Editing Hugo Black (section)

===Textualism and originalism===
Black was noted for his advocacy of a [[textualism|textualist]] approach to constitutional interpretation. He took a "literal" or absolutist reading of the provisions of the Bill of Rights<ref name="Ball (2006)" />{{rp|115–118}} and believed that the text of the Constitution is absolutely determinative on any question calling for judicial interpretation, leading to his reputation as a "[[textualism|textualist]]" and as a "[[strict constructionism|strict constructionist]]". While the text of the Constitution was an absolute limitation on the authority of judges in constitutional matters, within the confines of the text judges had a broad and unqualified mandate to enforce constitutional provisions, regardless of current public sentiment, or the feelings of the justices themselves.<ref name="Ball (2006)" />{{page needed|date=December 2020}}
Thus, Black refused to join in the efforts of the justices on the court who sought to abolish capital punishment in the United States, whose efforts succeeded (temporarily) in the term immediately following Black's death. He claimed that the [[Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States|Fifth]] and [[Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States|Fourteenth Amendment]]'s reference to takings of "life", and to "capital" crimes, meant approval of the death penalty was implicit in the Bill of Rights. He also was not persuaded that a right of privacy was implicit in the [[Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Ninth]] or Fourteenth amendments, and dissented from the court's 1965 ''[[Griswold v. Connecticut|Griswold]]'' decision which invalidated a conviction for the use of [[contraceptive]]s. Black said "It belittles that [Fourth] Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but 'privacy'{{nbsp}}... 'privacy' is a broad, abstract, and ambiguous concept{{nbsp}}... The constitutional right of privacy is not found in the Constitution."<ref name="Ball (2006)" />{{rp|241}}

Justice Black rejected reliance on what he called the "mysterious and uncertain" concept of [[natural law]]. According to Black that theory was vague and arbitrary, and merely allowed judges to impose their personal views on the nation. Instead, he argued that courts should limit themselves to a strict analysis of the actual text of the Constitution. Black was, in addition, an opponent of the "[[Living Constitution]]" theory. In his dissent to ''[[Griswold v. Connecticut|Griswold]]'' (1965), he wrote:

<blockquote>I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time, and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must, with all deference, reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change, and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and, being somewhat old-fashioned, I must add it is good enough for me.<ref name="GriswoldvConnecticut">{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=389&invol=347|title=FindLaw's United States Supreme Court case and opinions.|website=Findlaw|access-date=February 18, 2006|archive-date=February 8, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208090633/http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=389&invol=347|url-status=live}}</ref>
</blockquote>

Thus, some have seen Black as an [[originalism|originalist]]. David Strauss, for example, hails him as "[t]he most influential originalist judge of the last hundred years".<ref>Strauss, "The Death of Judicial Conservatism", 4 ''Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy''. 1, 4 (2009).</ref> Black insisted that judges rely on the intent of the Framers as well as the "plain meaning" of the Constitution's words and phrases (drawing on the history of the period) when deciding a case.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Justice Hugo Black (1886–1971) – Constituting America |url=https://constitutingamerica.org/justice-hugo-black-1886-1971-guest-essayist-daniel-a-cotter/ |access-date=May 19, 2022 |website=constitutingamerica.org|date=June 20, 2017 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yarbrough |first=Tinsley |date=1987 |title=The Constitutional Faith of Mr. Justice Black |url=https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol15/iss1/7 |journal=Journal of Political Science |volume=15 |issue=1 |issn=0098-4612 |quote=Black railed against judges who would substitute their policy judgments for the Constitution's language and the intent of its framers{{nbsp}}... At one point or another, all jurists cite language and historical intent in defending their interpretations of constitutional provisions. But arguably no other American judge has been as consistent, committed, and sincere an apostle of interpretivism as Justice Black was}}</ref>

Black additionally called for [[judicial restraint]] not usually seen in court decision-making. The justices of the court would validate the supremacy of the legislature in public policy-making, unless the legislature was denying people constitutional freedoms. Black stated that the legislature "was fully clothed with the power to govern and to maintain order".<ref name="Ball (2006)" />{{rp|112}}