Editing G. E. Moore (section)

==== Right action, duty and virtue ====
Moore holds that {{em|right actions}} are those producing the most good.<ref name="Schneewindp153">{{cite book |author=Schneewind |first=J. B. |author-link=J. B. Schneewind |url=https://archive.org/details/companiontoethic00sing/page/153 |title=A Companion to Ethics |publisher=Blackwell Publishers Ltd |year=1997 |isbn=0-631-18785-5 |editor=Singer, Peter |editor-link=Peter Singer |location=Oxford |page=[https://archive.org/details/companiontoethic00sing/page/153 153]}}</ref> The difficulty with this is that the consequences of most actions are too complex for us to properly take into account, especially the long-term consequences. Because of this, Moore suggests that the definition of duty is limited to what generally produces better results than probable alternatives in a comparatively near future.<ref name="Principia">{{cite book |last1=Moore |first1=George Edward |title=Principia Ethica |date=1903 |publisher=Project Gutenberg |url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm}}</ref>{{rp|§109}} Whether a given rule of action is also a ''duty'' depends to some extent on the conditions of the corresponding society but ''duties'' agree mostly with what common-sense recommends.<ref name="Principia"/>{{rp|§95}} Virtues, like honesty, can in turn be defined as ''permanent dispositions'' to perform duties.<ref name="Principia"/>{{rp|§109}}