Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

====After the Moscow agreement====
Between 8 and 27 August 1963, the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] held hearings on the treaty. The Kennedy administration largely presented a united front in favor of the deal. Leaders of the once-opposed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and AEC acknowledged that the treaty would be of net benefit, though Teller, former members of the JCS and AEC, and the commander of the [[Strategic Air Command]] made clear their firm opposition.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=72}} The opponents' argument centered on four themes. First, banning atmospheric tests would prevent the US from ensuring the [[radiation hardening|hardness]] of its [[LGM-30 Minuteman]] missile silos and, second, from developing a capable [[missile defense]] system. Third, it was argued that the Soviet Union led the US in high-yield weapons (recall the Soviet Tsar Bomba test of 1961), which required atmospheric testing banned by the treaty, while the US led the Soviet Union in low-yield weapons, which were tested underground and would be permitted by the treaty. Fourth, the ban would prevent [[peaceful nuclear explosion|peaceful, civilian uses of nuclear detonations]]. Teller declared that the treaty would be a "step away from safety and possibly&nbsp;... toward war."<ref name=cq />
[[File:President Kennedy signs Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 07 October 1963.jpg|thumb|250px|right|[[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] signs the PTBT on 7 October 1963 before [[W. Averell Harriman]], [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], [[Dean Rusk]], and others]]
Administration testimony sought to counteract these arguments. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced his "unequivocal support" for the treaty before the Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that US nuclear forces were secure and clearly superior to those of the Soviet Union, and that any major Soviet tests would be detected. [[Glenn T. Seaborg]], the chairman of the AEC, also gave his support to the treaty in testimony, as did [[Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense)|Harold Brown]], the Department of Defense's lead scientist, and [[Norris Bradbury]], the longtime director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. [[Maxwell D. Taylor]], the [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], also testified in favor of the deal. Taylor and other members of the JCS, including [[Curtis LeMay]], had made their support for the treaty conditional on four "safeguards": (1) a continued, aggressive underground testing program, (2) continued nuclear research programs, (3) continued readiness to resume atmospheric tests, and (4) improved verification equipment. Kennedy emphasized that the US would retain the ability to use nuclear weapons in war, would not be bound by the treaty if the Soviets violated it, and would continue an aggressive underground testing program. Kennedy also stressed that a ban would be a key step in preventing nuclear war.<ref name=cq />

The testimonies of the Joint Chiefs were seen as particularly effective in allaying concerns, as were the reassurances issued by Kennedy, who had acquired a reputation for resoluteness against the Soviet Union in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Additionally, a number of prominent [[Republican Party (United States)|Republicans]] came out in support of the deal, including Eisenhower, Eisenhower's vice president [[Richard Nixon]], and Senator Everett Dirksen, who had initially been skeptical of the treaty. Eisenhower's science advisor and former PSAC head, George Kistiakowsky, endorsed the treaty. Former President Harry S. Truman also lent his support. Supporters of the deal mounted a significant pressure campaign, with active lobbying in favor by a range of civilian groups, including the [[United Automobile Workers]]/[[AFL–CIO]], the [[Peace Action|National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy]], [[Women Strike for Peace]], and [[Methodism|Methodist]], [[Unitarian Universalism|Unitarian Universalist]], and [[Reform Judaism|Reform Jewish]] organizations. Jerome Wiesner, the chairman of PSAC, later said that this public advocacy was a primary motivation for Kennedy's push for a test ban.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=88}} Civil opposition to the deal was less prominent, though the [[Veterans of Foreign Wars]] announced opposition to the deal along with the [[International Council of Christian Churches]], which rejected a "covenant with a [[religion in the Soviet Union|godless power]]." Polling in late August 1963 indicated that more than 60% of Americans supported the deal while less than 20% opposed it.<ref name=cq />{{sfn|Terchek|1970|pp=135–136}}

On 3 September 1963, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty by a 16–1 vote. On 24 September 1963, the US Senate voted 80–14 to approve ratification of the treaty, exceeding the necessary two-thirds majority by 14 votes. The Soviet Union ratified the treaty the following day with a unanimous vote of the [[Presidium of the Supreme Soviet]].{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|p=464}} On 10 October 1963, the treaty entered into effect.<ref name=cq /><ref name=armcontrol.org>{{cite web |title=Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline |publisher=[[Arms Control Association]] |last1=Kimball |first1=Daryl G. |last2=Taheran |first2=Shervin |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclear-Testing-and-Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty-CTBT-Timeline |date=22 September 2015 |access-date=11 August 2016 |archive-date=21 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200421174531/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclear-Testing-and-Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty-CTBT-Timeline |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=unoda />