Editing Frederick Augustus I of Saxony (section)

===Settlement of Saxon affairs at the Congress of Vienna===
At the deliberations of the [[Congress of Vienna]] in 1814 and 1815, Frederick Augustus' position was doomed by his country's difficult geographic position, the changing fortunes of war, a lack of assistance from Austria, and his own vacillations. The [[Prussian-Russian alliance]] had never had honorable intentions in bringing Saxony into the anti-Napoleon alliance in the first place. Even before Prussia declared war on France on 17 March 1813, it had agreed to an alliance with Russia to the detriment of Saxony and Poland in the [[Treaty of Kalisz (1813)|Treaty of Kalisz]] on 22 February: the Duchy of Warsaw would predominantly come under Russian rule, whereas Prussia would be compensated for relinquished Polish territories with the annexation of Saxon territory. Prussia's appetite for the economically and culturally more developed territories of Saxony originated in the old dream of annexation that [[Frederick II of Prussia|Frederick II]] had developed in his political testament of 1752 and had already tried to realize in the [[Seven Years' War]].  It did not originate from any necessity to overcome Napoleonic rule in central Europe.

After the Battle of Leipzig the Prussian-Russian alliance showed no interest in an alliance with the Saxon king in the wider struggle against Napoleon irrespective of offers of support from Frederick Augustus. Rather, the King was made captive and taken to [[Friedrichsfelde]] near Berlin and placed under Russian-Prussian custody in the name of a "General Government of High Allied Powers."

It was the forceful manner of Prussian minister [[Baron von Stein]] rather than the government administered by Russian [[Prince Repnin]] until November 1814 or the subsequent Prussian force of occupation (lasting to June 1815), which were responsible for the low morale in Saxony at the end of the [[Napoleonic Wars]]. In contrast to the representatives of France, Frederick Augustus was denied participation at the Congress of Vienna as punishment for his supposed role as the quasi-deputy of his former ally Napoleon. Certainly this treatment of the Saxon king was owing to nothing other than the intention of Prussia and Russia to carry out the annexation plans agreed to in Kalisz. That Saxony was not completely abandoned can be attributed to the fear of Austria and France of an overly-strengthened Prussia. Because the Saxon question threatened to break up the Congress, the allies finally agreed to divide Saxony (7 January 1815) with the mediation of the Tsar.