Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

===Battle of the Sinai===

On 14 October, an engagement now known as the [[Battle of the Sinai (1973)|Battle of the Sinai]] took place. In preparation for the attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the armored attack.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=353}}

General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover. He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1982|1p=258|Shazly|2003|2p=317}}
[[File:1973 sinai war maps2.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|The 1973 War in the Sinai, 15–24 October]]
The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800–1,000 tanks would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with their defense against Israeli aerial attacks. Armored and mechanized units initiated the attack on 14 October with artillery support. They were up against 700–750 Israeli tanks.{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=310}}<ref name="abc-clio1" />

In the event, the Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the [[wadi]] thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli defenses.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=335}} At least 250 Egyptian tanks and some 200 armored vehicles were destroyed.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=144}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}}<ref>{{cite book|first=Martin |last=Van Creveld |url=http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |title=Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives |publisher=Sage |year=1975 |page=17 |isbn=978-0-8039-0562-7 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |archive-date=13 May 2014}}</ref><ref name="autogenerated260">Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', Random House, p. 260.</ref> Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000.<ref name="autogenerated260" /> Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit, and all but six of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service,{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}} while Israeli casualties numbered 665.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm|title=Yom Kippur War: Embattled Israeli Bridgehead at Chinese Farm|date=21 August 2006 |website=HistoryNet}}</ref>

Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on 14 October against an Egyptian signals-intercept site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during the engagement.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=116, 126 & 129}} Israeli intelligence had also detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up for a major armored thrust as early as 12 October.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|pp=257–258}}