure can come apart.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Pallies"/>

==Roles in philosophy==
{{Hedonism}}
{{Main|Hedonism}}
===Hedonism===
''Pleasure'' plays a central role in theories from various areas of ''philosophy''. Such theories are usually grouped together under the label "hedonism". [[Hedonism#Axiological_hedonism|Axiological hedonists]] hold that pleasure is the only thing that has [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]].<ref name="Britannica">{{cite web |title=Psychological hedonism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-hedonism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=29 January 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Many desires are concerned with pleasure. [[Hedonism#Psychological_hedonism|Psychological hedonism]] is the thesis that all our actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain.<ref name="Borchert2">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Hedonism}}</ref> [[Freud]]'s [[Pleasure principle (psychology)|pleasure principle]] ties pleasure to motivation and action by holding that there is a strong psychological tendency to seek pleasure and to avoid pain.<ref name="Lopez"/> [[Utilitarianism#Classical utilitarianism|Classical utilitarianism]] connects pleasure to ethics in stating that whether an action is right depends on the pleasure it produces: it should maximize the sum-total of pleasure.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Driver |first1=Julia |title=The History of Utilitarianism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2014}}</ref>

=== Ethics ===
Pleasure is related not just to how we actually act, but also to how we ought to act, which belongs to the field of ''[[ethics]]''. [[Ethical hedonism]] takes the strongest position on this relation in stating that considerations of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain fully determine what we should do or which action is right.<ref name="Weijers">{{cite web |last1=Weijers |first1=Dan |title=Hedonism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 January 2021}}</ref> ''Ethical hedonist theories'' can be classified in relation to whose pleasure should be increased. According to the [[Ethical egoism|egoist]] version, each agent should only aim at maximizing her own pleasure. This position is usually not held in very high esteem.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Shaver |first1=Robert |title=Egoism: 2. Ethical Egoism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/#EthiEgoi |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 February 2021 |date=2019}}</ref><ref name="Weijers"/> [[Utilitarianism]], on the other hand, is a family of altruist theories that are more respectable in the philosophical community. Within this family, [[Utilitarianism#Classical utilitarianism|classical utilitarianism]] draws the closest connection between pleasure and right action by holding that the agent should maximize the sum-total of everyone's happiness.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Driver |first1=Julia |title=The History of Utilitarianism: 2. The Classical Approach |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/#ClaApp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 February 2021 |date=2014}}</ref><ref name="Weijers"/> This sum-total includes the agent's pleasure as well, but only as one factor among many.

=== Value ===
Pleasure is intimately connected to ''[[Value (ethics)|value]]'' as something that is desirable and worth seeking. According to [[axiological hedonism]], it is the only thing that has [[intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]] or is ''good in itself''.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Haybron |first1=Daniel M. |title=The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=62 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAYTPO-8}}</ref> This position entails that things other than pleasure, like knowledge, virtue or money, only have ''instrumental value'': they are valuable because or to the extent that they produce pleasure but lack value otherwise.<ref name="Weijers"/> Within the scope of axiological hedonism, there are two competing theories about the exact relation between pleasure and value: ''quantitative hedonism'' and ''qualitative hedonism''.<ref name="Moore"/><ref name="Weijers"/> Quantitative hedonists, following [[Jeremy Bentham]], hold that the specific content or quality of a pleasure-experience is not relevant to its value, which only depends on its quantitative features: intensity and duration.<ref name="Moore"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Sweet |first1=William |title=Jeremy Bentham: 4. Moral Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/bentham/#H4 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=3 February 2021}}</ref> On this account, an experience of intense pleasure of indulging in food and sex is worth more than an experience of subtle pleasure of looking at fine art or of engaging in a stimulating intellectual conversation. Qualitative hedonists, following [[John Stuart Mill]], object to this version on the grounds that it threatens to turn axiological hedonism into a "philosophy of swine".<ref name="Weijers"/> Instead, they argue that the quality is another factor relevant to the value of a pleasure-experience, for example, that the ''lower pleasures'' of the body are less valuable than the ''higher pleasures'' of the mind.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Heydt |first1=Colin |title=John Stuart Mill: ii. Basic Argument |url=https://iep.utm.edu/milljs/#SH2d |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=3 February 2021}}</ref>

=== Beauty ===
A very common element in many conceptions of [[beauty]] is its relation to pleasure.<ref name="DeClercq2019">{{cite journal |last1=De Clercq |first1=Rafael |title=Aesthetic Pleasure Explained |journal=Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism |date=2019 |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=121–132 |doi=10.1111/jaac.12636 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DECAPE-3|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="BeautyandUgliness"/> [[Hedonism#Aesthetic hedonism|Aesthetic hedonism]] makes this relation part of the definition of beauty by holding that there is a necessary connection between pleasure and beauty, e.g. that for an object to be beautiful is for it to cause pleasure or that the experience of beauty is always accompanied by pleasure.<ref name="Gorodeisky">{{cite journal |last1=Gorodeisky |first1=Keren |title=On Liking Aesthetic Value |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2019 |volume=102 |issue=2 |pages=261–280 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12641 |s2cid=204522523 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phpr.12641 |language=en |issn=1933-1592}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Berg |first1=Servaas Van der |title=Aesthetic Hedonism and Its Critics |journal=Philosophy Compass |date=2020 |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=e12645 |doi=10.1111/phc3.12645 |s2cid=213973255 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VANAHA}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Matthen |first1=Mohan |last2=Weinstein |first2=Zachary |title=Aesthetic Hedonism |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0223.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |access-date=10 February 2021 |language=en}}</ref> The pleasure due to beauty does not need to be ''pure'', i.e. exclude all unpleasant elements.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Spicher |first1=Michael R. |title=Aesthetic Taste |url=https://iep.utm.edu/a-taste/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> Instead, beauty can involve ''mixed'' pleasure, for example, in the case of a beautifully tragic story.<ref name="DeClercq2019"/> We take pleasure from many things that are not beautiful, which is why beauty is usually defined in terms of a special type of pleasure: ''aesthetic'' or ''disinterested'' pleasure.<ref name="StanfordBeauty">{{cite web |last1=Sartwell |first1=Crispin |title=Beauty |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauty/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Aesthetics |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/aesthetics |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=9 February 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Levinson">{{cite book |last1=Levinson |first1=Jerrold |title=The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=3–24 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LEVPAA-3 |chapter=Philosophical Aesthetics: An Overview}}</ref> A pleasure is disinterested if it is indifferent to the existence of the beautiful object.<ref name="RoutledgeBeauty">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Beauty}}</ref><ref name="DeClercq2019"/> For example, the joy of looking at a beautiful landscape would still be valuable if it turned out that this experience was an illusion, which would not be true if this joy was due to seeing the landscape as a valuable real estate opportunity.<ref name="StanfordBeauty"/> Opponents of ''aesthetic hedonism'' have pointed out that despite commonly occurring together, there are cases of beauty without pleasure.<ref name="Gorodeisky"/> For example, a cold jaded critic may still be a good judge of beauty due to her years of experience but lack the joy that initially accompanied her work.<ref name="DeClercq2019"/> A further question for hedonists is how to explain the relation between beauty and pleasure. This problem is akin to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]: is something beautiful because we enjoy it or do we enjoy it because it is beautiful?<ref name="BeautyandUgliness">{{cite web |title=Beauty and Ugliness |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/beauty-and-ugliness |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=9 February 2021}}</ref> Identity theorists solve this problem by denying that there is a difference between beauty and pleasure: they identify beauty, or the appearance of it, with the experience of aesthetic pleasure.<ref name="DeClercq2019"/>

==History of analysis of pleasure==
=== Hellenistic philosophy ===
The ancient [[Cyrenaics]] posited pleasure as the universal aim for all people. Later, [[Epicurus]] defined the highest pleasure as [[aponia]] (the absence of pain),<ref name="Epicurus1">[http://www.epicurism.info/etexts/PD.html The Forty Principal Doctrines], Number III.</ref> and pleasure as "freedom from pain in the body and freedom from turmoil in the soul".<ref name="Epicurus2">[http://wiki.epicurus.info/Letter_to_Menoeceus Letter to Menoeceus] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081013132500/http://wiki.epicurus.info/Letter_to_Menoeceus |date=2008-10-13 }}, Section 131-2.</ref> According to [[Cicero]] (or rather his character Torquatus) Epicurus also believed that pleasure was the [[chief good]] and pain the chief evil.<ref name="Epicurus3">[http://www.epicurus.info/etexts/De_Finibus.html#IX, About the Ends of Goods and Evils, Book I] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131209054419/http://www.epicurus.info/etexts/De_Finibus.html |date=2013-12-09 }}, From Section IX, Torquatus sets out his understanding of Epicurus's philosophy.</ref> The [[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonist]] philosopher [[Aenesidemus]] claimed that following Pyrrhonism's prescriptions for [[philosophical skepticism]] produced pleasure.<ref>[[Eusebius]] ''[[Praeparatio Evangelica]]'' Chapter 18</ref>

=== Medieval philosophy ===
In the 12th century, [[Fakhr al-Din al-Razi|Razi]]'s ''Treatise of the Self and the Spirit'' (''Kitab al Nafs Wa’l Ruh'') analyzed different types of pleasure- [[sense|sensuous]] and [[intellectual]], and explained their relations with one another. He concludes that human needs and desires are endless, and "their satisfaction is by definition impossible."<ref>{{Cite journal |doi=10.1007/s10943-004-4302-z |first=Amber |last=Haque |year=2004 |title=Psychology from Islamic Perspective: Contributions of Early Muslim Scholars and Challenges to Contemporary Muslim Psychologists |journal=Journal of Religion and Health |volume=43 |issue=4 |pages=357–377 [371]|s2cid=38740431 }}</ref>

=== Schopenhauer ===
The 19th-century German philosopher [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] understood pleasure as a negative sensation, one that negates the usual existential condition of suffering.<ref name="Schopenhauer">[https://web.archive.org/web/20080618184644/http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/counsels/chapter1.html Counsels and Maxims], Chapter 1, General Rules Section 1.</ref>

== Psychology ==
Pleasure is often regarded as a bipolar construct, meaning that the two ends of the spectrum from pleasure to suffering are mutually exclusive. That is part of the circumplex model of affect.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = The circumplex model of affect: An integrative approach to affective neuroscience, cognitive development, and psychopathology|journal = Development and Psychopathology|date = 2005-09-01|issn = 1469-2198|pmc = 2367156|pmid = 16262989|pages = 715–734|volume = 17|issue = 3|doi = 10.1017/S0954579405050340|first1 = Jonathan|last1 = Posner|first2 = James A.|last2 = Russell|first3 = Bradley S.|last3 = Peterson| doi-broken-date=24 February 2025 }}</ref> Yet, some lines of research suggest that people do experience pleasure and suffering at the same time, giving rise to so-called mixed feelings.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Pleasure, displeasure, and mixed feelings: Are semantic opposites mutually exclusive?|journal = Cognition and Emotion|date = 2001-01-01|issn = 0269-9931|pages = 81–97|volume = 15|issue = 1|doi = 10.1080/02699930126097|first = Ulrich|last = Schimmack|s2cid = 144572285}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = Response latencies of pleasure and displeasure ratings: Further evidence for mixed feelings|journal = Cognition and Emotion|date = 2005-08-01|issn = 0269-9931|pages = 671–691|volume = 19|issue = 5|doi = 10.1080/02699930541000020|first = Ulrich|last = Schimmack|s2cid = 144217149}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = How Are You Feeling? Revisiting the Quantification of Emotional Qualia|journal = Psychological Science|date = 2013-08-01|issn = 0956-7976|pmid = 23824581|pages = 1503–1511|volume = 24|issue = 8|doi = 10.1177/0956797613475456|language = en|first1 = Assaf|last1 = Kron|first2 = Ariel|last2 = Goldstein|first3 = Daniel Hyuk-Joon|last3 = Lee|first4 = Katherine|last4 = Gardhouse|first5 = Adam Keith|last5 = Anderson|s2cid = 403233}}</ref> Pleasure is considered one of the core dimensions of emotion. It can be described as the positive evaluation that forms the basis for several more elaborate evaluations such as "agreeable" or "nice". As such, pleasure is an [[Affect (psychology)|affect]] and not an [[emotion]], as it forms one component of several different emotions.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Pleasures of the Brain|last = Frijda|first = Nico F.|publisher = Oxford University Press|year = 2010|pages = 99|chapter = On the Nature and Function of Pleasure|editor-last = Kringelbach|editor-first = Morten L.|editor-last2 = Berridge|editor-first2 = Kent C.}}</ref> The clinical condition of being unable to experience pleasure from usually enjoyable activities is called [[anhedonia]]. An active aversion to obtaining pleasure is called [[hedonophobia]].

===Pleasure and belief===
The degree to which something or someone is experienced as pleasurable not only depends on its objective attributes (appearance, sound, taste, texture, etc.), but on beliefs about its history, about the circumstances of its creation, about its rarity, fame, or price, and on other non-intrinsic attributes, such as the social status or identity it conveys.  For example, a sweater that has been worn by a celebrity is more desired than an otherwise identical sweater that has not, though considerably less so if it has been washed.<ref name="bloom">Paul Bloom. ''How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like'' (2010) 280 pages. Draws on neuroscience, philosophy, child-development research, and behavioral economics in a study of our desires, attractions, and tastes.</ref>

=== Motivation and behavior ===
Pleasure-seeking ''behavior'' is a common phenomenon and may indeed dominate our conduct at times. The thesis of [[psychological hedonism]] generalizes this insight by holding that all our actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain.<ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Hedonism}}</ref><ref name="Borchert2"/> This is usually understood in combination with [[egoism]], i.e. that each person only aims at her own happiness.<ref name="Britannica"/> Our actions rely on beliefs about what causes pleasure. False beliefs may mislead us and thus our actions may fail to result in pleasure, but even failed actions are ''motivated'' by considerations of pleasure, according to ''psychological hedonism''.<ref name="Moore">{{cite web |last1=Moore |first1=Andrew |title=Hedonism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The [[paradox of hedonism]] states that pleasure-seeking behavior commonly fails also in another way. It asserts that being motivated by pleasure is self-defeating in the sense that it leads to less actual pleasure than following other motives.<ref name="Moore"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dietz |first1=Alexander |title=Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=2019 |volume=97 |issue=3 |pages=497–510 |doi=10.1080/00048402.2018.1483409 |s2cid=171459875 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DIEETP}}</ref>

[[Sigmund Freud]] formulated his [[Pleasure principle (psychology)|pleasure principle]] in order to account for the effect pleasure has on our behavior. It states that there is a strong, inborn tendency of our mental life to seek immediate gratification whenever an opportunity presents itself.<ref name="Lopez"/> This tendency is opposed by the [[reality principle]], which constitutes a learned capacity to delay immediate gratification in order to take the real consequences of our actions into account.<ref>{{cite book |last1=De Mijolla |first1=Alain |title=International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis |date=2005 |publisher=Macmillan Reference USA |chapter=pleasure/unpleasure principle}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=De Mijolla |first1=Alain |title=International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis |date=2005 |publisher=Macmillan Reference USA |chapter=reality principle}}</ref> Freud also described the ''pleasure principle'' as a [[positive feedback]] mechanism that motivates the organism to recreate the situation it has just found pleasurable, and to avoid past situations that caused [[suffering|pain]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Freud|first1=Siegmund|title=Beyond the pleasure principle|year=1950|publisher=Liveright|location=New York}}</ref>

=== Cognitive biases ===
A ''[[cognitive bias]]'' is a systematic tendency of thinking and judging in a way that deviates from a normative criterion, especially from the demands of [[rationality]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Litvak |first1=P. |last2=Lerner |first2=J. S. |title=The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |chapter=Cognitive Bias}}</ref> Cognitive biases in regard to ''pleasure'' include the ''[[peak–end rule]]'', the ''[[Daniel Kahneman#Focusing illusion|focusing illusion]]'',  the ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias''.

The ''peak–end rule'' affects how we remember the pleasantness or unpleasantness of experiences. It states that our overall impression of past events is determined for the most part not by the total pleasure and suffering it contained but by how it felt at its ''peaks'' and at its ''end''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Do |first1=Amy M. |last2=Rupert |first2=Alexander V. |last3=Wolford |first3=George |title=Evaluations of pleasurable experiences: The peak–end rule |journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review |date=1 February 2008 |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=96–98 |doi=10.3758/PBR.15.1.96 |pmid=18605486 |language=en |issn=1531-5320|doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, the memory of a painful [[colonoscopy]] is improved if the examination is extended by three minutes in which the scope is still inside but not moved anymore, resulting in a moderately uncomfortable sensation. This extended colonoscopy, despite involving more pain overall, is remembered less negatively due to the reduced pain at the end. This even increases the likelihood for the patient to return for subsequent procedures.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Redelmeier |first1=Donald A. |last2=Katz |first2=Joel |last3=Kahneman |first3=Daniel |title=Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial |journal=Pain |date=July 2003 |volume=104 |issue=1–2 |pages=187–194 |doi=10.1016/s0304-3959(03)00003-4 |pmid=12855328 |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12855328/ |issn=0304-3959|hdl=10315/7959 |s2cid=206055276 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> [[Daniel Kahneman]] explains this distortion in terms of the difference between [[Thinking, Fast and Slow#Two selves|two selves]]: the ''experiencing self'', which is aware of pleasure and pain as they are happening, and the ''remembering self'', which shows the aggregate pleasure and pain over an extended period of time. The distortions due to the ''peak–end rule'' happen on the level of the ''remembering self''. Our tendency to rely on the ''remembering self'' can often lead us to pursue courses of action that are not in our best self-interest.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |title=Thinking, Fast and Slow |date=2011 |publisher=New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KAHTFA-2 |chapter=35. Two Selves}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |last2=Singer |first2=Peter |title=The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LAZTPO-7 |page=276}}</ref>

A closely related bias is the ''focusing illusion''. The "illusion" occurs when people consider the impact of one specific factor on their overall happiness. They tend to greatly exaggerate the importance of that factor, while overlooking the numerous other factors that would in most cases have a greater impact.<ref>{{cite journal|author2-link=Daniel Kahneman |last1=Schkade |first1=David A. |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |title=Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction |journal=Psychological Science |date=6 May 2016 |volume=9 |issue=5 |pages=340–346 |doi=10.1111/1467-9280.00066 |s2cid=14091201 |url=http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/biases/9_Psychological_Science_340_(Schkade).pdf |language=en |issn=1467-9280}}</ref>

The ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias'' are two different forms of violating the principle of ''temporal neutrality''. This principle states that the temporal location of a benefit or a harm is not important for its normative significance: a rational agent should care to the same extent about all parts of their life.<ref name="Dorsey">{{cite journal |last1=Dorsey |first1=Dale |title=A Near-Term Bias Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2019 |volume=99 |issue=2 |pages=461–477 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12496 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DORANB}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Brink |first1=David O. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPFT |chapter=Prospects for Temporal Neutrality|year=2011 }}</ref> The ''nearness bias'', also discussed under the labels "[[present bias]]" or "[[Time preference#Temporal discounting|temporal discounting]]", refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to temporal distance from the present. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be near rather than distant. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be distant rather than near.<ref name="Greene">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Sullivan |first2=Meghan |title=Against Time Bias |journal=Ethics |date=2015 |volume=125 |issue=4 |pages=947–970 |doi=10.1086/680910 |hdl=10220/40397 |s2cid=142294499 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GREATB-2|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Greene2">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Holcombe |first2=Alex |last3=Latham |first3=Andrew James |last4=Miller |first4=Kristie |last5=Norton |first5=James |title=The Rationality of Near Bias Toward Both Future and Past Events |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |date=2021 |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=905–922 |doi=10.1007/s13164-020-00518-1 |s2cid=230797064 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GRETRO-49}}</ref><ref name="Dorsey"/> The ''future bias'' refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to the direction of time. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in the future rather than in the past. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be in the past rather than in the future.<ref name="Greene"/><ref name="Greene2"/>

==Reward system==
{{See also|Affective neuroscience}}

===Pleasure centers===
{{Excerpt|Reward system|Pleasure centers}}

===Motivation===
While all pleasurable stimuli can be seen as rewards, some rewards do not evoke pleasure.<ref name=pmid26109341/> Based upon the [[incentive salience]] model of [[reward system|reward]] – the attractive and motivational property of a stimulus that induces [[approach behavior]] and [[consummatory behavior]]<ref name=pmid26109341/> – an intrinsic reward has two components: a "wanting" or desire component that is reflected in approach behavior, and a "liking" or pleasure component that is reflected in consummatory behavior.<ref name=pmid26109341/> Some research indicates that similar [[mesocortical pathway|mesocorticolimbic]] circuitry is activated by quite diverse pleasures, suggesting a common neural currency.<ref name=pmid25950633>{{cite journal |last1=Berridge |first1=Kent C. |last2=Kringelbach |first2=Morten L. |title=Pleasure systems in the brain |journal=Neuron |date=6 May 2015 |volume=86 |issue=3 |pages=646–664 |doi=10.1016/j.neuron.2015.02.018 |pmid=25950633 |pmc=4425246 }}</ref> Some commentators opine that our current understanding of how pleasure happens within us remains poor,<ref>"How we and our hedonic experience are situated or constituted in our brains and organisms remains to be seen."Conclusion, Pleasure, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Moccia |first1=Lorenzo |last2=Mazza |first2=Marianna |last3=Nicola |first3=Marco Di |last4=Janiri |first4=Luigi |title=The Experience of Pleasure: A Perspective Between Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |date=4 September 2018 |volume=12 |pages=359 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2018.00359 |pmid=30233347 |pmc=6131593 |doi-access=free }}</ref> but that scientific advance gives optimism for future progress.<ref>"prospects seem good for new and deep scientific understanding of pleasure and of how it is organized in the brain." Conclusion, Pleasure, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/</ref>

==Animal pleasure==
{{See also|Reward system#Animals vs humans|Animal sexual behaviour#Sex for pleasure}}
In the past, there has been debate as to whether pleasure is experienced by other animals rather than being an exclusive property of humankind; however, it is now known that animals do experience pleasure, as measured by objective behavioral and neural hedonic responses to pleasurable stimuli.<ref name=pmid25950633/>

==See also==
{{Columns-list|colwidth=30em|
*[[False pleasure]]
*[[Flow (psychology)]]
*[[Gratification]]
*[[Leisure]]
*[[Recreation]]
*[[Orgasm]]
*[[Pain and pleasure]]
*[[Sadomasochism]]
*[[Happiness]]
}}
{{clear}}

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite book|first1=Paul|last1=Bloom|title=How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like|url=https://archive.org/details/howpleasureworks00paul|url-access=registration|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|year=2010|isbn=978-0393340006}}  Draws on neuroscience, philosophy, child-development research, and behavioral economics in a study of our desires, attractions, and tastes.
* M.L. Kringelbach. ''The pleasure center: Trust Your Animal Instincts'' (2009). Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-532285-9}}. A general overview of the neuroscience of pleasure.

== External links ==
{{Commons category}}
* {{Wiktionary-inline}}
* {{Wikiquote-inline}}
* {{cite web |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margaret-paul-phd/the-difference-between-happiness-and-pleasure_b_7053946.html |title=The Difference Between Happiness and Pleasure |work=The Huffington Post |first=Margaret|last=Paul  |date=April 14, 2015}}

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[[Category:Pleasure| ]]
[[Category:Emotions]]
[[Category:Feeling]]
[[Category:Concepts in ethics]]