Editing Theophrastus (section)

== Philosophy ==
[[File:Theophrastus Nuremberg Chronicle.jpg|upright|thumb|Theophrastus, depicted as a medieval scholar in the ''[[Nuremberg Chronicle]]'']]
The extent to which Theophrastus followed Aristotle's doctrines, or defined them more accurately, or conceived them in a different form, and what additional structures of thought he placed upon them, can only be partially determined because of the loss of so many of his writings.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" /> Many of his opinions have to be reconstructed from the works of later writers such as [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]] and [[Simplicius of Cilicia|Simplicius]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Ierodiakonou |first=Katerina |title=Theophrastus |date=2020 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entriesheophrastus/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Winter 2020 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2022-07-07 }}{{Dead link|date=April 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

=== Logic ===
Theophrastus seems to have carried out still further the [[grammatical]] foundation of [[logic]] and [[rhetoric]], since in his book on the elements of [[speech]], he distinguished the main parts of speech from the subordinate parts, and also direct expressions ({{lang|grc|κυρία λέξις}} {{Transliteration|grc|kuria lexis}}) from metaphorical expressions, and dealt with the emotions ({{lang|grc|πάθη}} {{Transliteration|grc|pathe}}) of speech.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.'' 8.</ref> He further distinguished a twofold reference of speech ({{lang|grc|σχίσις}} {{Transliteration|grc|schisis}}) to things ({{lang|grc|πράγματα}} {{Transliteration|grc|pragmata}}) and to the hearers, and referred poetry and rhetoric to the latter.<ref>Ammonius, ''de Interpr.'' 53; Schol. ''in Arist.'' 108, 27.</ref>

He wrote at length on the unity of [[judgment]],<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' f. 128, 124; Schol. ''in Arist.'' 184. 24. 183, b. 2; Boethius, ''de Interpr.''</ref> on the different kinds of negation,<ref>Ammonius, ''in Arist. de Interpr.'' 128; Schol. ''in Arist.'' 121. 18.</ref> and on the difference between unconditional and conditional necessity.<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' f. 12. 6; Schol. ''in Arist.'' 149. 44.</ref> In his doctrine of [[syllogisms]] he brought forward the proof for the conversion of universal affirmative judgments, differed from Aristotle here and there in the laying down and arranging the ''modi'' of the syllogisms,<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' 14, 72, 73, 82. 22, b, 35; Boethius, ''de Syll. categ.'' ii. 594. 5, f. 603, 615.</ref> partly in the proof of them,<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' 39, b</ref> partly in the doctrine of mixture, i.e. of the influence of the modality of the premises upon the modality of the conclusion.<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' 39, b. etc. 40, 42, 56, b. 82, 64, b. 51; John Phil. xxxii, b. etc.</ref> Then, in two separate works, he dealt with the reduction of arguments to the syllogistic form and on the resolution of them;<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Anal. Pr.'' 115.</ref> and further, with hypothetical conclusions.<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Arist. Anal. Pr.'' 109, b. etc. 131, b.; John Phil. lx. etc. lxxv.; Boethius, ''de Syll. hypoth.''</ref> For the doctrine of [[Proof (truth)|proof]], [[Galen]] quotes the second ''Analytic'' of Theophrastus, in conjunction with that of Aristotle, as the best treatises on that doctrine.<ref>Galen, ''de Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm.'' ii. 2.</ref> In different [[monograph]]s he seems to have tried to expand it into a general theory of [[science]]. To this, too, may have belonged the proposition quoted from his ''Topics'', that the ''principles of opposites'' are themselves opposed, and cannot be deduced from one and the same higher genus.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.'' f. 5; Schol. p. 89. 15; comp. Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Metaph.'' 342. 30.</ref> For the rest, some minor deviations from the Aristotelian definitions are quoted from the ''Topica'' of Theophrastus.<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Top.'' 5, 68, 72, 25, 31.</ref> Closely connected with this treatise was that upon ambiguous words or ideas,<ref>Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''in Top.'' 83, 189.</ref> which, without doubt, corresponded to book Ε of Aristotle's ''Metaphysics''.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" />

=== Physics and metaphysics ===
Theophrastus introduced his Physics with the proof that all natural existence, being corporeal and composite, requires ''principles'',<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 1, 6.</ref> and first and foremost, [[Motion (physics)|motion]], as the basis of all change.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 5, 6.</ref> Denying the substance of [[space]], he seems to have regarded it, in opposition to Aristotle, as the mere arrangement and position ({{Transliteration|grc|taxis}} and {{Transliteration|grc|thesis}}) of bodies.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 149, b. 141.</ref> [[Time]] he called an accident of motion, without, it seems, viewing it, with Aristotle, as the numerical determinant of motion.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 87, b; John Phil. 213. 4.</ref> He attacked the doctrine of the four [[classical elements]] and challenged whether [[fire (classical element)|fire]] could be called a primary element when it appears to be compound, requiring, as it does, another material for its own nutriment.<ref>Theophrastus, ''On Fire'', 1.</ref>

[[File:Aristoteles Louvre.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Aristotle]]]]
He departed more widely from Aristotle in his doctrine of motion, since on the one hand he extended it over all categories, and did not limit it to those laid down by Aristotle.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.''; comp. Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 94, 201, 202, 1.</ref> He viewed motion, with Aristotle, as an activity, not carrying its own goal in itself ({{Transliteration|grc|ateles}}), of that which only [[Potentiality and actuality|potentially]] exists,<ref>Simplicius, l. c. and f. 94, 1.</ref> but he opposed Aristotle's view that motion required a special explanation, and he regarded it as something proper both to nature in general and the celestial system in particular:

{{blockquote|Surely, then, if the life in animals does not need explanation or is to be explained only in this way, may it not be the case that in the heavens too, and in the heavenly bodies, movement does not need explanation or is to be explained in a special way?|Theophrastus, ''Metaphysics'', 10a.16–29.{{sfn|Gould|1970|p=24}} }}

He recognised no activity without motion,<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.''</ref> and so referred all activities of the [[Soul (spirit)|soul]] to motion: the desires and emotions to corporeal motion, judgment ({{Transliteration|grc|kriseis}}) and contemplation to spiritual motion.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 225.</ref> The idea of a spirit entirely independent of organic activity, must therefore have appeared to him very doubtful; yet he appears to have contented himself with developing his doubts and difficulties on the point, without positively rejecting it.<ref>Themistius, ''in Arist. de An.'' 89, b. 91, b.</ref> Other Peripatetics, like [[Dicaearchus]], [[Aristoxenus]], and especially [[Strato of Lampsacus|Strato]], developed further this [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] in Aristotelian doctrine.

Theophrastus seems, generally speaking, where the investigation overstepped the limits of experience, to have preferred to develop the difficulties rather than solve them, as is especially apparent in his ''Metaphysics''.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" /> He was doubtful of Aristotle's [[teleology]] and recommended that such ideas be used with caution:

{{blockquote|With regard to the view that all things are for the sake of an end and nothing is in vain, the assignation of ends is in general not easy, as it is usually stated to be ... we must set certain limits to purposiveness and to the effort after the best, and not assert it to exist in all cases without qualification.|Theophrastus, ''Metaphysics'', 10a.22–24, 11a.1–3.{{sfn|Gould|1970b|p=25}}<!--end of quote-->}}

He did not follow the incessant attempts by Aristotle to refer phenomena to their ultimate foundations, or his attempts to unfold the internal connections between the latter, and between them and phenomena.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" /> In antiquity, it was a subject of complaint that Theophrastus had not expressed himself with precision and consistency respecting [[God]], and had understood it at one time as [[Heaven]], at another an (enlivening) breath (''[[pneuma]]'').<ref>Clement of Alexandria, ''Protrept.''; Cicero, ''de Natura Deorum'', i. 13.</ref>

=== Ethics ===
[[File:Theophrastus.jpg|thumb|upright|The bust inscribed "{{lang|grc|Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος}} ({{Transliteration|grc|Theophrastos Melanta Eresios}})"]]
Theophrastus did not allow a happiness resting merely upon virtue,<ref>Cicero, ''Academica'', i. 10, ''Tusculanae Quaestiones'', v. 9.</ref> or, consequently, to hold fast by the unconditional value of [[morality]]. He subordinated moral requirements to the advantage at least of a friend,<ref>Aulus Gellius, i. 3. §&nbsp;23.</ref> and had allowed in prosperity the existence of an influence injurious to them. In later times, fault was found with his expression in the ''Callisthenes'', "life is ruled by fortune, not wisdom" (''{{lang|la|vitam regit fortuna non sapientia}}'').<ref>Cicero, ''Tusculanae Quaestiones'', iii. 10; comp. Alexander of Aphrodisias, ''de Anima'', ii.</ref> That in the definition of pleasure, likewise, he did not coincide with Aristotle, seems to be indicated by the titles of two of his writings, one of which dealt with pleasure generally, the other with pleasure as Aristotle had defined it.{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§&nbsp;44}} Although, like his teacher, he preferred contemplative (theoretical), to active (practical) life,<ref>Cicero, ''ad Atticus'', ii. 16.</ref> he preferred to set the latter free from the restraints of family life, etc. in a manner of which Aristotle would not have approved.<ref>Jerome, ''Adversus Jovinianum'', i, 189.</ref>

Theophrastus was opposed to eating meat on the grounds that it robbed animals of life and was therefore unjust. Non-human animals, he said, can reason, sense, and feel just as human beings do.<ref name=Taylor35>Taylor, Angus. ''Animals and Ethics''. Broadview Press, p. 35.</ref>