Editing Spanish–American War (section)

===Declaring war===
{{Main|Propaganda of the Spanish–American War}}
[[File:Mapa ilustrado del Reino de España y sus posesiones para la Guardia Civil.jpg|thumb|Illustrated map published by the [[Guardia Civil]] showing the Kingdom of Spain and its remaining colonial possessions in 1895 ([[Caroline Islands|Caroline]] and [[Mariana Islands]], as well as [[Spanish Sahara]], [[Spanish Morocco|Morocco]], [[Spanish Guinea|Guinea]] and [[Guam]] are not included.)]]
[[File:Cuban soldiers, 1898.jpg|thumb|Cuban insurgent soldiers, who had already been fighting for [[Cuban War of Independence|Independence]] against Spain since 1895.]]
After ''Maine'' was destroyed, New York City newspaper publishers Hearst and Pulitzer decided that the Spanish were to blame, and they publicized this theory as fact in their papers.<ref>Evan Thomas, ''The war lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the rush to empire, 1898'' (Little, Brown, 2010) pp. 4–5, 209.</ref> Even prior to the explosion, both had published sensationalistic accounts of "atrocities" committed by the Spanish in Cuba; headlines such as "Spanish Murderers" were commonplace in their newspapers. Following the explosion, this tone escalated with the headline "Remember The Maine, To Hell with Spain!", quickly appearing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/cuba/map_04.html|title=CBSNews.com|website=www.cbsnews.com|access-date=July 27, 2021|archive-date=July 27, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727085410/http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/cuba/map_04.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.usni.org/remember-maine-hell-spain|title = 'Remember the Maine, to Hell with Spain!'|date = October 23, 2020|access-date = July 27, 2021|archive-date = July 27, 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210727085416/https://www.usni.org/remember-maine-hell-spain|url-status = live}}</ref> Their press exaggerated what was happening and how the Spanish were treating the Cuban prisoners.<ref>Ruiz, Vicki L. 2006. "Nuestra América: Latino History as United States History." ''Journal of American History''. p.?655</ref> The stories were based on factual accounts, but most of the time, the articles that were published were embellished and written with incendiary language causing emotional and often heated responses among readers. A common myth falsely states that when illustrator [[Frederic Remington]] said there was no war brewing in Cuba, Hearst responded: "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://academic2.american.edu/~wjc/wjc3/notlikely.htm|title=Not likely sent: the Remington-Hearst "telegrams"|first=W. Joseph|last=Campbell|date=August 2000|work=Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly|access-date=September 6, 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717003655/http://academic2.american.edu/~wjc/wjc3/notlikely.htm|archive-date=July 17, 2011|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

However, this new "[[yellow journalism]]" was uncommon outside New York City, and historians no longer consider it the major force shaping the national mood.<ref>{{harvnb|Smythe|2003|p=192}}.</ref> Public opinion nationwide did demand immediate action, overwhelming the efforts of President McKinley, [[Speaker of the United States House of Representatives|Speaker of the House]] [[Thomas Brackett Reed]], and the business community to find a negotiated solution. Wall Street, big business, high finance and Main Street businesses across the country were vocally opposed to war and demanded peace.<ref name="Pratt">{{cite journal |last=Pratt |first=Julius W. |date=May 1934 |title=American Business and the Spanish-American War |journal=The Hispanic American Historical Review |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=163–201 |doi=10.1215/00182168-14.2.163 |issn=0018-2168 |jstor=2506353 |doi-access=free}}</ref> After years of severe depression, the economic outlook for the domestic economy was suddenly bright again in 1897. However, the uncertainties of warfare posed a serious threat to full economic recovery. "War would impede the march of prosperity and put the country back many years," warned the ''New Jersey Trade Review.'' The leading railroad magazine editorialized, "From a commercial and mercenary standpoint it seems peculiarly bitter that this war should come when the country had already suffered so much and so needed rest and peace." McKinley paid close attention to the strong antiwar consensus of the business community, and strengthened his resolve to use diplomacy and negotiation rather than brute force to end the Spanish tyranny in Cuba.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|1934|pp=163–201}}. quotes on p. 168. Page 173 states: "an overwhelming preponderance of the local business interests of the country strongly desired peace."</ref> Historian Nick Kapur argues that McKinley's actions as he moved toward war were rooted not in various pressure groups but in his deeply held "Victorian" values, especially arbitration, pacifism, humanitarianism, and manly self-restraint.<ref>Nick Kapur (2011), "William McKinley's Values and the Origins of the Spanish‐American War: A Reinterpretation." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 41.1: pp. 18–38. {{JSTOR|23884754}}</ref>

A speech delivered by Republican Senator [[Redfield Proctor]] of Vermont on March 17, 1898, thoroughly analyzed the situation and greatly strengthened the pro-war cause. Proctor concluded that war was the only answer.<ref name="cubarmy">{{Harvnb|Dyal|Carpenter|Thomas|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1wv5KHk2_dsC&pg=PA210 210]}}</ref> Many in the business and religious communities which had until then opposed war, switched sides, leaving McKinley and Speaker Reed almost alone in their resistance to a war.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|1934|pp=173–74}}.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Offner|1992|pp=131–35}}; Michelle Bray Davis and Rollin W. Quimby, "Senator Proctor's Cuban Speech: Speculations on a Cause of the Spanish–American War," ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' 1969 55(2): 131–41.</ref><ref>Paul T. McCartney, "Religion, the Spanish–American War, and the Idea of American Mission", ''Journal of Church and State'' 54 (Spring 2012), 257–78.</ref> On April 11, McKinley ended his resistance and asked Congress for authority to send American troops to Cuba to end the civil war there, knowing that Congress would force a war.

[[File:Spanish American War transport Seneca.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|left|The American transport ship ''Seneca'', a chartered vessel that carried troops to Puerto Rico and Cuba]]

On April 19, while Congress was considering [[joint resolution]]s supporting Cuban independence, Republican Senator [[Henry M. Teller]] of [[Colorado]] proposed the [[Teller Amendment]] to ensure that the U.S. would not establish permanent control over Cuba after the war. The amendment, disclaiming any intention to annex Cuba, passed the Senate 42 to 35; the House concurred the same day, 311 to 6. The amended resolution demanded Spanish withdrawal and authorized the President to use as much military force as he thought necessary to help Cuba gain independence from Spain. President McKinley signed the joint resolution on April 20, 1898, and the ultimatum was sent to Spain.<ref name=stat33.738>Resolution 24, {{USStat|33|738}}</ref> In response, Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 21. On the same day, the U.S. Navy began a blockade of Cuba.<ref name="trask57" />

On April 25, the U.S. Congress [[United States declaration of war upon Spain|responded in kind]], declaring that a state of war between the U.S. and Spain had ''[[de facto]]'' existed since April 21, the day the blockade of Cuba had begun.<ref name="trask57"/> It was the embodiment of the naval plan created by Lieutenant Commander Charles Train four years ago, stating once the US enacted a proclamation of war against Spain, it would mobilize its N.A. (North Atlantic) squadron to form an efficient blockade in Havana, [[Matanzas]] and [[Sagua La Grande]].<ref name="auto1"/>

The Navy was ready, but the Army was not well-prepared for the war and made radical changes in plans and quickly purchased supplies. In the spring of 1898, the strength of the [[Regular Army (United States)|U.S. Regular Army]] was just 24,593 soldiers. The Army wanted 50,000 new men but received over 220,000 through volunteers and the mobilization of [[National Guard (United States)|state National Guard units]],<ref>Graham A. Cosmas, ''An Army for Empire: The United States Army and the Spanish–American War'' (1971) ch. 3–4</ref> even gaining nearly 100,000 men on the first night after the explosion of USS ''Maine''.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thomas|first=Evan|year=2016|title=Evan Thomas: War Lovers and American Power|journal=Military History, September 2010, 14 World History Collection}}</ref>

President McKinley issued two calls for volunteers, the first on April 23 which called for 125,000 men to enlist, followed by a second appeal for a further 75,000 volunteers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cunningham |first=Roger D. |date=January 2005 |title="A Lot of Fine, Sturdy Black Warriors": Texas's African American "Immunes" in the Spanish-American War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30242237 |journal=Southwestern Historical Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=3 |pages=345 |jstor=30242237 }}</ref> States in the Northeast, Midwest, and the West quickly filled their volunteer quota. In response to the surplus influx of volunteers, several Northern states had their quotas increased. Contrastingly, some Southern states struggled to fulfil even the first mandated quota, namely Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gleijeses |first=Piero |date=April 1996 |title=African Americans and the War against Spain |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23521538 |journal=North Carolina Historical Review |volume=73 |issue=2 |pages=192 |jstor=23521538 }}</ref>

The majority of states did not allow African-American men to volunteer, which impeded recruitment in Southern states, especially those with large African-American populations. Quota requirements, based on total population, were unmanageable, as they were disproportionate compared to the actual population permitted to volunteer.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |page=862 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> This was especially evident in some states, such as Kentucky and Mississippi, which accepted out-of-state volunteers to aid in meeting their quotas.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=890 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref>

This Southern apprehension towards enlistment can also be attributed to "a war weariness derived from the Confederacy's defeat in the Civil War."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=863 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> Many in the South were still recuperating financially after their losses in the Civil War, and the upcoming war did not provide much hope for economic prosperity in the South. The prospect of a naval war gave anxiety to those in the South. The financial security of those working and living in the cotton belt relied heavily upon trade across the Atlantic, which would be disrupted by a nautical war, the prospect of which fostered a reluctance to enlist.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=McCaffrey |first=James M. |date=October 2002 |title=Texans in the Spanish-American War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30240344 |journal=Southwestern Historical Quarterly |volume=106 |issue=2 |pages=260 |jstor=30240344 }}</ref> Potential volunteers were also not financially incentivized, with pay per month initially being $13.00, which then was then raised to $15.60 for combat pay.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=879 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> It was more economically promising for most Southern men to continue in their own enterprises rather than enlist.