Editing Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (section)

=== Role in the 1963 coup d'état ===
{{Main|1963 South Vietnamese coup d'état}}
Lodge quickly determined that Diem was both inept and corrupt, and that South Vietnam was headed for disaster unless Diem reformed his administration or was replaced.<ref>
{{cite video
  | people = Lodge, Henry Cabot
  | title = Interview with Henry Cabot Lodge
  | url = http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-b93dd4-interview-with-henry-cabot-lodge-1979-part-1-of-5
  | medium = Video interview (part 1 of 5)
  | publisher = Open Vault, WGBH Media Library and Archives
  | date = 1979 }}
</ref> On August 29 Lodge wrote in a cable: "We are launched on a course from where there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. There is no turning back because U.S. prestige is already publicly committed to this end in large measure, and will become more so as the facts leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=289}}

Lodge, noting that the [[South Vietnamese Army]] was completely reliant upon American military aid, demanded that Kennedy halt all such aid as long as Diem was president, and to make an "all-out effort" to have the mutinous generals "move promptly", as the outcome of the coup would depend "at least as much on us as them".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=289-290}} Lodge warned that to allow Diem to continue would lead to a popular revolt that would bring in a "pro-Communist or at best neutralist set of politicians".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} At the same time, French President [[Charles de Gaulle]] had launched a major diplomatic initiative to end the [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]] that called for a federation of North and South Vietnam, and for both Vietnams to be neutral in the Cold War.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=165}} Lodge was opposed to the peace plan, as he saw the proposed neutralization of South Vietnam as no different from Communist control of South Vietnam.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=165}}

Kennedy accepted Lodge's recommendations and gave him ''carte blanche'' to manage the affairs in Vietnam as he best saw fit, and gave him the power to cut off American aid if necessary.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} Just why Kennedy delegated such to Lodge has remained a matter of debate. Historian [[Arthur Schlesinger, Jr]]. later wrote Lodge was "a strong man with the bit between his teeth" whom Kennedy could not manage.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} In contrast, journalist [[Stanley Karnow]] speculated that Kennedy having embraced and praised Diem preferred that the "messy job" of overthrowing him be contracted out to Lodge, all the more so as there was always the possibility that the coup might fail, in which case the president would blame a "rogue ambassador".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}}

On October 5, Lodge cabled back to Kennedy that he learned that the generals were finally ready to proceed.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=294}} The CIA officer, [[Lucien Conein]] met with General [[Dương Văn Minh]], who asked that the United States "not thwart" a coup and promise to continue to provide the aid worth about $500 million per year after Diem was overthrown.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=294}} Lodge seized upon Minh's remark to argue to Kennedy that the United States should promise that it "will not attempt to thwart" a coup, a formula that Kennedy embraced.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=295}} Lodge himself later used this line as a defence against criticism, saying he did not promise to support a coup, only "not thwart" it.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=295}}

Kennedy had his National Security Adviser, [[McGeorge Bundy]], send Lodge a cable on October 25 saying that the United States should abandon the coup if there were "poor prospects of success".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} Lodge in reply maintained "it seems at least an even bet that the next government would not bungle and fumble as the present one has".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} Lodge also argued to stop a coup would be to take on "an undue responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office", which was a "judgment over the affairs of Vietnam".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} In the next sentence, he ignored his principle of noninterference in South Vietnamese internal affairs by suggesting that in a post-Diem cabinet should include Tran Quoc Buu, a trade union leader who had long been funded by the CIA, and the Buddhist leader [[Trí Quang|Tri Quang]], who had impressed Lodge with his [[anticommunism]].{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} On October 28, Lodge sent a dispatch to Kennedy saying a coup was "imminent", and that he would have only four hours notice before the coup started, which "rules out my checking with you".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=299}}

On October 29, Kennedy called a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss what to do.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=299}} Persuaded by [[Robert F. Kennedy|Robert Kennedy]] — his younger brother, Attorney General and right-hand man — President Kennedy changed his mind and decided against the coup.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}}  Writing on behalf of Kennedy, Bundy sent a message to Lodge warning the possibility of a civil war between pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces "could be serious or even disastrous for U.S. interests".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge was ordered to have Conein tell General [[Trần Văn Đôn]] that "we do not find that the presently revealed plans give a clear prospect of quick results" and to put General [[Paul D. Harkins]] in charge of the embassy in Saigon when the ambassador was due to leave shortly for a meeting in Washington.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}}

Lodge ignored this order from Bundy, stating in his reply that to have Harkins in charge of the embassy during an event "so profoundly political as a change of government" would violate the principle that the serving officers of the U.S. armed forces must always be non-political.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} He further argued that the only way of stopping the coup would be to inform Diem which officers had been plotting against him which would "make traitors out of us" and destroy the "civilian and military leadership needed to carry the war&nbsp;... to its successful conclusion" as Diem would have the rebel officers all shot.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge told Kennedy that when the coup started, he would grant asylum to Diem and the rest of the Ngo family should they ask for it, but felt that to stop the coup would be interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge also argued that the money should be "discreetly" provided to the plotters to "buy off potential opposition" and for the United States to immediately recognize a post-Diem government.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Finally, he argued that was needed for South Vietnam was "nation-building".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge wrote: "My general view is that the United States is trying bring this medieval country into the twentieth century&nbsp;... We have made considerable progress in military and economic ways, but to gain victory we must also bring them into the twentieth century politically, and that can only be done by either a thoroughgoing change in the behaviour of the present government or another government".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=300-301}} Faced with stark warnings from Lodge that the majority of the South Vietnamese people hated the Ngo family and there no possibility of a victory over the Viet Cong as long as Diem continued in power, Kennedy changed his mind yet again.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}} In his final message to Lodge, Kennedy wrote: "If you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to the generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better&nbsp;... But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun&nbsp;... it is in the interest of the U.S. government that it should succeed".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}} Kennedy had essentially abdicated responsibility by leaving the final decision about whatever to back a coup to Lodge, who had no doubts in his mind that a coup was the best course of action.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}}

On November 1, 1963, at about 10 am, Lodge visited the Gia Long Palace to meet Diem who gave him a two-hour-long lecture about American ingratitude towards his regime.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=304}} At about noon, Lodge returned to the embassy for lunch.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=304}} At about 1 pm, the coup began.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=305}} Later that day, the Ngo brothers secretly fled into [[Chợ Lớn, Ho Chi Minh City|Cholon]], the Chinese district of Saigon.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=308}} Lodge attempted to get into touch with Diem with the aim of arranging for him to go into exile, but it was unclear just where he was, as Diem kept claiming that he was still at the Gia Long Palace. Finally, Diem revealed in a phone call to Đôn that he and his brother were at Saint Francis Xavier, and was willing to go into exile provided he, his brother and their families were promised safe conduct.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=309}} Despite the promise of safe conduct, the Ngo brothers were shot in the armored personnel carrier that was supposed to take them to the airport.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=310}} Lodge invited the generals to the embassy to congratulate them for what he saw as a job well done.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=311}} In a cable to Kennedy, he wrote: "The prospects now are for a shorter war".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=311}}