Editing Value theory (section)

=== Realism and anti-realism ===
Value [[Philosophical realism|realism]] is the view that values have mind-independent existence.<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>{{efn|If this position limits itself to the moral realm, it is known as [[moral realism]], an influential position in [[ethics]].<ref name="auto3"/>}} This means that [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] facts determine what has value, irrespective of subjective beliefs and preferences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> According to this view, the evaluative statement "That act is bad" is as objectively true or false as the empirical statement "That act causes distress".<ref>{{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11 11–12]}}</ref>

Realists often analyze values as [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] of valuable things.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref> For example, stating that kindness is good asserts that kindness possesses the property of goodness. Value realists disagree about what type of property is involved. [[Naturalism (philosophy)|Naturalists]] say that value is a natural property. Natural properties, like size and shape, can be known through [[Empirical evidence|empirical observation]] and are studied by the natural sciences. [[Ethical non-naturalism|Non-naturalists]] reject this view but agree that values are real. They say that values differ significantly from empirical properties and belong to another realm of reality. According to one view, they are known through rational or emotional intuition rather than empirical observation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>

Another disagreement among realists is about whether the entity carrying the value is a concrete [[Particular|individual]] or a [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> For instance, the name "Bill" refers to an individual while the sentence "Bill is pleased" refers to a state of affairs. States of affairs are complex entities that combine other entities, like the individual "Bill" and the property "pleased". Some value theorists hold that the value is a property directly of Bill while others contend that it is a property of the state of affairs that Bill is pleased.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112, 115}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> This distinction affects various disputes in value theory. In some cases, a value is intrinsic according to one view and extrinsic according to the other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35–36, 130–131]}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112}} }}</ref>

Value realism contrasts with [[anti-realism]], which comes in various forms. In its strongest version, anti-realism rejects the existence of values in any form, claiming that value statements are meaningless.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow Chart}}</ref>{{efn|This view is sometimes called ''radical [[nihilism]]''.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}}</ref>}} Between these two positions, there are various intermediate views. Some anti-realists accept that value claims have meaning but deny that they have a [[truth value]],{{efn|This means that value statements are neither true nor false.<ref>{{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022a}}</ref>}} a position known as [[non-cognitivism]]. For example, [[Emotivism|emotivists]] say that value claims express emotional attitudes, similar to how exclamations like "Yay!" or "Boo!" express emotions rather than stating facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?}} | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 80]}} | {{harvnb|DeNicola|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_sp6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA267 267]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Projectivism]] is a closely related view holding that values are projections of emotions onto the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 80]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>}}

[[Cognitivism (ethics)|Cognitivists]] contend that value statements have a truth value. [[Error theory|Error theorists]] defend anti-realism based on this view by stating that all value statements are false because there are no values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10 10]}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA14 14]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref> Another view accepts the existence of values but denies that they are mind-independent. According to this view, the [[mental state]]s of individuals determine whether an object has value, for instance, because individuals desire it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–62]}} | {{harvnb|Mander|2016|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f0UFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT14 § 2.3 An Overview]}} }}</ref> A similar view is defended by [[Existentialism|existentialists]] like [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], who argued that values are human creations that endow the world with meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Onof|loc=§6c. An Ethical Dimension}} | {{harvnb|Landau|2012|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Subjectivist theories say that values are relative to each subject, whereas more objectivist outlooks hold that values depend on [[mind]] in general rather than on the individual mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–62]}} }}</ref> A different position accepts that values are mind-independent but holds that they are reducible to other facts, meaning that they are not a fundamental part of reality. One form of [[reductionism]] maintains that a thing is good if it is fitting to favor this thing, regardless of whether people actually favor it, a position known as the ''fitting-attitude theory of value''. The buck-passing account, a closely related reductive view, argues that a thing is valuable if people have reasons to treat the thing in certain ways. These reasons come from other features of the valuable thing. The strongest form of realism says that value is a fundamental part of reality and cannot be reduced to other aspects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are the Value Facts Irreducible?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow Chart}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA67 67–68]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} | {{harvnb|Howard|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1.5 Buck Passing}} | {{harvnb|Suikkanen|2009|pp=768–769}} }}</ref>