Editing Environmental ethics (section)

=== Deontology ===
[[Deontological ethics|Deontological]] theories state that an action should be based on duties or obligations to what is ''right'', instead of what is ''good''. In strong contrast to consequentialism, this view argues for principles of duty based not on a function of value, but on reasons that make no substantive reference to the consequences of an action. Something of ''intrinsic'' value, then, has to be protected not because its goodness would maximise a wider good, but because it is valuable in itself; not as a means towards something, but as an end in itself.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Alexander|first1=Larry|title=Deontological Ethics|date=2020|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/ethics-deontological/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2020|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-14|last2=Moore|first2=Michael}}</ref> Thus, if the natural environment is categorised as intrinsically valuable, any destruction or damage to such would be considered wrong as a whole rather than merely due to a calculated loss of net value. It can be said that this approach is more holistic in principle than one of consequentialist nature, as it fits more adequately with the delicate balance of large ecosystems.

Theories of rights, for example, are generally deontological. That is, within this framework an environmental policy that gives rights to non-human sentient beings, would prioritise the conservation of such in their natural state, rather than in an artificial manner. Consider for example, issues in [[climate engineering]]; [[Ocean fertilization|Ocean fertilisation]] aims to expand marine algae in order to remove higher levels of CO<sub>2</sub>. A complication from this approach is that it creates salient disruptions to local ecosystems.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Scott-Buechler|first1=Celina M.|title=Chapter 6 - Role of the ocean in climate stabilization|date=2019-01-01|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128162293000065|work=Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage|pages=109–130|editor-last=Magalhães Pires|editor-first=José Carlos|publisher=Academic Press|language=en|doi=10.1016/b978-0-12-816229-3.00006-5|isbn=978-0-12-816229-3|access-date=2021-03-14|last2=Greene|first2=Charles H.|osti=2234010 |s2cid=202467968 |editor2-last=Cunha Gonçalves|editor2-first=Ana Luísa Da}}</ref> Furthermore, an environmental ethical theory based on the rights of marine animals in those ecosystems, would create a protection against this type of intervention. Environmental deontologists such as [[Paul W. Taylor]], for example, have argued for a [[Kantian ethics|Kantian]] approach to issues of this kind. Taylor argues that all living things are 'teleological centres of life' <ref>{{Cite book|last=Taylor|first=Paul W.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/13124739|title=Respect for nature : a theory of environmental ethics|date=1986|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=0-691-07709-6|location=Princeton, N.J.|pages=99|oclc=13124739}}</ref> deserving of rights and respect. His view uses a concept of '[[universalizability]]', to argue that one ought to act only on actions which could be rationally willed as a universal law. [[Val Plumwood]] has criticised this approach by noting that the universalisation framework, is not necessarily based on 'respect' for the other, as it's based on duty and 'becoming' part of the environment.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Plumwood|first=Val|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51779272|title=Feminism and the mastery of nature|date=1993|publisher=Routledge|isbn=0-203-00675-5|location=London|pages=171|oclc=51779272}}</ref>