Editing Philosophy of religion (section)

===Religious experience===
{{See also|Religious experience|Phenomenology of religion}}
[[File:William_James_b1842c.jpg|thumb|225px|[[William James]] wrote ''[[The Varieties of Religious Experience]]'', 1902]]
Closely related to knowledge and belief is how to interpret [[religious experiences]] and their potential for providing knowledge.<ref name="auto4">Yandell, 2002, p. 39.</ref> Religious experiences have been recorded throughout all cultures and are widely diverse. These personal experiences tend to be highly important to individuals who undergo them.<ref>Meister 2009, p. 170.</ref> Discussions about religious experiences can be said to be informed in part by the question: "what sort of information about what there is might religious experience provide, and how could one tell?"<ref name="auto4"/>

One could interpret these experiences either veridically, neutrally or as delusions. Both monotheistic and non-monotheistic religious thinkers and mystics have appealed to religious experiences as evidence for their claims about ultimate reality. Philosophers such as [[Richard Swinburne]] and [[William Alston]] have compared religious experiences to everyday perceptions, that is, both are [[Nous|noetic]] and have a perceptual object, and thus religious experiences could logically be veridical unless we have a good reason to disbelieve them.<ref>Meister 2009, p. 177.</ref> Other philosophers such as [[Eleonore Stump]] and Matthew Benton argue for an interpersonal epistemology on which one can experience and know God in a relational or personal sense.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stump |first1=Eleonore |title=Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering |date=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=9780199277421}}; and {{cite book |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew |title=Knowledge and God |date=2024 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |isbn=9781009124119 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/knowledge-and-god/361F1D5364E65B137B88222A3BCE72A0}}.</ref>

According to [[Brian Davies (philosopher)|Brian Davies]] common objections against the veridical force of religious experiences include the fact that experience is frequently deceptive and that people who claim an experience of a god may be "mistakenly identifying an object of their experience", or be insane or hallucinating.<ref name="auto5">Davies 1993, p. 121.</ref> However, he argues that we cannot deduce from the fact that our experiences are ''sometimes'' mistaken, hallucinations or distorted to the conclusion that all religious experiences are mistaken etc. Indeed, a drunken or hallucinating person could still perceive things correctly, therefore these objections cannot be said to ''necessarily'' disprove all religious experiences.<ref name="auto5"/>

According to C. B. Martin, "there are no tests agreed upon to establish genuine experience of God and distinguish it decisively from the ungenuine", and therefore all that religious experiences can establish is the reality of these psychological states.<ref>Meister 2009, p. 176.</ref>

Naturalistic explanations for religious experiences are often seen as undermining their epistemic value. Explanations such as the [[Death anxiety|fear of death]], [[suggestion]], [[Regression (psychology)|infantile regression]], [[sexual frustration]], neurological anomalies ("it's all in the head") as well as the socio-political power that having such experiences might grant to a mystic have been put forward.<ref name="auto6">{{cite web |author1=Gellman, Jerome |title=Mysticism |publisher=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy {{!}} Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mysticism/ |date=2004-11-11 |access-date=2017-12-12 |archive-date=2019-03-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190318022133/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mysticism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> More recently, some argued that religious experiences are caused by cognitive misattributions akin to hallucinations,<ref name="auto69">{{cite journal |author1=Galen, Luke |title=Overlapping Mental Magisteria: Implications of Experimental Psychology for a Theory of Religious Belief as Misattribution |journal=Method & Theory in the Study of Religion |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316994887 }}</ref> although this was denied by others.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Van Eyghen, Hans |title=Arguing From Cognitive Science of Religion. Is Religious Belief Debunked? |year=2020| publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |url=https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=nl&user=8XSxntQAAAAJ&citation_for_view=8XSxntQAAAAJ:dshw04ExmUIC}}</ref>  A contrary position was taken by [[Bertrand Russell]] who compared the veridical value of religious experiences to the [[hallucinations]] of a drunk person: "From a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has abnormal perceptions."<ref>Bertrand Russell "Mysticism" From Religion and Science (Oxford University Press, 1961)</ref> However, as [[William L. Rowe]] notes:

<blockquote>The hidden assumption in Russell's argument is that bodily and mental states that interfere with reliable perceptions of the physical world also interfere with reliable perceptions of a spiritual world beyond the physical, if there is such a spiritual world to be perceived. Perhaps this assumption is reasonable, but it certainly is not obviously true.<ref name="auto7">Rowe 2007, pp 85</ref></blockquote>

In other words, as argued by [[C.D. Broad]], "one might need to be slightly 'cracked{{'"}} or at least appear to be mentally and physically abnormal in order to perceive the supranormal spiritual world.<ref name="auto7"/>

William James meanwhile takes a middle course between accepting mystical experiences as veridical or seeing them as delusional. He argues that for the individual who experiences them, they are authoritative and they break down the authority of the rational mind. Not only that, but according to James, the mystic is justified in this. But when it comes to the non-mystic, the outside observer, they have no reason to regard them as either veridical nor delusive.<ref>Rowe 2007, pp 88</ref>

The study of religious experiences from the perspective of the field of [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]] has also been a feature of the philosophy of religion. Key thinkers in this field include [[William Brede Kristensen]] and [[Gerard van der Leeuw]].

====Types====
[[File:Avatars of Vishnu.jpg|thumb|225px|Depiction of the [[theophany]] scene in the [[Bhagavadgita]] wherein [[Krishna]] reveals his universal form to [[Arjuna]]]]
Just like there are different religions, there are different forms of religious experience. One could have "subject/content" experiences (such as a euphoric meditative state) and "subject/consciousness/object" experiences (such as the perception of having seen a god, i.e. [[theophany]]).<ref>Yandell, 2002, p. 40, 47.</ref> Experiences of [[theophany]] are described in ancient Mediterranean religious works and myths and include the story of [[Semele]] who died due to her seeing [[Zeus]] and the Biblical story of the [[Burning bush]]. Indian texts like the [[Bhagavadgita|Bhagavad Gita]] also contain theophanic events. The diversity (sometimes to the point of contradiction) of religious experiences has also been used as an argument against their veridical nature, and as evidence that they are a purely subjective psychological phenomenon.<ref>Meister 2009, p. 180.</ref>

In Western thought, religious experience (mainly a theistic one) has been described by the likes of [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]], [[Rudolf Otto]] and [[William James]]. According to Schleiermacher, the distinguishing feature of a religious experience is that "one is overcome by the feeling of absolute dependence."<ref>Rowe, 2007, p. 70</ref> Otto meanwhile, argued that while this was an important element, the most basic feature of religious experiences is that it is ''[[numinous]]''. He described this as "non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is outside the self" as well as having the qualities of being a mystery, terrifying and fascinating.<ref>Otto, Rudolf (1996). Alles, Gregory D., ed. [https://books.google.com/books?id=D13tugwJcY0C ''Autobiographical and Social Essays'']. Berlin: [[Walter de Gruyter]]. p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=D13tugwJcY0C&dq=%22ganz+andere%22%22ganz+an%22%22ders+%5bwholly+other%5d%22&pg=PA30 30]. {{ISBN|978-3-110-14519-9}}.</ref>

Rowe meanwhile defined a religious experience as "an experience in which one senses the immediate presence of the divine."<ref>Rowe 2007, pg. 72.</ref> According to Rowe, religious experiences can be divided in the following manner:<ref>Rowe 2007, pp 73, 78</ref>

*Religious experiences in which one senses the presence of the divine as being distinct from oneself.
*Mystical experiences in which one senses one's own union with a divine presence.
**The extrovertive way looks outward through the senses into the world around us and finds the divine reality there.
**The introvertive way turns inward and finds the divine reality in the deepest part of the self.

Non-monotheistic religions meanwhile also report different experiences from theophany, such as [[non-dual]] experiences of oneness and deeply focused meditative states (termed ''[[samadhi]]'' in Indian religion) as well as experiences of [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|enlightenment]] in Buddhism, [[moksha|liberation]] in Hinduism, and [[kevala]] in [[Jainism]].{{citation needed|date=December 2023}}

Another typology, offered by Chad Meister, differentiates between three major experiences:<ref>Meister 2009, p. 171-74.</ref>

*Regenerative experiences, in which an individual feels reborn, transformed or changed radically, usually resulting in religious conversion.
*Charismatic experiences, in which special gifts, abilities, or blessings are manifested (such as healing, visions, etc.)
*[[Mystical experiences]], which can be described using William James qualifications as being: [[ineffable]], [[Nous|noetic]], transient and passive.

====Perennialism vs Constructivism====
Another debate on this topic is whether all religious cultures share common core mystical experiences ([[Perennial philosophy|Perennialism]]) or whether these experiences are in some way socially and culturally constructed ([[Constructivism (psychological school)|Constructivism]] or [[Contextualism]]). According to [[Walter Stace]] all cultures share mystical experiences of oneness with the external world, as well as introverted "Pure Conscious Events" which is empty of all concepts, thoughts, qualities, etc. except pure consciousness.<ref name="auto6"/> Similarly [[Ninian Smart]] argued that monistic experiences were universal. Perennialists tend to distinguish between the experience itself, and its post experience interpretation to make sense of the different views in world religions.<ref name="auto6"/>

Some constructivists like [[Steven T. Katz]] meanwhile have argued against the common core thesis, and for either the view that every mystical experience contains at least some concepts (soft constructivism) or that they are strongly shaped and determined by one's religious ideas and culture (hard constructivism).<ref name="auto6"/> In this view, the conceptual scheme of any mystic strongly shapes their experiences and because mystics from different religions have very different schemas, there cannot be any universal mystical experiences.<ref name="auto6"/>