Editing Epaminondas (section)

====Battle of Leuctra (371 BC)====
{{Main|Battle of Leuctra}}
[[File:Battle of Leuctra, 371 BC - Decisive action.svg|thumb|The [[Battle of Leuctra]] (371&nbsp;BC), showing Epaminondas's tactical advances]]
Immediately following the failure of the peace talks, orders were sent out from Sparta to the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who was at the head of an army in [[Phocis]], commanding him to march directly to Boeotia. Skirting north to avoid mountain passes where the Boeotians were prepared to ambush him, Cleombrotus entered Boeotian territory from an unexpected direction and quickly seized a fort and captured 10 or 12 [[trireme]]s. Then marching towards Thebes, he camped at [[Leuctra]], in the territory of [[Thespiae]]. Here, the Boeotian army came to meet him. The Spartan army contained some 10,000 hoplites, 700 of whom were the elite warriors known as [[Spartiate]]s. The Boeotians opposite them numbered about 6,000, but were bolstered by a cavalry superior to that of the Peloponnesians.{{sfn|Buck|1994|pp=113{{ndash}}114}}{{sfn|Gabriel|2001|p=90}}

Epaminondas was given charge of the Boeotian army, with the other six Boeotarchs in an advisory capacity. Pelopidas, meanwhile, was captain of the [[Sacred Band of Thebes|Sacred Band]], the elite Theban troops. Before the battle, there was evidently much debate amongst the Boeotarchs about whether to fight or not. As a consistent advocate of an aggressive policy, Epaminondas wished to fight, and supported by Pelopidas, he managed to swing the vote in favour of battle.{{sfn|Sage|2002|p=138}}{{sfn|Seager|2000|p=183}} During the course of the battle, Epaminondas was to display a grasp of tactics hitherto unseen in Greek warfare.{{sfn|Lazenby|1993|p=258}}

The [[phalanx formation]] used by Greek armies had a distinct tendency to veer to the right during battle, "because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right".{{sfn|Thucydides|1933|p=384}} Traditionally, a phalanx therefore lined up for battle with the elite troops on the right flank to counter this tendency.{{citation required|date=January 2022}} Thus, in the Spartan phalanx at Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the elite 'Spartiates' were on the right, while the less experienced Peloponnesian allies were on the left. However, needing to counter the Spartans' numerical advantage, Epaminondas implemented two tactical innovations. Firstly, he took the best troops in the army, and arranged them 50 ranks deep (as opposed to the normal 8–12 ranks) on the ''left'' wing, opposite Cleombrotus and the Spartans, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band on the extreme left flank.{{sfn|Davis|2001|p=24}}{{sfn|Gabriel|2001|pp=182{{ndash}}183}} Secondly, recognizing that he could not have matched the width of the Peloponnesian phalanx (even before deepening the left flank), he abandoned all attempts to do so. Instead, placing the weaker troops on the right flank, he "instructed them to avoid battle and withdraw gradually during the enemy's attack". The tactic of the deep phalanx had been anticipated by [[Pagondas]], another Theban general, who used a 25 man deep formation at the [[Battle of Delium]].{{sfn|Kagan|1990|p=283}} However, the reversing of the position of the elite troops, and an oblique line of attack were innovations; it seems that Epaminondas was therefore responsible for the military tactic of refusing one's flank.{{sfn|Hanson|1999<!-- |p= -->}}{{page needed|date=January 2022}}

The fighting at Leuctra opened with a clash between the cavalry, in which the Thebans were victorious over the inferior Spartan cavalry, driving them back into the ranks of the infantry, and thereby disrupting the phalanx. The battle then commenced in earnest, with the strengthened Theban left flank advancing at double speed, while the right flank retreated. After intense fighting, the Spartan right flank began to give way under the impetus and the mass of Thebans, and Cleombrotus was killed. Although the Spartans held on for long enough to rescue the body of the king, their line was soon broken by the sheer force of the Theban assault. The Peloponnesian allies on the left wing, seeing the Spartans put to flight, also broke and ran, and the entire army retreated in disarray.{{sfn|Jones|1987|pp=5{{ndash}}6}}{{sfn|Davis|2001|p=26}} One thousand Peloponnesians were killed, while the Boeotians lost only 300 men. Most importantly, since it constituted a significant proportion of the entire Spartan manpower, 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed, a loss that posed a serious threat to Sparta's future war-making abilities.{{sfn|Cartledge|1979|p=295}}{{sfn|Sealey|1976|p=420}} When, after the battle, the Spartans asked if they and the Peloponnesians could collect the dead, Epaminondas suspected that the Spartans would try to cover-up the scale of their losses. He therefore allowed the Peloponnesians to remove their dead first, so that those remaining would be shown to be Spartiates, and emphasise the scale of the Theban victory.{{sfn|Tritle|1997|p=84}}

The victory at Leuctra shook the foundations of the [[Spartan hegemony|Spartan dominance]] of Greece to the core. Since the number of [[Spartiates]] was always relatively small, Sparta had relied on her allies in order to field substantial armies. However, with the defeat at Leuctra, the Peloponnesian allies were less inclined to bow to Spartan demands. Furthermore, with the loss of men at Leuctra and other battles, the Spartans were not in a strong position to reassert their dominance over their erstwhile allies.{{sfn|Joint Association of Classical Teachers|1984|p=48}}{{sfn|Roy|2000|p=187}}