Editing George C. Marshall (section)

=== Analysis of Pearl Harbor intelligence failure ===
[[File:Photograph of President Truman shaking hands with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes after awarding him the... - NARA - 199180.jpg|thumb|President Truman, Marshall, Secretary of State [[James F. Byrnes]], and General Arnold at the White House, August 1945]]
After World War II ended, the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor Attack]] received testimony on the intelligence failure. It amassed 25,000 pages of documents, 40 volumes, and included nine reports and investigations, eight of which had been previously completed. These reports included criticism of Marshall for delaying sending Lieutenant General [[Walter Short]], the Army commander in Hawaii, important information obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. The report also criticized Marshall's lack of knowledge of the readiness of the [[Hawaiian Department|Hawaiian Command]] during November and December 1941.{{sfn|U.S. Senate Joint Committee}} Marshall also advised President Roosevelt to move part of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean to assist [[Neutrality Patrol]]s, and that the defenses at [[Oahu]] made a Japanese attack on the island impossible. These recommendations were dismissed by the President but could have been catastrophic if they had not been.{{Sfn|Roberts|2009|p=51}}

Ten days after the attack, Short and Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], commander of the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] at [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor]], were both relieved of their duties. The final report of the Joint Committee did not single out or fault Marshall. While the report was critical of the overall situation, the committee noted that subordinates had failed to pass on important information to their superiors, including to Marshall.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39 |year=1946 |publisher=Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=fSQ7kKogRGIC&pg=PA144 |location= Washington, D.C. |pages=144–45}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Conclusions and Recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |publisher=Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress |location= Washington, D.C. |pages=252, 265}}</ref>

A secret review of the Army's role, which resulted in the [[Clausen Report]], was authorized by Secretary [[Henry L. Stimson|Henry Stimson]].{{sfn|Clausen|2001|pp=23–24}} The report was critical of Short and also of Colonel [[Rufus S. Bratton]] of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), who investigator [[Henry Clausen]] concluded arrived at the War Department later on the morning of 7 December 1941 than he initially claimed during testimony and invented a story about a warning to affected army commanders about the imminent Pearl Harbor Attack being delayed because he had been unable to get in touch with Marshall, an allegation which "nearly destroyed" Marshall.{{sfn|Clausen|2001|pp=23–24}}