Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Ordinary language philosophy ===
The method of [[ordinary language philosophy]] consists in tackling philosophical questions based on how the related terms are used in ordinary language.<ref name="MeinerMethode"/><ref name="IEPOrdinary">{{cite web |last1=Parker-Ryan |first1=Sally |title=Ordinary Language Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/ord-lang/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=28 February 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=ordinary language analysis |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/ordinary-language-analysis |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=28 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref> In this sense, it is related to the method of common sense but focuses more on linguistic aspects.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> Some types of ordinary language philosophy only take a negative form in that they try to show how philosophical problems are not real problems at all. Instead, it is aimed to show that false assumptions, to which humans are susceptible due to the confusing structure of [[natural language]], are responsible for this false impression.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Joll |first1=Nicholas |title=Metaphilosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/con-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=28 February 2022}}</ref><ref name="MeinerMethode"/> Other types take more positive approaches by defending and justifying philosophical claims, for example, based on what sounds insightful or odd to the average English speaker.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/>

One problem for ordinary language philosophy is that regular speakers may have many different reasons for using a certain expression. Sometimes they intend to express what they believe, but other times they may be motivated by [[politeness]] or other conversational norms independent of the [[truth condition]]s of the expressed sentences.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> This significantly complicates ordinary language philosophy, since philosophers have to take the specific context of the expression into account, which may considerably alter its meaning.<ref name="IEPOrdinary"/> This criticism is partially mitigated by [[J. L. Austin]]'s approach to ordinary language philosophy. According to him, ordinary language already has encoded many important distinctions and is our point of departure in theorizing. But "ordinary language is not the last word: in principle, it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded".<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> However, it also falls prey to another criticism: that it is often not clear how to distinguish ordinary from non-ordinary language. This makes it difficult in all but the paradigmatic cases to decide whether a philosophical claim is or is not supported by ordinary language.<ref name="IEPOrdinary"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hammer |first1=Espen |title=Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary |date=22 March 2002 |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-0-7456-2358-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wPaP--K1viQC |language=en |chapter=1. Ordinary Language Philosophy}}</ref>