Editing Logrolling (section)

=== Logrolling in real politics ===
A problem in research is that it is impossible to identify vote trading directly within the House of Representatives or the Senate because roll call votes on specific goods are not observed (Irwin and Kroszner 1996<ref name="IrwinDouglass">{{cite journal|last=Irwin|first=Douglass|author2=Randall Kroszner |title=Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff|journal=Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy|year=1996|series=45|pages=173–200|doi=10.1016/S0167-2231(96)00023-1|volume=45|s2cid=154857884|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w5510.pdf}}</ref>). However, examples of refurbished bills can shed some light on the working-out of logrolling within the legislature. For example, in 1930, the [[Smoot-Hawley tariff]], the second-highest tariff in U.S. history, passed the House and Senate. Congress voted to increase tariffs exponentially, which worked to push the United States from a stagnant recession into a plummeting depression (Irwin and Kroszner 1996<ref name="IrwinDouglass" />). Strict party line votes suggest that partisan polarization in 1929 prevented the Smoot-Hawley bill from passing through Congress. The bill, however, was revamped, and legislators used logrolling to pass it through both chambers in 1930.

Omnibus bills can be an alternative market to logrolling. Various clauses are added to a bill to satisfy all involved parties sufficiently. However, large bills, like the [[Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act]], require an in depth knowledge of 1,000 plus pages. Many sections of these types of bills are initially opposed but are later supported because of special benefit clauses (Evans 1994<ref name="EvansDiana" />).

Because logrolling allows special-interest groups a voice in the political process, programs that benefit a minority group can get the approval of a majority. However, this may not be in the best interest of the majority. Special-interest groups typically do not represent the typical voter, but rather, small branches of minority ideologies (Holcombe 2006<ref name="HolcombeRandall" />). Voting results with or without logrolling will differ only if the minority is more interested in an issue than the majority, enough to separate the marginal voters from the majority. Studies show that lobbying and political pressure exerted by special-interest groups are not atypical behavior in a modern democracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />). Conditions imposed upon the social choice of the legislature imply a more severe restriction on the individual voter's preferences than the theory of logrolling presented by Buchanan and Tullock and presumed by Arrow's General Possibility Theory (Wilson 1969<ref>{{cite journal|last=Wilson|first=Robert|title=An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling|journal=The American Economic Review|year=1969|volume=59|series=3|pages=331–341}}</ref>).

Critics reproach members of Congress for protecting their own electoral interests at the expense of the general welfare. Congressmen tend to distribute specialized benefits at a great cost and ignore the particular costs the legislation bears upon the taxpayers (Evans 1994<ref name="EvansDiana" />). Legislators, who seek their personal benefit via logrolling even though it may not benefit those who must pay for the measure, are known as maximizers. Maximizers only take into account their personal cost and electability, instead of the effects of their actions on other parties involved. In short, other taxpayers will pay for the policy even if it does not affect them (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />). Initially, maximizers will encourage other legislators to have the same selfish behavior because significant gains can be accrued in the short run. Buchanan and Tullock state that within a system of maximizers, all individuals are worse off than if they had all adopted [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] norms of behavior.

Legislative bodies can expect higher government spending and taxation when logrolling is allowed to flourish. Logrolling does not imply excessive spending; members can trade tax reductions just as easily as they can trade pork barrel policies. The problem is that benefits of a vote only reach a particular portion of the population, while the tax costs that pay for the vote are spread throughout the entire populace, especially when the act depends on revenue from sales or income taxes. Benefits are concentrated in localities, and the costs are dispersed throughout the nation. Committee members can thus exploit pork barrel projects for electoral purposes. The citizenry is seen as a "common pool," used to finance projects through taxes. Somehow the citizens end up paying higher taxes than those who are not in a logroll system (Dalenberg and Duffy-Deno 1991<ref>{{cite journal|last=Dalenberg|first=Douglas R|author2=Kevin Duffy-Demo |title=At Large Vs. Ward Elections: Implications for Public Infrastructure|journal=Public Choice|year=1991|pages=335–342|doi=10.1007/BF00156239|volume=70|issue=3|s2cid=154544695}}</ref> and Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gilligan|first=Thomas|author2=John Matsusaka |title=Deviations from Constituent Interests|journal=Economic Inquiry|year=1995|pages=383–401|doi=10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01870.x|volume=33|issue=3}}</ref>). In a system where logrolling is permitted, a third party may bear the cost of the project, rather than those who receive the full benefit of the legislation. This is always inefficient.

The logic of collective action shows that votes for bills are motivated by politicians and are determined by a simple majority (Olson 1971<ref>{{cite book|last=Olson|first=Mancur Jr.|title=The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups|year=1971|publisher=Schocken Books|location=New York}}</ref>). Politicians are in the game to win it. <!-- Win what?? -->Collective effort explains why farms acquire government subsidies at the expense of millions of consumers and why those in the textile industry benefit at the expense of clothing buyers (Shughart 2008<ref name="econlib" />). Congressional committees ensure that each committee leader will create legislative coalitions to push his policies to fruition. Thus, ceteris paribus, members who receive such projects, are likely to vote in support of their leader's wishes (Evans 1994<ref name="EvansDiana" />).

Policymakers and congressmen have goals of power, and making their own mark in public policy, not pure aims of reelection (Dodd 1977<ref>{{cite journal|last=Dodd|first=Lawrence|title=Congress and the Quest for Power|journal=Congress Reconsidered|year=1977}}</ref>). Reelection does play a great part in the legislative process as a condition to achieving any other political goal. Thus, logrolling can be a powerful tool for committee chairs, who control the voting agendas (Evans 1994<ref name="EvansDiana" />). While committee leaders create the supermajority, they try to achieve their personal goals and help a bare majority of members achieve theirs. A skilled policy-oriented committee leader often seeks to exploit the goals of other members in order to construct legislation he or she will prefer (Arnold 1979<ref>{{cite book|last=Arnold|first=Douglas R.|title=Congress and the Bureaucracy|url=https://archive.org/details/congressbureaucr00arno|url-access=registration|year=1979|publisher=Yale University Press|location=New Haven, CT|isbn=9780300023459}}</ref> and Strahan 1989<ref>{{cite journal|last=Strahan|first=Randall|title=Member's Goals and Coalition-Building Strategies in the U.S. House: The Case of Tax Reforms|journal=Journal of Politics|year=1989|volume=51|pages=373–384|doi=10.2307/2131347|issue=2|jstor=2131347|s2cid=154543023}}</ref>).

====Wafelijzerpolitiek====
{{Main|Waffle-iron politics}}
''[[Wafelijzerpolitiek]]'' (lit. waffle iron politics) is a form of logrolling used in [[Belgium]]. Until the split of the unitary Belgium in several parts, the unitary government decided on the funds given to big projects. As there were usually two opposing groups of about equal size in Belgium, this norm resulted in the approval of two equally sized projects in the two parts of the country, with the funds given to the two projects being equal. As a result, one project was always overfunded. Many see ''wafelijzerpolitiek'' as the source of Belgium's high debt.

After the first state reformation in 1988, many big projects were decided regionally, so the number of ''wafelijzer'' projects went down. There are still some things that fall under the supervision of the federal government, where ''wafelijzerpolitiek'' still happens. One example is the Belgian railway network.

Another result of the ''wafelijzerpolitiek'' is the big useless works. As Flanders is a part of Belgium with many ports (e.g., big ports in [[Antwerp]] and [[Zeebrugge]]), for every investment in Flemish waterways there had to be an investment in Walloon waterways. Some results are the [[Ronquières inclined plane]] and the [[Strépy-Thieu boat lift]].