Editing Rational choice model (section)

==== Rational choice theory in international relations ====
Rational choice theory has become one of the major tools used to study international relations. Proponents of its use in this field typically assume that states and the policies crafted at the national outcome are the outcome of self-interested, politically shrewd actors including, but not limited to, politicians, lobbyists, businesspeople, activists, regular voters and any other individual in the national audience. The use of rational choice theory as a framework to predict political behavior has led to a rich literature that describes the trajectory of policy to varying degrees of success. For example, some scholars have examined how states can make credible threats to deter other states from a (nuclear) attack.<ref>T.C. Schelling (1960). ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing (1977). ''Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; R. Powell (1990). ''Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Others have explored under what conditions states wage war against each other.<ref>Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981). "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," ''International Studies Quarterly'', 25(4), pp. 541–568; J.D. Fearon (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War," ''International Organization'', 49(3), pp. 379–414.</ref> Yet others have investigated under what circumstances the threat and imposition of international economic sanctions tend to succeed and when they are likely to fail.<ref>Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff (1997). "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis," ''American Journal of Political Science'', 41(2), pp. 608–618; Daniel W. Drezner (1999). ''The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lisa L. Martin (1992). ''Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions''. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Claas Mertens, [[doi:10.1093/isq/sqae016|Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?, ''International Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 68, Iss. 2, June 2024]]</ref>