Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Nazi Germany===
After becoming [[Chancellor of Germany]] in 1933, [[Adolf Hitler]] ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Within the Wehrmacht, which was established in 1935, the command for motorized armored forces was named the ''[[Panzerwaffe]]'' in 1936. The ''[[Luftwaffe]]'', the German air force, was officially established in February 1935, and development began on ground-attack aircraft and doctrines. Hitler strongly supported the new strategy. He read Guderian's 1937 book ''[[Achtung – Panzer!]]'' and upon observing armored field exercises at [[Kummersdorf]], he remarked, "That is what I want – and that is what I will have".{{sfn|Guderian|2001|p=46}}{{sfn|Edwards|1989|p=24}}

====Guderian====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-139-1112-17, Heinz Guderian.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Heinz Guderian]]]]
Guderian summarized combined-arms tactics as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other to achieve decisive success. In his 1950 book, ''[[Panzer Leader (book)|Panzer Leader]]'', he wrote:

{{Blockquote|In this year, 1929, I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies, the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions; what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight with full effect.{{sfn|Guderian|2001|p=13}}}}

Guderian believed that developments in technology were required to support the theory, especially by equipping armored divisions, tanks foremost, with wireless communications. Guderian insisted in 1933 to the high command that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with a radio.{{sfn|Guderian|2001|p=20}} At the start of World War II, only the German Army was thus prepared with all tanks being "radio-equipped". That proved critical in early tank battles in which German tank commanders exploited the organizational advantage over the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] that radio communication gave them.

All Allied armies would later copy that innovation. During the Polish campaign, the performance of armored troops, under the influence of Guderian's ideas, won over a number of skeptics who had initially expressed doubt about armored warfare, such as von Rundstedt and Rommel.{{sfn|Murray|2011|p=129}}

====Rommel====
According to David A. Grossman, by the [[Battle of Caporetto|Twelfth Battle of Isonzo]] (October–November 1917), while he was conducting a light-infantry operation, Rommel had perfected his maneuver-warfare principles, which were the very same ones that were applied during the blitzkrieg against France in 1940 and were repeated in the [[Coalition of the Gulf War|Coalition]] ground offensive against Iraq in the [[1991 Gulf War]].{{sfn|Grossman|1993|pp=316–335}} During the Battle of France and against his staff advisor's advice, Hitler ordered that everything should be completed in a few weeks. Fortunately for the Germans, Rommel and Guderian disobeyed the General Staff's orders (particularly those of General [[Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist]]) and forged ahead making quicker progress than anyone had expected, on the way "inventing the idea of Blitzkrieg".{{sfn|Stroud|2013|pp=33–34}}

It was Rommel who created the new archetype of Blitzkrieg by leading his division far ahead of flanking divisions.{{sfn|Brighton|2008|p=247}} MacGregor and Williamson remark that Rommel's version of blitzkrieg displayed a significantly better understanding of combined-arms warfare than that of Guderian.{{sfn|Murray|MacGregor|2001|p=172}} General [[Hermann Hoth]] submitted an official report in July 1940 which declared that Rommel had "explored new paths in the command of Panzer divisions".{{sfn|Showalter|2006|p=200}}