Editing Prague Spring (section)

=== Soviet reaction ===
[[File:Brezhnev 1973.jpg|thumb|upright|left|[[Leonid Brezhnev]]]]

Initial reaction within the Communist Bloc was mixed. [[Hungarian People's Republic|Hungary]]'s [[János Kádár]] was highly supportive of Dubček's appointment in January, but [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and the [[hardline]]rs grew concerned about the reforms, which they feared might weaken the position of the Bloc in the [[Cold War]].<ref>Navrátil (2006), p. 37</ref><ref name="trans">{{Cite web | title = Document #81: Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev's Telephone Conversation with Alexander Dubček, August&nbsp;13, 1968 | year = 1998 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/psread/doc81.htm | work = The Prague Spring '68 | publisher = The Prague Spring Foundation | access-date = 23 January 2008 | archive-date = 17 January 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080117232525/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/psread/doc81.htm | url-status = live }}</ref><ref>Navrátil (2006), pp. 172–81</ref>

At a meeting in [[Dresden|Dresden, East Germany]] on 23 March, the leaders of the "Warsaw Five" ([[USSR]], [[Hungarian People's Republic|Hungary]], [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]], [[People's Republic of Bulgaria|Bulgaria]] and [[East Germany]]) questioned the Czechoslovak delegation over the planned reforms, suggesting any talk of "democratization" was a veiled criticism of the Soviet model.<ref name="NavDresden">Navrátil (2006), pp. 64–72</ref> The [[Polish United Workers' Party|Polish Party]] leader [[Władysław Gomułka]] and János Kádár were less concerned with the reforms themselves than with the growing criticisms levelled by the Czechoslovak media, and worried that the situation might be "similar to...the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|'Hungarian counterrevolution']]."<ref name="NavDresden"/> Some of the language in the Action Programme may have been chosen to assert that no "counterrevolution" was planned, but Kieran Williams suggests that Dubček was perhaps surprised at, but not resentful of, Soviet suggestions.<ref>Williams (1997), pp. 10–11</ref>

In May, the KGB initiated Operation Progress, which involved Soviet agents infiltrating Czechoslovak pro-democratic organizations, such as the Socialist and Christian Democrat parties.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2014-07-19|title=UK-held Mitrokhin archives reveal details of KGB operation against Prague Spring|url=https://english.radio.cz/uk-held-mitrokhin-archives-reveal-details-kgb-operation-against-prague-spring-8289811|access-date=2021-05-02|website=Radio Prague International|language=en}}</ref>

The Soviet leadership tried to stop, or at least limit, the changes in the ČSSR through a series of negotiations. The Soviet Union agreed to [[Bilateralism|bilateral]] talks with Czechoslovakia from 29 July to 1 August at [[Čierna nad Tisou]], near the Soviet border. The Soviets were represented by almost the full [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]] that met for the first time outside the territory of the Soviet Union; also the Czechoslovak delegation included the full membership of the Presidium,<ref>{{cite web| title=Soviets and Czechs agree on multilateral talks| url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1968-08-02b.pdf/| access-date=15 September 2023}}</ref> but the main agreements were reached at the meetings of the "fours" – Brezhnev, [[Alexei Kosygin]], [[Nikolai Podgorny]], [[Mikhail Suslov]] – Dubček, [[Ludvík Svoboda]], [[Oldřich Černík]], [[Josef Smrkovský]].<ref>{{cite book|author=Jiri Valenta|title=Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Z1vNmBoanUcC&dq=four++1968++%C4%8Cierna++Podgorny++Smrkovsky++Brezhnev++Svoboda+++Suslov&pg=PA151|year=1979|publisher=The Johns Hopkins University Press|isbn=0-8018-4297-2|page=151}}</ref>

At the meeting Dubček defended the proposals of the KSČ's reformist wing while pledging commitment to the Warsaw Pact and [[Comecon]].<ref name="Library"/> The KSČ leadership, however, was divided between vigorous reformers (Smrkovský, Černík, and [[František Kriegel]]) and hardliners ([[Vasil Biľak]], [[Drahomír Kolder]], and [[Oldřich Švestka]]) who adopted an anti-reformist stance.<ref name="Navrátil 2006, pp. 448–79">Navrátil (2006), pp. 448–79</ref>

Brezhnev decided on compromise. The KSČ delegates reaffirmed their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and promised to curb "anti-socialist" tendencies, prevent the revival of the [[Czech Social Democratic Party|Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party]] and control the press more effectively. The Soviets agreed to withdraw their [[military|armed forces]] still in Czechoslovakia after manoeuvres in June and permit the 9 September ''Party Congress''.<ref name="Navrátil 2006, pp. 448–79"/>

On 3 August representatives from the "Warsaw Five" and Czechoslovakia met in [[Bratislava]] and signed the [[Bratislava Declaration]]. The declaration affirmed unshakable fidelity to [[Marxism-Leninism]] and [[proletarian internationalism]], declared an implacable struggle against "bourgeois" [[ideology]] and all "anti-socialist" forces.<ref>Navrátil (2006), pp. 326–29</ref> The Soviet Union expressed its intention to intervene in any Warsaw Pact country if a "bourgeois" system—a [[Pluralist democracy|pluralist]] system of several [[Political party|political parties]] representing different factions of the "capitalist classes"—was ever established. After the conference, the Soviet troops left Czechoslovak territory but remained along its borders.<ref>Navrátil (2006), pp. 326–27</ref>