Editing Mexican peso (section)

====Economic effects====
The government's operational balances had been predicted to remain stable as the country was operating in a surplus between 1990 and 1994. This crisis was seen as the fault of the Mexican government in its signing of [[NAFTA]] at the beginning of 1994. The volatility of MXN increased after the ratification of NAFTA, when the annualized standard deviations seem to be highest post-1994, especially in terms of USD, compared to the United States, which experienced the lowest annualized standard deviation during that same period.<ref>Mahfuzul Haque, Oscar Varela, and M. Kabir Hassan, “Safety-First and Extreme Value Bilateral U.S.–Mexican Portfolio Optimization around the Peso Crisis and NAFTA in 1994", The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 47, no. 3 (2007): 455.</ref> Still, several contemporary economists of the time noted the unexpected shocks to the economy during 1994, which exacerbated the situation, starting with the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, causing a ripple effect on the exchange rate and interest rates that resulted in increased capital leaving the country. The result was the devaluation of MXN because of a domestic recession and an avalanche of investor withdrawals due to concern about the government's inability to remain liquid in its international debt repayments.<ref>Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell, Andrés Velasco, Francesco Giavazzi, and István Székely, “The Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned?", Economic Policy 11, no. 22 (1996): 16-18.</ref> The international outlook, particularly in Wall Street, on the MXN peso crisis was affected by the lack of information on Mexico's financial reserves from the Banco de Mexico, which only released information on Mexico's reserves three times a year, and the speed of reserve depletion to stabilize the MXN finally resulted in a 15% devaluation by 20 December 1994 and a lack of clear announcements on how the Mexican government was going to handle the crisis. In one day, Banco de Mexico lost USD 4 billion in holdings.<ref>Sebastian Edwards, “The Mexican Peso Crisis: How Much Did We Know? When Did We Know It?", World Economy 21, no. 1 (1998): 24-25.</ref>  The 1994 crisis was more devastating as it was released on a new peso currency. The adoption of MXN in 1993 was meant to balance the economy, and MXP 1000 was the same as MXN 1 upon its 1993 introduction. The MXN crisis let investors in 1995 see a failure of Mexican authorities to act with a lack of preparation to soften the devaluation with a more substantial commitment to maintaining the stability of the exchange rates and questioning further investment in the economy.<ref>Pierre-Richard Agénor and Paul R. Masson, “Credibility, Reputation, and the Mexican Peso Crisis", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 31, no. 1 (1999): 83.</ref> As the GNP fell by 9.2% in 1995, the panic of the MXN devaluation was significant to Mexican citizens, as the peso depreciated against the USD by 82.9%, while the interest rates rose from 10.5 to 42.7%.<ref>Cruz, et al., “Expectations, the Business Cycle and the Mexican Peso Crisis", 719.</ref> The unemployment rates of married male employees increased significantly in urban areas of Mexico, resulting in married women and teenagers from the same households finding employment to prevent the financial collapse of domestic quality of life. Married women with an unemployed husband experienced an employment rate of 33.84% and an unemployment rate of 1.62% compared with unmarried women during this period.<ref>Emmanuel Skoufias and Susan W. Parker, “Job Loss and Family Adjustments in Work and Schooling during the Mexican Peso Crisis", Journal of Population Economics 19, no. 1 (2006): 167.</ref> The unexpected increase in Mexican immigration, both legal and illegal, in 1995 resulted from the MXN devaluation, pushing Mexican citizens to seek better employment opportunities in the United States. Migration in 1995 was 40% higher than the average level of the rest of the 1990s, with 200,000 to 300,000 more Mexicans immigrating over the border, increasing a labour shock in Mexico that also affected parts of the southwestern United States.<ref>Joan Monras, “Immigration and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from the Mexican Peso Crisis", The Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 8 (2020): 3020.</ref> There was a significant decline in Mexican household expenditure during this time, where durable and semidurable commodities like televisions, glassware, clothing, and other goods that could be postponed fell between 1996 and 1998, while household food expenditure increased, with lower income households seeing an increase of 3.5% and middle-class households seeing a 2.4% increase, due to the resulting inflation of prices.<ref>McKenzie, “The Consumer Response to the Mexican Peso Crisis", 147.</ref> MXN finally started to see a stabilization between 1996 and 1998, once the Mexican government had enacted banking rescue packages to prevent further collapse, resulting in state control over a large majority of the Mexican financial sector, which led to a renewed growth in the economy that saw more stability by the turn of the millennium.<ref>Cruz, et al., “Expectations, the Business Cycle and the Mexican Peso Crisis", 719-720.</ref>