Editing Politics of Chile (section)

== Central-local government relations ==
Chile has an enduring unitary and centralised state power structure.<ref name="oecd.org">{{Cite book |date=2017-09-18 |title=Making Decentralisation Work in Chile |url=https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/making-decentralisation-work-in-chile_9789264279049-en.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=OECD |series=OECD Multi-level Governance Studies |language=en |doi=10.1787/9789264279049-en|isbn=978-92-64-27903-2 }}</ref> The national government has substantial political, administrative and particularly fiscal control (see Table 1 below). For example, despite the establishment of regional governors in 2017 (covered further below), the executive positions of Presidential Delegates remain at regional and provincial levels (see Figure 1 below), with their appointment and dismissal at the President's discretion.<ref name="Szmulewicz Ramírez 327–351">{{Cite journal |last=Szmulewicz Ramírez |first=Esteban |date=2024-06-27 |title=The COVID-19 Pandemic in Chile: Challenges of Intergovernmental Relations and Coordination in a Decentralized Unitary State |url=https://journals.umcs.pl/sil/article/view/17502 |journal=Studia Iuridica Lublinensia |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=327–351 |doi=10.17951/sil.2024.33.2.327-351|hdl=1887/4038319 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The regional governor and regional presidential delegate constitutionally share functions,<ref name="Szmulewicz Ramírez 327–351"/> compromising good practice regional governance and the intended levels of political decentralisation. 
[[File:Structure and relationships of national and subnational government in Chile.jpg|thumb|Figure 1: Structure and relationships of national and subnational government in Chile<ref name="Edward Elgar Publishing">{{Cite book |last1=Avellaneda |first1=Claudia N. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8zf7EAAAQBAJ&dq=Handbook%20on%20Subnational%20Governments%20and%20Governance&pg=PA151 |title=Handbook on Subnational Governments and Governance |last2=Bello-Gómez |first2=Ricardo A. |date=2024-03-14 |publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing |isbn=978-1-80392-537-0 |language=en}}</ref>]]
Chile's unitary structure has persisted due to:

# Colonial rule centralising decision-making with national government, which persisted after independence.
# Chile's long, narrow geography and enduring population concentration in the Central Valley (including the nation's capital, Santiago), meaning that unitary governance is perceived as more practical.
# Lack of empowered demand for an alternative (e.g. federal) structure due to a historical lack of strong and autonomous subnational movements.
# A desire to build a unified nation and avoid the regional conflicts or independence movements in other Latin American nations attempting federalism (e.g. Argentina).
# A desire to preserve the performance of Chile's economy through unified national control, and avoid the negative economic impacts of how decentralisation efforts were designed and implemented in other Latin American countries (e.g. Argentina).
# The Pinochet regime (1973–1990), which enacted martial law, overthrew and banned democratic institutions and established the 1980s constitution. This constitution cemented military power, neoliberalism and established a deconcentration approach, where underfunded municipalities controlled by appointed officials were required to implement national policies.

Municipalities are the only self-government entities in Chile,<ref name="oecd.org"/><ref name="Edward Elgar Publishing"/> with constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy, including for their:

* institution;
* interests and competences;
* election of their governing bodies;
* powers to set local regulations withstanding national equivalents.<ref name="Szmulewicz Ramírez 327–351"/>

Despite their partial political and administrative autonomy, municipalities have very low fiscal autonomy,<ref name="Edward Elgar Publishing"/> with proportionally small and mostly pre-allocated funding (see Table 1 below). Chile is the only OECD country not to allow municipalities to borrow.<ref name="oecd.org"/>

'''Table 1: Local and total government expenditure in Chile vs OECD average'''<ref name="oecd.org"/>
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Aspect'''
|'''Chile'''
|'''OECD average'''
|-
|Local government expenditure (% of GDP)
|3%
|17%
|-
|Total public expenditure (% of GDP)
|13%
|40%
|}
Chile has very large disparities between municipalities,<ref name="oecd.org"/><ref>{{Cite web |title=Subnational finance and investment |url=https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/subnational-finance-and-investment.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=OECD |language=en}}</ref> including in the concentration of population (almost twice the OECD average) and GDP (second highest in the OECD).<ref name="oecd.org"/> One cause of these disparities is the dominance of very substantial copper and other mining activities in specific areas, without similar economic drivers in other areas.

Chile's centralised structure, and strong comparative disadvantage of many municipalities, creates incentives for municipal leadership to directly lobby national, rather than regional, government for local policy decisions or funded interventions which need significant executive power.<ref name="Navarrete Yáñez 905–925">{{Cite journal |last=Navarrete Yáñez |first=Bernardo |date=2023-09-01 |title=Intergovernmental Relations in Chile |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-023-00716-2 |journal=Public Organization Review |language=en |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=905–925 |doi=10.1007/s11115-023-00716-2 |issn=1573-7098}}</ref> For example, facing resource constraints and a fragmented Congress, municipalities approached the national government for support responding to escalating crime rates (particularly violent crime).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Disi |first=Bernardo Lara, Rodolfo |date=2024-10-16 |title=Delincuencia, municipalidades y recursos |url=https://elpais.com/chile/2024-10-16/delincuencia-municipalidades-y-recursos.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=El País Chile |language=es-CL}}</ref>

The President and Ministers may also engage directly with municipalities affected by their policies or interventions. These informal bilateral exchanges (see Figure 2 below) bypass the intended governance structure, undermine provincial and regional authorities, and create inefficiencies and inequity in forming and implementing policies and interventions. 
[[File:Four types of relational exchanges.jpg|thumb|Figure 2: Four types of relational exchanges involving local governments<ref>{{Citation |last1=Shrestha |first1=Manoj K. |title=Local Government Networks |date=2017-09-20 |work=The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks |pages=0 |editor-last=Victor |editor-first=Jennifer Nicoll |url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/35479/chapter-abstract/303903166?redirectedFrom=fulltext |access-date=2025-02-06 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.22 |isbn=978-0-19-022821-7 |last2=Feiock |first2=Richard C. |editor2-last=Montgomery |editor2-first=Alexander H. |editor3-last=Lubell |editor3-first=Mark}}</ref>]]
Where regions and municipalities coordinate or collaborate, this often depends on the autonomous power of the presidential delegate or head of the public service, or on the relationships or other capacities of the mayor or municipality to influence national institutions’ decisions.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Investment |url=https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/investment.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=OECD |language=en}}</ref>

The 2017 Constitutional Reforms established the role of publicly elected regional governors. These governors, first-elected in 2021 to represent regional constituents, share responsibility with presidentially-appointed regional delegates/intendants, who represent national ministries. Their election was a turning point in decentralization efforts, introducing a new dynamic in national-regional relations and providing regions with a stronger voice in governance. However, Navarrete Yáñez<ref name="Navarrete Yáñez 905–925"/> argues that introducing this system, typical of federal structures, tends to fragment authority and create overlapping jurisdictions to promote coordination relations, which in practice is generating conflict. The current President of Chile, Gabriel Boric (2022–2026), stated that before his term ends, the presidential delegate position will disappear.<ref name="Navarrete Yáñez 905–925"/>

The decentralisation agenda in Chile recently received impetus, with:

# a presidential advisory commission for decentralisation defining a decentralisation agenda
# 2018 laws introducing direct election of regional governors, rather than the previous presidential appointment only. These laws also defined the powers and responsibilities of regional authorities and encouraged citizen participation. The first election of regional governors occurred in 2021.
# A 2020 referendum, in which 78% of voters supported the creation of a new constitution and the establishment of a Constitutional Convention.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-10-26 |title=Jubilation as Chile votes to rewrite constitution |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-54687090 |access-date=2025-02-06 |language=en-GB}}</ref> Two subsequent referendums (September 2022 and December 2023) proposed replacements of the existing Pinochet-era constitution, including:

## reducing the dominance of central government and strengthening regional governance
## establishing ‘regional states’ comprising autonomous regions, communes, indigenous territorial autonomies and special territories.

Despite the strong impetus for a new constitution, both new constitutional proposals were rejected by voters.<ref>{{Cite web |author=((AQ Editors)) |title=REACTION: Chile Rejects Second Constitutional Rewrite |url=https://americasquarterly.org/article/reaction-chile-rejects-second-constitutional-rewrite/ |date= 2023-12-18 |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=Americas Quarterly |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="Edward Elgar Publishing"/> Particularly given the substantial social upheaval in 2019 related to inequality,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Cox |first1=Loreto |last2=González |first2=Ricardo |last3=Le Foulon |first3=Carmen |date=2024-04-01 |title=The 2019 Chilean Social Upheaval: A Descriptive Approach |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1866802X231203747 |journal=Journal of Politics in Latin America |language=en |volume=16 |issue=1 |pages=68–89 |doi=10.1177/1866802X231203747 |issn=1866-802X}}</ref> and majority support for a constitutional re-write, these rejections are significant. By comparison, from 1789 to 2016, 94% of 179 referendums for new constitutions were ratified,<ref>{{Citation |last1=Elkins |first1=Zachary |title=The constitutional referendum in historical perspective |date=2019-10-25 |work=Comparative Constitution Making |pages=142–164 |url=https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781785365256/9781785365256.00013.xml |access-date=2025-02-06 |publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing |language=en-US |isbn=978-1-78536-526-3 |last2=Hudson |first2=Alexander}}</ref> making Chile's twin rejections rare exceptions.

'''Unclear sector responsibilities, siloed work'''

There are many unclear sector responsibilities at national level. Significant work occurs in silos, with poor integration across both policy and investment areas.<ref name="oecd.org"/> For example, responsibilities for the intercity network, for the urban transport utilising that network and for investment in urban roads lie with three different national ministries.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-12-21 |title=Gaps and Governance Standards of Public Infrastructure in Chile |url=https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/gaps-and-governance-standards-of-public-infrastructure-in-chile_9789264278875-en.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=OECD |language=en}}</ref> Inadequate inter-sector coordination and consultation about local conditions leads to poor quality decisions – for example, decisions on types of transport infrastructure, routes and frequencies which don't suit local needs or represent good value for taxpayers. Chilean citizens feel affected by the lack of national sector coordination.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Jiménez |first1=Teresa Franco |last2=Víctor |first2=Manuel Zafra |date=2022-04-07 |title=La controvertida interpretación y aplicación del artículo 26.2 de la Ley de Bases de Régimen Local |url=https://revistasonline.inap.es/index.php/REALA/article/view/11058 |journal=Revista de Estudios de la Administración Local y Autonómica |language=es |pages=139–154 |doi=10.24965/reala.i17.11058 |issn=1989-8975|doi-access=free }}</ref> 
[[File:Gini index vs. perceptions of unfair income distribution (Chile is circled).jpg|thumb|Figure 3: Gini index vs. perceptions of unfair income distribution (Chile is circled)<ref name="undp.org">{{Cite web |title=What People Think about Inequality and How They Think Policy Should React |url=https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/what-people-think-about-inequality-and-how-they-think-policy-should-react |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=UNDP |language=en}}</ref>]]
'''Poor central-regional-local coordination and subnational consultation'''

Local policies, planning instruments and priorities are centrally defined by national ministries but with weak subnational consultation and coordination.<ref name="oecd.org"/><ref name="Szmulewicz Ramírez 327–351"/> For example, the Government response to COVID reinforced a need to formalise ''how'' coordination between national, regional and local government occurs, particularly during emergency situations involving constitutional exceptions.<ref name="Szmulewicz Ramírez 327–351"/> 
[[File:Figure 4- Perceptions of unfair access to services (Chile in red box).jpg|thumb|Figure 4: Perceptions of unfair access to services (Chile in red box)<ref name="undp.org"/>]]
There are positive developments in subnational consultation. In January 2023, an agreement was signed with the Association of Regional Governors of Chile (AGORECHI) to advance political decentralisation, particularly intra-government coordination and local participation, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization and the development of a National Decentralization Policy.<ref>{{Cite web |title=OECD Regional Outlook 2023 - Country Profiles - 5 Chile |url=https://oecd-cfe-eds.github.io/ro2023-country-pages/tl2-chl.html |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=oecd-cfe-eds.github.io}}</ref>

'''Social inequity and intra-government structure and relations'''
[[File:Figure 5- Perceptions the country is governed in the interests of a powerful few (Chile in red box).jpg|thumb|Figure 5: Perceptions the country is governed in the interests of a powerful few (Chile in red box)<ref name="undp.org"/>]]
One study<ref name="undp.org"/> shows that 91%-95% of Chileans perceive that access to income is inequitable (Figure 3); that access to healthcare, justice and education is inequitable (Figure 4); and that Chile is governed in the interests of a powerful few (Figure 5).

Chile's centralized governance system contributes to limiting equitable resource distribution and effective local solutions.