Editing Mayaguez incident (section)

===Fourth NSC meeting===
In Washington, Ford convened another NSC meeting at 22:30 EDT (09:30 14 May Cambodia).<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|97}} A communication link had been established between the White House, Seventh Air Force at Nakhon Phanom, CINCPAC in Hawaii and the aircraft circling above Koh Tang allowing for near real-time communications.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|95–96}} The circling fighters reported that they could try to shoot the rudder off the fishing boat to stop its progress to Kampong Som, but the NSC decided that the risk of killing ''Mayaguez'' crew was too great. At 23:00 EDT (10:00 Cambodia) Ford ordered that only tear gas should be dropped on or near the fishing boat, while all patrol boats should be sunk.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|97–99}}

The NSC meeting continued to consider the appropriate course to resolve the crisis. It was informed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing had refused to pass on the American note intended for the Khmer Rouge, but George Bush reported that they had read the note and that it might have been relayed to the Khmer Rouge.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|99}} With a diplomatic solution appearing unlikely, [[General (United States)|General]] [[David Charles Jones|David Jones]], acting [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], presented the NSC with a range of military options. Rescue planning was complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the location of ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew. It was believed that some were still on the ship, some on Koh Tang and others were on the fishing boat bound for Kampong Som. The NSC decided to proceed with a simultaneous attack by Marines to retake ''Mayaguez'' and attack Koh Tang, together with attacking Cambodian shipping and bombing mainland targets.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|100}} Kissinger emphasized they needed to "impress the Koreans and the Chinese" with the punitive strikes.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|34}}

The NSC debated whether to assault Koh Tang on the 15th or 16th. The Pentagon's option paper that Jones had distributed explained why a 48-hour delay was advantageous. The primary risk of military operations on the 15th was the "serious disadvantage of slow insertion (270 men per wave at 4+ hour intervals)." Alternatively, with the arrival of the USS ''Hancock'' in the area, a "coordinated assault at first light on 16 May would "carry lower military risks" and "enhance the prospects of quick success and minimize the loss of life." However, the paper noted that the disadvantage of going on the 16th was less chance of surprise and more time for the Cambodians to "put forward preconditions for the return of the ship and/or crew."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|86-7}}

When Ford asked for the Pentagon's recommendation, Schlesinger deferred to Jones who said "We recommend that we land [on the morning of the 15th] on the island and on the ship." He told the NSC members the island could be taken with "high assurance of success." He thought, "The 175 Marines can secure themselves, with gunships and tactical air... When the second group arrives, we can cut off the neck of the island and move out... With somewhat over 600 Marines by nightfall, we should have a good feel for what is there. We can perhaps withdraw the next day." Jones concluded his presentation by saying "that is the operation as we recommend it, as a joint recommendation from all the Joint Chiefs."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|90}}

At 10:10, despite having been hit by tear gas, the fishing boat arrived at Kampong Som.<ref name=paust-1976/> The Khmer Rouge commander at Kampong Som, apparently fearing attack by the Americans, refused to accept responsibility for ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew and so the fishing boat moved further down the coast, dropping anchor off the island of [[Koh Rong Sanloem]]. The circling fighters lost track of the fishing boat once it entered the port at Kampong Som, and so this was the location transmitted up the chain of command.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|104–109}} At 11:29, U.S. aircraft sank another patrol boat and damaged another four.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|337}}

1/4 Marines had arrived at U-Tapao from the Philippines at 05:45 on 14 May and had been waiting on standby for a helicopter assault on ''Mayaguez'', but as the news of the arrival of the fishing boat at Kampong Som came in the helicopter assault was cancelled.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|111–112}} At 14:00, BLT 2/9 began arriving at U-Tapao.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|112}}