Editing Proportional representation (section)

==Advantages and disadvantages==
Researchers have repeatedly found multiparty proportional systems to improve voter turnout<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Selb |first=Peter |date=2009-04-01 |title=A Deeper Look at the Proportionality—Turnout Nexus |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414008327427?icid=int.sj-abstract.similar-articles.3 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=EN |volume=42 |issue=4 |pages=527–548 |doi=10.1177/0010414008327427 |issn=0010-4140}}</ref> and satisfaction<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Altman |first=David |last2=Flavin |first2=Patrick |last3=Radcliff |first3=Benjamin |date=2017-10-01 |title=Democratic Institutions and Subjective Well-Being |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032321716683203 |journal=Political Studies |language=EN |volume=65 |issue=3 |pages=685–704 |doi=10.1177/0032321716683203 |issn=0032-3217}}</ref> with less negative political debates<ref>{{Cite web |title=Negative Campaigning in a Multiparty System {{!}} Request PDF |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232849899_Negative_Campaigning_in_a_Multiparty_System |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20210301213655/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232849899_Negative_Campaigning_in_a_Multiparty_System |archive-date=2021-03-01 |access-date=2025-05-09 |website=ResearchGate |language=en}}</ref> and more representation among minorities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Canon |first=David T. |date=1999 |title=Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/440349?seq=1 |journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=331–385 |doi=10.2307/440349 |issn=0362-9805}}</ref> There also some evidence that they handle pandemics better.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ingraham |first=Christopher |date=2021-03-01 |title=Analysis {{!}} How to fix democracy: Move beyond the two-party system, experts say |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/03/01/break-up-two-party-system/ |access-date=2025-05-09 |work=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

The case for a single transferable vote system, a form of proportional representation, was made by [[John Stuart Mill]] in his 1861 essay ''[[Considerations on Representative Government]]''. His remarks are relevant to any form of PR.
{{Blockquote|text=In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy, the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? ... Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government ... there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.<ref name="JSM7" />}}

Mill's essay does not support party-based proportional representation and may indicate a distaste for the ills of party-based systems in saying:<blockquote>Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances.<ref name="JSM7" /></blockquote>Many political theorists agree with Mill<ref name="forder">{{cite book |last=Forder |first=James |author-link=James Forder |title=The case against voting reform |date=2011 |publisher=[[Oneworld Publications]] |location=Oxford |isbn=978-1-85168-825-8}}</ref> that in a [[representative democracy]] the representatives should represent all substantial segments of society but want reform rather than abolition of direct local community representation in the legislature.<ref>Abbott, Lewis F. ''British Democracy: Its Restoration and Extension''. ISR/Kindle Books, 2019. {{ISBN|9780906321522}}. Chapter 7, "Electoral System Reform: Increasing Competition and Voter Choice and Influence".</ref> (Mill himself only served one term as MP and then found it impossible to get a party to nominate him as their candidate. He was pointed out as an example of the kind of publicly spirited person who cannot even achieve a nomination under first-past-the-post.)<ref>{{citation |title=or effective voting, held at River House, Chelsea, on Tuesday, July 10th 1894. Addressed by Miss Spence, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Courtney, Sir John Lubbock, and Sir John Hall. |p=25 |url=https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupid?key=ha100618520 |date=1894 |publisher=J. Bale & sons |last=Spence |first=Catherine |via=HathiTrust}}</ref>

STV and regionalized forms of additional-member systems or MMP systems (such as used to elect the Scottish Assembly) produce local area representation and overall PR through mixed, balanced representation at the district or regional level.<ref>2020 Irish general election]]</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://ballotbox.scot/scottish-parliament/ams-explained/ | title=Holyrood's AMS Voting System Explained }}</ref>

===Fairness===
PR tries to resolve the unfairness of single-winner and [[Winner-take-all system|winner-take-all]] systems such as [[plurality voting]], where the largest parties typically receive an "unfair" seat bonus and smaller parties are disadvantaged, always under-represented, and on occasion win no representation at all ([[Duverger's law]]).<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Optimal apportionment |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=121 |issue=3 |pages=584–608 |date=2013 |first1=Y. |last1=Koriyama |first2=A. |last2=Macé |first3=J.-F. |last3=Laslier |first4=R. |last4=Treibich |doi=10.1086/670380 |s2cid=10158811}}</ref><ref name="Norris" />{{rp|6–7}} Under FPTP, an established party in UK elections has been elected to majority government with as little as 33.7% of votes ([[2024 United Kingdom general election|in 2024]],) and ten times on record [[1830 United Kingdom general election|since 1830]], a government obtained the most seats while losing the popular vote to another party. In certain Canadian elections, majority governments have been formed by parties with the support of under 40 percent of votes cast ([[2011 Canadian federal election|2011 Canadian election]], [[2015 Canadian federal election|2015 Canadian election]]). If turnout levels in the electorate are less than 60 percent, such outcomes allow a party to form a majority government by convincing as few as one quarter of the electorate to vote for it. 

That same situation can occur elsewhere as well. In the [[2005 United Kingdom general election|2005 UK election]], for example, the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] under [[Tony Blair]] won a comfortable parliamentary majority with the votes of only 21.6 percent of the total electorate.<ref>{{cite web |first1=Colin |last1=Rallings |first2=Michael |last2=Thrasher |title=The 2005 general election: analysis of the results |url=http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf |website=Electoral Commission, Research, Electoral data |publisher=[[Electoral Commission (United Kingdom)|Electoral Commission]] |access-date=29 March 2015 |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020142823/http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf |archive-date=20 October 2017}}</ref>{{rp|3}} Such misrepresentation has been criticized as "no longer a question of 'fairness' but of elementary rights of citizens".<ref name="hansard1976" />{{rp|22}}

However, some PR systems with a high [[electoral threshold]], or other features that reduce proportionality, are not necessarily much fairer: in the [[2002 Turkish general election]], using an open-list list PR system with a 10 percent threshold, 46 percent of votes were wasted.<ref name="ideaEsd">{{cite web |year=2005 |title=Electoral System Design: the New International IDEA Handbook |url=https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-new-international-idea-handbook |access-date=9 April 2014 |publisher=[[International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance]]}}</ref>{{rp|83}} The other 54 percent of the votes did receive fair level of representation, though. 

Under first-past-the-post, a third or so of members are elected with less than half the votes cast in their district, the majority of voters in such districts not getting any local representation and, with no levelling seats being used, getting no representation entirely.

District-based winner-take-all systems also benefit regional parties by allowing them to win many seats in the region where they have a strong following even though they have less support nationally, while other parties with support that is not concentrated in a few districts, like various [[Green politics|Green parties]], win few or no seats. An example was Canada's [[1993 Canadian federal election|1993 election]], when the [[Bloc Québécois]] won 52 seats, all in [[Quebec]], on 14 percent of the national vote <!-- Norris's figure of 18% is wrong, see following UBC ref -->, which was 12 more seats than it would have earned if seats were allocated based on the popular vote. The [[Progressive Conservative Party of Canada|Progressive Conservatives]] collapsed to two seats on 16 percent of the votes spread nationally, when it was due 48. The Conservative party, although strong nationally, previously had won many of its seats in the West, In 1993, many of its Western supporters turned to the Reform party (a regional party), which won all its seats west of Ontario and most of its seats west of Saskatchewan. 

The Conservative vote was spread so thin that in only one riding did it take a majority of votes, and in only two ridings did it take enough votes to win the seat. In about 150 districts, the Conservative candidate received more than 15 percent of the vote, but in only two cases did the candidate take enough votes to win the seat. Under PR, the Conservative party's 16 percent of the votes would have been mirrored by elected representation (likely about 48 seats), while under FPTP, the use of 295 separate election contests, with no overarching mechanism of proportionality, meant almost all of the Conservative votes were wasted.<ref name="Norris">{{Cite journal |last=Norris |first=Pippa |year=1997 |title=Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/019251297018003005 |journal=International Political Science Review |publisher=[[Harvard University]] |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=297–312 |doi=10.1177/019251297018003005 |s2cid=9523715 |issn=0192-5121 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150705000416/https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Choosing%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf |archive-date=5 July 2015 |access-date=9 April 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=1993 Canadian Federal Election Results |url=http://esm.ubc.ca/CA93/results.html |publisher=University of British Columbia |access-date=25 January 2016 |archive-date=30 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170830154131/http://esm.ubc.ca/CA93/results.html}}</ref> 

Similarly, in the [[2015 United Kingdom general election|2015 UK general election]], conducted using single-winner FPTP, the [[Scottish National Party]] gained 56 seats, all in [[Scotland]], with a 4.7 percent share of the national vote, while the [[UK Independence Party]], with 12.6 percent, gained only a single seat.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election 2015{{snd}}BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results|website=BBC |access-date=11 May 2015}}</ref>

===Representation of minor parties===
The use of multiple-member districts elects a greater variety of members compared to first-past-the-post. It has been argued that in emerging democracies, inclusion of minorities in the legislature can be essential for social stability and to consolidate the democratic process.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|58}}

Critics of PR, on the other hand, claim inclusion can give extreme parties a foothold in parliament. That is sometimes cited as a cause for the [[Weimar Republic#Institutional problems|collapse of the Weimar]] government. With very low thresholds, very small parties can act as "king-makers",<ref>{{cite news |first1=Ana Nicolaci |last1=da Costa |first2=Charlotte |last2=Greenfield |title=New Zealand's ruling party ahead after poll but kingmaker in no rush to decide |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-election-tally/new-zealands-ruling-party-ahead-after-poll-but-kingmaker-in-no-rush-to-decide-idUSKCN1BY0LZ |work=[[Reuters]] |date=23 September 2017}}</ref> holding larger parties to ransom during [[Coalition government|coalition]] discussions. The example of [[Israel]] is often quoted,<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|59}} These problems can be limited, as in the modern German [[Bundestag]], by the use of a high electoral threshold, limiting the parties that receive parliamentary representation (This would in turn increase the number of wasted votes, if voters cannot register alternate preferences).

Another criticism is that the dominant parties in plurality/majoritarian systems, often looked on as "coalitions" or as "[[broad church]]es",<ref>{{cite web |last1=Roberts |first1=Iain |title=People in broad church parties should think twice before attacking coalitions |url=http://www.libdemvoice.org/people-in-broad-church-parties-should-think-twice-before-attacking-coalitions-20101.html |publisher=[[Liberal Democrat Voice]] |access-date=29 July 2014 |date=29 June 2010}}</ref> can fragment under PR as the election of candidates from smaller groups becomes possible. Israel, Brazil, and Italy (until [[Italian electoral law of 1993|1993]]) are examples.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|59,89}} However, research shows, in general, there is only a small increase in the number of parties in parliament (although small parties have larger representation) under PR.

Open list systems and STV, the only prominent PR system that does not require political parties, enable [[Independent politician|independent]] candidates to be elected. In Ireland, on average, about six independent candidates have been elected each parliament.<ref>{{cite web |title=Electoral Reform Society's evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Bill for House of Lords Reform |url=http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/reforming-the-house-of-lords |publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]] |date=21 October 2011 |access-date=10 May 2015}}</ref> This can lead to a situation where forming a Parliamentary majority requires support of one or more of these independent representatives. In some cases these independents have positions that are closely aligned with the governing party and it hardly matters. The Irish Government formed after the [[2016 Irish general election|2016]] election even included independent representatives in the cabinet of a minority government. In other cases, the independent member's electoral platform is entirely local and addressing this is a price for support.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}}

===Coalitions===
The election of smaller parties gives rise to one of the principal objections to PR systems, that they almost always result in [[coalition government]]s.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|59}}<ref name="forder" />

Supporters of PR see coalitions as an advantage, forcing compromise between parties to form a coalition at the centre of the [[political spectrum]], and often when an election forces government change, some of the old coalition are in the new coalition so PR produces continuity and stability. Opponents counter that with many policies, compromise is not possible. Neither can many policies be easily positioned on the left-right spectrum (for example, the environment). So policies are [[Horse trading (political)|horse-traded]] during coalition formation, with the consequence that voters have no way of knowing which policies will be pursued by the government they elect; voters have less influence on governments. Also, coalitions do not necessarily form at the centre, and small parties can have excessive influence, supplying a coalition with a majority only on condition that a policy or policies favoured by few voters is/are adopted. Most importantly, some say the ability of voters to vote an unpopular party out of power is curtailed.<ref name="forder" />

All these disadvantages, the PR opponents contend, are avoided by two-party plurality voting systems. Coalitions are rare; the two dominant parties necessarily compete at the centre for votes, so that governments are more reliably moderate; the strong opposition necessary for proper scrutiny of government is assured; and governments remain sensitive to public sentiment because they can be, and are, regularly voted out of power.<ref name="forder" /> However, this is not necessarily so; a two-party system can result in a "drift to extremes", hollowing out the centre,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Harris |first1=Paul |title='America is better than this': paralysis at the top leaves voters desperate for change |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/20/paralysis-in-us-politics-extremism |access-date=17 November 2014 |work=The Guardian |date=20 November 2011}}</ref> or, at least, in one party drifting to an extreme.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Krugman |first1=Paul |title=Going To Extreme |url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/going-to-extreme/ |website=The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman Blog |publisher=[[The New York Times Co.]] |access-date=24 November 2014 |date=19 May 2012}}</ref> As well, a two-party election system may operate in an oligopolistic manner, with both parties ignoring a particular viewpoint (the two parties engaging in too much compromise), or one party may verge off, having been controlled by an extreme group, so creating polarization.<ref>{{Cite book| url=https://academic.oup.com/book/36918/chapter-abstract/322171607?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false | doi=10.1093/oso/9780190913854.003.0003 | chapter=The Paradox of Partisanship | title=Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop | date=2020 | last1=Drutman | first1=Lee | pages=35–57 | publisher=Oxford University Press | isbn=978-0-19-091385-4 }}</ref> A two-party plurality election system means there are many safe seats, districts where only one party has a chance to be elected. This often leads to polarization and low voter turnout, and sometimes opens door to foreign interference at the nomination stage.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/as-partisan-hostility-grows-signs-of-frustration-with-the-two-party-system/ | title=As Partisan Hostility Grows, Signs of Frustration with the Two-Party System | date=9 August 2022 }}</ref> 

The opponents of PR also contend that coalition governments created under PR are less stable, and elections are more frequent. Italy is an often-cited example with many governments composed of many different coalition partners. However, Italy is unusual in that both its houses can make a government fall, whereas other countries, including many PR nations, have either just one house or have one of their two houses be the core body supporting a government. Italy's current [[Italian electoral law of 2017|parallel voting system]] is not PR, so Italy is not an appropriate candidate for measuring the stability of PR.{{Citation needed|date=December 2023}} Canada, which uses FPTP with a multi-party system, had more elections between 1945 and 2017 than PR countries such as Norway, Germany and Ireland.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}}

===Voter participation===
Plurality systems usually result in single-party-majority government because generally fewer parties are elected in large numbers under FPTP compared to PR, and FPTP compresses politics to little more than two-party contests. Relatively few votes in a few of the most finely balanced districts, the "[[marginal seat|swing seats]]", are able to swing majority control in the house. Incumbents in less evenly divided districts are invulnerable to slight swings of political mood. In the UK, for example, about half the constituencies have always elected the same party since 1945;<ref name="DMstvPdf">{{cite web |last1=Mollison |first1=Denis |title=Fair votes in practice STV for Westminster |url=http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~denis/signif.pdf |publisher=[[Heriot Watt University]] |access-date=3 June 2014}}</ref> in the 2012 [[United States House of Representatives|US House]] elections 45 districts (10% of all districts) were uncontested by one of the two dominant parties.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}} Voters who know their preferred candidate will not win have little incentive to vote, and even if they do their votes have [[wasted vote|no effect]], although they are still counted in the popular vote calculation.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|10}}

With PR, there are no "[[marginal seat|swing seats]]". Most votes contribute to the election of a candidate, so parties need to campaign in all districts, not just those where their support is strongest or where they perceive most advantage. This fact in turn encourages parties to be more responsive to voters, producing a more "balanced" ticket by nominating more women and minority candidates.<ref name="Norris" /> On average about 8 percent more women are elected in PR systems than non-PR systems.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}}

Since most votes count, there are fewer "[[wasted vote]]s", so voters, aware that their vote can make a difference, are more likely to make the effort to vote, and less likely to vote [[Tactical voting|tactically]]. Compared to countries with plurality electoral systems, [[voter turnout]] improves and the population is more involved in the political process.<ref name="ideaEsd" /><ref name="Norris" /> However, some experts argue that transitioning from plurality to PR only increases voter turnout in geographical areas associated with [[safe seat]]s under the plurality system; turnout may decrease in areas formerly associated with [[marginal seat|swing seats]].<ref name="CoxContEffect">{{cite journal |last1=Cox |first1=Gary W. |last2=Fiva |first2=Jon H. |last3=Smith |first3=Daniel M. |title=The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout |url=http://www.jon.fiva.no/docs/Cox-Fiva-Smith-JoP-Final_Main.pdf |journal=[[The Journal of Politics]] |date=2016 |volume=78 |number=4 |pages=1249–1263 |doi=10.1086/686804 |hdl=11250/2429132 |s2cid=55400647 |hdl-access=free}}</ref>

Proportional systems show higher [[political efficacy]], citizens' trust in their ability to influence and understand the government, compared to plurality and majoritarian systems.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000161 |doi=10.1017/S0007123408000161 |title=Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour |year=2008 |last1=Karp |first1=Jeffrey A. |last2=Banducci |first2=Susan A. |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=311–334 |hdl=10036/64393 |s2cid=55486399 | hdl-access=free}}</ref>

===Gerrymandering===
First-past-the-post elections are dependent on the drawing of boundaries of their [[single-member district]]s, a process vulnerable to political interference ([[gerrymandering]]) even if districts are drawn in such a way as to ensure approximately equal representation. However, because voter turnout varies from district to district and because in one district a winner might take 80 percent of the vote while in another the winner might be elected with only 30 percent of the vote, there might be wide variation in votes-per-winner, even if districts are drawn in such a way as to take in equivalent population. As one party might take its seats with a low votes-per-winner ratio while another party might not have that advantage, the result is likely to be disproportionate.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/voters-dislike-disproportionality-in-electoral-systems/|title=Voters dislike disproportionality in electoral systems – even when it benefits the party they support|date=29 January 2020}}</ref>

To compound the problem, boundaries have to be periodically re-drawn to accommodate population changes. Even apolitically drawn boundaries can unintentionally produce the effect of gerrymandering, reflecting naturally occurring concentrations.<ref name="amyRCNV">{{cite book |last=Amy |first=Douglas J |title=Real Choices / New Voices, How Proportional Representation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |date=2002 |isbn=9780231125499}}</ref>{{rp|65}}

PR systems, due to having larger districts with multiple members, are less prone to gerrymandering{{snd}}research suggests five-seat districts or larger are immune to gerrymandering.<ref name="amyRCNV" />{{rp|66}}

Equality of size of multiple-member districts is not important (the number of seats can vary) so districts can be aligned with historical territories of varying sizes such as cities, counties, states or provinces. Later population changes can be accommodated by simply adjusting the number of representatives in the district, without having to re-draw a single boundary. For example, Mollison in his 2010 plan for STV for the UK divided the country into 143 districts and then allocated varying number of seats to each district (to add up to the existing total of 650 MPs) depending on the number of voters in each but with wide ranges (his five-seat districts include one with 327,000 voters and another with 382,000 voters). His district boundaries follow historical [[county]] and [[local authority]] boundaries, yet he achieves more uniform representation than does the [[Boundary Commissions (United Kingdom)|Boundary Commission]], the body responsible for balancing the UK's [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]] constituency sizes.<ref name="DMstvPdf" /><ref name="DMstvSite">{{cite web |last1=Mollison |first1=Denis |title=Fair votes in practice: STV for Westminster |url=http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~denis/stv4uk/ |publisher=[[Heriot-Watt University]] |access-date=3 June 2014 |date=2010}}</ref>

Mixed-member systems are susceptible to gerrymandering for the local seats that remain a part of such systems. Under [[parallel voting]], a [[semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional system]], there is no compensation for the effects that such gerrymandering might have. Under MMP, the use of compensatory list seats makes gerrymandering less of an issue. However, its effectiveness in this regard depends upon the features of the system, including the size of the regional districts, the relative share of list seats in the total, and opportunities for [[Mixed-member proportional representation#Collusion|collusion]] that might exist. A striking example of how the compensatory mechanism can be undermined can be seen in the [[2014 Hungarian parliamentary election]], where the leading party, [[Fidesz]], combined gerrymandering and decoy lists, which resulted in a two-thirds parliamentary majority from a 45% vote.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Scheppele |first1=Kim Lane |title=Legal But Not Fair (Hungary) |url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/legal-but-not-fair-hungary/ |website=The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman Blog |publisher=[[The New York Times Co.]] |access-date=12 July 2014 |date=13 April 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |author-link1=Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |title=Hungary, Parliamentary Elections, 6 April 2014: Final Report |url=http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/121098 |website=[[OSCE]] |date=11 July 2014}}</ref> This illustrates how certain implementations of [[Mixed electoral system|mixed systems]] (if non-compensatory or insufficiently compensatory) can produce moderately proportional outcomes, similar to parallel voting.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}}

===Link between constituent and representative===
It is generally accepted that a particular advantage of plurality electoral systems such as first-past-the-post, or majoritarian electoral systems such as the [[Instant-runoff voting|alternative vote]], is the geographic link between representatives and their constituents.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|36}}<ref name="Law Commission of Canada">{{cite web |title=Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada |url=http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/J31-61-2004E.pdf |publisher=Law Commission of Canada |page=22 |year=2004}}</ref>{{rp|65}}<ref name="hansard1976">{{cite web |title=Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ma0nvgAACAAJ |website=[[Hansard Society]] |location=London |date=1976 |last1=Commission On Electoral Reform |first1=Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government}}</ref>{{rp|21}} A notable disadvantage of PR is that, as its multiple-member districts are made larger, this link is weakened.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|82}} In party list PR systems without delineated districts, such as the Netherlands and Israel, the there is no geographic link between representatives and their constituents. This makes it more difficult for local or regional issues to be addressed at the federal level. With relatively small multiple-member districts, in particular with STV, there are counter-arguments: about 90 percent of voters can consult a representative they voted for, someone whom they might think more sympathetic to their problem. In such cases it is sometimes argued that constituents and representatives have a closer link;<ref name="DMstvPdf" /><ref name="amyRCNV" />{{rp|212}} constituents have a choice of representative so they can consult one with particular expertise in the topic at issue.<ref name="amyRCNV" />{{rp|212}}<ref name="ersSTV">{{cite web |title=Single Transferable Vote |url=https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/single-transferable-vote/ |publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]] |access-date=28 July 2014 |location=London}}</ref> With multiple-member districts, prominent candidates have more opportunity to be elected in their home constituencies, which they know and can represent authentically. There is less likely to be a strong incentive to [[Parachute candidate|parachute]] them into constituencies in which they are strangers and thus less than ideal representatives.<ref name="humphreys">{{cite book |last1=Humphreys |first1=John H |url=https://archive.org/details/proportionalrepr00humpuoft |title=Proportional Representation, A Study in Methods of Election |date=1911 |publisher=Methuen & Co.Ltd |location=London}}</ref>{{rp|248–250}} Mixed-member PR systems incorporate single-member districts to preserve the link between constituents and representatives.<ref name="ideaEsd" />{{rp|95}} However, because up to half the parliamentary seats are list rather than district seats, the districts are necessarily up to twice as large as with a plurality/majoritarian system where all representatives serve single-member districts.<ref name="hansard1976" />{{rp|32}}

An interesting case occurred in the Netherlands, when "out of the blue" a party for the elderly, the [[General Elderly Alliance]] gained six seats in the [[1994 Dutch general election|1994 election]]. The other parties had not paid attention, but this made them aware. With the next election, the Party of the Elderly was gone, because the established parties had started to listen to the elderly. Today, a party for older citizens, [[50PLUS]], has established itself in the Netherlands, albeit never winning as many as six seats.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}} 

This can be seen as an example how geographic representation is not all-important and does not overshadow all other particulars of the voting population. Voting in a single-member district restricts the voters to a specific geography where their votes either go to the winner in the district or are wasted. MMP allows a vote (in the form of the voter's party vote) to be used outside the district if necessary to produce representation for the voter.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1x0a/evenredige_vertegenwoordiging |title=Evenredige vertegenwoordiging |website=www.parlement.com |language=nl |access-date=28 January 2020}}</ref>

===Potential lack of balance in presidential systems===
In a [[presidential system]], the president is chosen independently from the parliament. As a consequence, it is possible to have a [[divided government]] where a parliament and president have opposing views and may want to balance each other's influence. However, the proportional system favors government of coalitions of many smaller parties that require compromising and negotiating topics.{{citation needed|date=August 2020}} As a consequence, these coalitions might have difficulties presenting a united front to counter presidential influence, leading to a lack of balance between these two powers. With a proportionally elected House, a President may strong-arm certain political issues.{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}}

This issue does not happen in a [[parliamentary system]], where the prime-minister is elected indirectly by the parliament itself. As a consequence, a divided government is impossible. Even if the political views change with time and the prime minister loses their support from parliament, they can be replaced with a [[motion of no confidence]]. Effectively, both measures make it impossible to create a [[divided government]].{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}}