Editing Black Wednesday

{{Short description|1992 UK financial crisis}}
{{redirect|White Wednesday|the online movement|White Wednesday (movement)|the shopping event|White Wednesday (shopping)|other uses|Black Wednesday (disambiguation)}}
{{EngvarB|date=September 2022}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2022}}
[[File:D GBPDEM 1992.PNG|thumb|The number of Deutschmarks which £1 could purchase from August 1992 to January 1993; Black Wednesday is marked by a solid red vertical line]]
{{United Kingdom in the European Union}}
{{Politics of the European Union}}
{{John Major sidebar}}

'''Black Wednesday''', or the '''1992 sterling crisis''', was a financial crisis that occurred on 16 September 1992 when the [[Government of the United Kingdom|UK Government]] was forced to withdraw [[pound sterling|sterling]] from the (first) [[European Monetary System|European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM{{nbsp}}I)]], following a failed attempt to keep its [[exchange rate]] above the lower limit required for ERM participation. At that time, the United Kingdom held the [[Presidency of the Council of the European Union]].

The crisis damaged the credibility of the [[second Major ministry]] in handling of economic matters. The ruling [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] suffered a landslide defeat five years later at the [[1997 United Kingdom general election|1997 general election]] and did not return to power until [[2010 United Kingdom general election|2010]]. The rebounding of the UK economy in the years following Black Wednesday has been attributed to the [[Currency appreciation and depreciation|depreciation]] of sterling and the replacement of its [[Fixed exchange rate system|currency tracking]] policy with an [[inflation targeting]] monetary stability policy.<ref>McRae, Hamish (10 February 2005). [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/how-the-erm-disaster-turned-into-a-triumph-1529940.html How the ERM disaster turned into a triumph]. ''The Independent''. Retrieved 21 October 2019.</ref><ref>Moore, Charles (3 November 2018). [https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/11/bring-on-the-next-black-wednesday/ Bring on the next Black Wednesday]. ''The Spectator''. Retrieved 21 October 2019.</ref>

==Prelude==
{{further|Monetarism}}
When the ERM was set up in 1979, the United Kingdom declined to join. This was a controversial decision, as the [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]], [[Geoffrey Howe]], was staunchly pro-European. His successor, [[Nigel Lawson]], whilst not at all advocating a [[fixed exchange rate system]], nevertheless so admired the low inflationary record of [[West Germany]] as to become, by the mid-eighties, a self-styled "exchange-rate monetarist", one viewing the sterling–Deutschmark exchange rate as at least as reliable a guide to domestic inflation{{snd}} and hence to  the setting of interest rates{{snd}} as any of the various [[Money supply#M0|M0-M3 measures]] beloved of those he labelled as "[[A Bold Stroke for a Wife#Simon Pure|Simon Pure]]" monetarists. He justified this by pointing to the dependable strength of the [[Deutsche Mark]] and the reliably anti-inflationary management of the Mark by the [[Deutsche Bundesbank|Bundesbank]], both of which he explained by citing the lasting impact in Germany of the disastrous hyperinflation of the inter-war [[Weimar Republic]]. Thus, although the UK had not joined the ERM, at Lawson's direction (and with Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s reluctant acquiescence), from early 1987 to March 1988 the Treasury followed a semi-official policy of "shadowing" the Deutsche Mark.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Not while I'm alive, he ain't&nbsp;– Part 4 Thatcher and Lawson|work=[[The Westminster Hour]]|publisher=BBC Radio 4|date=15 May 2003|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/the_westminster_hour/archive/2318013.stm}}</ref> Matters came to a head in a clash between Lawson and Thatcher's economic adviser [[Alan Walters]], when Walters claimed that the Exchange Rate Mechanism was "half baked".<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/4126227/Sir-Alan-Walters.html |title=Sir Alan Walters |type=obituary |work=The Daily Telegraph |date=5 January 2009 |access-date=21 October 2019}}</ref>

This led to Lawson's resignation as Chancellor; he was replaced by former Treasury Chief Secretary [[John Major]] who, with [[Foreign Secretary (United Kingdom)|Foreign Secretary]] [[Douglas Hurd]], convinced the Cabinet to sign Britain up to the ERM in October 1990, effectively guaranteeing that the UK Government would follow an economic and [[monetary policy]] preventing the [[exchange rate]] between the pound and other member currencies from fluctuating by more than 6%. On 8 October 1990, Thatcher entered the pound into the ERM at [[Deutsche Mark|DM]]{{nbsp}}2.95 to £1. Hence, if the exchange rate ever neared the bottom of its permitted range, DM{{nbsp}}2.773 (€1.4178 at the DM/Euro conversion rate), the government would be obliged to intervene. In 1989, the UK had inflation three times the rate of Germany, higher interest rates at 15%, and much lower labour productivity than France and Germany, which indicated the UK's different economic state in comparison to other ERM countries.<ref>{{cite magazine |url=https://libcom.org/library/britain-european-exchange-rate-mechanism |first1=Werner |last1=Bonefeld |first2=Peter |last2=Burnham|title=1990–1992: Britain and the politics of the European exchange rate mechanism |magazine=Libcom |date=13 January 2006 |access-date=17 January 2024}}</ref><!--Seems also to have been published in the journal and Capital & Class, Volume 20, Issue 3 https://doi.org/10.1177/030981689606000102. Verify before citing; it's behind a paywall.-->

From the beginning of the 1990s, high German interest rates, set by the Bundesbank to counteract inflationary effects related to excess expenditure on [[German reunification]], caused significant stress across the whole of the ERM. The UK and Italy had additional difficulties with their [[double deficit (economics)|double deficit]]s, while the UK was also hurt by the rapid depreciation of the United States dollar&nbsp;– a currency in which many British exports were priced&nbsp;– that summer. Issues of national prestige and the commitment to a doctrine that the fixing of exchange rates within the ERM was a pathway to a single European currency inhibited the adjustment of exchange rates. In the wake of the rejection of the [[Maastricht Treaty]] by the Danish electorate in [[1992 Danish Maastricht Treaty referendum|a referendum]] in the spring of 1992, and an announcement that there would be [[1992 French Maastricht Treaty referendum|a referendum in France]] as well, those ERM currencies that were trading close to the bottom of their ERM bands came under pressure from foreign exchange traders.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Aykens |first=Peter |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097797 |title=Conflicting Authorities: States, Currency Markets and the ERM Crisis of 1992–93 |journal=Review of International Studies |volume=28 |issue=2 |date=April 2002 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |pages=359–380 |doi=10.1017/S0260210502003595 |access-date=21 October 2019 |jstor=20097797}}</ref>

In the months leading up to Black Wednesday, among many other currency traders, [[George Soros]] had been building a huge [[Short (finance)|short position]] in sterling that would become immensely profitable if the currency fell below the lower band of the ERM. Soros believed the rate at which the United Kingdom was brought into the Exchange Rate Mechanism was too high, inflation was too high (triple the German rate), and British interest rates were hurting their asset prices.<ref name="amazon1">{{cite book|title=More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite |first=Sebastian |last=Mallaby |isbn=9781594202551 |publisher=Penguin Press HC |date=10 June 2010}}</ref>

==The currency traders act==
The UK government attempted to prop up the depreciating pound to avoid withdrawal from the monetary system the country had joined only two years earlier. [[John Major]] authorised the spending of billions of pounds worth of foreign currency reserves to buy up sterling being sold on the currency markets. These measures failed to prevent the pound falling below its minimum level in the ERM. The Treasury took the decision to defend sterling's position, believing that to [[Devaluation|devalue]] would promote inflation.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Bootle|first=Roger|title=Pound fall is UK's get-out-of-jail-free card|work=The Daily Telegraph|date=28 April 2008|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/04/28/ccom128.xml|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080501194554/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/04/28/ccom128.xml|url-status=dead|archive-date=1 May 2008|location=London, UK}}</ref>

Remarks by [[Deutsche Bundesbank|Bundesbank]] President [[Helmut Schlesinger]] triggered the attack on the pound.<ref name=EHS>{{cite web |author1=Alain Naef |title=A small remark with big consequences: what sparked Black Wednesday? |url=https://ehs.org.uk/a-small-remark-with-big-consequences-what-sparked-black-wednesday/ |website=Economic History Society |access-date=26 May 2024 |date=30 September 2022}}</ref> An interview of Schlesinger in ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' was reported by the German financial paper {{lang|de|[[Handelsblatt]]}}.<ref>{{Cite book |last=James |first=Harold |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/making-a-modern-central-bank/901C6C0969209C20D1962B698DA26874 |title=Making a Modern Central Bank: The Bank of England 1979–2003 |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-83501-5 |series=Studies in Macroeconomic History |location=Cambridge |page=229}}</ref> Schlesinger told the journalist that "a more comprehensive realignment" of currencies would be needed, following a recent devaluation of the Italian lira.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Eichengreen |first1=Barry |last2=Naef |first2=Alain |date=2022-09-01 |title=Imported or home grown? The 1992–3 EMS crisis |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199622000861 |journal=Journal of International Economics |language=en |volume=138 |pages=103654 |doi=10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103654 |issn=0022-1996}}</ref> On the evening of Tuesday, 15 September 1992, the headline was already circulating. Schlesinger said he thought he was speaking off the record. He later wrote that he stated a fact and this could not have triggered the crisis.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Marsh |first1=David  |isbn=9780995563636 |title=Six Days in September: Black Wednesday, Brexit and the making of Europe |last2=Keegan |first2=William |last3=Roberts |first3=Richard |date=2017-09-15 |publisher=OMFIF Press}}</ref> This remark hugely increased pressure on the pound leading to large sterling sales.<ref name=EHS /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Naef |first=Alain |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-exchange-rate-history-of-the-united-kingdom/68B7E57D9884394B815C76D48ACD3FB6 |title=An Exchange Rate History of the United Kingdom: 1945–1992 |date=2022 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-83999-0 |series=Studies in Macroeconomic History |location=Cambridge}}</ref>

Currency traders began a massive sell-off of pounds on Wednesday, 16 September 1992. The Exchange Rate Mechanism required the [[Bank of England]] to accept any offers to sell pounds. However, the Bank of England only accepted orders during the trading day. When the markets opened in London the next morning, the Bank of England began their attempt to prop up their currency, as decided by [[Norman Lamont]], the [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]], and [[Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Baron Kingsdown|Robin Leigh-Pemberton]], [[governor of the Bank of England]]. They began accepting orders of £300&nbsp;million twice before 8:30&nbsp;am, but to little effect.{{Citation needed|reason=The sentence reads weird and is essentially nonsensical. When I checked the cited source it doesn't mention anything in this sentence.|date=April 2025}}<ref>{{cite news|first=David|last=Litterick|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2773265/Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-of-England.html|title=Billionaire who broke the Bank of England|newspaper=The Telegraph|date=13 September 2002|access-date=16 May 2014}}</ref> The Bank of England's intervention was ineffective because traders were dumping pounds far faster. The Bank of England continued to buy, and traders continued to sell, until Lamont told Prime Minister [[John Major]] that their pound purchasing was failing to produce results.<ref name="PI1">{{cite news |last=Inman |first=Phillip |date=13 September 2012 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-wednesday-20-years-pound-erm |title=Black Wednesday 20 years on: how the day unfolded |work=The Guardian |access-date=21 October 2019}}</ref>

At 10:30&nbsp;am on 16 September, the British government announced an increase in the [[Central bank|base interest rate]], from an already high 10%, to 12% to tempt speculators to buy pounds. Despite this and a promise later the same day to raise base rates again to 15%, dealers kept selling pounds, convinced that the government would not keep its promise. By 7:00&nbsp;pm that evening, Lamont announced Britain would leave the ERM and rates would remain at the new level of 12%; however, on the next day the interest rate was back to 10%.<ref name=PI1/>

It was later revealed that the decision to withdraw had been agreed at an emergency meeting during the day between Lamont, Major, foreign secretary [[Douglas Hurd]], president of the Board of Trade [[Michael Heseltine]], and home secretary [[Kenneth Clarke]] (the latter three all being staunch [[Pro-Europeanism|pro-Europeans]] as well as senior Cabinet ministers),<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/majors-dither-cost-uk-billions-says-lamont-1122598.html |title=Major's dither cost UK billions, says Lamont |work=The Independent |date=27 September 1999 |access-date=21 October 2019}}</ref> and that the interest rate hike to 15% had only been a temporary measure to prevent a rout in the pound that afternoon.<ref>{{cite news |last=Johnston |first=Philip |date=10 September 2012 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/currency/9533474/Black-Wednesday-The-day-that-Britain-went-over-the-edge.html |title=Black Wednesday: The day that Britain went over the edge |work=The Daily Telegraph |access-date=21 October 2019}}</ref>

==Aftermath==
Other ERM countries such as Italy, whose currencies had breached their bands during the day, returned to the system with broadened bands or with adjusted central parities.<ref>Sevilla, Christina R. [http://aei.pitt.edu/7014/1/sevilla_christina.pdf Explaining the September 1992 ERM Crisis: The Maastricht Bargain and Domestic Politics in Germany, France, and Britain]. Harvard University. Retrieved 21 October 2019.</ref>

Some commentators, following [[Norman Tebbit]], took to referring to ERM as an "Eternal Recession Mechanism"<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/10/freedomofinformation.economy |author=Tebbit, Norman |title=An electoral curse yet to be lifted |access-date=30 December 2008 |work=The Guardian|location=London, UK |date=10 February 2005}}</ref> after the UK fell into recession during the early 1990s.  While many people in the UK recall Black Wednesday as a national disaster that permanently affected the country's international prestige, some Conservatives claim that the forced ejection from the ERM was a "Golden Wednesday"<ref>{{Cite news|title=A strong-arm policy is needed to hold the pound down on the rebound|author=Roger Bootle|author-link=Roger Bootle|work=[[The Daily Telegraph]]|date=15 May 2009|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/5339919/A-strong-arm-policy-is-needed-to-hold-the-pound-down-on-the-rebound.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/5339919/A-strong-arm-policy-is-needed-to-hold-the-pound-down-on-the-rebound.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|location=London, UK}}{{cbignore}}</ref> or "White Wednesday",<ref name="kaletsky">{{Cite journal|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/anatole_kaletsky/article1080261.ece|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100529150111/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/anatole_kaletsky/article1080261.ece|url-status=dead|archive-date=29 May 2010|title=The reason that Europe is having a breakdown...it's the Euro, stupid|author=Kaletsky, Anatole|access-date=30 December 2008|journal=The Times|date=9 June 2005}}{{subscription required}}</ref> the day that paved the way for an economic revival, with the Conservatives handing [[Tony Blair]]'s [[New Labour]] a much stronger economy in 1997 than had existed in 1992<ref name="kaletsky"/> as the new economic policy swiftly devised in the aftermath of Black Wednesday led to re-establishment of economic growth with falling unemployment and inflation.<ref>[http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-and-tour/john-major-2] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111016063730/http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-and-tour/john-major-2|date=16 October 2011}}</ref> [[Monetary policy]] switched to [[inflation targeting]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Inflation Targeting Has Been A Successful Monetary Policy Strategy|url=https://www.nber.org/digest/apr98/w6126.html|publisher=NBER|access-date=31 October 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Targeting Inflation: The United Kingdom in Retrospect|url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/targets/strach7.pdf|publisher=IMF|access-date=31 October 2016}}</ref>

The [[Second Major ministry|Conservative Party government]]'s reputation for economic excellence had been damaged to the extent that the electorate was more inclined to support a claim of the opposition of the time&nbsp;– that the economic recovery ought to be credited to external factors, as opposed to government policies implemented by the Conservatives. The Conservatives had recently won the [[1992 United Kingdom general election|1992 general election]], and the [[Gallup poll]] for September showed a small lead of 2.5% for the Conservative Party. By the October poll, following Black Wednesday, their share of the intended vote in the poll had plunged from 43% to 29%.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/datafiles/Gallup.xls|title=Gallup spreadsheet|access-date=28 July 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091013232132/http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/datafiles/Gallup.xls|archive-date=13 October 2009}}</ref> The Conservative government then suffered a string of by-election defeats which saw its 21-seat majority eroded by December 1996. The party's performances in local government elections were similarly dismal during this time, while Labour made huge gains.

Black Wednesday was a major factor in the Conservatives losing the 1997 general election to Labour,{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} who won by a landslide under the leadership of [[Tony Blair]]. The Conservatives failed to gain significant ground at the 2001 general election under the leadership of [[William Hague]], with Labour winning another landslide majority. The Conservatives did not take Government again until [[David Cameron]] led them to victory in the 2010 general election, 13 years later. Five years later in 2015, the party won its first overall majority 23 years after its last in 1992, five months before the crisis.

[[George Soros]] made over £1&nbsp;billion in profit by [[Short (finance)|short selling]] sterling.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2773265/Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-of-England.html|title=Billionaire who broke the Bank of England|access-date=24 February 2013|location=London, UK|work=The Daily Telegraph|first=David|last=Litterick|date=13 September 2002}}</ref>

==The cost of Black Wednesday==
In 1997, the [[HM Treasury|UK Treasury]] estimated the cost of Black Wednesday at £3.14&nbsp;billion,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Dury |first1=Hélène |title=Black_Wednesday |url=http://is.muni.cz/el/1456/podzim2011/MPF_AFIN/um/27608616/27608949/Black_Wednesday.pdf |access-date=24 February 2016}}</ref> which was revised to £3.3&nbsp;billion in 2005, following documents released under the [[Freedom of Information Act 2000|Freedom of Information Act]] (earlier estimates placed losses at a much higher range of £13–27&nbsp;billion).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tempest |first=Matthew |date=9 February 2005 |title=Treasury papers reveal cost of Black Wednesday |work=The Guardian |location=London, UK |url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/09/freedomofinformation.uk1 |access-date=26 April 2010}}</ref> Trading losses in August and September made up a small part of the total (estimated at £800&nbsp;million); the bulk of the loss to the central bank arose from non-realised profits of a potential [[devaluation]]. Treasury papers suggested that, had the government maintained $24&nbsp;billion foreign currency reserves and the pound had fallen by the same amount, the UK might have made a £2.4&nbsp;billion profit on sterling's devaluation.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Freeman |first1=Harold |title=The Cost of Black Wednesday Reconsidered |url=http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Cost_Black_Weds_reconsidered.pdf |archive-url=http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403000951/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Cost_Black_Weds_reconsidered.pdf |archive-date=3 April 2013 |access-date=9 October 2018 |publisher=[[HM Treasury]] |page=4}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Guide to the papers and full list of documents |url=http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/foi_erm4_2005.htm |archive-url=http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403000951/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/foi_erm4_2005.htm |archive-date=3 April 2013 |access-date=9 October 2018 |publisher=[[HM Treasury]]}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|1990s}}
*{{annotated link|Impossible trinity}}
*[[1999–2002 sale of United Kingdom gold reserves]]
* [[Sterling crisis (disambiguation)]], other currency crises in British history

==Footnotes==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Further reading==
* Budd, Alan. "Black Wednesday-A Re-examination of Britain's Experience in the Exchange Rate Mechanism." ''IEA Occasional Paper 135'' (2005). [https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/upldbook270pdf.pdf online]
* Bustos, Sebastian, and Martin Rotemberg. "Elasticity Pessimism: Economic Consequences of Black Wednesday." (2017). [https://wp.nyu.edu/mrotemberg/wp-content/uploads/sites/8049/2018/10/BR_UK_Devaluation_18_10_25.pdf online]
* Gottschalk, Sylvia. "From black Wednesday to Brexit: Macroeconomic shocks and correlations of equity returns in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom." ''International Journal of Finance & Economics'' 28.3 (2023): 2843-2873. [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ijfe.2567 online]
* Roberts, Richard Whitfield, William Keegan, and David Marsh. ''Six days in September: Black Wednesday, Brexit and the Making of Europe'' (OMFIF Press, 2017).  ISBN  9780995563636
* Truman, Edwin M. ''Economic Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes: What Have We Learned in the Ten Years since Black Wednesday?'' (LSE Financial Markets Group, 2002). [https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/economic-policy-and-exchange-rate-regimes-what-have-we-learned-ten-years?ResearchID=477?ResearchID=477 online]
* Ward, David. "Black Wednesday 30 years on." (2022). [https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3118010/black-wednesday-30-years-on/3911205/ online]
* Williams, Ben. "Black Wednesday: thirty years on." Political Insight 13.3 (2022): 22-25. [https://salford-repository.worktribe.com/preview/1562641/Black%20Wednesday%20%283%29.pdf online]

==External links==
*[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/16/newsid_2519000/2519013.stm Black Wednesday], bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 11 January 2017.
*[http://www.open2.net/openfinance/black_wednesday.html open.edu 24, September 2009] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100528083536/http://www.open2.net/openfinance/black_wednesday.html |date=28 May 2010 }}, Martin Upton, head of the Centre for Financial Management at The [[Open University]] Business School tells Ione Mako about the upside of Black Wednesday.
* {{Cite journal |last1=Eichengreen |first1=Barry |last2=Naef |first2=Alain |year=2022 |title=Imported or Home Grown? The 1992-3 EMS Crisis |journal=Journal of International Economics |location=Cambridge, MA |doi=10.3386/w29488 |quote=Our analysis focuses on a neglected factor in the crisis: the role of the weak dollar in intra-EMS tensions.|doi-access=free }}

{{John Major}}
{{Euro topics}}
{{Economy of the United Kingdom}}
{{United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 2016|state=collapsed}}
{{Financial crises}}
{{George Soros}}

[[Category:September 1992 in the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:Economic history of the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:George Soros]]
[[Category:Premiership of John Major]]
[[Category:Short selling]]
[[Category:Wednesday]]
[[Category:Black days]]
[[Category:Stock market crashes]]
[[Category:1992 in economic history]]
[[Category:History of pound sterling]]