Editing George S. Patton (section)

== World War II ==
[[File:HopewithGroupMeetsPattonWW2.jpg|thumb|right|Writer [[Hal Block]] (far left), comedian [[Bob Hope]] (second from left), writer/actor Barney Dean, singer [[Frances Langford]] and musician [[Tony Romano (musician)|Tony Romano]] meet George Patton in Sicily during World War II]]
Following the [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|German Army]]'s [[invasion of Poland]] and the outbreak of [[World War II]] in Europe in September 1939, the [[United States Armed Forces|U.S. military]] entered a period of [[mobilization]], and Colonel Patton sought to build up the power of U.S. armored forces. During maneuvers the [[United States Army Central|Third Army]] conducted in 1940, Patton served as an umpire, where he met [[Adna R. Chaffee Jr.]] and the two formulated recommendations to develop an armored force. Chaffee was named commander of this force,{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=75–76}} and created the [[1st Armored Division (United States)|1st]] and [[2nd Armored Division (United States)|2nd Armored Divisions]] as well as the first combined arms doctrine. He named Patton commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade, part of the 2nd Armored Division. The division was one of few organized as a heavy formation with many tanks, and Patton was in charge of its training.{{sfn|Brighton|2009|pp=82–83}} 

Patton was promoted to [[Brigadier general (United States)|brigadier general]] on 2 October, made acting division commander in November when [[Charles L. Scott (U.S. Army general)|Charles L. Scott]] assumed command of I Armored Corps, and on 4 April 1941, was promoted again to [[Major general (United States)|major general]] as [[Commanding officer|Commanding General]] (CG) of the 2nd Armored Division.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=75–76}} As Chaffee stepped down from command of the [[I Armored Corps (United States)|I Armored Corps]], Patton became the most prominent figure in U.S. armor doctrine. In December 1940, he staged a high-profile mass exercise in which 1,000 tanks and vehicles were driven from [[Columbus, Georgia]], to [[Panama City, Florida]], and back.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=77–79}} He repeated the exercise with his entire division of 1,300 vehicles the next month.{{sfn|Brighton|2009|p=85}} Patton earned a [[pilot's license]] and, during these maneuvers, observed the movements of his vehicles from the air to find ways to deploy them effectively in combat.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=77–79}} His exploits earned him a spot on the cover of ''[[Life (magazine)|Life]]'' magazine.{{sfn|Brighton|2009|p=106}}

[[File:George S. Patton 44.jpg|thumb|left|Major General George S. Patton sitting on a fence and smoking a pipe while observing 1941 maneuvers in Louisiana.]]

General Patton led the division during the [[Tennessee Maneuver Area|Tennessee Maneuvers]] in June 1941, and was lauded for his leadership, executing 48 hours' worth of planned objectives in only nine. During the September [[Louisiana Maneuvers]], his division was part of the losing Red Army in Phase I, but in Phase II was assigned to the Blue Army. His division executed a {{convert|400|mi|adj=on}} end run around the Red Army and "captured" [[Shreveport, Louisiana]]. During the October–November [[Carolina Maneuvers]], Patton's division captured the now Lieutenant General Drum, who served as the commander of the opposing army.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=80–82}} The general was greatly embarrassed and became the subject of mockery.<ref>{{cite book |last=Keane |first=Michael |date=2012 |title=Patton: Blood, Guts, and Prayer |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eHRJ3w9vcw4C&q=%22hugh+drum%22+%22carolina+maneuvers%22&pg=PA111 |location=Washington, DC |publisher=Regnery History |page=111 |isbn=978-1-59698-326-7 |ref={{sfnRef|''Patton: Blood, Guts, and Prayer''}}}}</ref> After soldiers from [[Isaac D. White]]'s battalion detained Drum,<ref>{{cite book |last=Morton |first=Matthew Darlington |date=2009 |title=Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.S. Cavalry |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9q4pAQAAIAAJ&q=%22captured+gen+hugh+drum%22 |location=DeKalb, IL |publisher=Northern Illinois University Press |page=83 |isbn=978-0-8758-0397-5 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> the exercise umpires ruled that the circumstances would not have transpired in combat, so he was allowed to return to his headquarters, enabling the exercise to continue and for Drum to [[Face (sociological concept)|save face]].{{sfn|''Patton: Blood, Guts, and Prayer''|page=111}} Despite the umpires' actions, the incident indicated to senior leaders that Hugh Drum might not be prepared to command large bodies of troops under the modern battlefield conditions the Army would face in World War II, thus, he was not considered for field command.{{sfn|''Patton: Blood, Guts, and Prayer''|page=111}}{{efn|Drum's capture was the inspiration for a scene in the 1967 film ''[[The Dirty Dozen]]''.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJsC-buIkSE  |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211221/EJsC-buIkSE |archive-date=2021-12-21 |url-status=live|title=George S. Patton: American Ajax |last=Hanson |first=Victor Davis |author-link=Victor Davis Hanson |date=February 11, 2020 |website=YouTube |publisher=Hillsdale College |location=Hillsdale, MI |access-date=August 25, 2020 |at=15:35 |quote=1940 in war games in Louisiana, he captured the senior general Hugh Drum. You may have seen ''The Dirty Dozen'', that old movie about how they played dirty. That was based on Patton's war maneuvers, about how he went on a 400-mile goose chase, they thought, and ended up capturing the red general. He was on the blue team.}}{{cbignore}}</ref>}}

On 15 January 1942, a few weeks after the American entry into World War II, he succeeded Scott as commander of I Armored Corps, and the next month established the [[Desert Training Center]]{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=83}} in the [[Coachella Valley]] region of [[Riverside County]] in California, to run training exercises. He commenced these exercises in late 1941 and continued them into the summer of 1942. Patton chose a {{convert|10000|acre|km2|adj=on}} expanse of desert area about {{convert|50|mi}} southeast of [[Palm Springs, California|Palm Springs]].{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=84–85}} From his first days as a commander, Patton strongly emphasized the need for armored forces to stay in constant contact with opposing forces. His instinctive preference for offensive movement was typified by an answer Patton gave to [[war correspondent]]s in a 1944 press conference. In response to a question on whether the Third Army's [[Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine|rapid offensive across France]] should be slowed to reduce the number of U.S. casualties, Patton replied, "Whenever you slow anything down, you waste human lives."{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=542}} It was around this time that a reporter, after hearing a speech where Patton said that it took "blood and brains" to win in combat, began calling him "blood and guts". The nickname would follow him for the rest of his life.{{sfn|Lovelace|2014|p=110}} Soldiers under his command were known at times to have quipped, "our blood, his guts". Nonetheless, he was known to be admired widely by the men under his charge.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=2}}

=== North African campaign ===
[[File:Major General Patton and Rear Admiral Hewitt on USS Augusta (CA-31), circa in November 1942 (80-G-30116).jpg|thumb|Patton (left) with [[Rear admiral (United States)|Rear Admiral]] [[Henry Kent Hewitt]] aboard {{USS|Augusta|CA-31|6}}, off the coast of [[North Africa]], November 1942]]
{{See also|Operation Torch|Tunisian campaign}}
[[File:Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed and guests at a dinner for the Sultan (cropped).jpg|thumb|220x220px|George S. Patton at the [[Casablanca Conference]]]]
Under [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the [[Supreme Allied Commander]], Patton was assigned to help plan the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] invasion of [[Scramble for Africa#France|French North Africa]] as part of [[Operation Torch]] in the summer of 1942.{{sfn|Brighton|2009|pp=117–119}}{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=88–90}} Patton commanded the Western Task Force, consisting of 33,000 men in 100 ships, in landings centered on [[Casablanca]], Morocco. The landings, which took place on 8 November 1942, were opposed by [[Vichy France|Vichy French]] forces, but Patton's men quickly gained a [[beachhead]] and pushed through fierce resistance. Casablanca fell on 11 November and Patton negotiated an [[armistice]] with French General [[Charles Noguès]].{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=91–93}}{{sfn|Brighton|2009|pp=165–166}} The [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Sultan of Morocco]] was so impressed that he presented Patton with the [[Order of Ouissam Alaouite]], with the citation "''Les Lions dans leurs tanières tremblent en le voyant approcher''" (The lions in their dens tremble at his approach).{{sfn|Edey|1968|p=60}} Patton oversaw the conversion of Casablanca into a military port and hosted the [[Casablanca Conference]] in January 1943.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=94}}

On 6 March 1943, following the defeat of the [[II Corps (United States)|U.S. II Corps]] by the German [[Afrika Korps]], commanded by ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]'' [[Erwin Rommel]], at the [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]], Patton replaced Major General [[Lloyd Fredendall]] as Commanding General of the II Corps and was promoted to lieutenant general. Soon thereafter, he had Major General [[Omar Bradley]] reassigned to his corps as its deputy commander.{{sfn|Blumenson|1985|p=182}} With orders to take the battered and demoralized formation into action in 10 days' time, Patton immediately introduced sweeping changes, ordering all soldiers to wear clean, pressed and complete uniforms, establishing rigorous schedules, and requiring strict adherence to military protocol. He continuously moved throughout the command talking with men, seeking to shape them into effective soldiers. He pushed them hard, and sought to reward them well for their accomplishments.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=96–97}} His uncompromising leadership style is evidenced by his orders for an attack on a hill position near [[Gafsa]], in which he ended by reportedly saying, "I expect to see such casualties among officers, particularly staff officers, as will convince me that a serious effort has been made to capture this objective."{{sfn|Hunt|1990|p=169}}

[[File:US generals Theodore Roosevelt Jr., Terry Allen and George Patton.jpg|thumb|left|From left to right, Brigadier General [[Theodore Roosevelt Jr.]], Major General [[Terry de la Mesa Allen Sr.|Terry Allen]] and Lieutenant General George S. Patton, March 1943]]

Patton's training was effective, and on 17 March, the [[1st Infantry Division (United States)|U.S. 1st Infantry Division]] took Gafsa participating in the indecisive [[Battle of El Guettar]], and pushing a German and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italian]] armored force back twice. In the meantime, on 5 April, he removed Major General [[Orlando Ward]], commanding the [[1st Armored Division (United States)|1st Armored Division]], after its lackluster performance at Maknassy against numerically inferior German forces. Advancing on [[Gabès]], Patton's corps pressured the [[Mareth Line]].{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=96–97}} During this time, he reported to British [[General (United Kingdom)|General]] [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]], commander of the [[18th Army Group]], and came into conflict with [[Air Vice Marshal]] [[Arthur Coningham (RAF officer)|Sir Arthur Coningham]] about the lack of [[close air support]] being provided for his troops.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=98–99}} By the time his force reached Gabès, the Germans had abandoned it. He then relinquished command of II Corps to Bradley, and returned to the I Armored Corps in Casablanca to help plan Operation Husky, the [[Allied invasion of Sicily]]. Fearing U.S. troops would be sidelined, he convinced British commanders to allow them to continue fighting through to the end of the [[Tunisia Campaign]] before leaving on this new assignment.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=98–99}}{{sfn|Brighton|2009|p=188}}

=== Sicily campaign ===
{{See also|Allied invasion of Sicily}}
For Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, Patton was to command the [[Seventh United States Army]], dubbed the Western Task Force, in landings at [[Gela]], [[Scoglitti]] and [[Licata]] to support landings by General [[Bernard Montgomery|Sir Bernard Montgomery]]'s [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|British Eighth Army]]. Patton's I Armored Corps was officially redesignated the Seventh Army just before his force of 90,000 landed before dawn on D-Day, 10 July 1943, on beaches near the town of Licata. The armada was hampered by wind and weather, but despite this the three U.S. infantry divisions involved, the [[3rd Infantry Division (United States)|3rd]], [[1st Infantry Division (United States)|1st]], and [[45th Infantry Division (United States)|45th]], secured their respective beaches. They then [[Battle of Gela (1943)|repulsed counterattacks at Gela]],{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=101–104}} where Patton personally led his troops against German reinforcements from the [[Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 Hermann Göring|Hermann Göring Division]].{{sfn|Brighton|2009|pp=201–202}}

[[File:Lieutenant Colonel Lyle Bernard and Lieutenant General George S. Patton near Brolo, 1943 28-1162M original.jpg|thumb|left|Lieutenant Colonel [[Lyle W. Bernard]], commanding the 2nd Battalion, [[30th Infantry Regiment (United States)|30th Infantry Regiment]], in conversation with Patton, near [[Brolo]], [[Sicily]], July 1943]]

Initially ordered to protect the British forces' left flank, Patton was granted permission by Alexander to take [[Palermo]] after Montgomery's forces became bogged down on the road to Messina. As part of a provisional corps under Major General [[Geoffrey Keyes]], the 3rd Infantry Division under Major General [[Lucian Truscott]] covered {{convert|100|mi}} in 72 hours, arriving at Palermo on 21 July. Patton then set his sights on Messina.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=105–107}} He sought an [[amphibious assault]], but it was delayed by lack of landing craft, and his troops did not land at [[Santo Stefano di Camastra|Santo Stefano]] until 8 August, by which time the Germans and Italians had already evacuated the bulk of their troops to mainland [[Italy]]. He ordered more landings on 10 August by the 3rd Infantry Division, which took heavy casualties but pushed the German forces back, and hastened the advance on Messina.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=108–109}} A third landing was completed on 16 August, and by 22:00 that day Messina fell to his forces. By the end of the battle, the 200,000-man Seventh Army had suffered 7,500 casualties, and killed or captured 113,000 Axis troops and destroyed 3,500 vehicles. Still, 40,000 German and 70,000 Italian troops escaped to Italy with 10,000 vehicles.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=110–111}}{{sfn|Brighton|2009|p=215}}

Patton's conduct in this campaign met with several controversies. He was also frequently in disagreement with [[Terry de la Mesa Allen Sr.]] and [[Theodore Roosevelt Jr.]] though often then conceding, to their relief, in line with Bradley's view.{{sfn|D'Este|1995|p=466}}

[[File:Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.,.jpg|thumb|right|General Sir Bernard Montgomery shakes hands with Lieutenant General George S. Patton at an airport at [[Palermo]], Sicily, 28 July 1943. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, deputy commander of Patton's Seventh Army, stands to the far left of the picture.]]

When Alexander sent a transmission on 19 July limiting Patton's attack on Messina, his [[chief of staff]], Brigadier General [[Hobart R. Gay]], claimed the message was "lost in transmission" until Messina had fallen.

In an incident on 22 July, while a U.S. armored column was under attack from German aircraft, he shot and killed a pair of mules that had stopped while pulling a cart across a bridge. The cart was blocking the way of the column. When their Sicilian owner protested, Patton attacked him with a walking stick and had his troops push the two mule carcasses off the bridge.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=105–107}}

When informed of the [[Biscari massacre]] of prisoners, which was by troops under his command, Patton wrote in his diary, "I told Bradley that it was probably an exaggeration, but in any case to tell the officer to certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape or something, as it would make a stink in the press and also would make the civilians mad. Anyhow, they are dead, so nothing can be done about it."{{sfn|Atkinson|2007|p=119}} Bradley refused Patton's suggestions. Patton later changed his mind. After he learned that the 45th Division's Inspector General found "no provocation on the part of the prisoners&nbsp;... They had been slaughtered" Patton is reported to have said: "Try the bastards."{{sfn|Atkinson|2007|p=119}}

Two soldiers were tried for the Biscari massacre, both of whom claimed in their defense that they were acting under orders from Patton not to take prisoners if enemy combatants continued to resist within two hundred yards of their position.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weingartner |first=James J. |date=1989 |title=Massacre at Biscari: Patton and an American War Crime |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24447601 |journal=The Historian |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=28–29 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.1989.tb00772.x |jstor=24447601 |issn=0018-2370}}</ref> Major General [[Everett Hughes (United States Army officer)|Everett Hughes]], an old friend of Patton's, defended him, asserting that Patton had not "at any time advocated the destruction of prisoners of war under any circumstances".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weingartner |first=James J. |date=1989 |title=Massacre at Biscari: Patton and an American War Crime |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24447601 |journal=The Historian |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=36 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.1989.tb00772.x |jstor=24447601 |issn=0018-2370}}</ref> James J. Weingartner argues that Patton's innocence in inciting violence against prisoners of war is uncertain, stating that

{{blockquote|The testimony of multiple witnesses indicated beyond a reasonable doubt that Patton had urged the killing of enemy troops who continued to resist at close quarters, even if they offered to surrender. Patton probably wished his troops to deny quarter or refuse to accept the surrender of enemy combatants who continued to resist at close range, itself a violation of the laws of war (although common practice) by the twentieth century, but it should not be surprising if some Americans concluded that they were authorized to kill resolute enemy soldiers after they had placed themselves under American control.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weingartner |first=James J. |date=1989 |title=Massacre at Biscari: Patton and an American War Crime |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24447601 |journal=The Historian |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=37 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.1989.tb00772.x |jstor=24447601 |issn=0018-2370}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |isbn=978-0-7432-0263-3|first=Christopher|last=Robbins|title=Test of Courage: The [[Michel Thomas]] Story|publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|location=New York|year=2000}}</ref>}}

No official action was taken against Patton for any complicity in the massacre.

=== Slapping incidents and aftermath ===
{{Main|George S. Patton slapping incidents}}
[[File:Wounded-on wayto-hospital-RG-208-AA-158-A-015.jpg|thumb|right|Patton talks to wounded soldiers preparing for evacuation]]
Two high-profile incidents of Patton striking subordinates during the Sicily campaign attracted national controversy following the end of the campaign. On 3 August 1943, Patton slapped and verbally abused [[Private (rank)|Private]] Charles H. Kuhl at an evacuation hospital in [[Nicosia, Sicily|Nicosia]] after he had been found to suffer from "[[Post-traumatic stress disorder|battle fatigue]]".{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=331}} On 10 August, Patton slapped Private Paul G. Bennett under similar circumstances.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=331}} Ordering both soldiers back to the front lines,{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=118}} Patton railed against cowardice and issued orders to his commanders to discipline any soldier making similar complaints.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=117}}

Word of the incident reached Eisenhower, who privately reprimanded Patton and insisted he apologize.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=329}} Patton apologized to both soldiers individually, as well as to doctors who witnessed the incidents,{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=336}} and later to all of the soldiers under his command in several speeches.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=338}} Eisenhower suppressed the incident in the media,{{sfn|D'Este|1995|pp=535–536}} but in November journalist [[Drew Pearson (journalist)|Drew Pearson]] revealed it on his radio program.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=120}} Criticism of Patton in the United States was harsh, and included members of Congress and former generals, Pershing among them.{{Sfn|Edey|1968|pp=160–166}}{{Sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=379}} The views of the general public remained mixed on the matter,{{Sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=377}} and eventually Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson stated that Patton must be retained as a commander because of the need for his "aggressive, winning leadership in the bitter battles which are to come before final victory."{{sfn|D'Este|1995|p=543}}

Patton did not command a force in combat for 11 months.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=122}} In September, Bradley, who was Patton's junior in both rank and experience, was selected to command the First United States Army forming in England to prepare for [[Operation Overlord]].{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=345}} This decision had been made before the slapping incidents were made public, but Patton blamed them for his being denied the command.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=121}} Eisenhower felt the invasion of Europe was too important to risk any uncertainty, and that the slapping incidents had been an example of Patton's inability to exercise discipline and self-control. While Eisenhower and Marshall both considered Patton to be a skilled combat commander, they felt Bradley was less impulsive and less prone to making mistakes.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=348}} On 26 January 1944, Patton was formally given command of the [[U.S. Third Army]] in England, a newly formed field Army, and he was assigned to prepare its inexperienced soldiers for combat in Europe.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=407}}{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=124}} This duty kept Patton busy during the first half of 1944.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=423}}

=== Ghost Army ===
{{See also|Ghost Army}}

[[File:Lt. Gen. Patton with Maj. Gen. Walter Robertson, April 1944.jpg|thumb|left|Major General [[Walter M. Robertson]] (back seat), commanding the [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]], with Lieutenant General Patton pass in review of elements of Patton's Third Army in April 1944, prior to the Normandy invasion in June]]

The [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|German High Command]] had more respect for Patton than for any other [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] commander and considered him to be central to any plan to invade Europe from England.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=127}} Because of this, Patton was made a prominent figure in the deception scheme [[Operation Fortitude]] during the first half of 1944.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=409}} Through the British [[Double-Cross System|network of double-agents]], the Allies fed German intelligence a steady stream of false reports about troop sightings and that Patton had been named commander of the [[First United States Army Group]] (FUSAG), all designed to convince the Germans that Patton was preparing this massive command for an invasion at [[Pas de Calais]]. FUSAG was in reality an intricately constructed fictitious army of decoys, props, and fake [[radio signal]] traffic based around [[Dover]] to mislead German [[reconnaissance plane]]s and to make Axis leaders believe that a large force was massing there. This helped to mask the real location of the invasion in [[Normandy]]. Patton was ordered to keep a low profile to deceive the Germans into thinking that he was in Dover throughout early 1944, when he was actually training the Third Army.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=127}} As a result of Operation Fortitude, the [[15th Army (Wehrmacht)|German 15th Army]] remained at the Pas de Calais to defend against Patton's supposed attack.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=128}} So strong was their conviction that this was the main landing area that the German army held its position there even after the [[invasion of Normandy]] on 6 June 1944, believing it to be a diversionary force. Patton flew to France a month later, and then returned to combat command.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=132}}

=== Normandy breakout offensive ===
{{Main|Invasion of Normandy}}
Sailing to Normandy throughout July, Patton's Third Army formed on the extreme right (west) of the Allied land forces,{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=132}}{{efn|Patton's friend [[Gilbert R. Cook]] was his deputy commander, whom Patton later had to relieve due to illness, a decision which "shook him to the core."{{sfn|Essame|1974|p=178}} }} and became operational at noon on 1 August 1944, under Bradley's [[Twelfth United States Army Group]]. The Third Army simultaneously [[Battle for Brest|attacked west into Brittany]], south, east toward the [[Seine]], and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the [[Falaise Pocket]] between [[Falaise, Calvados, France|Falaise]] and [[Argentan]].{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=135–136}}{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=139–140}}

[[File:General Montgomery with Generals Patton (left) and Bradley (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944. B6551.jpg|right|thumb|Bradley (center) with Patton (left) and [[Bernard Montgomery|Montgomery]] (right) at Montgomery's [[21st Army Group]] HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944.]]

Patton's strategy with his army favored speed and aggressive offensive action, though his forces saw less opposition than did the other three Allied field armies in the initial weeks of its advance.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=137}} The Third Army typically employed forward scout units to determine enemy strength and positions. [[Self-propelled artillery]] moved with the [[Military spearhead|spearhead]] units and was sited well forward, ready to engage protected German positions with [[indirect fire]]. Light aircraft such as the [[Piper J-3 Cub|Piper L-4 Cub]] served as artillery spotters and provided airborne reconnaissance. Once located, the armored infantry would attack using tanks as infantry support. Other armored units would then break through enemy lines and exploit any subsequent breach, constantly pressuring withdrawing German forces to prevent them from regrouping and reforming a cohesive defensive line.{{sfn|Jarymowycz|2001|pp=215–216}} The U.S. armor advanced using [[reconnaissance by fire]], and the .50 caliber [[M2 Browning]] heavy machine gun proved effective in this role, often flushing out and killing German [[panzerfaust]] teams waiting in ambush as well as breaking up German infantry assaults against the armored infantry.{{sfn|Jarymowycz|2001|pp=212}}

The speed of the advance forced Patton's units to rely heavily on air reconnaissance and tactical air support.{{sfn|Jarymowycz|2001|pp=215–216}} The Third Army had by far more [[military intelligence]] (G-2) officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.{{sfn|Gooderson|1998|p=44}} Its attached close air support group was [[XIX Tactical Air Command]], commanded by Brigadier General [[Otto P. Weyland]]. Developed originally by General [[Elwood Quesada]] of [[IX Tactical Air Command]] for the First Army in [[Operation Cobra]], the technique of "armored column cover", in which close air support was directed by an air traffic controller in one of the attacking tanks, was used extensively by the Third Army. Each column was protected by a standing patrol of three to four [[Republic P-47 Thunderbolt|P-47]] and [[North American P-51 Mustang|P-51]] fighter-bombers as a [[combat air patrol]] (CAP).{{sfn|Gooderson|1998|p=85}}

In its advance from [[Avranches]] to Argentan, the Third Army traversed {{convert|60|mi}} in just two weeks. Patton's force was supplemented by [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]] intelligence for which he was briefed daily by his G-2, Colonel [[Oscar Koch]], who apprised him of German counterattacks, and where to concentrate his forces.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=138}} Equally important to the advance of Third Army columns in northern France was the rapid advance of the supply echelons. Third Army logistics were overseen by Colonel Walter J. Muller, Patton's [[Military staff#Logistics (4)|G-4]], who emphasized flexibility, improvisation, and adaptation for Third Army supply echelons so forward units could rapidly exploit a breakthrough. Patton's rapid drive to [[Lorraine (region)|Lorraine]] demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. The major U.S. and Allied advantages were in mobility and air superiority. The U.S. Army had more trucks, more reliable tanks, and better radio communications, all of which contributed to a superior ability to operate at a rapid offensive pace.{{sfn|Jarymowycz|2001|p=217}}

=== Lorraine campaign ===
{{Main|Lorraine campaign}}
[[File:"Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, U.S. Third Army commander, pins the Silver Star on Private Ernest A. Jenkins of New York Cit - NARA - 535724.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Patton pins a [[Silver Star Medal]] on Private Ernest A. Jenkins, a soldier under his command, October 1944]]
Patton's Third Army was sent to Lorraine. Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its cities of Nancy and Metz the region contained few significant military objectives. Once the Third Army had penetrated Lorraine there would still be no first-rate military objectives on entering Germany. The Saar's industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north.<ref>The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September–December 1944, page 3, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel,
February, 1985, Combat Studies Institute.</ref> Patton's offensive came to a halt on 31 August 1944, as the Third Army ran out of fuel near the [[Moselle River]], just outside [[Metz]]. Patton expected that the theater commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support his advance, but Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, believing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch.

Still within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his [[Twenty First Army Group]] a higher priority for supplies for [[Operation Market Garden]].{{sfn|Ambrose|2007|pp=162–164}} However no supplies were diverted from Patton's Third Army. Three British transport companies were lent to American forces on 6 August for eight days not being returned until 4 September.<ref>Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, page 589</ref> The Third Army exhausted its fuel supplies, however after the Market Garden operation.{{sfn|Zaloga|2008|pp=184–193}} According to Bradley there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US, by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited on page 52 in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign, "by 10th September the period of critical [gasoline] shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September.<ref>Hugh Cole, The Lorraine Campaign page 52</ref>

The French rail network greatly aided the speed of the Third Army's logistical recovery, which was repaired and quickly put to use. In eastern France the rail network was relatively undamaged by Allied aircraft and had been abandoned almost intact by the retreating Germans. The Third Army brought its railheads as far forward as Nancy. The French themselves operated the trains providing rolling stock and trained personnel to supplement the Third Army.<ref>The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September–December 1944, page 22, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, February, 1985, Combat Studies Institute.</ref><ref>The Liberation Line by Christian Wolmar</ref>

Patton believed his forces were close enough to the [[Siegfried Line]] that he remarked to Bradley that with 400,000&nbsp;gallons of gasoline he could be in Germany within two days.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=141}} In late September, a large German Panzer counterattack sent expressly to stop the advance of Patton's Third Army was defeated by the [[U.S. 4th Armored Division]] at the [[Battle of Arracourt]]. The German commanders believed this was because their counterattack had been successful.{{sfn|von Mellenthin|2006|pp=381–382}}{{why|date=April 2025}}

{{external media| float = right| video1 = [https://www.c-span.org/video/?68490-1/patton-genius-war ''Booknotes'' interview with Carlo D'Este on ''Patton: A Genius for War''], 28 January 1996, [[C-SPAN]]}}

The halt of the Third Army during the month of September was enough to allow the Germans to strengthen the [[fortifications of Metz|fortress of Metz]]. Patton's forces reached the fortress at Metz on 5 September 1944, forcing a German surrender on 21 November 1944, taking over 10 weeks in the [[Battle of Metz]]<ref>An Overview, September–December 1944, page 29, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, 1985, Combat Studies Institute.</ref> with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Also an [[Battle of Fort Driant|attempt]] by Patton to seize Fort Driant just south of Metz was defeated.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=142}}

[[File:LtGen Omar Bradley, LtGen George Patton, and MGen Manton Eddy.jpg|thumb|From left to right: Major General [[Leven Cooper Allen|Leven C. Allen]], Lieutenant General [[Omar Bradley]], Major General [[John Shirley Wood|John S. Wood]], Lieutenant General George S. Patton and Major General [[Manton S. Eddy]] being shown a map by one of Patton's armored battalion commanders during a tour near Metz, France, November 1944]]

Patton's decisions in taking this city were criticized. German commanders interviewed after the war noted he could have bypassed the city and moved north to Luxembourg where he would have been able to cut off the [[7th Army (Wehrmacht)|German Seventh Army]].{{sfn|Hirshson|2003|p=546}} The German commander of Metz, General [[Hermann Balck]], also noted that a more direct attack would have resulted in a more decisive Allied victory in the city. Historian [[Carlo D'Este]] later wrote that the Lorraine campaign was one of Patton's least successful, faulting him for not deploying his divisions more aggressively and decisively.{{sfn|D'Este|1995|p=669}} Patton remained frustrated at the lack of progress of his forces. From 8 November to 15 December, his army advanced no more than {{convert|40|mi}}.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=143–144}}

In ''The Lorraine Campaign An Overview, September–December 1944'', on page 36, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel of the Combat Studies Institute stated in February, 1985:

<blockquote>Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.</blockquote>

=== Battle of the Bulge ===
{{Main|Battle of the Bulge}}
[[File:General Omar Bradley, General Dwight Eisenhower, and General George Patton, all graduates of West Point, survey war damage in Bastogne, Belgium. 1944-1945.jpg|thumb|upright|left|From left to right, [[Omar Bradley|Bradley]], [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and Patton in Bastogne, Belgium, 1945|alt=]]

In December 1944, the German army, under the command of German Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]], launched a last-ditch offensive across [[Belgium]], [[Luxembourg]], and northeastern France. On 16 December 1944, it massed 29 divisions totaling 250,000 men at a weak point in the Allied lines, and during the early stages of the ensuing [[Battle of the Bulge]], made significant headway towards the [[Meuse River]] during a severe winter. Eisenhower called a meeting of all senior Allied commanders on the Western Front at a headquarters near Verdun on the morning of 19 December to plan strategy and a response to the German assault.{{sfn|D'Este|1995|pp=675–678}}

At the time, Patton's Third Army was engaged in heavy fighting near [[Saarbrücken]]. Guessing the intent of the Allied command meeting, Patton ordered his staff to make three separate operational contingency orders to disengage elements of the Third Army from its present position and begin offensive operations toward several objectives in the area of the bulge occupied by German forces.{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=77}} At the Supreme Command conference, Eisenhower led the meeting, which was attended by Patton, Bradley, General [[Jacob L. Devers|Jacob Devers]], Major General [[Kenneth Strong]], Deputy Supreme Commander [[Air Chief Marshal]] [[Arthur Tedder, 1st Baron Tedder|Arthur Tedder]], and several staff officers.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=599}} When Eisenhower asked Patton how long it would take him to disengage six divisions of his Third Army and commence a counterattack north to relieve the [[U.S. 101st Airborne Division]] which had been [[Siege of Bastogne|trapped at Bastogne]], Patton replied, "As soon as you're through with me."{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=75}} Patton then clarified that he had already worked up an operational order for a counterattack by three full divisions on 21 December, then only 48 hours away.{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=75}} Eisenhower was incredulous: "Don't be fatuous, George. If you try to go that early you won't have all three divisions ready and you'll go piecemeal." Patton replied that his staff already had a contingency operations order ready to go. Still unconvinced, Eisenhower ordered Patton to attack the morning of 22 December, using at least three divisions.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=148–149}}

Patton left the conference room, phoned his command, and uttered two words: "Play ball." This code phrase initiated a prearranged operational order with Patton's staff, mobilizing three divisions—the 4th Armored Division, the [[80th Infantry Division (United States)|80th Infantry Division]], and the [[26th Infantry Division (United States)|26th Infantry Division]]—from the Third Army and moving them north toward [[Bastogne]].{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=77}} In all, Patton would reposition six full divisions, [[U.S. III Corps]] and [[U.S. XII Corps]], from their positions on the [[Saar River]] front along a line stretching from Bastogne to [[Diekirch]] and to [[Echternach]], the town in Luxembourg that had been at [[Battle of the Bulge#Planning|the southern end of the initial "Bulge" front line]] on 16 December.{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=78}} Within a few days, more than 133,000 Third Army vehicles were rerouted into an offensive that covered an average distance of over {{convert|11|mi}} per vehicle, followed by support echelons carrying {{convert|62,000|t}} of supplies.{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=79}}

[[File:Generals Marshall, McBride, Eddy, and Patton.jpg|thumb|Shown from left to right are: an unidentified driver, General [[George C. Marshall]], Major General [[Horace L. McBride]], Major General [[Manton S. Eddy]], Lieutenant General George S. Patton, and an unidentified aide]]

On 21 December, Patton met with Bradley to review the impending advance, starting the meeting by remarking, "Brad, this time the Kraut's stuck his head in the meat grinder, and I've got hold of the handle."{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=77}} Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack toward [[Koblenz]], cutting off the bulge at the base and trap the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive. After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed it, since he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=148–149}} Desiring good weather for his advance, which would permit close ground support by [[U.S. Army Air Forces]] tactical aircraft, Patton ordered the Third Army [[military chaplain|chaplain]], Colonel [[James Hugh O'Neill]], to compose a suitable prayer. He responded with:

{{blockquote|Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen.{{sfn|D'Este|1995|pp=535–536}}}}
When the weather cleared soon after, Patton awarded O'Neill a [[Bronze Star Medal]] on the spot.{{sfn|D'Este|1995|pp=535–536}}

On 26 December 1944, the first spearhead units of the Third Army's 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne, opening a corridor for relief and resupply of the besieged forces. Patton's ability to disengage six divisions from front line combat during the middle of winter, then wheel north to relieve Bastogne was one of his most remarkable achievements during the war.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=152–153}} He later wrote that the relief of Bastogne was "the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed, and it is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of the war. This is my biggest battle."{{sfn|McNeese|2003|p=79}}

=== Advance into Germany ===
By February, the Germans were in full retreat. On 23 February 1945, the [[94th Infantry Division (United States)|U.S. 94th Infantry Division]] crossed the [[Saar River]] and established a vital bridgehead at [[Serrig]], through which Patton pushed units into the [[Saarland]]. Patton had insisted upon an immediate crossing of the Saar River against the advice of his officers. Historians such as [[Charles Whiting]] have criticized this strategy as unnecessarily aggressive.{{sfn|Le Tissier|2007|pp=147–155}}

Once again, Patton found other commands given priority on gasoline and supplies.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=156}} To obtain these, Third Army ordnance units passed themselves off as First Army personnel and in one incident they secured thousands of gallons of gasoline from a First Army dump.{{sfn|Rickard|2004|p=85}} Between 29 January and 22 March, the Third Army took [[Trier]], [[Koblenz]], [[Bingen (Rhein) Hauptbahnhof|Bingen]], [[Worms, Germany|Worms]], [[Mainz]], [[Kaiserslautern]], and [[Ludwigshafen]], killing or wounding 99,000 and capturing 140,112 German soldiers, which represented virtually all of the remnants of the [[German 1st Army|German First]] and Seventh Armies. An example of Patton's sarcastic wit was broadcast when he received orders to bypass Trier, as it had been decided that four divisions would be needed to capture it. When the message arrived, Trier had already fallen. Patton rather caustically replied: "Have taken Trier with two divisions. Do you want me to give it back?"{{sfn|Regan|1992|p=53}}

The Third Army began crossing the [[Rhine River]] after constructing a [[pontoon bridge]] on 22 March, two weeks after the First Army [[Battle of Remagen|crossed it at Remagen]], and Patton slipped a division across the river that evening.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|p=157}} Patton later boasted he had urinated into the river as he crossed.{{sfn|Brighton|2009|p=322}}

[[File:Ohrdruf Corpses Eisenhower.jpg|thumb|left|Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton inspect a cremation pyre at the [[Ohrdruf concentration camp]] on 12 April 1945, after liberation]]
On 26 March 1945, Patton sent [[Task Force Baum]], consisting of 314 men, 16 tanks, and assorted other vehicles, {{convert|50|mi}} behind German lines to liberate the [[prisoner of war]] camp [[OFLAG XIII-B]], near [[Hammelburg]]. Patton knew that one of the inmates was his son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel [[John K. Waters]]. The raid was a failure, and only 35 men made it back; the rest were either killed or captured, and all 57 vehicles were lost. Patton reported this attempt to liberate Oflag XIII-B as the only mistake he made during World War II.{{sfn|Farago|1964|p=790}} When Eisenhower learned of the secret mission, he was furious.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=158–159}} Patton later said he felt the correct decision would have been to send a [[Combat Command]], which is a force about three times larger.{{sfn|Farago|1964|p=790}}

[[File:American World War II senior military officials, 1945.JPEG|thumb|right|Senior American commanders of the European theater of World War II. Seated, from left to right, are [[William Hood Simpson|William H. Simpson]], George S. Patton, [[Carl A. Spaatz]], [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Omar Bradley]], [[Courtney Hodges]], and [[Leonard T. Gerow]];
standing are (from left to right) [[Ralph Francis Stearley|Ralph F. Stearley]], [[Hoyt Vandenberg]], [[Walter Bedell Smith]], [[Otto P. Weyland]], and [[Richard E. Nugent]]]]

By April, resistance against the Third Army was tapering off, and the forces' main efforts turned to managing some 400,000 German prisoners of war.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=158–159}} On 14 April 1945, Patton was promoted to [[General (United States)|general]], a promotion long advocated by Stimson in recognition of Patton's battle accomplishments during 1944.{{sfn|Blumenson|1974|p=655}} Later that month, Patton, Bradley, and Eisenhower toured the [[Nazi storage sites for art during World War II#Merkers salt mine|Merkers salt mine]] as well as the [[Ohrdruf concentration camp]], and seeing the conditions of the camp firsthand caused Patton great disgust. Third Army was ordered toward [[Bavaria]] and [[Czechoslovakia]], anticipating a [[last stand]] by German forces there. He was reportedly appalled to learn that the [[Red Army]] would take [[Berlin]], feeling that the Soviet Union was a threat to the U.S. Army's advance to [[Plzeň|Pilsen]], but was stopped by Eisenhower from reaching [[Prague|Prague, Czechoslovakia]], before [[Victory in Europe Day|V-E Day]] on 8 May and the end of the war in Europe.{{sfn|Axelrod|2006|pp=160–162}}

In its advance from the Rhine to the Elbe, Patton's Third Army, which numbered between 250,000 and 300,000 men at any given time, captured {{convert|32763|sqmi}} of German territory. Its losses were 2,102 killed, 7,954 wounded, and 1,591 missing. German losses in the fighting against the Third Army totaled 20,100 killed, 47,700 wounded, and 653,140 captured.{{sfn|Wallace|1946|pp=194–195}}

Between becoming operational in Normandy on 1 August 1944, and the end of hostilities on 9 May 1945, the Third Army was in continuous combat for 281 days. In that time, it crossed 24 major rivers and captured {{convert|81500|sqmi}} of territory, including more than 12,000 cities and towns. The Third Army claimed to have killed, wounded, or captured 1,811,388 German soldiers, six times its strength in personnel.{{sfn|Wallace|1946|pp=194–195}} Fuller's review of Third Army records differs only in the number of enemies killed and wounded, stating that between 1 August 1944 and 9 May 1945, 47,500 of the enemy were killed, 115,700 wounded, and 1,280,688 captured, for a total of 1,443,888.{{sfn|Fuller|2004|p=254}}