Editing G. E. Moore

{{Short description|English philosopher (1873–1958)}}
{{for|the cofounder of Intel|Gordon Moore}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2021}}
{{Infobox philosopher
|name=G. E. Moore
|honorific_suffix = {{postnominals|country=GBR|OM|FBA|size=100%}}
|image = 1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg
|caption = Moore in 1914
|birth_name = George Edward Moore
|birth_date = {{birth date|1873|11|4|df=y}}
|birth_place = [[Upper Norwood]], London, England
|death_date = {{death date and age|1958|10|24|1873|11|4|df=y}}
|death_place = [[Nuffield Health Cambridge Hospital|Evelyn Nursing Home]], Cambridge, England
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|resting_place = [[Ascension Parish Burial Ground, Cambridge]]
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|alma_mater = [[Trinity College, Cambridge]]
|era = {{longitem|[[19th-century philosophy|19th-]]/[[20th-century philosophy]]}}
|institutions = [[Trinity College, Cambridge]]<br>[[Aristotelian Society]]<br>(president, 1918–19)<br>[[Humanists UK|Ethical Union]]<br>(president, 1935–36)
|region = [[Western philosophy]]
|school_tradition = [[Analytic philosophy]]<br>[[Consequentialism]]
|main_interests = {{hlist |[[Ethics]] |[[Epistemology]]}} [[Philosophy of language]]
|academic_advisors = [[James Ward (psychologist)|James Ward]]<ref>{{cite SEP |url-id=james-ward |title=James Ward}} by Pierfrancesco Basile.</ref>
|doctoral_students = [[Casimir Lewy]]
|notable_students = [[R. B. Braithwaite]]<ref>[[Alice Ambrose]], [[Morris Lazerowitz]] (eds.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=7bRcSI5QvKAC ''G. E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect, Volume 3''], Psychology Press, 2004, p. 25.</ref>
|notable_ideas = {{ublist |[[Naturalistic fallacy]] |[[Moore's paradox]] |[[Paradox of analysis]] |[[Open-question argument]] |External and internal [[Relations (philosophy)|relations]]<ref>G. E. Moore (15 December 1919), [http://hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi156/moore.pdf "External and Internal Relations"], ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 20 (1919–20): 40–62.</ref> |"[[Here is one hand]]" (Moorean shift)|Transparency of consciousness<ref>G. E. Moore, "[http://www.ditext.com/moore/refute.html The Refutation of Idealism]" (1903), p. 37.</ref><ref>Robert Hanna, ''Kant, Science, and Human Nature''. Clarendon Press, 2006, p. 60.</ref>
}}
|spouse = Dorothy Ely
|children = 2, including [[Nicholas Moore]]
|relatives = [[Thomas Sturge Moore]] (brother)
}}

'''George Edward Moore''' {{postnominals|country=GBR|OM|FBA}} (4 November 1873 – 24 October 1958) was an English philosopher, who with [[Bertrand Russell]], [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] and earlier [[Gottlob Frege]] was among the initiators of [[analytic philosophy]]. He and Russell began de-emphasizing the [[idealism]] which was then prevalent among British philosophers and became known for advocating [[common sense|common-sense]] concepts and contributing to [[ethics]], [[epistemology]] and [[metaphysics]]. He was said to have had an "exceptional personality and moral character".<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Preston |first1=Aaron |author-link1=:sv:Aaron Preston |title=George Edward Moore (1873—1958) |url=https://iep.utm.edu/moore/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 August 2020}}</ref> [[Ray Monk]] dubbed him "the most revered philosopher of his era".<ref name="monk">{{Cite news |last1=Monk |first1=Ray |author1-link=Ray Monk |title=He was the most revered philosopher of his era. So why did GE Moore disappear from history? |url=https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ge-moore-philosophy-books-analytic-ray-monk-biography |access-date=21 June 2021 |work=[[Prospect (magazine)|Prospect]] |date=3 April 2020 |location=London}}</ref> 

As Professor of Philosophy at the [[University of Cambridge]], he influenced but abstained from the [[Bloomsbury Group]], an informal set of intellectuals. He edited the journal ''[[Mind (journal)|Mind]]''. He was a member of the [[Cambridge Apostles]] from 1894 to 1901,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Levy |first1=Paul |author-link1=Paul Levy (journalist) |url=https://archive.org/details/moore00paul |title=Moore: G.E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles |date=1979 |publisher=Weidenfeld and Nicolson |isbn=0297775766 |location=London |page=319 |url-access=registration}}</ref> a fellow of the [[British Academy]] from 1918, and was chairman of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club in 1912–1944.<ref>{{Cite book |editor1-last=Stern |editor1-first=David G. |editor2-last=Rogers |editor2-first=Brian |editor3-last=Citron |editor3-first=Gabriel |title=Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933: From the Notes of G. E. Moore |date=2016 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781316432136 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ubmSDQAAQBAJ |access-date=29 April 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Ahmed |first1=Arif |title=The Moral Sciences Club (A Short History) |url=https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc-history |website=Faculty of Philosophy |date=6 September 2013 |publisher=University of Cambridge |access-date=29 April 2020}}</ref> A [[secular humanist|humanist]], he presided over the British Ethical Union (now [[Humanists UK]]) in 1935–1936.<ref>{{Cite archive |item=Annual Reports of the Ethical Union |item-url=https://internetserver.bishopsgate.org.uk/Details/archive/110028006 |item-id= |date=1946-1967 |series=Congress Minutes and Papers, 1913-1991 |file=Minute Book |collection=British Humanist Association |collection-url=https://internetserver.bishopsgate.org.uk/Details/archive/110012192 |institution=Bishopsgate Institute Special Collections and Archives |location=London |accession=|ref=BHA/1/1/2}}</ref>

==Life==
[[File:G. E. Moore c. 1903.jpg|left|thumb|Moore, {{Circa}} 1903]]
George Edward Moore was born in [[Upper Norwood]], in south-east London, on 4 November 1873, the middle child of seven of Daniel Moore, a medical doctor, and Henrietta Sturge.<ref name=levy/><ref>{{cite book|last1=Gwynn|first1=Frederick L.|title=Sturge Moore and the Life of Art |date=1951 |publisher=University of Kansas Press|location=Lawrence, Kansas |page=9 |url=https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/6344/upk.sturge_moore.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180415190755/https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/6344/upk.sturge_moore.pdf |archive-date=2018-04-15 |url-status=live|accessdate=15 February 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Father Daniel |url=https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/72d46a6f-0b49-4333-b502-932afbd727f0 |website=The National Archives |publisher=Cambridge University Library: Department of Manuscripts and University Archives |access-date=16 February 2022}}</ref> His grandfather was the author [[George Moore (physician)|George Moore]]. His eldest brother was [[Thomas Sturge Moore]], a poet, writer and engraver.<ref name="levy">{{Cite book |last1=Levy |first1=Paul |author-link1=Paul Levy (journalist) |url=https://archive.org/details/moore00paul |title=Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles |date=1979 |publisher=Weidenfeld and Nicolson |isbn=0297775766 |location=London |pages=28–30 |url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>[http://www.dulwich.org.uk/OA_Document_1.aspx?id=1:29464&id=1:29454&id=1:29431/ Eminent Old Alleynians : Academe] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025200056/http://www.dulwich.org.uk/OA_Document_1.aspx?id=1%3A29464&id=1%3A29454&id=1%3A29431%2F |date=25 October 2007}} at dulwich.org.uk, accessed 24 February 2009</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Baldwin |first1=Tom |author-link1=Thomas Baldwin (philosopher) |title=George Edward Moore |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/#1 |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University |access-date=29 October 2015 |date=26 March 2004}}</ref>

He was educated at [[Dulwich College]]<ref>Sheila Hodges, 1981, ''[[iarchive:godsgiftlivinghi0000hodg|God's Gift: A Living History of Dulwich College]]'', pp. 87–88, Heinemann: London.</ref> and, in 1892, began attending [[Trinity College, Cambridge]], to learn [[classics]] and [[moral sciences]]. His [[tripos]] results were a [[double first]].<ref>{{acad |id=MR892GE |name=Moore, George Edward}}</ref> He became a Fellow of Trinity in 1898 and was later [[University of Cambridge]] [[Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge|Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic]] from 1925 to 1939.

Moore is known best now for defending [[ethical non-naturalism]], his emphasis on [[common sense]] for philosophical method, and the [[Moore's paradox|paradox that bears his name]]. He was admired by and influenced by other philosophers and some of the [[Bloomsbury Group]]. But unlike his colleague and admirer Bertrand Russell, who for some years thought Moore fulfilled his "ideal of genius",<ref>''The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell'' (Volume I, 1872-1914), George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971, p. 64. He added: "He had a kind of exquisite purity. I have never but once succeeded in making him tell a lie, and that was a subterfuge. 'Moore', I said, 'do you always speak the truth?' 'No' he replied. I believe this to be the only lie he ever told."</ref> he is mostly unknown presently except among academic philosophers. Moore's essays are known for their clarity and circumspection of writing style and methodical and patient treatment of philosophical problems. He was critical of modern philosophy for lack of [[Philosophical progress|progress]], which he saw as a stark contrast to the dramatic advances in the [[natural science]]s since the [[Renaissance]]. Among Moore's most famous works are his ''[[Principia Ethica]]'',<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Moore |first1=G. E. |title=Principia Ethica |date=1903 |publisher=University Press |location=Cambridge |isbn=0879754982 |url=http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica |access-date=29 October 2015}}</ref> and his essays, "The Refutation of Idealism", "[[A Defence of Common Sense]]", and "A Proof of the External World".

Moore was an important and admired member of the secretive [[Cambridge Apostles]], a discussion group drawn from the British intellectual elite.  At the time another member, 22-year-old Bertrand Russell, wrote "I almost worship him as if he were a god. I have never felt such an extravagant admiration for anybody",<ref name=monk/> and would later write that "for some years he fulfilled my ideal of genius. He was in those days beautiful and slim, with a look almost of inspiration as deeply passionate as [[Spinoza]]'s".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Baldwin |first1=Thomas |title=G. E. Moore: A great philosopher? |url=https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/g-e-moore-a-great-philosopher/ |access-date=13 October 2021 |work=The Times Literary Supplement |date=25 September 2020 |location=London}}</ref>

From 1918 to 1919, Moore was chairman of the [[Aristotelian Society]], a group committed to the systematic study of philosophy, its historical development and its methods and problems.<ref>[http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/about/the-council/ The Aristotelian Society – The Council]</ref> He was appointed to the [[Order of Merit]] in 1951.<ref>{{cite news |title=Three New Barons in Honours List |url=https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/48200100 |access-date=3 April 2023 |work=The West Australian |date=7 June 1951 |location=Perth, WA |page=3}}</ref>

Moore died in England in the [[Nuffield Health Cambridge Hospital|Evelyn Nursing Home]] on 24 October 1958.<ref name="dnb2004">{{Cite ODNB|last1=Baldwin|first1=Thomas|author-link1=Thomas Baldwin (philosopher)|chapter=Moore, George Edward (1873–1958)|date=23 September 2004|title=Oxford Dictionary of National Biography|title-link=Oxford Dictionary of National Biography|editor-last1=Matthew|editor-first1=H. C. G.|editor-link1=Colin Matthew|editor-last2=Harrison|editor-first2=Brian|editor-link2=Brian Harrison (historian)|isbn=0-19-861411-X|oclc=54778415|volume=38|pages=[[iarchive:isbn_0198613881/page/936/mode/1up|936–939]]|doi=10.1093/ref:odnb/35090}} </ref> He was cremated at Cambridge Crematorium on 28 October 1958 and his ashes interred at the [[Ascension Parish Burial Ground, Cambridge|Parish of the Ascension Burial Ground]] in the city. His wife, Dorothy Ely (1892–1977), was buried there. Together, they had two sons, the poet [[Nicholas Moore]] and the composer Timothy Moore.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Yau|first1=John|author-link1=John Yau|title=Nicholas Moore, Touched by Poetic Genius|url=http://hyperallergic.com/173897/nicholas-moore-touched-by-poetic-genius/|website=[[Hyperallergic]]|access-date=29 October 2015|date=11 January 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |first = Nicholas |last = Marshall |title = Timothy Moore |date = 10 March 2003 |url = https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/mar/10/guardianobituaries.artsobituaries1 |work = The Guardian |access-date = 14 March 2014}}</ref>

==Philosophy==
===Ethics===
[[Image:Principia Ethica title page.png|thumb|right|The title page of ''Principia Ethica'']]
His influential work ''[[Principia Ethica]]'' is one of the main inspirations of the reaction against [[ethical naturalism]] (see [[ethical non-naturalism]]) and is partly responsible for the twentieth-century concern with [[meta-ethics]].<ref>{{cite SEP |url-id=metaethics |title=Metaethics}} by Geoff Sayre-McCord.</ref>

====Naturalistic fallacy====
{{Main|Naturalistic fallacy}}
Moore asserted that philosophical arguments can suffer from a confusion between the use of a term in a particular argument and the definition of that term (in all arguments). He named this confusion the [[naturalistic fallacy]]. For example, an ethical argument may claim that if an item has certain properties, then that item is 'good.' A [[hedonism|hedonist]] may argue that 'pleasant' items are 'good' items. Other theorists may argue that 'complex' things are 'good' things. Moore contends that, even if such arguments are correct, they do not provide definitions for the term 'good'. The property of 'goodness' cannot be defined. It can only be shown and grasped. Any attempt to define it (X is good if it has property Y) will simply shift the problem (Why is Y-ness good in the first place?).

====Open-question argument====
{{Main|Open-question argument}}
Moore's [[argument]] for the indefinability of 'good' (and thus for the fallaciousness in the "naturalistic fallacy") is often termed the [[open-question argument]]; it is presented in [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.13 §13 of ''Principia Ethica'']. The argument concerns the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "Is it ''good'' that x is pleasant?". According to Moore, these questions are ''open'' and these statements are ''significant''; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail. In other words, if value could be analysed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable.

Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. the [[paradox of analysis]]), rather than revealing anything special about value. The argument clearly depends on the assumption that if 'good' were definable, it would be an [[Logical truth|analytic truth]] about 'good', an assumption that many contemporary moral realists like [[Richard Boyd]] and [[Peter Railton]] reject.  Other responses appeal to the [[Frege]]an distinction between [[sense and reference]], allowing that value concepts are special and ''sui generis'', but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by [[physicalism|non-reductive materialists]] in [[philosophy of mind]]).

====Good as indefinable====
Moore contended that goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other property. In ''[[Principia Ethica]]'', he writes:

: It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not "other," but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.10#s10p3 § 10 ¶ 3])

Therefore, we cannot define 'good' by explaining it in other words. We can only indicate a ''thing'' or an ''action'' and say "That is good". Similarly, we cannot describe to a person born totally blind exactly what yellow is. We can only show a sighted person a piece of yellow paper or a yellow scrap of cloth and say "That is yellow".

====Good as a non-natural property====
In addition to categorising 'good' as indefinable, Moore also emphasized that it is a non-natural property. This means that it cannot be empirically or scientifically tested or verified{{mdash}}it is not analyzable by "natural science".

====Moral knowledge====
Moore argued that, once arguments based on the [[naturalistic fallacy]] had been discarded, questions of intrinsic goodness could be settled only by appeal to what he (following [[Henry Sidgwick|Sidgwick]]) termed "moral intuitions": [[self-evidence|self-evident]] propositions which recommend themselves to moral thought, but which are not susceptible to either direct proof or disproof (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.45 § 45]). As a result of his opinion, he has often been described by later writers as an advocate of [[ethical intuitionism]]. Moore, however, wished to distinguish his opinions from the opinions usually described as "Intuitionist" when ''Principia Ethica'' was written:

{{quotation|In order to express the fact that ethical propositions of my ''first'' class [propositions about what is good as an end in itself] are incapable of proof or disproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick's usage in calling them 'Intuitions.' But I beg that it may be noticed that I am not an 'Intuitionist,' in the ordinary sense of the term. Sidgwick himself seems never to have been clearly aware of the immense importance of the difference which distinguishes his Intuitionism from the common doctrine, which has generally been called by that name. The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of my ''second'' class—propositions which assert that a certain action is ''right'' or a ''duty''—are incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of ''this'' kind are ''not'' 'Intuitions,' than to maintain that propositions of my ''first'' class ''are'' Intuitions.|G. E. Moore|[http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/preface#s0p5 ''Principia Ethica'', Preface ¶ 5]}}

Moore distinguished his view from the opinion of [[deontological ethics|deontological]] intuitionists, who claimed that "intuitions" could determine questions about what ''actions'' are right or required by [[duty]]. Moore, as a [[consequentialist]], argued that "duties" and moral rules could be determined by investigating the ''effects'' of particular actions or kinds of actions (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.89 § 89]), and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.90 § 90]). According to Moore, "intuitions" revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what items were good in themselves, as ''ends to be pursued''.

==== Right action, duty and virtue ====
Moore holds that {{em|right actions}} are those producing the most good.<ref name="Schneewindp153">{{cite book |author=Schneewind |first=J. B. |author-link=J. B. Schneewind |url=https://archive.org/details/companiontoethic00sing/page/153 |title=A Companion to Ethics |publisher=Blackwell Publishers Ltd |year=1997 |isbn=0-631-18785-5 |editor=Singer, Peter |editor-link=Peter Singer |location=Oxford |page=[https://archive.org/details/companiontoethic00sing/page/153 153]}}</ref> The difficulty with this is that the consequences of most actions are too complex for us to properly take into account, especially the long-term consequences. Because of this, Moore suggests that the definition of duty is limited to what generally produces better results than probable alternatives in a comparatively near future.<ref name="Principia">{{cite book |last1=Moore |first1=George Edward |title=Principia Ethica |date=1903 |publisher=Project Gutenberg |url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm}}</ref>{{rp|§109}} Whether a given rule of action is also a ''duty'' depends to some extent on the conditions of the corresponding society but ''duties'' agree mostly with what common-sense recommends.<ref name="Principia"/>{{rp|§95}} Virtues, like honesty, can in turn be defined as ''permanent dispositions'' to perform duties.<ref name="Principia"/>{{rp|§109}}
 
===Proof of an external world===
{{Main|Here is one hand}}
One of the most important parts of Moore's philosophical development was his differing with the [[idealism]] that dominated British philosophy (as represented by the works of his former teachers [[F. H. Bradley]] and [[J. M. E. McTaggart|John McTaggart]]), and his defence of what he regarded as a "common sense" type of [[Philosophical realism|realism]]. In his 1925 essay "[[A Defence of Common Sense]]", he argued against idealism and [[scepticism]] toward the external world, on the grounds that they could not give reasons to accept that their metaphysical premises were more plausible than the reasons we have for accepting the common sense claims about our knowledge of the world, which sceptics and idealists must deny. He famously put the point into dramatic relief with his 1939 essay "Proof of an External World", in which he gave a common sense argument against scepticism by raising his right hand and saying "Here is one hand" and then raising his left and saying "And here is another", then concluding that there are at least two external objects in the world, and therefore that he knows (by this argument) that an external world exists. Not surprisingly, not everyone preferring sceptical doubts found Moore's method of argument entirely convincing; Moore, however, defends his argument on the grounds that sceptical arguments seem invariably to require an appeal to "philosophical intuitions" that we have considerably less reason to accept than we have for the common sense claims that they supposedly refute. The "Here is one hand" argument also influenced [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], who spent his last years working out a new method for Moore's argument in the remarks that were published posthumously as ''[[On Certainty]]''.)

===Moore's paradox===
Moore is also remembered for drawing attention to the peculiar inconsistency involved in uttering a sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe it is raining", a puzzle now commonly termed "[[Moore's paradox]]". The puzzle is that it seems inconsistent for anyone to ''assert'' such a sentence; but there doesn't seem to be any ''logical contradiction'' between "It is raining" and "I don't believe that it is raining", because the former is a statement about the weather and the latter a statement about a person's belief about the weather, and it is perfectly logically possible that it may rain whilst a person does not believe that it is raining.

In addition to Moore's own work on the paradox, the puzzle also inspired a great deal of work by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], who described the paradox as the most impressive philosophical insight that Moore had ever introduced. It is said{{by whom|date=February 2020}} that when Wittgenstein first heard this paradox one evening (which Moore had earlier stated in a lecture), he rushed round to Moore's lodgings, got him out of bed and insisted that Moore repeat the entire lecture to him.

===Organic wholes===
Moore's description of the principle of the [[organic unity|organic whole]] is extremely straightforward, nonetheless, and a variant on a pattern that began with Aristotle:

: The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.18 § 18]).

According to Moore, a moral actor cannot survey the 'goodness' inherent in the various parts of a situation, assign a value to each of them, and then generate a sum in order to get an idea of its total value. A moral scenario is a complex assembly of parts, and its total value is often created by the relations between those parts, and not by their individual value. The organic metaphor is thus very appropriate: biological organisms seem to have emergent properties which cannot be found anywhere in their individual parts. For example, a human brain seems to exhibit a capacity for thought when none of its neurons exhibit any such capacity. In the same way, a moral scenario can have a value different than the sum of its component parts.

To understand the application of the organic principle to questions of value, it is perhaps best to consider Moore's primary example, that of a consciousness experiencing a beautiful object. To see how the principle works, a thinker engages in "reflective isolation", the act of isolating a given concept in a kind of null context and determining its intrinsic value. In our example, we can easily see that, of themselves, beautiful objects and consciousnesses are not particularly valuable things. They might have some value, but when we consider the total value of a consciousness experiencing a beautiful object, it seems to exceed the simple sum of these values.  Hence the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.

==Works==
[[Image:Grave of philosopher G.E. Moore - geograph.org.uk - 382503.jpg|thumb|The gravestone of G. E. Moore and his wife Dorothy Moore in the [[Ascension Parish Burial Ground]], Cambridge]]
* G. E. Moore, "[http://fair-use.org/mind/1899/04/the-nature-of-judgment The Nature of Judgment]" (1899)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/3.1.80 |doi-access=free |title=IV.—Experience and Empiricism |year=1903 |author=G. E. Moore |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |volume=3 |pages=80–95 }}
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:principia-ethica-by-g.-e.-moore|Principia Ethica]]'' (1903)
* G. E. Moore, "[http://fair-use.org/international-journal-of-ethics/1903/10/book-reviews/the-origin-of-the-knowledge-of-right-and-wrong Review of Franz Brentano's ''The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong'']" (1903)
* G. E. Moore, "[http://www.ditext.com/moore/refute.html The Refutation of Idealism]" (1903)
* {{cite journal |doi=10.1093/aristotelian/4.1.127 |doi-access=free |title=VII.—Kant's Idealism |year=1904 |author=G. E. Moore |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |volume=4 |pages=127–140}}
* G. E. Moore, "[http://www.hist-analytic.com/Mooreobjectsofperception.pdf The Nature and Reality of the Objects of Perception]" (1905–6)
* {{cite journal |doi=10.1093/aristotelian/8.1.33 |doi-access=free |title=III.—Professor James' "Pragmatism" |year=1908 |author=G. E. Moore |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |volume=8 |pages=33–77}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/10.1.36 |doi-access=free |title=II.—The Subject-Matter of Psychology |year=1910 |author=G. E. Moore |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |volume=10 |pages=36–62 }}
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:in.ernet.dli.2015.272729|Ethics]]'' (1912)
* G. E. Moore, "[http://www.hist-analytic.com/Moorejudgements2.pdf Some Judgments of Perception]" (1918)
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:philosophicalstu008406mbp|Philosophical Studies]]'' (1922) [papers published 1903–21]
** G. E. Moore, "[http://www.ditext.com/moore/intrinsic.html The Conception of Intrinsic Value]"
** G. E. Moore, "[http://www.ditext.com/moore/nmp.html The Nature of Moral Philosophy]"
* G. E. Moore, "[http://www.hist-analytic.com/Moorecharacteristics.pdf Are the Characteristics of Things Universal or Particular?]" (1923)
* G. E. Moore, "[http://www.ditext.com/moore/common-sense.html A Defence of Common Sense]" (1925)
* G. E. Moore and [[Frank P. Ramsey|F. P. Ramsey]], ''[http://www.hist-analytic.com/ramseymoore2.pdf Facts and Proposition (Symposium)]'' (1927)
* [[W. Kneale]] and G. E. Moore, [https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article/15/1/154/1787436 "Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate?"] (1936)
* G. E. Moore, [[iarchive:in.ernet.dli.2015.46303/page/n21/mode/1up|"An Autobiography,"]] and [[iarchive:in.ernet.dli.2015.46303/page/n555/mode/1up|"A reply to my critics,"]] in: ''The Philosophy Of G. E. Moore''. ed. Schilpp, Paul Arthur (1942).
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:somemainproblems007085mbp|Some Main Problems of Philosophy]]'' (1953) [lectures delivered 1910–11]
** G. E. Moore, Ch. 3, "[http://www.hist-analytic.com/Mooreonpropositions.pdf Propositions]"
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:philosophicalpap0000moor|Philosophical Papers]]'' (1959)
** G. E. Moore, Ch. 7: "[http://www.hist-analytic.com/MooreExternalWorld.pdf Proof of an External World]"
* [http://www.hist-analytic.com/Reidmoore.htm "Margin Notes by G. E. Moore on The Works of Thomas Reid (1849: With Notes by Sir William Hamilton)"].
* G. E. Moore, ''[[iarchive:gemooreearlyessa0000moor/mode/2up|The Early Essays]]'', edited by [[Tom Regan]], Temple University Press (1986).
* G. E. Moore, [[iarchive:elementsofethics0000moor|''The Elements of Ethics'']], edited and with an introduction by Tom Regan, Temple University Press, (1991).
* G. E. Moore, [[iarchive:analyticphilosop0000unse_b6k3/page/314/mode/1up|'On Defining "Good,'"]] in ''Analytic Philosophy: Classic Readings,'' Stamford, CT: Wadsworth, 2002, pp.&nbsp;1–10. {{ISBN|0-534-51277-1}}.

==See also==
* ''[[The Right and the Good]]''

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
* [[Alan R. White|White, Alan R.]] (1958) ''[[iarchive:gemoorecriticale0000whit|G. E. Moore]]'', Blackwell {{ISBN|978-0313208058}}
* Klemke, E. D. (1969) ''[https://arch.library.northwestern.edu/concern/generic_works/t148fh29q The Epistemology of G. E. Moore]'', Northwestern University Press. {{Doi|10.21985/N2TQ6G}}
* O’Connor, David (1982) ''[[iarchive:metaphysicsofgem0000ocon|The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore]]'''''.''' D. Reidel {{ISBN|978-90-277-1352-0}}
* [[Tom Regan|Regan, Tom]] (1986). ''Bloomsbury's Prophet: G.E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy'', Temple University Press. {{ISBN|978-0877224464}}
* {{Cite book |last=Klemke |first=E. D. |title=A Defense of Realism: Reflections on the Metaphysics of G. E. Moore |year=1999 |publisher=Humanity Books |isbn=1-57392-732-5 }}
* [[Ernest Sosa|Sosa, Ernest]] (2001). [https://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/bpl_images/content_store/WWW_Content/9780631214151/003.pdf "G. E. Moore (1873–1958)"] in ''A Companion to Analytic Philosophy'' (eds [[Aloysius Martinich|A.P. Martinich]] and [[David Sosa|D. Sosa]]). {{Doi|10.1002/9780470998656.ch4}}

==External links==
{{wikiquote}}
{{wikisource author}}
* [http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/moor.htm George Edward Moore – philosophypages.com]
* The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/ George Edward Moore]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/ Moore's Moral Philosophy]
* {{StandardEbooks|Standard Ebooks URL=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/g-e-moore}}
* {{Gutenberg author|45722}}
* {{Internet Archive author |sname=G. E. Moore |sopt=t}}
* {{Librivox author|id=343}}
* [http://www.trinitycollegechapel.com/brasses-l-p/ Trinity College Chapel]
* ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20190704163803/https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238842.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199238842-e-010 G. E. Moore and the Cambridge School of Analysis],'' [[Thomas Baldwin (philosopher)|Thomas Baldwin]], ''The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy''
* [https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/pages/moore Open Access papers] by Moore published in ''Proceedings of the [[Aristotelian Society]]'' and ''Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.''

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