Editing Chinese Communist Party

{{Short description|Ruling party of the People's Republic of China}}
{{redirect|CCP}}
{{pp-semi-indef|small=yes}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=July 2024}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2024}}
{{Infobox political party
| name             = Communist Party of China
| native_name      = {{nobold|{{lang|zh-Hans-CN|中国共产党}}<br />{{lang|zh-Latn|Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng}}}}
| native_name_lang = zh-Hans-CN
| abbreviation     = {{ubl|CCP (common)|CPC (official)}}
| founders         = {{unbulleted list|[[Chen Duxiu]]|[[Li Dazhao]]}}
{{Collapsible list
 | title = {{nobold|...{{nbsp}}''and others''}}
 | [[1st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|1st National Congress]] representatives:
 | [[Henk Sneevliet]]
 | {{ill|Vladimir Neumann|de|Nikolski (Geheimdienstoffizier)|zh|尼克爾斯基}}
 | [[Li Da (philosopher)|Li Da]]
 | [[Li Hanjun]]
 | [[Zhang Guotao]]
 | {{ill|Liu Renjing|zh|刘仁静}}
 | [[Mao Zedong]]
 | [[He Shuheng]]
 | [[Dong Biwu]]
 | [[Chen Tanqiu]]
 | [[Wang Jinmei (revolutionary)|Wang Jinmei]]
 | [[Deng Enming]]
 | [[Chen Gongbo]]
 | [[Zhou Fohai]]
 | {{ill|Bao Huiseng|zh|包惠僧}}
}}
| logo             = Danghui.svg
| logo_size        = 150px
| colorcode        = {{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}
| general_secretary = [[Xi Jinping]]
| standing_committee = {{ubl|Xi Jinping|[[Li Qiang]]|[[Zhao Leji]]|[[Wang Huning]]|[[Cai Qi]]|[[Ding Xuexiang]]|[[Li Xi (politician)|Li Xi]]}}
| founded          = {{unbulleted list
 | {{start date and age|df=yes|1921|07|23}} (1st National Congress){{NoteTag|During the Chinese Civil War, party officials were only able to confirm from available documents that the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in July 1921, but not the specific date of the meeting. In June 1941, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared 1 July the party's "anniversary day". Although the exact date of the 1st National Congress was later determined by party officials to be 23 July 1921, the date of the anniversary has not been changed.<ref>{{Cite news |last=楊立傑 |date=30 April 2013 |title=共产主义小组的建立与中国共产党的成立 |language=zh-Hans-CN |work=Xinhua |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/25/content_2136770.htm |access-date=3 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130430055514/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/25/content_2136770.htm |archive-date=30 April 2013}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=June 2023}}}}
 | [[Site of the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]], 106 Rue Wantz, [[Shanghai French Concession]]
}}
| headquarters     = [[Zhongnanhai]], Xicheng District, Beijing
| newspaper        = ''[[People's Daily]]''
| youth_wing       = [[Communist Youth League of China]]
| wing1_title      = [[Pioneer movement|Children's wing]]
| wing1            = [[Young Pioneers of China]]
| wing2_title      = [[Military|Armed wing]]
| wing2            = {{unbulleted list|[[People's Liberation Army]]|[[People's Armed Police]]|[[Militia (China)|Militia of China]]}}
| wing3_title      = [[Think tank|Research office]]
| wing3            = [[Central Policy Research Office]]
| membership_year  = 2023
| membership       = {{increase}} 99,185,000<ref name = 2023PartyCensus/>
| ideology         = {{ubl|[[Communism]] | [[Marxism–Leninism]]}}
| position         = <!-- Discuss on the talk page before entering -->
| international    = [[International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties|IMCWP]]<br>[[For the Freedom of Nations!|FFN!]]
| slogan           = "[[Serve the People]]"{{NoteTag|{{lang-zh|s=为人民服务|p=Wèi Rénmín Fúwù}}}}
| seats1_title     = [[National People's Congress]] ([[13th National People's Congress|13th]])
| seats1           = {{Composition bar|2090|2980|hex={{party color|Communist Party of China}}}}
| seats2_title     = [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|NPC Standing Committee]] ([[14th National People's Congress|14th]])
| seats2           = {{Composition bar|116|175|hex={{party color|Communist Party of China}}}}
| flag             = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg
| colours          = {{Colour box|{{party color|Communist Party of China}}|border=silver}} Red
| website          = {{Official URL}}
| country          = China
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| showflag = p
| title = Communist Party of China
| pic = Communist Party of China (Chinese characters).svg
| piccap = "Communist Party of China" in simplified (top) and traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
| picupright = 0.75
| s = 中国共产党
| t = 中國共產黨
| p = Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
| w = {{tone superscript|Chung1-kuo2 Kung4-ch'an3-tang3}}
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|uo|2|-|g|ong|4|.|ch|an|3|.|d|ang|3}}
| bpmf = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄍㄨㄥˋ ㄔㄢˇ ㄉㄤˇ
| tp = Jhongguó Gòng-chǎn-dǎng
| j = zung1 gwok3 gung6 caan2 dong2
| y = Jūng-gwok Guhng-cháan-dóng
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|z|ung|1|-|gw|ok|3|-|g|ung|6|-|c|aan|2|-|d|ong|2}}
| poj = Tiong-kok Kiōng-sán-tóng
| order = st
| altname = Abbreviation
| c2 = 中共
| p2 = Zhōnggòng
| w2 = {{tone superscript|Chung1-kung4}}
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|ong|4}}
| bpmf2 = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄥˋ
| j2 = zung1 gung6
| y2 = Jūng-guhng
| ci2 = {{IPAc-yue|z|ung|1|.|g|ung|6}}
| poj2 = Tiong-kiōng
| tib = ཀྲུང་གོ་གུང་ཁྲན་ཏང
| wylie = Krung go gung khran tang
| thdl = Trung go gung trän tang
| zwpy = Zhung ko kung chän dang
| zha = Cunghgoz Gungcanjdangj
| mong = ᠳᠤᠮᠳᠠᠳᠤ ᠤᠯᠤᠰ ᠤᠨ<br />(ᠬᠢᠲᠠᠳ ᠤᠨ)<br />ᠡᠪ ᠬᠠᠮᠲᠤ<br />(ᠺᠣᠮᠮᠤᠶᠢᠨᠢᠰᠲ)<br />ᠨᠠᠮ
| mon = Дундад улсын (Хятадын) Эв хамт (Kоммунист) Нам
| monr = Dumdad ulcyn (Khyatadyn) Av khamt (Kommunist) Ham
| uig = جۇڭگو كوممۇنىستىك پارتىيىسى
| uly = Junggo Kommunistik Partiyisi
| uyy = Junggo Kommunistik Partiyisi
| usy = Җуңго Коммунистик Партийиcи
| mnc = ᡩᡠᠯᡳᠮᠪᠠᡳ ᡤᡠᡵᡠᠨ {{zwj}}‍ᡳ<br />(ᠵᡠᠨᡤᠣ {{zwj}}‍ᡳ)<br />ᡤᡠᠩᡮᠠᠨ<br />ᡥᠣᡴᡳ
| mnc_rom = Dulimbai gurun-i (Jungg'o-i) Gungcan Hoki
}}

The '''Chinese Communist Party''' ('''CCP'''),<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Chinese Communist Party |encyclopedia=[[Encyclopædia Britannica]] |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party |access-date=13 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191002223447/https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party |archive-date=2 October 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> officially the '''Communist Party of China''' ('''CPC'''),<ref name=":62">{{Cite web |title=Style Guide: PRC, China, CCP or Chinese? |url=https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/news/style-guide-prc-china-ccp-or-chinese/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220725100303/https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/news/style-guide-prc-china-ccp-or-chinese/ |archive-date=25 July 2022 |access-date=2022-06-19 |website=Asia Media Centre – New Zealand |publisher=Asia New Zealand Foundation |quote=Chinese Communist Party (CCP): May also refer to Communist Party of China (CPC){{nbsp}}... CPC is used officially in China and by China's media, whereas English-language media outside of Chinese conventionally use CCP.}}</ref> is the founding and [[One-party state|sole ruling party]] of the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC). Founded in 1921, the CCP emerged victorious in the [[Chinese Civil War]] against the [[Kuomintang]] and [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|proclaimed the establishment of the PRC]] under the leadership of [[Mao Zedong]] in October 1949. Since then, the CCP has governed China and has had sole control over the [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA). {{As of|2024}}, the CCP has more than 99 million members, making it the [[List of largest political parties|second largest political party by membership in the world]].

In 1921, [[Chen Duxiu]] and [[Li Dazhao]] led the founding of the CCP with the help of the Far Eastern Bureau of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Russian Communist Party]] ([[Bolsheviks]]) and [[Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International]]. Although the CCP aligned with the Kuomintang (KMT) during its initial years, the rise of the right-wing in the KMT under the leadership of [[Chiang Kai-Shek]] and massacre of tens of thousands of CCP members, resulted in the split and a prolonged civil war between the two. During the next ten years of [[guerrilla warfare]], Mao Zedong rose to become the most influential figure in the CCP, and the party established a strong base among the rural [[peasant]]ry with its [[Land Reform Movement (China)|land reform policies]]. Support for the CCP continued to grow throughout the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], and after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the CCP emerged triumphant in [[Chinese Communist Revolution|the communist revolution]] against the [[Nationalist government]]. After the [[Kuomintang's retreat to Taiwan|KMT's retreat to Taiwan]], the CCP established the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

Mao Zedong continued to be the most influential member of the CCP until [[Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong|his death in 1976]]. Under Mao, the party completed its land reform program, launched a series of [[Five-year plans of China|five-year plans]], and eventually [[Sino-Soviet split|split with the Soviet Union]]. Although Mao attempted to purge the party of capitalist and [[reactionary]] elements during the [[Cultural Revolution]], after his death, these policies were only briefly continued by the [[Gang of Four]] before a less radical faction seized control. During the 1980s, [[Deng Xiaoping]] directed the CCP away from Maoist orthodoxy and towards a policy of [[Chinese economic reform|economic liberalization]]. Since the [[Revolutions of 1989|collapse of the Eastern Bloc]] and the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991, the CCP has focused on maintaining its relations with the ruling parties of the remaining [[List of socialist states|socialist states]]. The CCP has also established relations with several non-communist parties, including dominant nationalist parties of many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as [[Social democracy|social democratic]] parties in Europe.

The [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|Chinese Communist party's ideology]] consists of [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Shan |first1=Wei |last2=Gu |first2=Yongxin |last3=Chen |first3=Juan |date=May 2023 |title=Layering Ideologies from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping: Tracing Ideological Changes of the Communist Party of China Using Text Analysis |journal=[[China: An International Journal]] |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=34–35 |doi=10.1353/chn.2023.a898340 |doi-access=free}}</ref> As a [[Marxist–Leninist]] party, the Chinese Communist Party is organized based on [[democratic centralism]], a principle that entails open policy discussion on the condition of unity among party members in upholding the agreed-upon decision. The highest body of the CCP is the [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|National Congress]], convened every fifth year. When the National Congress is not in session, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee]] is the highest body, but since that body usually only meets once a year, most duties and responsibilities are vested in the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo]] and its [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Standing Committee]]. Members of the latter are seen as the top leadership of the party and the state.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=McGregor |first=Richard |title=The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers |title-link=The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-06-170877-0 |location=New York |oclc=630262666 |author-link=Richard McGregor |publisher=Harper Perennial}}</ref> Today the [[Leader of the Chinese Communist Party|party's leader]] holds the offices of [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] (responsible for civilian party duties), [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman of the Central Military Commission]] (CMC) (responsible for military affairs), and [[President of the People's Republic of China|State President]] (a largely ceremonial position). Because of these posts, the party leader is seen as the country's [[paramount leader]]. The current leader is [[Xi Jinping]], who was elected at the 1st Plenary Session of the [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Central Committee]] held on 15 November 2012 and has been reelected twice, on 25 October 2017 by the [[19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|19th Central Committee]] and on 10 October 2022 by the [[20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|20th Central Committee]].

{{TOC limit|3}}

==History==
{{Main|History of the Chinese Communist Party}}

===Founding and early history===
The [[October Revolution]] and [[Marxist philosophy|Marxist theory]] inspired the founding of the CCP.<ref name="auto">{{Cite book |last=Hunt |first=Michael |url=https://archive.org/details/worldtransformed0000hunt |title=The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-312-24583-2 |page=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=114}} [[Chen Duxiu]] and [[Li Dazhao]] were among the first to publicly support [[Leninism]] and [[world revolution]]. Both regarded the October Revolution in Russia as groundbreaking, believing it to herald a new era for oppressed countries everywhere.{{sfn|Van de Ven|1991|pp=26–27}}

Some historical analysis views the [[May Fourth Movement]] as the beginning of the revolutionary struggle that led to the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|founding of the People's Republic of China]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |date=2023 |publisher=1804 Books |isbn=978-1-7368500-8-4 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=22}} Following the movement, trends towards social transformation increased.<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=14}} Writing in 1939, Mao Zedong stated that the Movement had shown that the [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] revolution against imperialism and China had developed to a new stage, but that the [[proletariat]] would lead the revolution's completion.<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=20}} The May Fourth Movement led to the establishment of radical intellectuals who went on to mobilize peasants and workers into the CCP and gain the organizational strength that would solidify the success of the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]].<ref name="zhidong">{{Cite journal |last=Hao |first=Zhidong |date=March 1997 |title=May 4th and June 4th compared: A sociological study of Chinese social movements |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=6 |issue=14 |pages=79–99 |doi=10.1080/10670569708724266 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref> Chen and Li were among the most influential promoters of Marxism in China during the May Fourth period.<ref name=":04">{{Cite book |last=Huang |first=Yibing |title=An Ideological History of the Communist Party of China |date=2020 |publisher=Royal Collins Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-4878-0391-9 |editor-last=Zheng |editor-first=Qian |volume=2 |location=Montreal, Quebec |pages= |translator-last=Sun |translator-first=Li |translator-last2=Bryant |translator-first2=Shelly}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7}} The CCP itself embraces the May Fourth Movement and views itself as part of the movement's legacy.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Šebok |first=Filip |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |chapter=Historical Legacy |pages=15–28 |doi=10.4324/9781003350064-3 |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=24}}

Study circles were, according to [[Cai Hesen]], "the rudiments [of our party]".{{sfn|Van de Ven|1991|p=38}} Several study circles were established during the [[New Culture Movement]], but by 1920 many grew sceptical about their ability to bring about reforms.{{sfn|Van de Ven|1991|p=44}} China's intellectual movements were fragmented in the early 1920s.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: a Concise History |date=2010 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |series=Asia-pacific: Culture, Politics, and Society series |location=Durham, NC |doi=10.2307/j.ctv11hpp6w |jstor=j.ctv11hpp6w}}</ref>{{Rp|page=17}} The May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement had identified issues of broad concern to Chinese progressives, including [[anti-imperialism]], support for [[Chinese nationalism|nationalism]], support for [[Democracy in China|democracy]], promotion of feminism, and rejection of traditional values.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|page=17}} Proposed solutions among Chinese progressives differed significantly, however.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|page=17}}

[[File:The First National Congress of CPC.jpg|thumb|left|[[Site of the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|Site of the first CCP Congress]], in the former [[Shanghai French Concession]]]]

The CCP was founded on 1 July 1921 with the help of the Far Eastern Bureau of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]] and [[Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International|Far Eastern Secretariat of the Communist International]], according to the party's official account of its history.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hé |first=Lìbō |title=Xiǎn wéi rénzhī de zhōnggòng yī dà cānjiāzhě: Éguórén Níkē'ěrsījī |script-title=zh:鲜为人知的中共一大参加者：俄国人尼科尔斯基 |language=zh |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85038/6444613.html |url-status=live |access-date=7 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071104234821/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85038/6444613.html |archive-date=4 November 2007 |trans-work=News of the Communist Party of China |script-work=zh:中国共产党新闻网}}</ref><ref name="CI">{{Cite book |last=Party History Research Office of the CPC Central Committee |date=1997 |publisher=Beijing Library Press |pages=39–51 |script-title=zh:共產國際、聯共（布）與中國革命檔案資料叢書}}</ref> However, party documents suggest that the party's actual founding date was 23 July 1921, the first day of the [[1st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|1st National Congress of the CCP]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tatlow |first=Didi Kirsten |date=20 July 2011 |title=On Party Anniversary, China Rewrites History |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/world/asia/21iht-letter21.html |url-access=limited |access-date=2 June 2021 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/world/asia/21iht-letter21.html |archive-date=1 January 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}{{cbignore}}</ref> The founding National Congress of the CCP was held 23–31 July 1921.<ref>{{Cite web |title=1st. National Congress of The Communist Party of China (CPC). |url=http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/cpc_1st_congress_standing_polibureau.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171222031024/http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/cpc_1st_congress_standing_polibureau.htm |archive-date=22 December 2017 |access-date=8 October 2015}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=May 2024}} With only 50 members in the beginning of 1921, among them Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping |url=http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131211053051/http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |archive-date=11 December 2013 |access-date=21 March 2022 |website=Asia for Educators |publisher=[[Columbia University]]}}</ref> the CCP organization and authorities grew tremendously.<ref name="auto" />{{Rp|page=115}} While it was originally held in [[Site of the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|a house]] in the [[Shanghai French Concession]], French police interrupted the meeting on 30 July{{sfn|Gao|2009|p=119}} and the congress was moved to a tourist boat on [[South Lake (Jiaxing)|South Lake]] in [[Jiaxing]], Zhejiang province.{{sfn|Gao|2009|p=119}} A dozen delegates attended the congress, with neither Li nor Chen being able to attend,{{sfn|Gao|2009|p=119}} the latter sending a personal representative in his stead.{{sfn|Gao|2009|p=119}} The resolutions of the congress called for the establishment of a [[communist party]] as a branch of the [[Communist International]] (Comintern) and elected Chen as its leader. Chen then served as the first general secretary of the CCP{{sfn|Gao|2009|p=119}} and was referred to as "China's Lenin".{{citation needed|date=November 2023}}

The Soviets hoped to foster pro-Soviet forces in East Asia to fight against [[anti-communist]] countries, particularly [[Empire of Japan|Japan]]. They attempted to contact the warlord [[Wu Peifu]] but failed.<ref>{{Cite news |date=9 October 1920 |title=News of the Soviets of People's Deputies}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=16 November 1921 |title=News of the Soviets of People's Deputies}}</ref> The Soviets then contacted the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), which was leading the [[Government of the Republic of China in Guangzhou|Guangzhou government]] parallel to the [[Beiyang government]]. On 6 October 1923, the Comintern sent [[Mikhail Borodin]] to Guangzhou, and the Soviets established friendly relations with the KMT. The [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee of the CCP]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=中央檔案館 |title=中共中央文件選集1 |date=1989 |publisher=中共中央黨校出版社 |pages=187, 271–297}}</ref> Soviet leader [[Joseph Stalin]],<ref>{{Cite book |title=中共中央、共青團中央和共產國際代表聯席會議記錄 |date=December 1924}}</ref> and the Comintern<ref>{{Cite book |last= |first= |title=共產國際有關中國資料選輯 Collection of the Communist International's Materials on China |date=1981 |publisher=Institute of Modern History, [[Chinese Academy of Social Sciences]] |page=83}}</ref> all hoped that the CCP would eventually control the KMT and called their opponents "rightists".{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=84, 89}}{{NoteTag|Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed this label and the CCP's analysis of the KMT. He believed that the KMT served all Chinese, regardless of political leanings.<ref name="ccc" />}} KMT leader [[Sun Yat-sen]] eased the conflict between the communists and their opponents. CCP membership grew tremendously after the [[4th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|4th congress]] in 1925, from 900 to 2,428.<ref name="ksy">{{Cite book |last=奎松 |first=楊 |title=中間地帶的革命 |date=April 2010 |publisher=山西人民出版社 |location=Taiyuan}}</ref> The CCP still treats Sun Yat-sen as one of the founders of their movement and claim descent from him<ref>{{Cite news |last=Allen-Ebrahimian |first=Bethany |title=The Chinese Communist Party Is Still Afraid of Sun Yat-Sen's Shadow |work=[[Foreign Policy]] |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/08/the-chinese-communist-party-is-still-afraid-of-sun-yat-sens-shadow/ |url-status=live |access-date=1 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210314084608/https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/08/the-chinese-communist-party-is-still-afraid-of-sun-yat-sens-shadow/ |archive-date=14 March 2021}}</ref> as he is viewed as a proto-communist<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 November 2016 |title=Tug of war over China's founding father Sun Yat-sen as Communist Party celebrates his legacy |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044782/tug-war-over-chinas-founding-father-sun-yat-sen |url-status=live |access-date=1 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210310125141/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044782/tug-war-over-chinas-founding-father-sun-yat-sen |archive-date=10 March 2021}}</ref> and the economic element of [[Three Principles of the People|Sun's ideology]] was socialism.{{sfn|Dirlik|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=S-aGLEtx7AYC&pg=PA20 20]}} Sun stated, "Our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Godley |first=Michael R. |year=1987 |title=Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Sun Yatsen and the International Development of China |journal=The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs |issue=18 |pages=109–125 |doi=10.2307/2158585 |jstor=2158585 |s2cid=155947428}}</ref>

The communists dominated the [[Socialist ideology of the Kuomintang|left wing of the KMT]] and struggled for power with the party's right-wing factions.{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=84, 89}} When Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, [[Chiang Kai-shek]], who initiated moves to marginalize the position of the communists.{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=84, 89}} Chiang, Sun's former assistant, was not actively anti-communist at that time,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=獨秀 |first=Du Xiu |date=3 April 1926 |title=中國革命勢力統一政策與廣州事變 |journal=嚮導}}</ref> even though he hated the theory of [[Class conflict|class struggle]] and the CCP's seizure of power.<ref name="ccc">{{Cite book |last=Chiang |first=Chung Cheng |url=https://archive.org/details/sovietrussiainch0000chai |title=Soviet Russia in China: a Summing Up at Seventy |date=1957 |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Cudahy |ol=89083W}}</ref> The communists proposed removing Chiang's power.<ref>{{Cite book |last=中央檔案館 |title=中共中央文件選集2 |date=1989 |publisher=中共中央黨校出版社 |pages=311–318}}</ref> When Chiang gradually gained the support of Western countries, the conflict between him and the communists became more and more intense. Chiang asked the Kuomintang to join the Comintern to rule out the secret expansion of communists within the KMT, while Chen Duxiu hoped that the communists would completely withdraw from the KMT.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=奎松 |first=楊 |year=2002 |title=蔣介石從三二零到四一二的心路歷程 |journal=史學月刊 |volume=6}}</ref>

In April 1927, both Chiang and the CCP were preparing for conflict.<ref>{{Cite book |last=上海市檔案館 |title=上海工人三次武裝起義 |date=1983 |publisher=[[Shanghai People's Press]]}}</ref> Fresh from the success of the [[Northern Expedition]] to overthrow the warlords, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the communists, who by now numbered in the tens of thousands across China.{{sfn|Feigon|2002|p=42}} Ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiang's arrival, he turned on them, [[Shanghai massacre of 1927|massacring 5,000]]{{NoteTag|"In the next weeks five thousand Communists were butchered by the stammering machine-guns of the Kuomintang and by the knives of the criminal gangs whom Chiang recruited for slaughter."{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=62}}{{br}}Other sources give different estimates, e.g. 5,000–10,000.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ryan |first=Tom |title=China Rising: The Revolutionary Experience |date=2016 |publisher=History Teachers' Association of Victoria |isbn=978-1-875585-08-3 |editor-last=Purnell |editor-first=Ingrid |location=Collingwood |page=77 |editor-last2=Plozza |editor-first2=Shivaun}}</ref>}} with the aid of the [[Green Gang]].{{sfn|Feigon|2002|p=42}}{{sfn|Schram|1966|p=106}}{{sfn|Carter|1976|pp=61–62}} Chiang's army then marched on Wuhan but was prevented from taking the city by CCP General [[Ye Ting]] and his troops.{{sfn|Schram|1966|p=112}} Chiang's allies also attacked communists; for example, in Beijing, Li Dazhao and 19 other leading communists were executed by [[Zhang Zuolin]].{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=106–109}}{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=62}} Angered by these events, the peasant movement supported by the CCP became more violent. [[Ye Dehui]], a famous scholar, was killed by communists in [[Changsha]], and in revenge, KMT general [[He Jian]] and his troops gunned down hundreds of peasant militiamen.{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=112–113}} That May, tens of thousands of communists and their sympathizers were killed by KMT troops, with the CCP losing approximately {{formatnum:15000}} of its {{formatnum:25000}} members.{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=62}}

===Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War===
{{Further|Chinese Civil War|Outline of the Chinese Civil War|Chinese Soviet Republic|Long March|Second Sino-Japanese War|Chinese Communist Revolution}}
[[File:中國工農紅軍軍旗.svg|thumb|upright=0.8|Flag of the [[Chinese Red Army|Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]]]]

The CCP continued supporting the Wuhan KMT government,{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=62}} but on 15 July 1927 the Wuhan government expelled all communists from the KMT.{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=63}} The CCP reacted by founding the [[Chinese Red Army|Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China]], better known as the "Red Army", to battle the KMT. A battalion led by General [[Zhu De]] was ordered to take the city of [[Nanchang]] on 1 August 1927 in what became known as the [[Nanchang uprising]].

Initially successful, Zhu and his troops were forced to retreat after five days, marching south to [[Shantou]], and from there being driven into the wilderness of [[Fujian]].{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=63}} [[Mao Zedong]] was appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and led four regiments against Changsha in the [[Autumn Harvest Uprising]], hoping to spark peasant uprisings across Hunan.{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=64}} His plan was to attack the KMT-held city from three directions on 9 September, but the Fourth Regiment deserted to the KMT cause, attacking the Third Regiment. Mao's army made it to Changsha but could not take it; by 15 September, he accepted defeat, with 1,000 survivors marching east to the [[Jinggang Mountains]] of [[Jiangxi]].{{sfn|Carter|1976|p=64}}{{sfn|Schram|1966|pp=122–125}}{{sfn|Feigon|2002|pp=46–47}}

The near destruction of the CCP's urban organizational apparatus led to institutional changes within the party.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} The party adopted [[democratic centralism]], a way to organize revolutionary parties, and established a politburo to function as the standing committee of the central committee.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} The result was increased centralization of power within the party.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} At every level of the party this was duplicated, with standing committees now in effective control.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} After being expelled from the party, Chen Duxiu went on to lead China's [[Trotskyism|Trotskyist]] movement. [[Li Lisan]] was able to assume ''de facto'' control of the party organization by 1929–1930.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}}

The 1929 [[Gutian Congress]] was important in establishing the principle of party control over the military, which continues to be a core principle of the party's ideology.<ref name=":Duan">{{Cite book |last=Duan |first=Lei |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=978-90-8728-441-1 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages= |chapter=Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=280}}

Li's leadership was a failure, leaving the CCP on the brink of destruction.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} The Comintern became involved, and by late 1930, his powers had been taken away.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} By 1935, Mao had become a member of [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP]] and the party's informal military leader, with [[Zhou Enlai]] and [[Zhang Wentian]], the formal head of the party, serving as his informal deputies.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}} The conflict with the KMT led to the reorganization of the Red Army, with power now centralized in the leadership through the creation of CCP political departments charged with supervising the army.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=72}}

The [[Xi'an Incident]] of December 1936 paused the conflict between the CCP and the KMT.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=370}} Under pressure from Marshal [[Zhang Xueliang]] and the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to a [[Second United Front]] focused on repelling the Japanese invaders.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=354}} While the front formally existed until 1945, all collaboration between the two parties had effectively ended by 1940.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=354}} Despite their formal alliance, the CCP used the opportunity to expand and carve out independent bases of operations to prepare for the coming war with the KMT.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=355}} In 1939, the KMT began to restrict CCP expansion within China.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=355}} This led to frequent clashes between CCP and KMT forces{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=355}} which subsided rapidly on the realization on both sides that civil war amidst a foreign invasion was not an option.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=355}} By 1943, the CCP was again actively expanding its territory at the expense of the KMT.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=355}}

[[File:Three Campaigns of Chinese Civil War.png|thumb|upright=1.2|Map showing the [[Liaoshen Campaign|Liaoshen]], [[Huaihai campaign|Huaihai]], and [[Pingjin campaign|Pingjin Campaigns]] that decisively turned the war in favour of the CCP.]]

Mao Zedong became the [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|Chairman of the CCP]] in 1945. After the [[Japanese surrender]] in 1945, the war between the CCP and the KMT began again in earnest.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} The 1945–1949 period had four stages; the first was from August 1945 (when the Japanese surrendered) to June 1946 (when the peace talks between the CCP and the KMT ended).{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} By 1945, the KMT had three times more soldiers under its command than the CCP and initially appeared to be prevailing.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} With the cooperation of the US and Japan, the KMT was able to retake major parts of the country.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} However, KMT rule over the reconquered territories proved unpopular because of its endemic [[political corruption]].{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}}

Notwithstanding its numerical superiority, the KMT failed to reconquer the rural territories which made up the CCP's stronghold.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} Around the same time, the CCP launched an invasion of [[Manchuria]], where they were assisted by the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} The second stage, lasting from July 1946 to June 1947, saw the KMT extend its control over major cities such as [[Yan'an]], the CCP headquarters, for much of the war.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=95}} The KMT's successes were hollow; the CCP had tactically withdrawn from the cities, and instead undermined KMT rule there by instigating protests among students and intellectuals. The KMT responded to these demonstrations with heavy-handed repression.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=96}} In the meantime, the KMT was struggling with factional infighting and Chiang Kai-shek's autocratic control over the party, which weakened its ability to respond to attacks.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=96}}

The third stage, lasting from July 1947 to August 1948, saw a limited counteroffensive by the CCP.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=96}} The objective was clearing "Central China, strengthening North China, and recovering Northeast China."{{sfn|Leung|1996|p=96}} This operation, coupled with military desertions from the KMT, resulted in the KMT losing 2 million of its 3 million troops by the spring of 1948, and saw a significant decline in support for KMT rule.{{sfn|Leung|1992|p=96}} The CCP was consequently able to cut off KMT garrisons in Manchuria and retake several territories.{{sfn|Leung|1996|p=96}}

The last stage, lasting from September 1948 to December 1949, saw the communists go on the offensive and the collapse of KMT rule in mainland China as a whole.{{sfn|Leung|1996|p=96}} Mao's [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|proclamation of the founding of the People's Republic of China]] on 1 October 1949 marked the end of the second phase of the Chinese Civil War (or the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]], as it is called by the CCP).{{sfn|Leung|1996|p=96}}

===Proclamation of the PRC and the 1950s===
{{Further|Proclamation of the People's Republic of China}}
[[File:Stalin birthday2.jpg|thumb|upright=0.95|left|Chinese communists celebrate Joseph Stalin's birthday, 1949.]]
Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) before a massive crowd at Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949. The CCP headed the [[Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (1949–1954)|Central People's Government]].<ref name="auto" />{{Rp|page=118}} From this time through the 1980s, top leaders of the CCP (such as Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) were largely the same military leaders prior to the PRC's founding.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Miller |first=Alice |title=The 19th Central Committee Politburo |url=https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm55-am-final.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210215022611/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm55-am-final.pdf |archive-date=15 February 2021 |access-date=27 April 2020 |website=China Leadership Monitor, No. 55 |publisher=[[Hoover Institution]]}}</ref> As a result, informal personal ties between political and military leaders dominated civil-military relations.<ref name=":2" />

Stalin proposed a one-party constitution when [[Liu Shaoqi]] visited the Soviet Union in 1952.<ref>{{Cite book |last=哲 |first=師 |title=在歷史巨人身邊——師哲回憶錄 |date=1991 |publisher=中央文獻出版社 |location=Beijing |page=531}}</ref> The constitution of the PRC in 1954 subsequently abolished the previous coalition government and established the CCP's one-party system.<ref>{{Cite book |last=子陵 |first=辛 |title=紅太陽的隕落：千秋功罪毛澤東 |date=2009 |publisher=書作坊 |location=Hong Kong |page=88}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=理羣 |first=錢 |title=毛澤東和後毛澤東時代 |date=2012 |publisher=聯經 |location=Taipei |page=64}}</ref> In 1957, the CCP launched the [[Anti-Rightist Campaign]] against political dissidents and prominent figures from minor parties, which resulted in the political persecution of at least 550,000 people. The campaign significantly damaged the limited pluralistic nature in the socialist republic and solidified the country's status as a ''de facto'' [[one-party state]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=King |first=Gilbert |title=The Silence that Preceded China's Great Leap into Famine |language=en |work=[[Smithsonian (magazine)|Smithsonian]] |url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-silence-that-preceded-chinas-great-leap-into-famine-51898077/ |url-status=live |access-date=28 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014232813/https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-silence-that-preceded-chinas-great-leap-into-famine-51898077/ |archive-date=14 October 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Du |first=Guang |year=2007 |title="反右"运动与民主革命——纪念"反右"运动五十周年 |url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/97-mcs-2007-issue-3/1015-2012-01-05-15-35-22.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414035811/https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/97-mcs-2007-issue-3/1015-2012-01-05-15-35-22.html |archive-date=14 April 2021 |access-date=18 July 2020 |website=[[Modern China Studies]] |language=zh}}</ref>

The Anti-Rightist Campaign led to the catastrophic results of the Second Five Year Plan from 1958 to 1962, known as the [[Great Leap Forward]]. In an effort to transform the country from an agrarian economy into an industrialized one, the CCP collectivized farmland, formed people's communes, and diverted labour to factories. General mismanagement and exaggerations of harvests by CCP officials led to the [[Great Chinese Famine]], which resulted in an estimated 15 to 45 million deaths,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gráda |first=Cormac Ó |year=2007 |title=Making Famine History |url=http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/10197/492/3/ogradac_article_pub_063.pdf |url-status=live |journal=[[Journal of Economic Literature]] |volume=45 |issue=1 |pages=5–38 |doi=10.1257/jel.45.1.5 |issn=0022-0515 |jstor=27646746 |s2cid=54763671 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602070651/https://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/10197/492/3/ogradac_article_pub_063.pdf |archive-date=2 June 2021 |access-date=21 April 2021 |hdl-access=free |hdl=10197/492}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Meng |first1=Xin |last2=Qian |first2=Nancy |last3=Yared |first3=Pierre |year=2015 |title=The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959–1961 |url=https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf |url-status=live |journal=[[The Review of Economic Studies]] |volume=82 |issue=4 |pages=1568–1611 |citeseerx=10.1.1.321.1333 |doi=10.1093/restud/rdv016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200305165942/https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf |archive-date=5 March 2020 |access-date=22 April 2020}}</ref> making it the largest famine in recorded history.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Smil |first=Vaclav |date=18 December 1999 |title=China's great famine: 40 years later |journal=[[The BMJ]] |volume=319 |issue=7225 |pages=1619–1621 |doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619 |issn=0959-8138 |pmc=1127087 |pmid=10600969}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Mirsky |first=Jonathan |date=7 December 2012 |title=Unnatural Disaster |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |url-status=live |access-date=22 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170124011617/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |archive-date=24 January 2017 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dikötter |first=Frank |author-link=Frank Dikötter |title=Mao's Great Famine: Ways of Living, Ways of Dying |url=http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crossley/HIST5.03/FILES/OHMC_DIkotter.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716231543/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crossley/HIST5.03/FILES/OHMC_DIkotter.pdf |archive-date=16 July 2020 |publisher=[[Dartmouth College]]}}</ref>

===Sino-Soviet split and Cultural Revolution===
{{Main|Sino-Soviet split|Cultural Revolution}}
[[File:MaoZedong19660818.jpg|thumb|On August 18, 1966, Mao Zedong met with student Red Guards on Tiananmen]]
During the 1960s and 1970s, the CCP experienced a significant ideological separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was going through a period of "[[de-Stalinization]]" under [[Nikita Khrushchev]].{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=103}} By that time, Mao had begun saying that the "continued revolution under the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]]" stipulated that class enemies continued to exist even though the socialist revolution seemed to be complete, leading to the [[Cultural Revolution]] in which millions were persecuted and killed.{{sfn|Wong|2005|p=131}} During the Cultural Revolution, party leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, [[Deng Xiaoping]], [[Peng Dehuai]], and [[He Long]] were purged or exiled, and the [[Gang of Four]], led by Mao's wife [[Jiang Qing]], emerged to fill in the power vacuum left behind.

===Reforms under Deng Xiaoping===
{{Main|Chinese economic reform}}

Following Mao's death in 1976, a power struggle between CCP chairman [[Hua Guofeng]] and vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping erupted.{{sfn|Wong|2005|p=47}} Deng won the struggle, and became China's paramount leader in 1978.{{sfn|Wong|2005|p=47}} Deng, alongside [[Hu Yaobang]] and [[Zhao Ziyang]], spearheaded the "[[Chinese economic reform|reform and opening-up]]" policies, and introduced the ideological concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, opening China to the world's markets.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=254}} In reversing some of Mao's "leftist" policies, Deng argued that a socialist state could use the [[market economy]] without itself being capitalist.<ref name="marketvsplanning" /> While asserting the political power of the CCP, the change in policy generated significant economic growth.{{citation needed|date=July 2023}} This was justified on the basis that "[[1978 Truth Criterion Controversy|Practice is the Sole Criterion for the Truth]]", a principle reinforced through a 1978 article that aimed to combat dogmatism and criticized the "[[Two Whatevers]]" policy.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 January 2008 |title=An article influences Chinese history |url=http://www.china.org.cn/2008-01/19/content_1240036.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080310005822/http://www.china.org.cn:80/2008-01/19/content_1240036.htm |archive-date=10 March 2008 |access-date=9 August 2021 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=July 2023}} The new ideology, however, was contested on both sides of the spectrum, by Maoists to the left of the CCP's leadership, as well as by those supporting political liberalization. In 1981, the Party adopted a [[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China|historical resolution]], which assessed the historical legacy of the Mao Zedong era and the future priorities of the CCP.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last1=Doyon |first1=Jérôme |title=The Chinese Communist Party: a 100-Year Trajectory |last2=Froissart |first2=Chloé |date=2024 |publisher=[[ANU Press]] |isbn=978-1-76046-624-4 |editor-last=Doyon |editor-first=Jérôme |location=Canberra |chapter=Introduction |editor-last2=Froissart |editor-first2=Chloé}}</ref>{{Rp|page=6}} With other social factors, the conflicts culminated in the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]].{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=25}} The protests having been crushed and the reformist party general secretary Zhao Ziyang under house arrest, Deng's economic policies resumed and by the early 1990s the concept of a [[socialist market economy]] had been introduced.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=682}} In 1997, Deng's beliefs (officially called "[[Deng Xiaoping Theory]]") were embedded into the [[Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP's constitution]].{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=684}}

===Further reforms under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao===
CCP general secretary [[Jiang Zemin]] succeeded Deng as paramount leader in the 1990s and continued most of his policies.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=100}} In the 1990s, the CCP transformed from a veteran revolutionary leadership that was both leading militarily and politically, to a political elite increasingly renewed according to institutionalized norms in the civil bureaucracy.<ref name=":2" /> Leadership was largely selected based on rules and norms on promotion and retirement, educational background, and managerial and technical expertise.<ref name=":2" /> There is a largely separate group of professionalized military officers, serving under top CCP leadership largely through formal relationships within institutional channels.<ref name=":2" />

The CCP ratified Jiang's [[Three Represents]] concept for the 2003 revision of the party's constitution, as a "guiding ideology" to encourage the party to represent "advanced productive forces, the progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the people."{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=238}} The theory legitimized the entry of private business owners and [[bourgeois]] elements into the party.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=238}} [[Hu Jintao]], Jiang Zemin's successor as general secretary, took office in 2002.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=317}} Unlike Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin, Hu laid emphasis on [[collective leadership]] and opposed one-man dominance of the political system.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=317}} The insistence on focusing on economic growth led to a [[Social issues in China|wide range of serious social problems]]. To address these, Hu introduced two main ideological concepts: the "[[Scientific Outlook on Development]]" and "[[Harmonious Society]]".{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=329}} Hu resigned from his post as CCP general secretary and Chairman of the CMC at the [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]] held in 2012, and was succeeded in both posts by Xi Jinping.<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 November 2011 |title=Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping meet delegates to 18th CCP National Congress |agency=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/16/c_131977530.htm |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150929080903/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/16/c_131977530.htm |archive-date=29 September 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=O'Keeffe |first1=Kate |last2=Ferek |first2=Katy Stech |date=14 November 2019 |title=Stop Calling China's Xi Jinping 'President,' U.S. Panel Says |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000 |url-access=subscription |access-date=8 July 2023 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115142227/https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Leadership of Xi Jinping===
Since taking power, Xi has initiated [[Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping|a wide-reaching anti-corruption campaign]], while centralizing powers in the office of CCP general secretary at the expense of the collective leadership of prior decades.<ref>{{Cite news |author-link=Staff writer |date=20 September 2014 |title=The Rise and Rise of Xi Jinping: Xi who must be obeyed |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21618780-most-powerful-and-popular-leader-china-has-had-decades-must-use-these-assets-wisely-xi |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=26 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011020044/https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21618780-most-powerful-and-popular-leader-china-has-had-decades-must-use-these-assets-wisely-xi |archive-date=11 October 2017}}</ref> Commentators have described the campaign as a defining part of [[Xi Jinping Administration|Xi's leadership]] as well as "the principal reason why he has been able to consolidate his power so quickly and effectively."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign: The Hidden Motives of a Modern-Day Mao |url=https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-the-hidden-motives-of-a-modern-day-mao/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200717101228/https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-the-hidden-motives-of-a-modern-day-mao/ |archive-date=17 July 2020 |access-date=17 July 2020 |website=[[Foreign Policy Research Institute]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Xi's leadership has also overseen an increase in the Party's role in China.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mitchell |first=Tom |date=25 July 2016 |title=Xi's China: The rise of party politics |language=en-GB |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=16 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108091305/https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a |archive-date=8 November 2020}}</ref> Xi has added [[Xi Jinping Thought|his ideology]], named after himself, into the CCP constitution in 2017.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=24 October 2017 |title=Xi Jinping becomes most powerful leader since Mao with China's change to constitution |work=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution |url-status=live |access-date=24 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024053607/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution |archive-date=24 October 2017 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Xi's term as general secretary was renewed in 2022.<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite news |title=The 7 Men Who Will Run China |language=en-US |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-7-men-who-will-run-china/ |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200602025853/https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-7-men-who-will-run-china/ |archive-date=2 June 2020}}</ref>

Since 2014, the CCP has led efforts in Xinjiang that involve the detention of more than 1 million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in [[Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]], as well as other [[Persecution of Uyghurs in China|repressive measures]]. This has been described as a genocide by some academics and some governments.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kirby |first=Jen |date=28 July 2020 |title=Concentration camps and forced labor: China's repression of the Uighurs, explained |language=en |work=[[Vox (website)|Vox]] |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uighurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang |url-status=live |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20201206013427/https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uighurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang |archive-date=6 December 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=5 July 2019 |title='Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education' |language=en |work=[[The Independent]] |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |url-status=live |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20211028160230/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |archive-date=28 October 2021}}</ref> On the other hand, a greater number of countries signed a letter penned to the Human Rights Council supporting the policies as an effort to combat terrorism in the region.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Delmi |first=Boudjemaa |date=12 July 2019 |title=Letter to the HRC |url=https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190712_joint_counterstatement_xinjiang.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190719024521/https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190712_joint_counterstatement_xinjiang.pdf |archive-date=19 July 2019 |website=[[Human Rights Watch]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Qiblawi |first=Tamara |date=17 July 2019 |title=Muslim nations are defending China as it cracks down on Muslims, shattering any myths of Islamic solidarity |language=en |work=[[CNN]] |url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/17/asia/uyghurs-muslim-countries-china-intl/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=29 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204153142/https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/17/asia/uyghurs-muslim-countries-china-intl/index.html |archive-date=4 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Berlinger |first=Joshua |date=15 July 2019 |title=North Korea, Syria and Myanmar among countries defending China's actions in Xinjiang |language=en |work=[[CNN]] |url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/15/asia/united-nations-letter-xinjiang-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=29 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220429011809/https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/15/asia/united-nations-letter-xinjiang-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=29 April 2022}}</ref>

[[File:Slogan for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China 20210611.jpg|thumb|A temporary monument displayed in [[Changsha]], Hunan Province, to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the CCP's founding]]

Celebrations of the [[100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party|100th anniversary of the CCP's founding]], one of the [[Two Centenaries]], took place on 1 July 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Inside the plans for the CCP's 100th anniversary |language=en |work=[[The Week UK]] |url=https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/china/952582/inside-the-plans-for-the-chinese-communist-partys-100th-anniversary |url-status=live |access-date=25 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210525233540/https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/china/952582/inside-the-plans-for-the-chinese-communist-partys-100th-anniversary |archive-date=25 May 2021}}</ref> In the sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, CCP adopted a [[Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century|resolution on the Party's history]], which for the first time credited Xi as being the "main innovator" of Xi Jinping Thought while also declaring Xi's leadership as being "the key to the great rejuvenation of the [[Chinese nation]]".<ref>{{Cite news |date=11 November 2021 |title=Chinese Communist party clears way for Xi to tighten grip on power |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/77f8dd89-fd16-42f9-b2a5-0f5e9ee93ace |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221219/https://www.ft.com/content/77f8dd89-fd16-42f9-b2a5-0f5e9ee93ace |archive-date=11 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last= |date=12 November 2021 |title=China's Communist Party passes resolution amplifying President Xi's authority |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-passes-resolution-party-history-achievements-2021-11-11/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810125237/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-passes-resolution-party-history-achievements-2021-11-11/ |url-status=live}}</ref> In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history.<ref>{{Cite news |author1=Wong, Chun Han |author2=Zhai, Keith |date=17 November 2021 |title=How Xi Jinping Is Rewriting China's History to Put Himself at the Center |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810135113/https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |url-status=live}}</ref>

On 6 July 2021, Xi chaired the [[CPC and World Political Parties Summit|Communist Party of China and World Political Parties Summit]], which involved representatives from 500 political parties across 160 countries.<ref name=":7">{{Cite news |last=Tian |first=Yew Lun |date=6 July 2021 |title=China's Xi takes dig at U.S. in speech to political parties around world |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-takes-dig-us-speech-political-parties-around-world-2021-07-06/ |url-status=live |access-date=27 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627210613/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-takes-dig-us-speech-political-parties-around-world-2021-07-06/ |archive-date=27 June 2022}}</ref> Xi urged the participants to oppose "technology blockades," and "developmental decoupling" in order to work towards "building a community with a shared future for mankind."<ref name=":7" />

==Ideology==
{{Main|Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party}}

===Formal ideology===
{{Further|Generations of Chinese leadership}}
[[File:Marx et Engels à Shanghai.jpg|thumb|left|upright|A monument dedicated to Karl Marx (left) and Friedrich Engels (right) in Shanghai]]

The core ideology of the party has evolved with each distinct [[Generations of Chinese leadership|generation of Chinese leadership]]. As both the CCP and the [[People's Liberation Army]] promote their members according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.<ref name="auto1">{{Cite book |last=Whitson |first=William W. |url=https://archive.org/details/chinesehighcomma0000whit |title=The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 |date=1973 |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger]] |isbn=978-0-333-15053-5 |language=en}}</ref> In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China by reference to these "generations".{{citation needed|date=July 2023}}

[[Marxism–Leninism]] was the first official ideology of the CCP.<ref name="MLT" /> According to the CCP, "Marxism–Leninism reveals the [[Historical materialism|universal laws governing the development of history of human society]]."<ref name="MLT" /> To the CCP, Marxism–Leninism provides a "vision of the [[Capitalist mode of production (Marxist theory)|contradictions in capitalist society]] and of the inevitability of a future socialist and communist societies".<ref name="MLT" /> According to the ''[[People's Daily]]'', [[Mao Zedong Thought]] "is Marxism–Leninism applied and developed in China".<ref name="MLT">{{Cite news |date=30 October 2012 |title=Ideological Foundation of the CPC |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/206215/206216/7997750.html |url-status=live |access-date=26 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131228014526/http://english.people.com.cn/206215/206216/7997750.html |archive-date=28 December 2013}}</ref> Mao Zedong Thought was conceived not only by Mao Zedong, but by leading party officials, according to [[Xinhua News Agency]].<ref name="MaoZedongThought">{{Cite news |author-link=Staff writer |date=26 December 2013 |title=Mao Zedong Thought |agency=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/26/c_132996545.htm |access-date=26 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304132852/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/26/c_132996545.htm |archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref>

Deng Xiaoping Theory was added to the party constitution at the [[14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|14th National Congress]] in 1992.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=684}} The concepts of "[[socialism with Chinese characteristics]]" and "the primary stage of socialism" were credited to the theory.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=684}} Deng Xiaoping Theory can be defined as a belief that [[state socialism]] and [[planned economy|state planning]] is not by definition communist, and that market mechanisms are class neutral.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=668}} In addition, the party needs to react to the changing situation dynamically; to know if a certain policy is obsolete or not, the party had to "[[seek truth from facts]]" and follow the slogan "practice is the sole criterion for the truth".{{sfn|Chan|2003|p=180}} At the 14th National Congress, Jiang reiterated Deng's mantra that it was unnecessary to ask if something was socialist or capitalist, since the important factor was whether it worked.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=685}}

The "Three Represents", Jiang Zemin's contribution to the party's ideology, was adopted by the party at the [[16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|16th National Congress]]. The Three Represents defines the role of the CCP, and stresses that the Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."<ref>Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 2013, Vol. III, p. 519.</ref>{{sfn|Chan|2003|p=201}} Certain segments within the CCP criticized the Three Represents as being un-Marxist and a betrayal of basic Marxist values. Supporters viewed it as a further development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|pp=108–109}} Jiang disagreed, and had concluded that attaining the communist mode of production, as formulated by earlier communists, was more complex than had been realized, and that it was useless to try to force a change in the mode of production, as it had to develop naturally, by following the "[[Historical materialism|economic laws of history]]."{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|pp=107–108}} The theory is most notable for allowing capitalists, officially referred to as the "new social strata", to join the party on the grounds that they engaged in "honest labor and work" and through their labour contributed "to build[ing] socialism with Chinese characteristics."{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=110}}

In 2003, the 3rd Plenary Session of the [[16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|16th Central Committee]] conceived and formulated the ideology of the [[Scientific Outlook on Development]] (SOD).{{sfn|Izuhara|2013|p=110}} It is considered to be Hu Jintao's contribution to the official ideological discourse.{{sfn|Guo|Guo|2008|p=119}} The SOD incorporates [[scientific socialism]], [[sustainable development]], [[social welfare]], a [[humanism|humanistic]] society, increased democracy, and, ultimately, the creation of a [[Socialist Harmonious Society]]. According to official statements by the CCP, the concept integrates "Marxism with the reality of contemporary China and with the underlying features of our times, and it fully embodies the Marxist worldview on and methodology for development."<ref>{{Cite news |date=19 November 2012 |title=Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/102774/8024779.html |url-status=live |access-date=19 September 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607164302/http://english.people.com.cn/102774/8024779.html |archive-date=7 June 2013}}</ref>

[[File:A political slogan on the wall in Longhua District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China, picture1.jpg|thumb|A billboard advertising Xi Jinping Thought in [[Shenzhen]], Guangdong]]

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, commonly known as Xi Jinping Thought, was added to the party constitution in the [[19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|19th National Congress]] in 2017.<ref name=":0" /> The theory's main elements are summarized in the ten affirmations, the fourteen commitments, and the thirteen areas of achievements.<ref>{{cite web |title=His own words: The 14 principles of 'Xi Jinping Thought' |url=https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmwn4r |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171028152832/https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmwn4r |archive-date=28 October 2017 |access-date=28 October 2017 |publisher=[[BBC Monitoring]]}}</ref>

The party combines elements of both [[socialist patriotism]]{{sfn|Zhao|2004|p=28}}{{sfn|Löfstedt|1980|p=25}}{{sfn|Li|1995|pp=38–39}}{{sfn|Ghai|Arup|Chanock|2000|p=77}} and [[Chinese nationalism]].{{sfn|Zheng|2012|p=119}}

===Economics===
Deng did not believe that the fundamental difference between the capitalist mode of production and the socialist mode of production was [[central planning]] versus [[free market]]s. He said, "A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity".<ref name="marketvsplanning">{{Cite news |last=Deng Xiaoping |author-link=Deng Xiaoping |date=30 June 1984 |title=Building a Socialism with a specifically Chinese character |work=[[People's Daily]] |publisher=[[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] |url=http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1220.html |url-status=live |access-date=13 January 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130116081318/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1220.html |archive-date=16 January 2013}}</ref> Jiang Zemin supported Deng's thinking, and stated in a party gathering that it did not matter if a certain mechanism was capitalist or socialist, because the only thing that mattered was whether it worked.{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=682}} It was at this gathering that Jiang Zemin introduced the term socialist market economy, which replaced [[Chen Yun]]'s "planned socialist market economy".{{sfn|Vogel|2011|p=682}} In his report to the 14th National Congress Jiang Zemin told the delegates that the socialist state would "let market forces play a basic role in resource allocation."<ref name="basicdecisive">{{Cite news |date=18 November 2013 |title=Marketization the key to economic system reform |work=[[China Daily]] |publisher=Chinese Communist Party |url=http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013cpctps/2013-11/18/content_17113583.htm |url-status=live |access-date=22 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924033908/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013cpctps/2013-11/18/content_17113583.htm |archive-date=24 September 2015}}</ref> At the 15th National Congress, the party line was changed to "make market forces further play their role in resource allocation"; this line continued until the 3rd Plenary Session of the [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Central Committee]],<ref name="basicdecisive" /> when it was amended to "let market forces play a ''decisive'' role in [[resource allocation]]."<ref name="basicdecisive" /> Despite this, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee upheld the creed "Maintain the dominance of the [[public sector]] and strengthen the economic vitality of the state-owned economy."<ref name="basicdecisive" />

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| quote = "...{{nbsp}}their theory that capitalism is the ultimate [force] has been shaken, and socialist development has experienced a miracle. Western capitalism has suffered reversals, a financial crisis, a credit crisis, a crisis of confidence, and their self-conviction has wavered. Western countries have begun to reflect, and openly or secretively compare themselves against China's politics, economy and path."
| source = — [[Xi Jinping]], on the inevitability of socialism<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=13 February 2014 |title=Xi Touts Communist Party as Defender of Confucius's Virtues |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/xi-touts-communist-party-as-defender-of-confuciuss-virtues/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 |url-status=live |access-date=13 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222200302/http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/xi-touts-communist-party-as-defender-of-confuciuss-virtues/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 |archive-date=22 February 2014}}</ref>
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The CCP views the world as organized into two opposing camps; socialist and capitalist.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=62}} They insist that socialism, on the basis of [[historical materialism]], will eventually triumph over capitalism.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=62}} In recent years, when the party has been asked to explain the capitalist [[globalization]] occurring, the party has returned to the writings of [[Karl Marx]].{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=62}} Despite admitting that globalization developed through the capitalist system, the party's leaders and theorists argue that globalization is not intrinsically capitalist.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=63}} The reason being that if globalization was purely capitalist, it would exclude an alternative socialist form of modernity.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=63}} Globalization, as with the market economy, therefore does not have one specific class character (neither socialist nor capitalist) according to the party.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=63}} The insistence that globalization is not fixed in nature comes from Deng's insistence that China can pursue socialist modernization by incorporating elements of capitalism.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=63}} Because of this there is considerable optimism within the CCP that despite the current capitalist dominance of globalization, globalization can be turned into a vehicle supporting socialism.{{sfn|Heazle|Knight|2007|p=64}}

===Analysis and criticism===
While foreign analysts generally agree that the CCP has rejected orthodox Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (or at least basic thoughts within orthodox thinking), the CCP itself disagrees.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=104}} Critics of the CCP argue that Jiang Zemin ended the party's formal commitment to Marxism–Leninism with the introduction of the ideological theory, the Three Represents.{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=99}} However, party theorist [[Leng Rong]] disagrees, claiming that "President Jiang rid the Party of the ideological obstacles to different kinds of ownership{{nbsp}}... He did not give up Marxism or socialism. He strengthened the Party by providing a modern understanding of Marxism and socialism—which is why we talk about a 'socialist market economy' with Chinese characteristics."{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=99}} The attainment of true "communism" is still described as the CCP's and China's "ultimate goal".{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=527}} While the CCP claims that China is in the [[primary stage of socialism]], party theorists argue that the current development stage "looks a lot like capitalism".{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=527}} Alternatively, certain party theorists argue that "capitalism is the early or first stage of communism."{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=527}} Some have dismissed the concept of a primary stage of socialism as intellectual cynicism.{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=527}} For example, [[Robert Lawrence Kuhn]], a former foreign adviser to the Chinese government, stated: "When I first heard this rationale, I thought it more comic than clever—a wry caricature of hack propagandists leaked by intellectual cynics. But the 100-year horizon comes from serious political theorists."{{sfn|Kuhn|2011|p=527}}

American political scientist and [[Sinology|sinologist]] [[David Shambaugh]] argues that before the "[[1978 Truth Criterion Controversy|Practice Is the Sole Criterion for the Truth]]" campaign, the relationship between ideology and decision making was a deductive one, meaning that policy-making was derived from ideological knowledge.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=105}} However, under Deng's leadership this relationship was turned upside down, with decision making justifying ideology.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=105}} Chinese policy-makers have described the [[Ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Union's state ideology]] as "rigid, unimaginative, ossified, and disconnected from reality", believing that this was one of the reasons for the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]]. Therefore, Shambaugh argues, Chinese policy-makers believe that their party ideology must be dynamic to safeguard the party's rule.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=105}}

British sinologist [[Kerry Brown (historian)|Kerry Brown]] argues that the CCP does not have an ideology, and that the party organization is [[Pragmatism|pragmatic]] and interested only in what works.{{sfn|Brown|2012|p=52}} The party itself argues against this assertion. Hu Jintao stated in 2012 that the Western world is "threatening to divide us" and that "the international culture of the West is strong while we are weak ... Ideological and cultural fields are our main targets".{{sfn|Brown|2012|p=52}} As such, the CCP puts a great deal of effort into the party schools and into crafting its ideological message.{{sfn|Brown|2012|p=52}}

==Governance==

===Collective leadership===
{{Further|Collective leadership}}
Collective leadership, the idea that decisions will be taken through consensus, has been the ideal in the CCP.{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=22}} The concept has its origins back to Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party.{{sfn|Baylis|1989|p=102}} At the level of the central party leadership this means that, for instance, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee are of equal standing (each member having only one vote).{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=22}} A member of the Politburo Standing Committee often represents a sector; during Mao's reign, he controlled the People's Liberation Army, [[Kang Sheng]], the security apparatus, and Zhou Enlai, the [[State Council of China|State Council]] and the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]].{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=22}} This counts as informal power.{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=22}} Despite this, in a paradoxical relation, members of a body are ranked [[Hierarchy|hierarchically]] (despite the fact that members are in theory equal to one another).{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=22}} Informally, the collective leadership is headed by a "[[leadership core]]"; that is, the [[paramount leader]], the person who holds the offices of CCP general secretary, [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|CMC chairman]] and [[President of China|PRC president]].{{sfn|Unger|2002|pp=22–24}} Before Jiang Zemin's tenure as paramount leader, the party core and collective leadership were indistinguishable.{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=158}} In practice, the core was not responsible to the collective leadership.{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=158}} However, by the time of Jiang, the party had begun propagating a responsibility system, referring to it in official pronouncements as the "core of the collective leadership".{{sfn|Unger|2002|p=158}} Academics have noted a decline in collective leadership under Xi Jinping.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Baranovitch |first=Nimrod |date=4 March 2021 |title=A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis: Xi Jinping's Strongman Politics as A Collective Response to Regime Weakness |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=30 |issue=128 |pages=249–265 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1790901 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shirk |first=Susan L. |date=2018 |title=The Return to Personalistic Rule |url=https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/ |journal=[[Journal of Democracy]] |language=en |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=22–36 |doi=10.1353/jod.2018.0022 |issn=1086-3214 |access-date=21 April 2024 |archive-date=21 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240421162036/https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Lyman Miller |first=Alice |title=1. Xi Jinping and the Evolution of Chinese Leadership Politics |date=31 December 2020 |work=Fateful Decisions |pages=33–50 |editor-last=Fingar |editor-first=Thomas |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |doi=10.1515/9781503612235-005 |isbn=978-1-5036-1223-5 |editor2-last=Oi |editor2-first=Jean C.}}</ref>

===Democratic centralism===
{{Further|Democratic centralism}}
{{Quote box
| quote = "[Democratic centralism] is centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralized guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people's congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level{{nbsp}}..."
| source = — Mao Zedong, from his speech entitled "Our General Programme"<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi">{{Cite web |last=Chuanzi |first=Wang |date=1 October 2013 |title=Democratic Centralism: The Core Mechanism in China's Political System |url=http://english.qstheory.cn/politics/201311/t20131113_290377.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140106032209/http://english.qstheory.cn/politics/201311/t20131113_290377.htm |archive-date=6 January 2014 |access-date=5 January 2014 |website=[[Qiushi]]}}</ref>
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The CCP's organizational principle is democratic centralism, a principle that entails open discussion of policy on the condition of unity among party members in upholding the agreed-upon decision.<ref>{{Citation |last=Biddulph |first=Sarah |title=Democratic Centralism and Administration in China |date=5 July 2018 |work=Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia |pages=195–223 |editor-last=Fu |editor-first=Hualing |edition=1 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781108347822.008 |isbn=978-1-108-34782-2 |editor2-last=Gillespie |editor2-first=John |editor3-last=Nicholson |editor3-first=Pip |editor4-last=Partlett |editor4-first=William Edmund |hdl=11343/254293 |hdl-access=free}}</ref> It is based on two principles: democracy (synonymous in official discourse with "socialist democracy" and "inner-party democracy") and [[centralism]].<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> This has been the guiding organizational principle of the party since the [[5th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|5th National Congress]], held in 1927.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> In the words of the party constitution, "The Party is an integral body organized under its program and constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism".<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Mao once quipped that democratic centralism was "at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form." Mao claimed that the superiority of democratic centralism lay in its internal contradictions, between democracy and centralism, and [[liberty|freedom]] and [[discipline]].<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Currently, the CCP is claiming that "democracy is the lifeline of the Party, the lifeline of socialism".<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> But for democracy to be implemented, and functioning properly, there needs to be centralization.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Democracy in any form, the CCP claims, needs centralism, since without centralism there will be no order.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" />

===Supervision===
''Shuanggui'' was an intra-party disciplinary process conducted by the [[Central Commission for Discipline Inspection]] (CCDI). The process, which literally translates to "double regulation", aims to extract confessions from members accused of violating party rules. According to the Dui Hua Foundation, tactics such as cigarette burns, beatings and simulated drowning are among those used to extract confessions. Other reported techniques include the use of induced hallucinations, with one subject of this method reporting that "In the end I was so exhausted, I agreed to all the accusations against me even though they were false."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jacobs |first=Andrew |date=14 June 2012 |title=Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh Discipline |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/asia/accused-chinese-party-members-face-harsh-discipline.html |url-access=limited |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/asia/accused-chinese-party-members-face-harsh-discipline.html |archive-date=1 January 2022 |access-date=17 July 2020 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

In 2018, the ''shuanggui'' process was superseded by ''[[Liuzhi (supervision)|liuzhi]]'' or "retention in custody," which expands beyond CCP members to the entire public sector, academics, and business leaders.<ref name=":05">{{Cite news |last=Xiong |first=Yong |date=2024-12-28 |title=China is building new detention centers all over the country as Xi Jinping widens corruption purge |url=https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/28/china/china-liuzhi-detention-centers-dst-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241228122229/https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/28/china/china-liuzhi-detention-centers-dst-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=2024-12-28 |access-date=2024-12-28 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=16 January 2025 |title=An outrage that even China's supine media has called out |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2025/01/16/an-outrage-that-even-chinas-supine-media-has-called-out |url-access=subscription |access-date=2025-01-17 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |quote=In 2018 the Communist Party launched a parallel secretive system called ''liuzhi'' (retention in custody) for use in cases involving not only party members—who had always been subject to extra-legal forms of detention—but anyone in public service, including academics and hospital staff.}}</ref>

===United front===
{{Further|United front (China)|First United Front|Second United Front}}

The CCP employs a political strategy that it terms "united front work" that involves groups and key individuals that are influenced or controlled by the CCP and used to advance its interests.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web |last=Brady |first=Anne-Marie |author-link=Anne-Marie Brady |date=2017 |title=Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200612023338/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |archive-date=12 June 2020 |publisher=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]] |s2cid=197812164}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Tatlow |first=Didi Kirsten |date=12 July 2019 |title=The Chinese Influence Effort Hiding in Plain Sight |work=[[The Atlantic]] |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/chinas-influence-efforts-germany-students/593689/ |url-status=live |access-date=31 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717011931/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/chinas-influence-efforts-germany-students/593689/ |archive-date=17 July 2019 |issn=1072-7825}}</ref> United front work is managed primarily but not exclusively by the [[United Front Work Department]] (UFWD).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Joske |first=Alex |author-link=Alex Joske |date=9 June 2020 |title=The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party's united front system |url=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609000729/https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you |archive-date=9 June 2020 |access-date=9 June 2020 |publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] |language=en |jstor=resrep25132 |jstor-access=free}}</ref> The united front has historically been a [[popular front]] that has included eight [[List of political parties in China|legally permitted political parties]] alongside other [[people's organization]]s which have nominal representation in the [[National People's Congress]] and the [[Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference]] (CPPCC).<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 1957 |title=The United Front in Communist China |url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123040110/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf |archive-date=23 January 2017 |access-date=9 June 2020 |publisher=[[Central Intelligence Agency]]}}</ref> However, the CPPCC is a body without real power.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=70}} While consultation does take place, it is supervised and directed by the CCP.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=70}} Under Xi Jinping, the united front and its targets of [[Influence operations|influence]] have expanded in size and scope.<ref>{{Citation |last=Groot |first=Gerry |title=The Expansion of the United Front Under Xi Jinping |date=19 September 2016 |url=http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n2095/pdf/ch04_forum_groot.pdf |work=The China Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution |editor-last=Davies |editor-first=Gloria |access-date=31 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170404161800/http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n2095/pdf/ch04_forum_groot.pdf |url-status=live |publisher=ANU Press |doi=10.22459/csy.09.2016.04a |isbn=978-1-76046-068-6 |archive-date=4 April 2017 |editor2-last=Goldkorn |editor2-first=Jeremy |editor3-last=Tomba |editor3-first=Luigi |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |last=Groot |first=Gerry |date=24 September 2019 |title=The CCP's Grand United Front abroad |url=https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-ccps-grand-united-front-abroad/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191103170211/https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-ccps-grand-united-front-abroad/ |archive-date=3 November 2019 |access-date=31 August 2020 |website=Sinopsis |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Organization==
{{Main|Organization of the Chinese Communist Party|Cadre system of the Chinese Communist Party}}

===Central organization===
[[File:18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.jpg|thumb|The [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]], convened in November 2012]]

The [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|National Congress]] is the party's highest body, and, since the [[9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|9th National Congress]] in 1969, has been convened every five years (prior to the 9th Congress they were convened on an irregular basis). According to the party's constitution, a congress may not be postponed except "under extraordinary circumstances."{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=228}} The party constitution gives the National Congress six responsibilities:{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=229}}
# Electing the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee]];
# Electing the [[Central Commission for Discipline Inspection]] (CCDI);
# Examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee;
# Examining the report of the outgoing CCDI;
# Discussing and enacting party policies; and,
# Revising the party's constitution.

In practice, the delegates rarely discuss issues at length at the National Congresses. Most substantive discussion takes place before the congress, in the preparation period, among a group of top party leaders.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=229}} In between National Congresses, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=66}} The CCDI is responsible for supervising party's internal anti-corruption and ethics system.{{sfn|Joseph|2010|p=394}} In between congresses the CCDI is under the authority of the Central Committee.{{sfn|Joseph|2010|p=394}}
[[File:Meeting Room of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee.png |thumb|A [[democratic life meeting]] of the Politburo of the [[20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|20th Central Committee of the CCP]]]]
The Central Committee, as the party's highest decision-making institution between national congresses, elects several bodies to carry out its work.{{sfn|Liu|2011|p=41}} The first [[plenary session]] of a newly elected central committee elects the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] of the Central Committee, the party's leader; the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC); the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo]]; the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The first plenum also endorses the composition of the [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party|Secretariat]] and the leadership of the CCDI.{{sfn|Liu|2011|p=41}} According to the party constitution, the general secretary must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and is responsible for convening meetings of the PSC and the Politburo, while also presiding over the work of the Secretariat.<ref name="CRI">{{Cite news |author-link=Staff writer |date=13 November 2012 |title=General Secretary of CPC Central Committee |publisher=[[China Radio International]] |url=http://english.cri.cn/6909/2012/11/13/53s732392.htm |access-date=8 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160216202252/http://english.cri.cn/6909/2012/11/13/53s732392.htm |archive-date=16 February 2016}}</ref> The Politburo "exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session".{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=85}} The PSC is the party's highest decision-making institution when the Politburo, the Central Committee and the National Congress are not in session.{{sfn|Miller|2011|p=7}} It convenes at least once a week.{{sfn|Joseph|2010|p=169}} It was established at the 8th National Congress, in 1958, to take over the policy-making role formerly assumed by the Secretariat.{{sfn|Li|2009|p=64}} The Secretariat is the top implementation body of the Central Committee, and can make decisions within the policy framework established by the Politburo; it is also responsible for supervising the work of organizations that report directly into the Central Committee, for example departments, commissions, publications, and so on.{{sfn|Fu|1993|p=201}} The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party, and controls the operations of the People's Liberation Army.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=74}} The general secretary has, since Jiang Zemin, also served as Chairman of the CMC.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=74}} Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC chairman acts as [[commander-in-chief]] with full authority to appoint or dismiss top military officers at will.{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=74}}
[[File:Front cover of Constitution of the Communist Party of China.jpg|left|thumb|189x189px|Front cover of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party]]
A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects heads of departments, bureaus, central leading groups and other institutions to pursue its work during a term (a "term" being the period elapsing between national congresses, usually five years).{{sfn|Mackerras|McMillen|Watson|2001|p=228}} The [[General Office of the Chinese Communist Party|General Office]] is the party's "nerve centre", in charge of day-to-day administrative work, including communications, protocol, and setting agendas for meetings.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=212}} The CCP currently has six main central departments: the [[Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Organization Department]], responsible for overseeing provincial appointments and vetting cadres for future appointments,<ref name="COD">{{Cite news |last=McGregor, Richard |author-link=Richard McGregor |date=30 September 2009 |title=The party organiser |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae18c830-adf8-11de-87e7-00144feabdc0.html |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=9 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319223717/https://www.ft.com/content/ae18c830-adf8-11de-87e7-00144feabdc0 |archive-date=19 March 2022}}</ref> the [[Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Publicity Department]] (formerly "Propaganda Department"), which oversees the media and formulates the party line to the media,{{sfn|McGregor|2012|p=17}}{{sfn|Guo|2012|p=123}} the United Front Work Department, which oversees the country's eight minor parties, [[people's organization]]s, and influence groups inside and outside of the country,{{sfn|Smith|West|2012|p=127}} the [[International Department of the Chinese Communist Party|International Department]], functioning as the party's "foreign affairs ministry" with other parties, the [[Society Work Department]], which handles work related to civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups and mixed-ownership and non-public enterprises,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wang |first=Kelly |date=17 March 2023 |title=China's Institutional Shake-Up Produces New Department to Better Handle Public's Complaints |work=[[Caixin]] |url=https://www.caixinglobal.com/2023-03-17/chinas-institutional-shake-up-produces-new-department-to-better-handle-publics-complaints-102009361.html |access-date=18 March 2023 |archive-date=17 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230317223246/https://www.caixinglobal.com/2023-03-17/chinas-institutional-shake-up-produces-new-department-to-better-handle-publics-complaints-102009361.html |url-status=live}}</ref> and the [[Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission]], which oversees the country's legal enforcement authorities.{{sfn|Guo|2012b|pp=99, 237}} The CC also has direct control over the [[Central Policy Research Office]], which is responsible for researching issues of significant interest to the party leadership,{{sfn|Finer|2003|p=43}} the [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Party School]], which provides political training and ideological indoctrination in communist thought for high-ranking and rising cadres,{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=49}} the [[Institute of Party History and Literature]], which sets priorities for scholarly research in state-run universities and the Central Party School and studies and translates the classical works of Marxism.{{sfn|Chambers|2002|p=37}}{{sfn|Yu|2010|p=viii}} The party's newspaper, the ''People's Daily'', is under the direct control of the Central Committee{{sfn|Latham|2007|p=124}} and is published with the objectives "to tell good stories about China and the (Party)" and to promote its party leader.<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 October 2017 |title=Communist Party mouthpiece People's Daily launches English news app in soft power push |work=[[Hong Kong Free Press]] |url=https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/16/communist-party-mouthpiece-peoples-daily-launches-english-news-app-soft-power-push/ |url-status=live |access-date=16 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319223727/https://hongkongfp.com/2017/10/16/communist-party-mouthpiece-peoples-daily-launches-english-news-app-soft-power-push/ |archive-date=19 March 2022}}</ref> The theoretical magazines ''[[Qiushi]]'' and ''[[Study Times]]'' are published by the Central Party School.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=49}} The [[China Media Group]], which oversees [[China Central Television]] (CCTV), [[China National Radio]] (CNR) and [[China Radio International]] (CRI), is under the direct control of the Publicity Department.<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 June 2021 |title=Ownership and control of Chinese media |url=https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/ownership-and-control-chinese-media |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210730030200/https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/ownership-and-control-chinese-media |archive-date=30 July 2021 |access-date=10 December 2022 |website=[[Safeguard Defenders]] |language=en}}</ref> The various offices of the "Central Leading Groups", such as the [[Hong Kong and Macau Work Office]], the [[Taiwan Affairs Office]], and the Central Finance Office, also report to the central committee during a plenary session.{{sfn|Heath|2014|p=141}} Additionally, CCP has sole control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through its Central Military Commission.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019 |url=https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509180220/https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf |archive-date=9 May 2019 |access-date=27 October 2019 |website=[[United States Department of Defense]] |page=5}}</ref>

===Lower-level organizations===
After seizing political power, the CCP extended the dual party-state command system to all government institutions, social organizations, and economic entities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Guo |first=Baogang |date=1 November 2020 |title=A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=29 |issue=126 |pages=809–823 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1744374 |issn=1067-0564 |s2cid=216205948}}</ref> The State Council and the Supreme Court each has a [[party group]], established since November 1949. Party committees permeate in every state administrative organ as well as the People's Consultation Conferences and mass organizations at all levels.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Doshi |first=Rush |author-link=Rush Doshi |title=The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order |date=30 September 2021 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-752791-7 |edition=1 |page=35 |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001 |oclc=1256820870}}</ref> According to scholar [[Rush Doshi]], "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state."<ref name=":10" /> Modelled after the Soviet [[Nomenklatura]] system, the party committee's organization department at each level has the power to recruit, train, monitor, appoint, and relocate these officials.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pieke |first=Frank N. |title=The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today's China |date=2009 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-511-69173-7 |location=Cambridge |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511691737 |author-link=Frank N. Pieke}}</ref>

Party committees exist at the level of [[Provinces of China|provinces]], cities, [[Counties of China|counties]], and neighbourhoods.<ref>{{Cite news |date=11 June 2020 |title=China's Communist Party worries about its grassroots weakness |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2020/06/11/chinas-communist-party-worries-about-its-grassroots-weakness |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=14 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200613234511/https://www.economist.com/china/2020/06/11/chinas-communist-party-worries-about-its-grassroots-weakness |archive-date=13 June 2020 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> These committees play a key role in directing local policy by selecting local leaders and assigning critical tasks.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last1=Gao |first1=Nan |last2=Long |first2=Cheryl Xiaoning |last3=Xu |first3=Lixin Colin |date=February 2016 |title=Collective Leadership, Career Concern, and the Housing Market in China: The Role of Standing Committees: Leadership, Careers and Housing Market |journal=[[Review of Development Economics]] |language=en |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1111/rode.12202 |s2cid=150576471}}</ref> The Party secretary at each level is more senior than that of the leader of the government, with the CCP standing committee being the main source of power.<ref name=":3" /> Party committee members in each level are selected by the leadership in the level above, with provincial leaders selected by the central Organizational Department, and not removable by the local party secretary.<ref name=":3" /> Neighborhood committees are generally composed of older volunteers.<ref name=":024">{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York |author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=118}}

CCP committees exist inside of companies, both private and state-owned.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Yan |first1=Xiaojun |last2=Huang |first2=Jie |year=2017 |title=Navigating Unknown Waters: The Chinese Communist Party's New Presence in the Private Sector |journal=[[China Review]] |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=37–63 |issn=1680-2012 |jstor=44440170}}</ref> A business that has more than three party members is legally required to establish a committee or branch.<ref name=":11" />{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=227}} {{As of|2021}}, more than half of China's private firms have such organizations.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=225}} These branches provide places for new member socialization and host morale boosting events for existing members.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=14}} They also provide mechanisms that help private firm interface with government bodies and learn about policies which relate to their fields.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=225–226}} On average, the profitability of private firms with a CCP branch is 12.6 per cent higher than the profitability of private firms.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=230}}

Within [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]], these branches are governing bodies that make important decisions and inculcate CCP ideology in employees.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=15}} Party committees or branches within companies also provide various benefits to employees.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=228–229}} These may include bonuses, interest-free loans, mentorship programs, and free medical and other services for those in need.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=228–229}} Enterprises that have party branches generally provide more expansive benefits for employees in the areas of retirement, medical care, unemployment, injury, and birth and fertility.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=229}} Increasingly, the CCP is requiring private companies to revise their charters to include the role of the party.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |date=6 July 2023 |title=China's Communist Party is tightening its grip in businesses |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/07/06/chinas-communist-party-is-tightening-its-grip-in-businesses |url-access=subscription |access-date=9 July 2023 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=9 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230709020401/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/07/06/chinas-communist-party-is-tightening-its-grip-in-businesses |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Funding===
The funding of all CCP organizations mainly comes from state fiscal revenue. Data for the proportion of total CCP organizations' expenditures in total China fiscal revenue is unavailable.{{citation needed|date=July 2023}}

===Members===
{{Quote box
| quote = "It is my will to join the Communist Party of China, uphold the Party's program, observe the provisions of the Party constitution, fulfill a Party member's duties, carry out the Party's decisions, strictly observe Party discipline, guard Party secrets, be loyal to the Party, work hard, fight for communism throughout my life, be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the Party and the people, and never betray the Party."
| source = — [[Chinese Communist Party Admission Oath]]{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}}
| align = right
| width = 25em
| bgcolor = ivory
}}

The CCP reached 99.19&nbsp;million members at the end of 2023, a net increase of 1.1&nbsp;million over the previous year.<ref name="2023PartyCensus">{{Cite web |date=30 June 2024 |title=中国共产党党内统计公报 |language=Chinese |trans-title=Communist Party of China Party Statistics Announcement |publisher=[[State Council of the People's Republic of China]] |url=https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202406/content_6960213.htm |access-date=30 June 2024 |archive-date=30 June 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240630091531/https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202406/content_6960213.htm |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Zhang |first=Phoebe |date=1 July 2024 |title=China's Communist Party on track for 100 million members by year's end |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3268723/chinas-communist-party-track-100-million-members-years-end |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240701114131/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3268723/chinas-communist-party-track-100-million-members-years-end |archive-date=1 July 2024 |access-date=1 July 2024 |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en }}</ref> It is the second largest political party in the world after India's [[Bharatiya Janata Party]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Balachandran |first1=Manu |last2=Dutta |first2=Saptarishi |date=31 March 2015 |title=Here's How the BJP Surpassed China's Communists to Become the Largest Political Party in the World |work=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]] |url=https://qz.com/372466 |url-status=live |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319223724/https://qz.com/india/372466/heres-how-the-bjp-surpassed-chinas-communists-to-become-the-largest-political-party-in-the-world/ |archive-date=19 March 2022}}</ref>

To join the CCP, an applicant must go through an approval process.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=53–56}} Adults can file applications for membership with their local party branch.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=53}} A prescreening process, akin to a background check, follows.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=53}} Next, established party members at the local branch vet applicants' behaviour and political attitudes and may make a formal inquiry to a party branch near the applicants' parents residence to vet family  loyalty to communism and the party.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=53}} In 2014, only 2 million applications were accepted out of some 22&nbsp;million applicants.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=McMorrow |first=R. W. |date=19 December 2015 |title=Membership in the Communist Party of China: Who is Being Admitted and How? |url=https://daily.jstor.org/communist-party-of-china/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151221001029/http://daily.jstor.org:80/communist-party-of-china/ |archive-date=21 December 2015 |website=[[JSTOR|JSTOR Daily]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Admitted members then spend a year as a probationary member.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} Probationary members are typically accepted into the party.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=55}} Members must pay dues regardless of location and, in 2019, the CCP Central Committee issued a rule requiring members abroad to contact CCP cells at home at least once every six months.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Yu |first=Sun |date=July 3, 2024 |title=China demands loyalty from young expats in the US |url=https://www.ft.com/content/43ccc5be-29a6-45c0-b4be-547937cae946 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-07-03 |website=[[Financial Times]] |archive-date=3 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240703113826/https://www.ft.com/content/43ccc5be-29a6-45c0-b4be-547937cae946 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In contrast to the past, when emphasis was placed on the applicants' ideological criteria, the current CCP stresses technical and educational qualifications.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} To become a probationary member, the applicant must take an admission oath before the party flag.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} The relevant CCP organization is responsible for observing and educating probationary members.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} Probationary members have duties similar to those of full members, with the exception that they may not vote in party elections nor stand for election.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} Many join the CCP through the [[Communist Youth League of China|Communist Youth League]].{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}} Under Jiang Zemin, private entrepreneurs were allowed to become party members.{{sfn|Sullivan|2012|p=183}}

====Membership demographics====
[[File:Chinese Communist Party member badge diagram.png|thumb|left|Badge worn by party members]]

{{As of|2023|December}}, individuals who identify as farmers, herdsmen and fishermen make up 26 million members; members identifying as workers totalled 6.6 million.<ref name=":4" /><ref name="2023PartyCensus" /> Another group, the "Managing, professional and technical staff in enterprises and public institutions", made up 16.2 million, 11.5 million identified as working in administrative staff and 7.6 million described themselves as party cadres.<ref name="CCPmembersoccupation">{{Cite news |author-link=Staff writer |date=30 June 2015 |title=China's Communist Party membership tops entire population of Germany |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |publisher=[[SCMP Group]] |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1829407/chinas-communist-party-enlists-million-new-members |url-status=live |access-date=30 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150703004249/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1829407/chinas-communist-party-enlists-million-new-members |archive-date=3 July 2015}}</ref> The CCP systematically recruits [[white-collar worker]]s over other social groups.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Angiolillo |first=Fabio |date=22 December 2023 |title=Authoritarian Ruling Parties' Recruitment Dilemma: Evidence from China |journal=[[Journal of East Asian Studies]] |language=en |pages=1–25 |doi=10.1017/jea.2023.20 |issn=1598-2408 |doi-access=free}}</ref> By 2023, CCP membership had become more educated, younger, and less blue-collar than previously, with 56.2% of party members having a college degree or above.<ref name=":8" /> {{As of|2022}}, around 30 to 35 per cent of Chinese entrepreneurs are or have been a party member.{{sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=13}} At the end of 2023, the CCP stated that it has approximately 7.59&nbsp;million ethnic minority members or 7.7% of the party.<ref name="2023PartyCensus" />

====Status of women====
{{As of|2023}}, 30.19 million women are CCP members, representing 30.4% of the party.<ref name="2023PartyCensus" /> Women in China have low participation rates as political leaders. Women's disadvantage is most evident in their severe underrepresentation in the more powerful political positions.<ref name="Bauer">{{Cite journal |last1=Bauer |first1=John |last2=Feng |first2=Wang |last3=Riley |first3=Nancy E. |last4=Xiaohua |first4=Zhao |date=July 1992 |title=Gender inequality in urban China |journal=[[Modern China]] |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=333–370 |doi=10.1177/009770049201800304 |s2cid=144214400}}</ref> At the top level of decision making, no woman has ever been among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, while the broader Politburo currently does not have any female members. Just 3 of 27 government ministers are women, and importantly, since 1997, China has fallen to 53rd place from 16th in the world in terms of female representation in the National People's Congress, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tatlow |first=Didi Kirsten |date=24 June 2010 |title=Women Struggle for a Foothold in Chinese Politics |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25iht-letter.html |url-access=limited |access-date=6 October 2021 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25iht-letter.html |archive-date=1 January 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}{{cbignore}}</ref> CCP leaders such as Zhao Ziyang have vigorously opposed the participation of women in the political process.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Judd |first=Ellen R. |title=The Chinese Women's Movement |date=2002 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=0-8047-4406-8 |location=Private Collection |page=175}}</ref> Within the party women face a [[glass ceiling]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=14 October 2017 |title=In China women 'hold up half the sky' but can't touch the political glass ceiling |work=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/in-china-women-hold-up-half-the-sky-but-cant-touch-the-political-glass-ceiling |url-status=live |access-date=17 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214164410/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/in-china-women-hold-up-half-the-sky-but-cant-touch-the-political-glass-ceiling |archive-date=14 December 2018}}</ref>

====Benefits of membership====
A 2019 [[Binghamton University]] study found that CCP members gain a 20% wage premium in the market over non-members.<ref name=":03">{{Cite news |date=6 July 2023 |title=Does it pay to be a communist in China? |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/07/06/does-it-pay-to-be-a-communist-in-china |url-access=subscription |access-date=8 July 2023 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> A subsequent academic study found that the economic benefit of CCP membership is strongest on those in lower wealth brackets.<ref name=":03"/> CCP households also tend to accumulate wealth faster than non-CCP households.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Targa |first1=Matteo |last2=Yang |first2=Li |date=September 2024 |title=The impact of Communist Party membership on wealth distribution and accumulation in urban China |journal=[[World Development (journal)|World Development]] |language=en |volume=181 |page=106660 |doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106660 |doi-access=free|hdl=10419/283577 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Certain CCP cadres have access to a special supply system for foodstuffs called ''tegong''.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tsai |first=Wen-Hsuan |date=June 2016 |title=Delicacies for a Privileged Class in a Risk Society: The Chinese Communist Party's Special Supplies Food System |journal=Issues & Studies |language=en |volume=52 |issue=2 |page=1650005 |doi=10.1142/S1013251116500053 |issn=1013-2511}}</ref> CCP leadership cadres have access to a dedicated [[Healthcare in China|healthcare]] system managed by the CCP General Office.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tsai |first=Wen-Hsuan |date=2018-11-02 |title=Medical Politics and the CCP's Healthcare System for State Leaders |url= |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=27 |issue=114 |pages=942–955 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2018.1488107 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref>

===Communist Youth League===
{{Main|Communist Youth League of China}}

The Communist Youth League (CYL) is the CCP's [[youth wing]], and the largest mass organization for youth in China.{{sfn|Sullivan|2007|p=582}} To join, an applicant has to be between the ages of 14 and 28.{{sfn|Sullivan|2007|p=582}} It controls and supervises [[Young Pioneers of China|Young Pioneers]], a youth organization for children below the age of 14.{{sfn|Sullivan|2007|p=582}} The organizational structure of CYL is an exact copy of the CCP's; the highest body is the National Congress, followed by the Central Committee, Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee.{{sfn|Sullivan|2007|p=583}} However, the Central Committee (and all central organs) of the CYL work under the guidance of the CCP central leadership.<ref name="CPCactualconstitution">{{Cite web |title=Constitution of the Communist Party of China |url=http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130524233100/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html |archive-date=24 May 2013 |access-date=2 January 2014 |website=[[People's Daily]] |publisher=Chinese Communist Party}}</ref> By the end of 2024, the CYLC had 75 million members and 4.4 million organizations throughout China.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news |date=3 May 2025 |title=全国共有共青团员7531.8万名 |trans-title=There are 75.318 million members of the Communist Youth League nationwide. |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0503/c64387-40472815.html |url-status= |archive-url= |archive-date= |access-date=3 May 2025 |work=[[People's Daily]]}}</ref>

==Symbols==
{{Main|Emblem of the Chinese Communist Party}}
{{multiple image
 | direction = vertical
 | width = 150
 | image1 = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg
 | alt1 = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party from 1942 to 1996
 | image2 = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg
 | alt2 = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party since 1996
 | footer = Flag of the Chinese Communist Party from 1942 to 1996 (top) and from 1996 onward (bottom)
}}

At the beginning of its history, the CCP did not have a single official standard for the flag, but instead allowed individual party committees to copy the flag of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<ref name="CPCemblemflag">{{Cite web |date=29 March 2013 |title=Flag and emblem of Communist Party of China |url=http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188029.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150327215204/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188029.html |archive-date=27 March 2015 |access-date=15 January 2014 |website=[[People's Daily]]}}</ref> The Central Politburo decreed the establishment of a sole official flag on 28 April 1942: "The flag of the CPC has the length-to-width proportion of 3:2 with a [[hammer and sickle]] in the upper-left corner, and with no five-pointed star. The Political Bureau authorizes the General Office to custom-make a number of standard flags and distribute them to all major organs".<ref name="CPCemblemflag" />

According to ''People's Daily'', "The red color symbolizes revolution; the hammer-and-sickle are tools of workers and peasants, meaning that the Communist Party of China represents the interests of the masses and the people; the yellow color signifies brightness."<ref name="CPCemblemflag" />

==Party-to-party relations==
The [[International Department of the Chinese Communist Party]] is responsible for dialogue with global political parties.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hackenesch |first1=Christine |last2=Bader |first2=Julia |date=9 June 2020 |title=The Struggle for Minds and Influence: The Chinese Communist Party's Global Outreach |journal=[[International Studies Quarterly]] |language=en |volume=64 |issue=3 |pages=723–733 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqaa028 |issn=0020-8833 |doi-access=free|hdl=11245.1/7324dee8-d4d7-4163-86c5-f0e467a5b65a |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

===Communist parties===
{{Communist parties|expanded=Asia}}

The CCP continues to have relations with non-ruling communist and workers' parties and attends international communist conferences, most notably the [[International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 November 2013 |title=15 IMCWP, List of participants |url=http://www.solidnet.org/15-imcwp/15-imcwp-list-of-participants |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131224034053/http://www.solidnet.org/15-imcwp/15-imcwp-list-of-participants |archive-date=24 December 2013 |access-date=4 January 2014 |publisher=[[International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties]]. Solidnet.org}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=April 2025}} While the CCP retains contact with major parties such as the [[Portuguese Communist Party|Communist Party of Portugal]],<ref name="PCP">{{Cite news |date=21 February 2013 |title=Senior CPC official meets Portuguese Communist Party leader |url=http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66485/99306/99309/6855848.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160205103007/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66485/99306/99309/6855848.html |archive-date=5 February 2016 |access-date=4 January 2014 |website=[[People's Daily]]}}</ref> the [[French Communist Party|Communist Party of France]],<ref name="FCP">{{Cite news |date=8 November 2011 |title=Senior CPC official vows to develop friendly cooperation with French Communist Party |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7669292.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121028233646/http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7669292.html |archive-date=28 October 2012}}</ref> the [[Communist Party of the Russian Federation]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=24 August 2010 |title=Senior CPC official meets Russian delegation |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7922026.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104035505/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7922026.html |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> the [[Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=19 May 2011 |title=CPC to institutionalize talks with European parties |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7384837.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111109055618/http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7384837.html |archive-date=9 November 2011}}</ref> the [[Communist Party of Brazil]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=5 June 2005 |title=Senior CPC leader meets chairman of Communist Party of Brazil |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/200507/05/eng20050705_194032.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104212649/http://english.people.com.cn/200507/05/eng20050705_194032.html |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> the [[Communist Party of Greece]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Vagenas |first=Elisseos |date=2010 |title=The International role of China |url=https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/The-International-role-of-China |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422195936/http://inter.kke.gr:80/en/articles/The-International-role-of-China |archive-date=22 April 2016 |access-date=17 January 2022 |website=[[Communist Party of Greece]]}}</ref> the [[Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist−Leninist)|Communist Party of Nepal (UML)]]<ref>{{Cite web |date=27 June 2012 |title=A Leadership Delegation of The Communist Party of Nepal (unified Marxist−Leninist) |url=http://www.celaj.gov.cn/english/www/18/2011-07/219.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181014113139/http://www.celaj.gov.cn/english/www/18/2011-07/219.html |archive-date=14 October 2018 |access-date=4 January 2014 |publisher=China Executive Leadership Academy, Jinggangshan}}</ref> and the [[Communist Party of Spain]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 April 2010 |title=CPC leader pledges exchanges with Communist Party of Spain |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6942176.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104055654/http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6942176.html |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> the party also retains relations with minor communist and workers' parties, such as the [[Communist Party of Australia]],<ref>{{Cite web |date=12 September 2013 |title=12th CPA Congress |url=http://www.cpa.org.au/resources/congress/12/greetings.html#china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150329042903/http://cpa.org.au/resources/congress/12/greetings.html#china |archive-date=29 March 2015 |access-date=4 January 2014 |publisher=Central Committee of the [[Communist Party of Australia]]}}</ref> the [[Workers Party of Bangladesh]], the [[Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist–Leninist) (Barua)|Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (ML)]], the [[Communist Party of Sri Lanka]], the [[Workers' Party of Belgium]], the [[Hungarian Workers' Party]], the [[Dominican Workers' Party]], the [[Nepal Workers Peasants Party]], and the [[Party for the Transformation of Honduras]], for instance.<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 November 2007 |title=More foreign party leaders congratulate CPC on National Congress |agency=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/16/content_6891337.htm |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140108212651/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/16/content_6891337.htm |archive-date=8 January 2014}}</ref> It has prickly{{Vague|date={{CURRENTMONTHNAME}} {{CURRENTYEAR}}}} relations with the [[Japanese Communist Party]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=中共与日共：曾经的"兄弟"为何一度关系不睦 |url=https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1444629 |access-date=27 September 2021 |date=19 April 2016 |publisher=[[The Paper (newspaper)|The Paper]] |language=zh-cn |archive-date=12 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220512095641/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1444629 }}</ref> In recent years, noting the self-reform of the European social democratic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP "has noted the increased marginalization of West European communist parties."{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=100}}

====Ruling parties of socialist states====
The CCP has retained close relations with the ruling parties of [[socialist state]]s still espousing [[communism]]: [[Cuba]], [[Laos]], [[North Korea]], and [[Vietnam]].{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=81}} It spends a fair amount of time analysing the situation in the remaining socialist states, trying to reach conclusions as to why these states survived when so many did not, following the [[Revolutions of 1989|collapse of the Eastern European socialist states]] in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=82}} In general, the analyses of the remaining socialist states and their chances of survival have been positive, and the CCP believes that the socialist movement will be revitalized sometime in the future.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=82}}

The ruling party which the CCP is most interested in is the [[Communist Party of Vietnam]] (CPV).{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=84}} In general the CPV is considered a model example of socialist development in the post-Soviet era.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=84}} Chinese analysts on Vietnam believe that the introduction of the [[Đổi Mới]] reform policy at the [[6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam|6th CPV National Congress]] is the key reason for Vietnam's current success.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=84}}

While the CCP is probably the organization with [[China–North Korea relations|most access to North Korea]], writing about North Korea is tightly circumscribed.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=82}} The few reports accessible to the general public are those about [[North Korean economic reform]]s.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=82}} While Chinese analysts of North Korea tend to speak positively of North Korea in public, in official discussions {{Circa|2008}} they show much disdain for [[Economy of North Korea|North Korea's economic system]], the [[North Korean cult of personality|cult of personality]] which pervades society, the [[Kim dynasty (North Korea)|Kim family]], the idea of hereditary succession in a socialist state, the security state, the use of scarce resources on the [[Korean People's Army]] and the general impoverishment of the North Korean people.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|pp=82–83}} Circa 2008, there are those analysts who compare the current situation of North Korea with that of China during the Cultural Revolution.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=83}}{{Update inline|date=June 2022}} Over the years, the CCP has tried to persuade the [[Workers' Party of Korea]] (or WPK, North Korea's ruling party) to introduce economic reforms by showing them key economic infrastructure in China.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=83}} For instance, in 2006 the CCP invited then-[[General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea|WPK general secretary]] [[Kim Jong Il]] to [[Guangdong]] to showcase the success economic reforms had brought China.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=83}} In general, the CCP considers the WPK and North Korea to be negative examples of a ruling communist party and socialist state.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=83}}

There is a considerable degree of interest in Cuba within the CCP.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=84}} [[Fidel Castro]], the former [[First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba|First Secretary]] of the [[Communist Party of Cuba]] (PCC), is greatly admired, and books have been written focusing on the successes of the [[Cuban Revolution]].{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=84}} [[China–Cuba relations|Communication between the CCP and the PCC]] has increased since the 1990s.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=85}} At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which discussed the possibility of the CCP learning from other ruling parties, praise was heaped on the PCC.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008 |p=85}} When [[Wu Guanzheng]], a Central Politburo member, met with Fidel Castro in 2007, he gave him a personal letter written by Hu Jintao: "Facts have shown that China and Cuba are trustworthy good friends, good comrades, and good brothers who treat each other with sincerity. The two countries' friendship has withstood the test of a changeable international situation, and the friendship has been further strengthened and consolidated."{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|pp=85–86}}

===Non-communist parties===
Since the decline and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the CCP has begun establishing party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.{{sfn|Smith|West|2012|p=127}} These relations are sought so that the CCP can learn from them.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|pp=86–92}} For instance, the CCP has been eager to understand how the [[People's Action Party]] of Singapore (PAP) maintains its total domination over [[Politics of Singapore|Singaporean politics]] through its "low-key presence, but total control."{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=93}} According to the CCP's own analysis of Singapore, the PAP's dominance can be explained by its "well-developed social network, which controls constituencies effectively by extending its tentacles deeply into society through branches of government and party-controlled groups."{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=93}} While the CCP accepts that Singapore is a [[liberal democracy]], they view it as a [[guided democracy]] led by the PAP.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=93}} Other differences are, according to the CCP, "that it is not a political party based on the working class—instead it is a political party of the elite.{{nbsp}}... It is also a political party of the [[parliamentary system]], not a [[vanguard party|revolutionary party]]."{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=94}} Other parties which the CCP studies and maintains strong party-to-party relations with are the [[United Malays National Organization]], which has ruled [[Malaysia]] (1957–2018, 2020–2022), and the [[Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)|Liberal Democratic Party]] in Japan, which dominated [[Japanese politics]] since 1955.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|pp=95–96}}

Since Jiang Zemin's time, the CCP has made friendly overtures to its erstwhile foe, the Kuomintang. The CCP emphasizes strong party-to-party relations with the KMT so as to strengthen the probability of the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=96}} However, several studies have been written on the KMT's loss of power in 2000 after having ruled Taiwan since 1949 (the KMT officially ruled mainland China from 1928 to 1949).{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=96}} In general, one-party states or dominant-party states are of special interest to the party and party-to-party relations are formed so that the CCP can study them.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=96}} The longevity of the [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Syrian Regional Branch]] of the [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party]] is attributed to the personalization of power in the [[al-Assad family]], the strong [[presidential system]], the inheritance of power, which passed from [[Hafez al-Assad]] to his son [[Bashar al-Assad]], and the role given to the [[Syrian military]] in politics.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}}

[[File:Cena de Estado que en honor del Excmo. Sr. Xi Jinping, Presidente de la República Popular China, y de su esposa, Sra. Peng Liyuan (8959188037).jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping (second from left) with [[Enrique Peña Nieto]] (second from right), the former [[President of Mexico]] and a leading member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party]]

Circa 2008, the CCP has been especially interested in Latin America,{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}} as shown by the increasing number of delegates sent to and received from these countries.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}} Of special fascination for the CCP is the 71-year-long rule of the [[Institutional Revolutionary Party]] (PRI) in Mexico.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}} While the CCP attributed the PRI's long reign in power to the strong presidential system, tapping into the [[machismo]] culture of the country, its nationalist posture, its close identification with the rural populace and the implementation of [[nationalization]] alongside the [[marketization]] of the [[Economy of Mexico|economy]],{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}} the CCP concluded that the PRI failed because of the lack of inner-party democracy, its pursuit of [[social democracy]], its rigid party structures that could not be reformed, its [[Corruption in Mexico|political corruption]], the pressure of globalization, and American interference in [[Mexican politics]].{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=97}} While the CCP was slow to recognize the [[pink tide]] in Latin America, it has strengthened party-to-party relations with several socialist and [[anti-American]] political parties over the years.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} The CCP has occasionally expressed some irritation over [[Hugo Chávez]]'s [[anti-capitalist]] and anti-American rhetoric.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} Despite this, the CCP reached an agreement in 2013 with the [[United Socialist Party of Venezuela]] (PSUV), which was founded by Chávez, for the CCP to educate PSUV cadres in political and social fields.<ref>{{Cite news |date=13 May 2013 |title=Chinese Communist Party to train chavista leaders |work=[[El Universal (Caracas)|El Universal]] |url=http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130513/chinese-communist-party-to-train-chavista-leaders |access-date=4 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104213020/http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130513/chinese-communist-party-to-train-chavista-leaders |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> By 2008, the CCP claimed to have established relations with 99 political parties in 29 Latin American countries.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}}

Social democratic movements in Europe have been of great interest to the CCP since the early 1980s.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} With the exception of a short period in which the CCP forged party-to-party relations with far-right parties during the 1970s in an effort to halt "[[Soviet empire|Soviet expansionism]]", the CCP's relations with European social democratic parties were its first serious efforts to establish cordial party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} The CCP credits the European social democrats with creating a "capitalism with a human face".{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} Before the 1980s, the CCP had a highly negative and dismissive view of social democracy, a view dating back to the [[Second International]] and the Marxist–Leninist view on the social democratic movement.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} By the 1980s, that view had changed and the CCP concluded that it could actually learn something from the social democratic movement.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=98}} CCP delegates were sent all over Europe to observe.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=99}} By the 1980s, most European social democratic parties were facing electoral decline and in a period of self-reform.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=99}} The CCP followed this with great interest, laying most weight on reform efforts within the [[Labour Party (UK)|British Labour Party]] and the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]].{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|p=99}} The CCP concluded that both parties were re-elected because they modernized, replacing traditional [[state socialist]] tenets with new ones supporting [[privatization]], shedding the belief in [[big government]], conceiving a new view of the [[welfare state]], changing their negative views of the market and moving from their traditional support base of trade unions to entrepreneurs, the young and students.{{sfn|Shambaugh|2008|pp=99–100}}

==Electoral history==

===National People's Congress elections===
{| class=wikitable style=text-align:center
! Election
! General Secretary
! Seats
! +/–
! Position
|-
| [[6th National People's Congress|1982–1983]]
| [[Hu Yaobang]]
| {{Composition bar|1861|2978|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
|
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[7th National People's Congress|1987–1988]]
| [[Zhao Ziyang]]
| {{Composition bar|1986|2979|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{increase}} 125
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[8th National People's Congress|1993–1994]]
| rowspan="2" | [[Jiang Zemin]]
| {{Composition bar|2037|2979|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{increase}} 51
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[9th National People's Congress|1997–1998]]
| {{Composition bar|2130|2979|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{increase}} 93
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[10th National People's Congress|2002–2003]]
| rowspan="2" | [[Hu Jintao]]
| {{Composition bar|2178|2985|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{increase}} 48
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[11th National People's Congress|2007–2008]]
| {{Composition bar|2099|2987|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{decrease}} 79
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[12th National People's Congress|2012–2013]]
| rowspan="3" | [[Xi Jinping]]
| {{Composition bar|2157|2987|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{increase}} 58
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[13th National People's Congress|2017–2018]]
| {{Composition bar|2119|2980|hex={{party color|Chinese Communist Party}}}}
| {{decrease}} 38
| {{steady}} 1st
|-
| [[14th National People's Congress|2022–2023]]
|
|
| {{steady}} 1st
|}

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Communism|Politics}}
* [[Politics of China]]
* [[Succession of power in China]]

==Notes==
{{NoteFoot}}

==References==

===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Sources===

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* Saich, Tony. ''Governance and Politics of China'' (2015)
* {{Cite book |last1=Saich |first1=Tony |title=The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis |last2=Yang |first2=Benjamin |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=1995 |isbn=978-1-56324-155-0}}
* {{Cite book |last=Schram |first=Stuart |url=https://archive.org/details/maotsetung0000schr |title=Mao Tse-Tung |publisher=Simon & Schuster |year=1966 |isbn=978-0-14-020840-5 |author-link=Stuart R. Schram |url-access=registration}}
* {{Cite book |last=Shambaugh |first=David |title=China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation |publisher=[[University of California Press]] |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-520-25492-3 |author-link=David Shambaugh}}
* {{Cite book |last=Shambaugh |first=David |title=China Goes Global: The Partial Power |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-19-932369-2}}
*  Snow, Edgar, [[Red Star Over China]] 1937 [https://archive.org/details/redstaroverchina0000snow Red Star Over China - The Rise Of The Red Army]
* {{Cite book |last=Sullivan |first=Lawrence |title=Historical Dictionary of the People's Republic of China |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-8108-6443-6}}
* {{Cite book |last=Sullivan |first=Lawrence |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-8108-7225-7}}
* {{Cite book |last=Jonathan |first=Unger |title=The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-7656-4115-1 |ref=CITEREFUnger2002 |author-link=Jonathan Unger}}
* {{Cite book |last=van de Ven |first=Johan |url=https://archive.org/details/fromfriendtocomr00vand |title=From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920–1927 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1991 |isbn=978-0-520-91087-4 |ref=CITEREFVan_de_Ven1991 |author-link=Hans van de Ven |url-access=registration}}
* {{Cite book |last=Vogel |first=Ezra |title=[[Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China]] |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-674-05544-5 |author-link=Ezra Vogel}}
* {{Cite book |last=Yeh |first=Wen-hsin |url=https://archive.org/details/provincialpassag0000yehw |title=Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism |publisher=[[University of California Press]] |year=1996 |isbn=978-0-520-91632-6 |url-access=registration}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Gunwu |title=China: Development and Governance |last2=Zheng |first2=Yongian |publisher=World Scientific |year=2012 |isbn=978-981-4425-83-4}}
* {{Cite book |last=White |first=Stephen |title=Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0-521-58737-2}}
* [https://archive.org/details/chinesehighcomma0000whit Whitson, William W., ''The Chinese high command : a history of Communist military politics, 1927–71,'' (1973)]
* {{Cite book |last=Wong |first=Yiu-chung |title=From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political Reform in the People's Republic of China |publisher=University Press of America |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-7618-3074-0}}
* {{Cite book |last=Yu |first=Keping |title=Democracy and the Rule of Law in China |publisher=Brill Publishers |year=2010 |isbn=978-90-04-18212-7}}
* {{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |title=A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-8047-5001-1}}
* {{Cite book |last=Zheng |first=Wang |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OucYBQAAQBAJ |title=Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-231-14891-7 |page=119 |publisher=Columbia University Press |access-date=21 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019182807/https://books.google.com/books?id=OucYBQAAQBAJ&q=Chinese+communist+party+nationalism |archive-date=19 October 2020 |url-status=live}}
{{refend}}

====Journal articles====
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{Cite news |last1=Abrami |first1=Regina |author2-link=Edmund Malesky |last2=Malesky |first2=Edmund |last3=Zheng |first3=Yu |year=2008 |title=Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China |pages=1–46 |publisher=University of California Press |url=http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/Malesky.pdf |access-date=9 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160216202350/http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/Malesky.pdf |archive-date=16 February 2016}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Brown |first=Kerry |date=2 August 2012 |title=The Communist Party of China and Ideology |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/china/v010/10.2.brown.pdf |url-status=live |journal=China: An International Journal |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=52–68 |doi=10.1353/chn.2012.0013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160216202352/http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=%2Fjournals%2Fchina%2Fv010%2F10.2.brown.pdf |archive-date=16 February 2016 |access-date=19 March 2022}}
* {{Cite news |last=Chambers |first=David Ian |date=30 April 2002 |title=Edging in from the Cold: The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography |volume=56 |pages=31–46 |work=Journal of the American Intelligence Professional |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |issue=3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WCgZJwXbNEEC&pg=PA31 |url-status=live |access-date=6 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200729234518/https://books.google.com/books?id=WCgZJwXbNEEC&pg=PA31 |archive-date=29 July 2020}}
* {{Cite news |last=Dynon |first=Nicholas |date=July 2008 |title="Four Civilizations" and the Evolution of Post-Mao Chinese Socialist Ideology |volume=60 |pages=83–109 |work=The China Journal |publisher=University of Chicago Press |jstor=20647989}}
* {{Cite news |last=Li |first=Cheng |date=19 November 2009 |title=Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously? |volume=30 |pages=1–14 |publisher=China Leadership Monitor |issue=4 |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/11/fall-china-democracy-li |url-status=live |access-date=9 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160604030519/http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/11/fall-china-democracy-li |archive-date=4 June 2016 |ref=none}}
* {{Cite news |last1=Mahoney |first1=Josef Gregory |last2=Yi |first2=Jiexiong |last3=Li |first3=Xiuling |date=April 2009 |title=A Marxist Perspective on Chinese Reforms: Interview with Jiexiong |pages=177–192 |jstor=40404544}}
* {{Cite news |last=Köllner |first=Patrick |date=August 2013 |title=Informal Institutions in Autocracies: Analytical Perspectives and the Case of the Chinese Communist Party |pages=1–30 |publisher=German Institute of Global and Area Studies |issue=232 |url=http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp232_koellner.pdf |url-status=live |access-date=9 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117145421/https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp232_koellner.pdf |archive-date=17 November 2020}}
* {{Cite news |last=Miller |first=H. Lyman |date=19 November 2009 |title=Hu Jintao and the Party Politburo |volume=32 |pages=1–11 |publisher=China Leadership Monitor |issue=9 |url=http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm9_lm.pdf |access-date=9 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413163540/https://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm9_lm.pdf |archive-date=13 April 2020 |ref=CITEREFMiller2011}}
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{Library resources box}}
* {{Commons and category inline|Communist Party of China}}
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* {{official website}}

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