Editing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (section)

===Logical atomism===
[[File:Wittgenstein Tractatus Annalen der Naturphilosophie.png|thumb|The ''Tractatus'' was first published in {{lang|de|Annalen der Naturphilosophie}} (1921)]]
Although Wittgenstein did not use the term himself, his metaphysical view throughout the ''Tractatus'' is commonly referred to as [[logical atomism]]. While his logical atomism resembles that of [[Bertrand Russell]], the two views are not strictly the same.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p58}}

Russell's [[theory of descriptions]] is a way of logically analyzing sentences containing definite descriptions without presupposing the existence of an object satisfying the description. According to the theory, a statement like "There is a man to my left" should be analyzed into: "There is some ''x'' such that ''x'' is a man and ''x'' is to my left, and for any ''y'', if ''y'' is a man and ''y'' is to my left, ''y'' is identical to ''x''". If the statement is true, ''x'' refers to the man to my left.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#RusTheDes |title=Descriptions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |publisher=Plato.stanford.edu |access-date=2011-12-10}}</ref>

Whereas Russell believed the names (like ''x'') in his theory should refer to things we can know directly by virtue of acquaintance, Wittgenstein did not believe that there are any epistemic constraints on logical analyses: the simple objects are whatever is contained in the [[elementary proposition]]s which cannot be logically analyzed any further.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p63}}

By ''objects'', Wittgenstein did not mean physical objects in the world, but the absolute base of logical analysis, that can be combined but not divided (TLP 2.02–2.0201).<ref name="Kenny2005" /> According to Wittgenstein's logico-atomistic metaphysical system, objects each have a "nature", which is their capacity to combine with other objects. When combined, objects form "states of affairs". A state of affairs that obtains is a "fact". Facts make up the entirety of the world; they are logically independent of one another, as are states of affairs. That is, the existence of one state of affairs (or fact) does not allow us to infer whether another state of affairs (or fact) exists or does not exist.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|pp58–59}}

Within states of affairs, objects are in particular relations to one another.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p59}} This is analogous to the spatial relations between toy cars discussed above. The structure of states of affairs comes from the arrangement of their constituent objects (TLP 2.032), and such arrangement is essential to their intelligibility, just as the toy cars must be arranged in a certain way in order to picture the automobile accident.<ref name="Kenny2005" />

A fact might be thought of as the obtaining state of affairs that Madison is in Wisconsin, and a possible (but not obtaining) state of affairs might be Madison's being in Utah. These states of affairs are made up of certain arrangements of objects (TLP 2.023). However, Wittgenstein does not specify what objects are. Madison, Wisconsin, and Utah cannot be atomic objects: they are themselves composed of numerous facts.<ref name="Kenny2005" /> Instead, Wittgenstein believed objects to be the things in the world that would correlate to the smallest parts of a logically analyzed language, such as names like ''x''. Our language is not sufficiently (i.e., not completely) analyzed for such a correlation, so one cannot ''say'' what an object is.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p60}} We can, however, talk about them as "indestructible" and "common to all possible worlds".<ref name="Kenny2005" /> Wittgenstein believed that the philosopher's job is to discover the structure of language through analysis.<ref name="Stern1995"/>{{rp|p38}}

[[Anthony Kenny]] provides a useful analogy for understanding Wittgenstein's [[logical atomism]]: a slightly modified game of [[chess]].<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp| pp60–61}} Just like objects in states of affairs, the chess pieces alone do not constitute the game{{mdash}}their arrangements, together with the pieces (objects) themselves, determine the state of affairs.<ref name="Kenny2005" />

Through Kenny's chess analogy, we can see the relationship between Wittgenstein's logical atomism and his [[Picture theory of language|picture theory of representation]].<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p61}} For the sake of this analogy, the chess pieces are objects, they and their positions constitute states of affairs and therefore facts, and the totality of facts is the entire particular game of chess.<ref name="Kenny2005" />

We can communicate such a game of chess in the exact way that Wittgenstein says a proposition represents the world.<ref name="Kenny2005" /> We might say "WR/KR1" to communicate a white rook's being on the square commonly labeled as king's rook 1. Or, to be more thorough, we might make such a report for every piece's position.<ref name="Kenny2005" />

The logical form of our reports must be the same logical form of the chess pieces and their arrangement on the board in order to be meaningful. Our communication about the chess game must have as many possibilities for constituents and their arrangement as the game itself.<ref name="Kenny2005" /> Kenny points out that such logical form need not strictly resemble the chess game. The logical form can be had by the bouncing of a ball (for example, twenty bounces might communicate a white rook's being on the king's rook 1 square). One can bounce a ball as many times as one wishes, which means that the ball's bouncing has "logical multiplicity", and can therefore share the logical form of the game.<ref name="Kenny2005" />{{rp|p62}}  A motionless ball cannot communicate this same information, as it does not have logical multiplicity.<ref name="Kenny2005" />