Editing Nuclear strategy

{{Short description|Doctrines and plans for production and use of atomic weapons}}
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{{nuclear weapons}}

'''Nuclear strategy''' involves the development of [[military doctrine|doctrine]]s and [[strategy|strategies]] for the production and use of [[nuclear weapon]]s.

As a sub-branch of [[military strategy]], nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether [[tactical nuclear weapon|in the battlefield]] or [[strategic nuclear weapon|strategically]], a large part of nuclear strategy involves their use as a bargaining tool.

Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:

*Conditions which serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons
*Types of nuclear weapons to be developed
*How and when weapons are to be used

Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of [[military strategy]]. The immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use, in seeking victory in a traditional military sense, impossible.

Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of [[mutually assured destruction]].

In the context of [[nuclear proliferation]] and maintaining the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]], states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of '''nuclear''' '''strategy'''.

==Nuclear deterrent composition==
The doctrine of [[mutual assured destruction]] (MAD) assumes that a [[Deterrence theory#Nuclear deterrence theory|nuclear deterrent]] force must be credible and survivable. That is, each deterrent force must survive a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] with sufficient capability to effectively destroy the other country in a [[second strike]]. Therefore, a first strike would be suicidal for the launching country.

In the late 1940s and 1950s as the [[Cold War]] developed, the [[United States]] and [[Soviet Union]] pursued multiple delivery methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively called a "[[nuclear triad]]". These are air-delivered weapons (bombs or missiles), [[ballistic missile submarines]] (usually nuclear-powered and called SSBNs), and [[intercontinental ballistic missiles]] (ICBMs), usually deployed in land-based hardened [[missile silo]]s or on vehicles.

Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional weapons.

{{Anchor|deter2016-01-29}}During the 1970s there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the [[Warsaw Pact|Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact]] could overwhelm the forces of [[NATO]].  It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe with [[strategic nuclear weapon]]s, inviting a catastrophic exchange.  Thus, technologies were developed to greatly reduce collateral damage while being effective against advancing conventional military forces.  Some of these were [[Neutron bomb|low-yield neutron bombs]], which were lethal to tank crews, especially with tanks massed in tight formation, while producing relatively little blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout.  Other technologies were so-called "suppressed radiation devices," which produced mostly blast with little radioactivity, making them much like conventional explosives, but with much more energy.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Solem|first=J. C.|year=1974|title=Tactical nuclear deterrence|journal=Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report LA-74-1362}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Assured destruction]]
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]]
* [[Counterforce]], [[Countervalue]]
* [[Decapitation strike]]
* [[Deterrence theory]]
* [[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]]
* ''[[Dr. Strangelove or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb|Dr. Strangelove]]'' (1964), a film by [[Stanley Kubrick]], satirizing nuclear strategy.
* [[Fail-deadly]]
* [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike]], [[Second strike]]
* [[Force de frappe]]
* [[Game theory]], [[wargaming]]
* [[Herman Kahn]]
* [[Madman theory]]
* [[Massive retaliation]]
* [[Military strategy]]
* [[Minimal deterrence]]
* [[Mutual assured destruction]] (MAD)
* [[No first use]]
* [[National Security Strategy of the United States]]
* [[Nuclear blackmail]]
* [[Nuclear proliferation]]
* [[Nuclear umbrella]]
* [[Nuclear utilization target selection]] (NUTS)
* [[Nuclear weapons debate]]
* [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP)
* [[Strategic bombing]]
* [[Tactical nuclear weapon]]s
* [[Thomas Schelling]]
{{div col end}}

== Bibliography ==

===Early texts===
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Brodie, Bernard]]. ''The Absolute Weapon''. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946.
* Brodie, Bernard. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1.html ''Strategy in the Missile Age'']. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
* Dunn, Lewis A. [https://web.archive.org/web/20111207181216/http://ifri.org/downloads/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf ''Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses''] Paris: IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007.
* [[Herman Kahn|Kahn, Herman]]. ''On Thermonuclear War''. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
* [[Henry Kissinger|Kissinger, Henry A]]. ''Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy''. New York: Harper, 1957.
* Schelling, Thomas C. ''Arms and Influence''. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
* [[Albert Wohlstetter|Wohlstetter, Albert]]. [https://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html "The Delicate Balance of Terror."] ''Foreign Affairs'' 37, 211 (1958): 211–233.

===Secondary literature===
* Baylis, John, and John Garnett. ''Makers of Nuclear Strategy''. London: Pinter, 1991.  {{ISBN|1-85567-025-9}}.
* [[Barry Buzan|Buzan, Barry]], and Herring, Eric. "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics". London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. {{ISBN|1-55587-596-3}}.
* [[Lawrence Freedman|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.  {{ISBN|0-333-97239-2}} .
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000'' (London: Macmillan, hardback 1997, paperback 1999), 256p., {{ISBN|0-333-67365-4}}
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''Nuclear Mentalities?  Strategies and Belief Systems in Britain, France and the FRG'' (London: Macmillan, July 1998), 277p., Index, Tables. {{ISBN|0-333-69389-2}}
* Heuser, Beatrice. "[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=1295548 Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies]", ''Contemporary European History'' Vol. 7 Part 3 (November 1998), pp.&nbsp;311–328.
* Heuser, Beatrice. "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives", ''Comparative Strategy'' Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp.&nbsp;437–457.
* Kaplan, Fred M. ''The Wizards of Armageddon''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.  {{ISBN|0-671-42444-0}}.
* Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. '' Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World'', Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.
* Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." ''International Security'' 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71.
* [[Thomas Schelling|Schelling, Thomas C]]. ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
* Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1993.  {{ISBN|0-07-059352-3}}.

== References ==
<references />

[[Category:Nuclear strategy| ]]
[[Category:Nuclear warfare]]