Editing George B. McClellan (section)

=== Building an army ===
After the defeat of the Union forces at [[First Battle of Bull Run|Bull Run]] on July 21, 1861, Lincoln summoned McClellan from western Virginia, where McClellan had given the North the only engagements bearing a semblance of victory. He traveled by special train on the main Pennsylvania line from [[Wheeling, West Virginia|Wheeling]] through [[Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania|Pittsburgh]], [[Philadelphia, Pennsylvania|Philadelphia]], and [[Baltimore, Maryland|Baltimore]], and on to [[Washington City]], and was greeted by enthusiastic crowds that met his train along the way.<ref name="Sears95" />

[[File:George B. McClellan Patriotic Cover 1861.jpeg|thumb|Patriotic cover honoring the arrival of McClellan in [[Washington, D.C.]], on July 26, 1861]]
[[Carl Sandburg]] wrote, "McClellan was the man of the hour, pointed to by events, and chosen by an overwhelming weight of public and private opinion."<ref name="Sandburg62" /> On July 26, the day he reached the capital, McClellan was appointed commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, the main Union force responsible for the defense of Washington. On August 20, several military units in Virginia were consolidated into his department and he immediately formed the Army of the Potomac, with himself as its first commander.<ref name="W4tpx" /> This Army became the primary force in the Union army in the Eastern Theatre that protected the Capital and the North. He reveled in his newly acquired power and influence:<ref name="Sears95" />

{{blockquote|I find myself in a new and strange position here—Presdt, Cabinet, Genl Scott & all deferring to me—by some strange operation of magic I seem to have become ''the'' power of the land. ... I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator or anything else that might please me—but nothing of that kind would please me—''therefore'' I ''won't'' be Dictator. Admirable self-denial!|George B. McClellan|letter to his wife Ellen, July 26, 1861}}

[[File:GeorgeMcClellan1861a.jpg|thumb|General George B. McClellan with staff & dignitaries (from left to right): Gen. [[George W. Morell]], Lt. Col. A.V. Colburn, Gen. McClellan, Lt. Col. N.B. Sweitzer, [[François d'Orléans, Prince of Joinville|Prince de Joinville]] (son of King [[Louis Phillippe]] of France), and on the very right—the prince's nephew, [[Prince Philippe, Count of Paris|Count de Paris]]]]
During the summer and fall, McClellan brought a high degree of organization to his new army, and greatly improved its morale with frequent trips to review and encourage his units. It was a remarkable achievement, in which he came to personify the Army of the Potomac and reaped the adulation of his men.<ref name="RRbjJ" /> He created defenses for Washington that were almost impregnable, consisting of 48 forts and strong points, with 480 guns manned by 7,200 artillerists.<ref name="Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 116" /> The Army of the Potomac grew in number from 50,000 in July to 168,000 in November, becoming the largest military force the United States had raised until that time.<ref name="Sandburg62" /> But this was also a time of tension in the high command, as he continued to quarrel frequently with the government and the general-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Scott, on matters of strategy. McClellan rejected the tenets of Scott's [[Anaconda Plan]], favoring instead an overwhelming grand battle, in the [[Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic]] style. He proposed that his army should be expanded to 273,000 men and 600 guns and "crush the rebels in one campaign". He favored a war that would impose little impact on civilian populations and require no emancipation of slaves.

McClellan's antipathy to emancipation added to the pressure on him, as he received bitter criticism from [[Radical Republicans]] in the government.<ref name="gH6Ea" /> He viewed slavery as an institution recognized in the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]], and entitled to federal protection wherever it existed (Lincoln held the same public position until August 1862).<ref name="Tried122" /> McClellan's writings after the war were typical of many Northerners: "I confess to a prejudice in favor of my own race, & can't learn to like the odor of either Billy goats or niggers."<ref name="Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 116" /> But in November 1861, he wrote to his wife, "I will, if successful, throw my sword onto the scale to force an improvement in the condition of those poor blacks." He later wrote that had it been his place to arrange the terms of peace, he would have insisted on gradual emancipation, guarding the rights of both slaves and masters, as part of any settlement. But he made no secret of his opposition to the Radical Republicans. He told Ellen, "I will not fight for the abolitionists." This put him in opposition with officials of the administration who believed he was attempting to implement the policies of the opposition party.<ref name="16vqn" />

The immediate problem with McClellan's war strategy was that he was convinced the Confederates were ready to attack him with overwhelming numbers. On August 8, believing that the Confederacy had over 100,000 troops facing him (in contrast to the 35,000 they had actually deployed at Bull Run a few weeks earlier), he declared a state of emergency in the capital. By August 19, he estimated 150,000 rebel soldiers on his front. In this, McClellan was perhaps influenced by his questioning of Confederate deserter Edward B. McMurdy, whose testimony was not accepted by Lincoln, Secretary of State Seward, or General-in-Chief Scott, but reaffirmed for McClellan the numbers he had convinced himself of. McClellan's feeling of facing overwhelming odds in subsequent campaigns throughout his tenure as General of the Army of the Potomac were strongly influenced by the overblown enemy strength estimates of his secret service chief, detective [[Allan Pinkerton]], but in August 1861, these estimates were entirely McClellan's own.<ref>Sears (1988), p.102</ref> The result was a level of extreme caution that sapped the initiative of McClellan's army and dismayed the government. Historian and biographer [[Stephen W. Sears]] observed that McClellan's actions would have been "essentially sound" for a commander who was as outnumbered as McClellan thought he was, but McClellan in fact rarely had less than a two-to-one advantage over the armies that opposed him in 1861 and 1862. That fall, for example, Confederate forces ranged from 35,000 to 60,000, whereas the Army of the Potomac in September numbered 122,000 men; in early December 170,000; by year end, 192,000.<ref name="usRf1" />

The dispute with Scott became increasingly personal. Scott (as well as many in the War Department) was outraged that McClellan refused to divulge any details about his strategic planning, or even such basic information as the strengths and dispositions of his units. McClellan claimed he could not trust anyone in the administration to keep his plans secret from the press, and thus the enemy. In the course of a disagreement about defensive forces on the Potomac River, McClellan wrote to his wife on August 10: "Genl Scott is the great obstacle—he will not comprehend the danger & is either a traitor, or an incompetent. I have to fight my way against him."<ref name="coVgw" /> Scott became so disillusioned with the young general that he offered his resignation to President Lincoln, who initially refused to accept it. Rumors traveled through the capital that McClellan might resign, or instigate a military coup, if Scott were not removed. Lincoln's Cabinet met on October 18 and agreed to accept Scott's resignation for “reasons of health”.<ref name="McPherson360" />

However, the subsequently formed Army of the Potomac had high morale and was extremely proud of their general, some even referring to McClellan as the savior of Washington. He prevented the army's morale from collapsing at least twice, in the aftermath of the [[First Battle of Bull Run|First]] and [[Second Battle of Bull Run|Second]] Battles of Bull Run. Many historians argue that he was talented in this aspect.