Editing Russo-Japanese War (section)

=== Pre-war negotiations ===
The Japanese statesman [[Itō Hirobumi]] started to negotiate with the Russians. He regarded Japan as too weak to evict the Russians militarily, so he proposed giving Russia control over Manchuria in exchange for Japanese control of northern Korea. Of the five ''Genrō'' (elder statesmen) who made up the Meiji oligarchy, Itō Hirobumi and Count [[Inoue Kaoru]] opposed the idea of war against Russia on financial grounds, while [[Katsura Tarō]], [[Komura Jutarō]] and Field Marshal [[Yamagata Aritomo]] favored war.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p= 96}} Meanwhile, Japan and Britain had signed the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]] in 1902 – the British seeking to restrict naval competition by keeping the Russian Pacific seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur from their full use. Japan's alliance with the British meant, in part, that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any war against Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japan's side. Russia could no longer count on receiving help from either Germany or France without the danger of British involvement in the war. With such an alliance, Japan felt free to commence hostilities if necessary.{{sfn|Nish|1985|loc=ch. 8}}

The 1890s and 1900s marked the height of the "[[Yellow Peril]]" propaganda by the German government, and the German Emperor [[Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Wilhelm II]] ({{reign | 1888 | 1918}}) often wrote letters to his cousin Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, praising him as the "saviour of the white race" and urging Russia forward in Asia.<ref name="McLean2003_121">{{harvnb|McLean|2003|p=121}}.</ref><ref name="Fiebi-vonHase2003_165">{{harvnb|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|p=165}}.</ref> From November 1894 onward, Wilhelm had been writing letters praising Nicholas as Europe's defender from the "Yellow Peril", assuring the Tsar that God Himself had "chosen" Russia to defend Europe from the alleged Asian threat.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=182}} On 1 November 1902 Wilhelm wrote to Nicholas that "certain symptoms in the East seem to show that Japan is becoming a rather restless customer" and "it is evident to every unbiased mind that Korea must and will be Russian".{{r|McLean2003_121}} Wilhelm ended his letter with the warning that Japan and China would soon unite against Europe, writing: <blockquote>Twenty to thirty million Chinese, supported by a half dozen Japanese divisions, led by competent, intrepid Japanese officers, full of hatred for Christianity{{snd}}that is a vision of the future that cannot be contemplated without concern, and it is not impossible. On the contrary, it is the realisation of the yellow peril, which I described a few years ago and I was ridiculed by the majority of people for my graphic depiction of it&nbsp;... Your devoted friend and cousin, Willy, Admiral of the Atlantic.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=183}}</blockquote>

Wilhelm aggressively encouraged Russia's ambitions in Asia because [[Franco-Russian Alliance|France, Russia's closest ally]] since 1894, was less than supportive of Russian expansionism in Asia, and it was believed in Berlin that German support of Russia might break up the Franco-Russian alliance and lead to a new German–Russian alliance.{{r|McLean2003_121}}
The French had made it clear that they disapproved of Nicholas's forward policy in Asia; the French Premier [[Maurice Rouvier]] (in office: May to December 1887) publicly declaring that the Franco-Russian alliance applied only in Europe, not to Asia,<ref>{{cite book
 | last1 = Röhl
 | first1 = John C. G.
 | author-link1 = John C. G. Röhl
 | translator1-last = de Bellaigue
 | translator1-first = Sheila
 | translator2-last = Bridge
 | translator2-first = Roy
 | year = 2008
 | chapter = Uncle and nephew: Edward VII and the 'encirclement' of Germany
 | title = Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=xUxkAgAAQBAJ
 | edition = reprint
 | publisher = Cambridge University Press
 | publication-date = 2014
 | pages = 252–253
 | isbn = 9780521844314
 | access-date = 16 September 2020
 | quote = As war between Russia and Japan drew nearer in the winter of 1903–4, London and Paris intensified their efforts to come to an understanding, both governments being anxious to avoid being dragged into the coming conflict between their respective allies. [...] When the French premier, Maurice Rouvier, declared that his country's alliance with Russia did not extend to East Asia but only to Europe, Wilhelm greeted this announcement jubilantly [...].
 | archive-date = 1 October 2020
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201001022242/https://books.google.com/books?id=xUxkAgAAQBAJ
 | url-status = live
 }}</ref>
and that France would remain neutral if Japan attacked Russia.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|pp= 252–253}}{{request quotation|date=September 2020}} The American president [[Theodore Roosevelt]] (in office 1901–1909), who was attempting to mediate the Russian–Japanese dispute, complained that Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" propaganda, which strongly implied that Germany might go to war against Japan in support of Russia, encouraged Russian intransigence.{{sfn|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|p= 163}} On 24 July 1905, in a letter to the British diplomat [[Cecil Spring Rice]], Roosevelt wrote that Wilhelm bore partial responsibility for the war as "he has done all he could to bring it about", charging that Wilhelm's constant warnings about the "Yellow Peril" had made the Russians uninterested in compromise as Nicholas believed that Germany would intervene if Japan attacked.{{sfn|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|pp=163–164}}

The implicit promise of German support suggested by Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" speeches and letters to Nicholas led many decision-makers in [[Saint Petersburg]] to believe that Russia's military weaknesses in the Far East (like the uncompleted Trans-Siberian railroad line) did not matter{{snd}}they assumed that the ''Reich'' would come to Russia's assistance if war should come. In fact, neither Wilhelm nor his Chancellor Prince [[Bernhard von Bülow]] (in office: 1900–1909) had much interest in East Asia, and Wilhelm's letters to Nicholas praising him as Europe's saviour against the "Yellow Peril" were really meant to provoke change in the [[European balance of power|balance of power in Europe]], as Wilhelm believed that any Russian entanglement with Japan would break up the Franco-Russian alliance and lead to Nicholas signing an alliance with Germany.{{r|Fiebi-vonHase2003_165}} This was especially the case as Germany had embarked upon the "[[Tirpitz Plan]]" and a policy of ''[[Weltpolitik]]'' (from 1897) meant to challenge Britain's position as the world's leading power. Since Britain was allied to Japan, if Germany could manipulate Russia and Japan into going to war with each other, this in turn would allegedly lead to Russia turning towards Germany.{{r|Fiebi-vonHase2003_165}}

Furthermore, Wilhelm believed if a Russian–German alliance emerged, France would be compelled to join it. He also hoped that having Russia pursue an expansionist policy in Asia would distract and keep Russia out of the Balkans, thus removing the main source of tension between Russia and Germany's ally [[Austria-Hungary]].{{r|McLean2003_121}} During the war, Nicholas, who took at face value Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" speeches, placed much hope in German intervention on his side. More than once Nicholas chose to continue the war out of the belief that the Kaiser would come to his aid.{{sfn|McLean|2003|pp= 127–128}}

Despite previous assurances that Russia would completely withdraw from Manchuria the forces it had sent to crush the Boxer Rebellion by 8 April 1903, that day passed with no reduction in Russian forces in that region.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p=102}} In Japan, university students demonstrated both against Russia and against their own government for not taking any action.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p=102}} On 28 July 1903 [[Shinichiro Kurino|Kurino Shin'ichirō]], the Japanese minister in Saint Petersburg, was instructed to present his country's view opposing Russia's consolidation plans in Manchuria. On 3 August 1903 the Japanese minister handed in the following document to serve as the basis for further negotiations:<ref>{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date= 3 August 1903 }} in {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|pp= [https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/7/mode/1up 7–9]}}.</ref>
# Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.
# Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of article I of this agreement.
# Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of article I of this agreement. Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan–Newchwang lines.
# Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in article II of this agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.
# Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.
# This agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.
On 3 October 1903 the Russian minister to Japan, [[Roman Rosen]], presented to the Japanese government the Russian counter proposal as the basis of negotiations, as follows:<ref>{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date= 5 October 1903 }} in {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|pp= [https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/22/mode/1up 22–24]}}.</ref>
# Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.
# Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the empire without infringing the stipulations of article I.
# Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of article I.
# Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
# Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.
# Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.
# Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
# This agreement to supplant all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.

During the Russian–Japanese talks, the Japanese historian Hirono Yoshihiko noted, "once negotiations commenced between Japan and Russia, Russia scaled back its demands and claims regarding Korea bit by bit, making a series of concessions that Japan regarded as serious compromises on Russia's part".<ref name="Katō2007_978">{{harvnb|Katō|2007|pp=97–98}}.</ref> The war might not have broken out had not the issues of Korea and Manchuria become linked.<ref name="Katō2007_101">{{harvnb|Katō|2007|p=101}}.</ref> The Korean and Manchurian issues had become linked as the Prime Minister of Japan, [[Katsura Tarō]] (in office 1901–1906), decided if war did come, that Japan was more likely to have the support of the United States and Great Britain if the war could be presented as a struggle for [[free trade]] against the highly protectionist Russian empire, in which case, Manchuria, which was the larger market than Korea, was more likely to engage Anglo-American sympathies.{{r|Katō2007_101}} Throughout the war, Japanese propaganda presented the recurring theme of Japan as a "civilized" power (that supported free trade and would implicitly allow foreign businesses into the resource-rich region of Manchuria) vs. Russia the "uncivilized" power (that was protectionist and wanted to keep the riches of Manchuria all to itself).{{r|Katō2007_101}}

Emperor Gojong of Korea (King from 1864 to 1897, Emperor from 1897 to 1907) came to believe that the issue dividing Japan and Russia was Manchuria, and chose to pursue a policy of neutrality as the best way of preserving Korean independence as the crisis mounted.{{r|Katō2007_978}} In a series of reports to Beijing, Hu Weide, the Chinese ambassador in Saint Petersburg from July 1902 to September 1907, looked closely at whether a Russian or a Japanese victory would be favourable to China, and argued that the latter was preferable, as he maintained a Japanese victory presented the better chance for China to regain sovereignty over Manchuria.{{r|Katō2007_978}} In December 1903 China decided to remain neutral if war came, because though Japan was the only power capable of evicting Russia from Manchuria, the extent of Japanese ambitions in Manchuria was not clear to Beijing.{{r|Katō2007_978}}

Russian–Japanese negotiations then followed, although by early January 1904 the Japanese government had realised that Russia was not interested in settling the [[Manchuria]]n or Korean issues. Instead, Russia's goal was buying time{{snd}}via diplomacy{{snd}}to further build up militarily.<ref name="KodaNWCR2005">{{Cite journal |last= Koda |first= Yoji |title= The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success |journal= [[Naval War College Review]]  |volume= 58 |issue= 2 |date= Spring 2005 |url-access=  |url= https://www.questia.com/read/1P3-840737501 }}{{dead link|date=July 2021}}</ref> In December 1903, Wilhelm wrote in a marginal note on a diplomatic dispatch about his role in inflaming Russo-Japanese relations:<blockquote>Since 97{{snd}}Kiaochow{{snd}}we have never left Russia in any doubt that we would cover her back in Europe, in case she decided to pursue a bigger policy in the Far East that might lead to military complications (with the aim of relieving our eastern border from the fearful pressure and threat of the massive Russian army!). Whereupon, Russia took Port Arthur and ''trusting us'', took her fleet ''out of the Baltic'', thereby making herself ''vulnerable to us'' by sea. In Danzig 01 and Reval 02, the same assurance was given again, with result that entire Russian divisions from Poland and European Russia were and are being sent to the Far East. This would not had happened if our governments had not been in agreement!{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=164}}</blockquote>
A recurring theme of Wilhelm's letters to Nicholas was that "Holy Russia" had been "chosen" by God to save the "entire white race" from the "Yellow Peril", and that Russia was "entitled" to annex all of Korea, Manchuria, and northern China up to Beijing.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=263}} Wilhelm went on to assure Nicholas that once Russia had defeated Japan, this would be a deadly blow to British diplomacy, and that the two emperors, the self-proclaimed "Admiral of the Atlantic" and the "Admiral of the Pacific", would rule Eurasia together, making them able to challenge British [[sea power]] as the resources of Eurasia would make their empires immune to a British blockade, and thus allowing Germany and Russia to "divide up the best" of the British colonies in Asia between them.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=263}}

Nicholas had been prepared to compromise with Japan, but after receiving a letter from Wilhelm attacking him as a coward for his willingness to compromise with the Japanese (who, Wilhelm never ceasing reminding Nicholas, represented the "Yellow Peril") for the sake of peace, became more obstinate.<ref name="Röhl2014_269">{{harvnb|Röhl|2014|p= 269}}.</ref> Wilhelm had written to Nicholas stating that the question of Russian interests in Manchuria and Korea was beside the point, saying instead it was a matter of Russia:<blockquote>...undertaking the protection and defence of the White Race, and with it, Christian civilization, against the Yellow Race. And whatever the Japs are determined to ensure the domination of the Yellow Race in East Asia, to put themselves at its head and organise and lead it into battle against the White Race. That is the kernel of the situation, and therefore there can be very little doubt about where the sympathies of all half-way intelligent Europeans should lie. England betrayed Europe's interests to America in a cowardly and shameful way over the Panama Canal question, so as to be left in 'peace' by the Yankees. Will the 'Tsar' likewise betray the interests of the White Race to the Yellow as to be 'left in peace' and not embarrass the Hague tribunal too much?.{{r|Röhl2014_269}}</blockquote>
When Nicholas replied that he still wanted peace, Wilhelm wrote back in a telegram "You innocent angel!", telling his advisors "This is the language of an innocent angel. But not that of a White Tsar!"{{r|Röhl2014_269}} Nevertheless, Tokyo believed that Russia was not serious about seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. On 13 January 1904, Japan proposed a formula by which Manchuria would remain outside Japan's sphere of influence and, reciprocally, Korea outside Russia's. On 21 December 1903, the Katsura cabinet voted to go to war against Russia.{{r|Katō2007_101}}

[[File:Shinichiro Kurino.jpg|thumb|Kurino Shin'ichirō]]

By 4 February 1904, no formal reply had been received from Saint Petersburg. On 6 February the Japanese minister to Russia, [[Shin'ichirō Kurino|Kurino Shin'ichirō]], was recalled, and Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia.{{r|KodaNWCR2005}}

Potential diplomatic resolution of territorial concerns between Japan and Russia failed; historians have argued that this directly resulted from the actions of Emperor [[Nicholas II]]. Crucially, Nicholas mismanaged his government. Although certain scholars contend that the situation arose from the determination of Nicholas II to use the war against Japan to spark a revival in Russian patriotism, no historical evidence supports this claim.{{sfn|Esthus|1981|p= 411}} The Tsar's advisors did not support the war, foreseeing problems in transporting troops and supplies from European Russia to the East.<ref>{{Cite book |last= Tolf |first= Robert W. |year= 1976 |title= The Russian Rockfellers |publisher= Hoover Press |isbn= 0-8179-6583-1 |page= 156 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3DmsQLtWq1wC |access-date= 20 September 2020 |archive-date= 1 November 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201101200552/https://books.google.com/books?id=3DmsQLtWq1wC |url-status= live }}</ref> The Tsar himself repeatedly delayed negotiations with the Japanese government as he believed that he was protected by God and the autocracy.{{sfn|Esthus|1981|p= 397}} The Japanese understanding of this can be seen in a telegram from Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Komura, to the minister to Russia, in which he stated:
<blockquote>
...the Japanese government have at all times during the progress of the negotiations made it a special point to give prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian government. The negotiations have now been pending for no less than four months, and they have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can with certainty be predicted. In these circumstances the Japanese government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation for which the delays in negotiations are largely responsible.<ref>
{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date=  1903 }} In {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|p=[https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/38/mode/1up 38]}}.
</ref>
</blockquote>
Some scholars have suggested that Nicholas II dragged Japan into war intentionally, in hopes of reviving Russian nationalism. This notion conflicts with a comment made by Nicholas to Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, saying there would be no war because he "did not wish it".{{sfn|Schimmelpenninck van der Oye|2005|p=42}}
This does not reject the claim that Russia played an aggressive role in the East, which it did; rather, it means that Russia unwisely calculated and supposed that Japan would not go to war against Russia's far larger and seemingly superior navy and army. Nicholas held the Japanese in contempt as "yellow monkeys", and he took for granted that the Japanese would simply yield in the face of Russia's superior power, which thus explains his unwillingness to compromise.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|pp= 16–20}} Evidence of Russia's false sense of security and superiority to Japan is seen by Russian reference to Japan's choosing war as a big mistake.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|p=21}}{{request quotation|date=September 2020}}