Editing Max Weber (section)

==Methodology==
Weber's sociology treated [[social action]] as its central focus.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=313|2a1=Albrow|2y=1990|2p=137|3a1=Rhoads|3y=2021|3p=132}} He also interpreted it as having been an important part of the field's scientific nature.{{sfn|Swedberg|Agevall|2016|p=313}} He divided social action into the four categories of [[Affectional action|affectional]], [[Traditional action|traditional]], [[instrumental and value-rational action|instrumental, and value-rational action]].{{sfn|Swedberg|Agevall|2016|pp=313–315}} In his methodology, he distinguished himself from [[Émile Durkheim]] and [[Karl Marx]] in that his primary focus was on individuals and culture.{{sfn|Sibeon|2012|pp=37–38}} Whereas Durkheim focused on society, Weber concentrated on the [[Individualism|individual]] and their actions. Meanwhile, compared to Marx's support for the primacy of the material world over the world of ideas, Weber valued ideas as motivating individuals' actions.{{sfnm|1a1=Sibeon|1y=2012|1pp=37–38|2a1=Allan|2y=2005|2pp=144–148}} He had a different perspective from the two of them regarding [[structure and agency|structure and action]] and [[Macrostructure (sociology)|macrostructure]] in that he was open to the idea that social phenomena could have several different causes and placed importance on [[social actor]]s' interpretations of their actions.{{sfn|Sibeon|2012|pp=37–38}}

==={{Lang|de|Verstehen}}===
{{Main|Verstehen}}

{{quote box
| width = 30em
| quote = The result of what has been said so far is that an "objective" treatment of cultural occurrences, in the sense that the ideal aim of scientific work would be to reduce the empirical [reality] to "laws", is absurd. ''Not'' because{{snd}}as it has often been claimed{{snd}}the course of cultural processes or, say, processes in the human mind would, "objectively" speaking, be less law-like, but for the following two reasons: (1) knowledge of social laws does not constitute knowledge of social reality, but is only one of the various tools that our intellect needs for that [latter] purpose; (2) knowledge of ''cultural'' occurrences is only conceivable if it takes as its point of departure the ''significance'' that the reality of life, with its always individual character, has for us in certain ''particular'' respects. No law can reveal to us in ''what'' sense and in ''what'' respects this will be the case, as that is determined by those ''value ideas'' in the light of which we look at "culture" in each individual case.
| source = —Max Weber in "The 'Objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy", 1904.{{sfn|Weber|2012|pp=119, 138}}
}}

In terms of methodology, Weber was primarily concerned with the question of [[objectivity and subjectivity]], distinguishing social action from [[social behavior]] and noting that social action must be understood through the subjective relationships between individuals.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Ritzer|2y=2009|2p=31|3a1=Weber|3y=2011|3pp=7–32}} According to him, the study of social action through interpretive means or {{Lang|de|verstehen}} ("to understand") needed to be based upon understanding the [[Meaning-making|subjective meaning]] and purpose that individuals attached to their actions.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Heath|2y=2024|3a1=Swedberg|3a2=Agevall|3y=2016|3pp=356–357}} Determining an individual's interpretation of their actions required either empathically or rationally derived evidence.{{sfnm|Kim|2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=356–357|3a1=Rhoads|3y=2021|3pp=132–133}} Weber noted that the importance of subjectivity in the social sciences made the creation of fool-proof, universal laws much more difficult than in the [[natural science]]s and that the amount of objective knowledge that social sciences were able to create was limited. Overall, he supported objective science as a goal worth striving for but noted that it was ultimately an unreachable goal.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=228–230}}

Weber's methodology was developed in the context of wider debates about social scientific methodology.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1p=187|2a1=Beiser|2y=2011|2pp=551–552}} The first of which was the {{Lang|de|[[Methodenstreit]]}} ("method dispute").{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=15–16|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=525–528}} His position in it was close to [[historicism]], as he thought that social actions were heavily tied to particular historical contexts. Furthermore, analysing social actions required an understanding of the relevant individuals' subjective motivations.{{sfn|Beiser|2011|pp=527–529, 546}} Therefore, his methodology emphasised the use of [[comparative history|comparative historical analysis]].{{sfn|Allan|2005|p=153}} As such, he was more interested in explaining how a certain outcome was the result of various historical processes than in predicting those processes' outcome in the future.{{sfn|Allan|2005|p=148}} The second debate that shaped Weber's perspective on methodology was the {{Lang|de|[[Werturteilsstreit]]}} ("value-judgement dispute").{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–552}} This debate was held between 1909 and 1914 on the subject of [[value-judgement]]s in the social sciences. It originated with a debate in the {{Lang|de|Verein für Socialpolitik}} between the supporters of the idea that ethics was an important consideration in the field of economics and those who opposed it.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=185–189|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–552}} Weber's position was that the social sciences should strive to be [[value-free]].{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=364–365|3a1=Aldenhoff-Hübinger|3y=2004|3p=144}} In his view, scholars and students needed to avoid promoting political values in the classroom. Science had no part in the choosing of values. With regards to economics, he argued that productivity was not a useful scientific concept, as it could impede the proper evaluation of economic phenomena.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=364–365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–553}}

===Methodological individualism===
{{Main|Methodological individualism}}

The principle of methodological individualism, which holds that social scientists should seek to understand collectivities solely as the result of individual people's actions, can be traced to Weber.{{sfnm|1a1=Heath|1y=2024|2a1=Ritzer|2y=2009|2p=31|3a1=Swedberg|3a2=Agevall|3y=2016|3pp=211–212}} The term "methodological individualism" was coined in 1908 by the Austrian-American economist [[Joseph Schumpeter]] as a way of referring to Weber's views on how to explain social phenomena.{{sfn|Heath|2024}} While his research interests placed a strong emphasis on interpreting [[economic history]], Weber's support of methodological individualism represented a break with the historical school and an agreement with the Austrian school's founder, Carl Menger, in the {{Lang|de|Methodenstreit}}.{{sfnm|1a1=Maclachlan|1y=2017|1pp=1163–1164|2a1=Callison|2y=2022|2p=276}} In the first chapter of ''[[Economy and Society]]'', he argued that only individuals "can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action".{{sfnm|1a1=Heath|1y=2024|2a1=Ritzer|2y=2009|2p=31|3a1=Swedberg|3a2=Agevall|3y=2016|3pp=211–212}} Despite the term's usage of "individualism", Weber did not interpret the individual as being the true source for sociological explanations. Instead, while only individuals could engage in intentional action, they were not necessarily separate from the collective group.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1pp=211–212|2a1=Heath|2y=2024}} He interpreted methodological individualism as having had close proximity to {{Lang|de|verstehende}} ("interpretive") sociology, as actions could be interpreted subjectively. Similarly, it was also related to ideal types in that it involved discussions of abstract and rational models of human behaviour.{{sfnm|1a1=Heath|1y=2024|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=211}}

===Ideal type===
{{Main|Ideal type}}

The ideal type was a central concept in Weber's methodology.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Kim|2y=2022|3a1=Kaesler|3y=1988|3p=180}} He interpreted them as having been indispensable for it.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Albrow|2y=1990|2p=151}} Due their taking of meaning into account, they are unique to the social sciences.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Albrow|2y=1990|2p=153}} The term "ideal type" was derived from [[Georg Jellinek]]'s use of it.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=157|2a1=Albrow|2y=1990|2p=151}} Weber outlined it in "[[The "Objectivity" of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy|The 'Objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy]]" and the first chapter of ''Economy and Society''.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=157|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2pp=180–183}} The ideal types' three functions are the formulation of terminology, classifications, and hypotheses. The latter task was of the greatest importance of the three.{{sfn|Swedberg|Agevall|2016|p=156}} In terms of their construction, an ideal type is a schematic that represents a social action and considers the role of meaning in it.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Kim|2y=2022}} By its nature, it was an exaggeration of an empirical situation through its assumption that the involved individuals were rational, had complete situational knowledge, were completely aware of the situation, were completely aware of their actions, and made no errors.{{sfn|Swedberg|Agevall|2016|p=156}} This was then contrasted with empirical reality, allowing the researcher to better understand it.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Kim|2y=2022|3a1=Albrow|3y=1990|3p=157}} However, ideal types are not direct representations of reality and Weber warned against interpreting them as such.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=156|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2p=182|3a1=Albrow|3y=1990|3p=152}} He placed no limits on what could be analysed through the use of ideal types. Since, for him, rational methodology and science were synonymous with one another, ideal types were constructed rationally.{{sfn|Albrow|1990|p=154}}

===Value-freedom===
{{Main|Value-freedom}}

Weber believed that social scientists needed to avoid making value-judgements. Instead, he wanted social scientific research to be value-free.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=364|2a1=Albrow|2y=1990|2p=234}} This would give them objectivity, but it needed to be combined with an acknowledgement that their research connected with values in different ways.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=364|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2pp=192–193|3a1=Albrow|3y=1990|3pp=243–244}} As part of his support for value-freedom, Weber opposed both instructors and students promoting their political views in the classroom.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=364|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2pp=192–193}} He first articulated it in his writings on scientific philosophy, including "The 'Objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy" and "Science as a Vocation".{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=364|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2pp=184–185}} Weber was influenced by [[Heinrich Rickert]]'s concept of value-relevance.{{sfnm|1a1=Albrow|1y=1990|1p=232|2a1=Kim|2y=2022|3a1=Swedberg|3a2=Agevall|3y=2016|3p=367}} Rickert used it to relate historical objects to values while maintaining objectivity through explicitly defined conceptual distinctions. However, Weber disagreed with the idea that a scholar could maintain objectivity while ascribing to a hierarchy of values in the way that Rickert did, however.{{sfnm|1a1=Albrow|1y=1990|1p=232|2a1=Kim|2y=2022}} His argument regarding value-freedom was connected to his involvement in the {{Lang|de|Werturteilsstreit}}.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=185–189|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–552}} As part of it, he argued in favour of the idea that the social sciences needed to be value-free.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=365|2a1=Kaesler|2y=1988|2pp=184–187|3a1=Aldenhoff-Hübinger|3y=2004|3p=144}} During it, he unsuccessfully tried to turn the [[German Sociological Association]] into a value-free organisation.{{sfnm|1a1=Swedberg|1a2=Agevall|1y=2016|1p=365|2a1=Kaesler|2y=2014|2pp=654–655|3a1=Kaesler|3y=1988|3pp=188–189}} Ultimately, that prompted his resignation from it.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=2014|1pp=654–655|2a1=Turner|2y=2001b|2pp=16401–16402}}