Editing Edward III of England (section)

=== Cost of war ===
Meanwhile, the fiscal pressure on the kingdom caused by Edward's expensive alliances led to discontent at home. The regency council at home was frustrated by the mounting national debt, while the King and his commanders on the Continent were angered by the failure of the government in England to provide sufficient funds.{{Sfn|Prestwich|2005|pp=273–275}} To deal with the situation, Edward himself returned to England, arriving in London unannounced on 30 November 1340.{{Sfn|McKisack|1959|p=168}}{{Sfn|Jones|2013|pp=385–390}} Finding the affairs of the realm in disorder, he purged the royal administration of a great number of ministers and judges.{{Sfn|Fryde|1975|pp=149–161}} These measures did not bring domestic stability, and a stand-off ensued between the King and [[John de Stratford]], [[Archbishop of Canterbury]], during which Stratford's relatives [[Robert Stratford]], [[Bishop of Chichester]], and [[Henry de Stratford]] were temporarily stripped of title and imprisoned respectively.{{Sfn|Myers|1953|p=69}} Stratford claimed that Edward had violated the laws of the land by arresting royal officers.{{Sfn|Prestwich|2005|pp=275–276}} A certain level of conciliation was reached at the Parliament of April 1341. Here Edward was forced to accept severe limitations to his financial and administrative freedom, in return for a grant of taxation.{{Sfn|McKisack|1959|pp=174–175}} Yet in October the same year, Edward repudiated this statute and Archbishop Stratford was politically ostracised. The extraordinary circumstances of the April Parliament had forced the King into submission, but under normal circumstances, the powers of the king in medieval England were virtually unlimited, a fact that Edward was able to exploit.{{Sfn|Ormrod|2000|pp=23–25}}

[[File:Edward III Groat.jpg|thumb|left|[[Groat (coin)|Groat]] featuring Edward III]]

Historian [[Nicholas Rodger]] called Edward III's claim to be the "Sovereign of the Seas" into question, arguing there was hardly any [[History of the Royal Navy|royal navy]] before the reign of [[Henry V of England|Henry V]] (1413–1422). Despite Rodger's view, [[John, King of England|King John]] had already developed a royal fleet of [[galley]]s and had attempted to establish an administration for these ships and others which were arrested (privately owned ships pulled into royal/national service). [[Henry III of England|Henry III]], his successor, continued this work. Notwithstanding the fact that he, along with his predecessor, had hoped to develop a strong and efficient naval administration, their endeavours produced one that was informal and mostly ad hoc. A formal naval administration emerged during Edward's reign, comprising lay administrators and led by William de Clewre, Matthew de Torksey and John de Haytfield successively bearing the title of ''Clerk of the King's Ships''. [[Robert de Crull]] was the last to fill this position during Edward III's reign{{Sfn|Rose|1982|p=7}} and would have the longest tenure in this position.{{Sfn|Sherborne|1994|p=32}} It was during his tenure that Edward's naval administration would become a base for what evolved during the reigns of successors such as [[Henry VIII]]'s ''Council of Marine'' and ''Navy Board'' and [[Charles I of England|Charles I]]'s ''Board of Admiralty''. Rodger also argues that for much of the fourteenth century, the French had the upper hand, apart from Sluys in 1340 and, perhaps, off [[Battle of Winchelsea|Winchelsea]] in 1350.{{Sfn|Rodger|1997|p=99}} Yet, the French never invaded England and King [[John II of France]] died in captivity in England. There was a need for an English navy to play a role in this and to handle other matters, such as the insurrection of the Anglo-Irish lords and acts of piracy.{{Sfn|McKisack|1959|p=509}}

==== Command structure ====
Edward's military command structure began with himself at the centre, and then members of the court acted as his generals. This included the King's family, and Edward utilised the martial capabilities of his sons, particularly his eldest son, Edward the Black Prince. This was not only pragmatic, in that they were all good warriors, but had the added propaganda value of demonstrating the hereditary nature of Edward's claim to the French throne.{{Sfn|Allmand|1988|p=70}}{{Efn|This policy was not confined to Edward III; the French king also employed his three brothers in the command positions, while Edward's successor in the war, [[Henry V, Holy Roman Emperor|Henry V]], not only employed his three brothers in France but lost them there too.{{Sfn|Allmand|1988|p=70}}}} However, command was not always the prerogative of the nobility. [[Knights Banneret]] – knights able to lead other knights{{Sfn|Hefferan|2021|p=115}} – were also favoured as leaders of armies or divisions,{{Sfn|Allmand|1988|p=70}} as they were also already close to the king, being part of his household and bodyguard. They bore particular responsibilities during King Edward's ''[[chevauchée]]s'', which often required the main army to split into smaller forces, each requiring its own captain.{{Sfn|Hefferan|2021|p=115}} This sometimes led to dissension. For example, in the 1369 [[Loire]] campaign, the [[John Hastings, 2nd Earl of Pembroke|Earl of Pembroke]] shared command with [[Sir John Chandos]]; although the latter was appointed [[seneschal]] of France by the Black Prince, Pembroke refused to work beneath him on account of his superior social status.{{Sfn|Barber|2004a}}{{Sfn|Jack|2004}} Ultimately, though, the task of raising the armies that they would lead fell to both: the aristocracy could raise the largest number of tenants and [[Affinity (medieval)|retainers]] after the King, but it was the lower men who acted as recruiting sergeants in the regions.{{Sfn|Allmand|1988|pp=70–71}} Unlike during his father's or great-grandfather's campaigns in Scotland, the [[feudal levy]] ― whereby military service was provided for free in exchange for land rights ― by the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War it had become the norm for men of all ranks to be paid for their service from the King. In return, the crown shouldered the responsibility for paying for the bulk of equipment. The military historian Andrew Ayton has described this transition as amounting to a "military revolution", and one spearheaded by the King himself.{{Sfn|Ayton|1994|p=96}}