Editing Civil war (section)

==== Bargaining problems ====
In a state torn by civil war, the contesting powers often do not have the ability to commit or the trust to believe in the other side's commitment to put an end to war.<ref>Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth". ''Handbook of Economic Growth'' 1: 385–472.</ref> When considering a peace agreement, the involved parties are aware of the high incentives to withdraw once one of them has taken an action that weakens their military, political or economical power. Commitment problems may deter a lasting peace agreement as the powers in question are aware that neither of them is able to commit to their end of the bargain in the future.<ref>Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180908093107/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 |date=2018-09-08 }}". ''International Studies Quarterly'' ''53''(3), 737–759.</ref> States are often unable to escape [[conflict trap]]s (recurring civil war conflicts) due to the lack of strong political and legal institutions that motivate bargaining, settle disputes, and enforce peace settlements.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Walter|first=Barbara F.|s2cid=154632359|date=2015-10-01|title=Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=59|issue=7|pages=1242–1272|doi=10.1177/0022002714528006|issn=0022-0027}}</ref>