Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

===Military assumptions prior to the battle===

====Number of Indian warriors====
[[File:Little Big Horn.jpg|thumb|left|A Cheyenne artist's depiction of the Battle of the Little Bighorn]]

As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. These assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 "hostiles" were in the area. The Indian Agents based this estimate on the number of Lakota that Sitting Bull and other leaders had reportedly led off the reservation in protest of U.S. government policies. It was in fact a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. The agents did not consider the many thousands of these "reservation Indians" who had unofficially left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, including the 800 non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. Although Custer was criticized after the battle for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it appears that he had accepted the same official government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon had also accepted. Historian James Donovan notes, however, that when Custer later asked interpreter [[Fred Gerard]] for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at 1,100 warriors.<ref>Donovan, loc 3576</ref>

Additionally, Custer was more concerned with preventing the escape of the Lakota and Cheyenne than with fighting them, as reported by John Martin (born in Italy as [[Giovanni Martino]]),<ref name="ReferenceA">Charles Windolph, Frazier Hunt, Robert Hunt, Neil Mangum, ''I Fought with Custer: The Story of Sergeant Windolph, Last Survivor of the Battle of the Little Big Horn: with Explanatory Material and Contemporary Sidelights on the Custer Fight'', University of Nebraska Press, 1987, p. 86.</ref>

It is noteworthy to pinpoint that John Martin was temporarily assigned to serve as one of Custer's bugler-orderlies. As Custer and nearly 210 troopers and scouts began their final approach to the massive Indian village located in the Little Bighorn River Valley, Martino was dispatched with an urgent note for reinforcements and ammunition. Newspaper accounts of the period referred to him as "Custer massacre survivor" and "the last white man to see Custer alive".

From his observation, Custer assumed the warriors had been sleeping in on the morning of the battle, to which virtually every native account attested later, giving Custer a false estimate of what he was up against. When he and his scouts first looked down on the village from the Crow's Nest across the Little Bighorn River, they could see only the herd of ponies. Later, looking from a hill {{convert|2+1/2|mi|km|0}} away after parting with Reno's command, Custer could observe only women preparing for the day, and young boys taking thousands of horses out to graze south of the village.{{Citation needed|date=September 2021}} Custer's [[Crow scouts]] told him it was the largest native village they had ever seen. When the scouts began changing back into their native dress right before the battle, Custer released them from his command. While the village was enormous, Custer still thought there were far fewer warriors to defend the village.

Finally, Custer may have assumed when he encountered the Native Americans that his subordinate Benteen, who was with the pack train, would provide support. Rifle volleys were a standard way of telling supporting units to come to another unit's aid. In a subsequent official 1879 Army investigation requested by Major Reno, the Reno Board of Inquiry (RCOI), Benteen and Reno's men testified that they heard distinct rifle volleys as late as 4:30 pm during the battle.<ref name="court of inquiry">{{cite web |first=Marcus A.|last=Reno |title=The official record of a court of inquiry convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879, by the President of the United States upon the request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th U.S. Cavalry, to investigate his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25–26, 1876 |url= http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.Reno|year=1951 }}</ref>

Custer had initially wanted to take a day to scout the village before attacking; however, when men who went back looking for supplies accidentally dropped by the pack train, they discovered that their track had already been discovered by Indians. Reports from his scouts also revealed fresh pony tracks from ridges overlooking his formation. It became apparent that the warriors in the village were either aware or would soon be aware of his approach.<ref>Donovan, loc 3684</ref> Fearing that the village would break up into small bands that he would have to chase, Custer began to prepare for an immediate attack.<ref name="Donovan, loc 3699">Donovan, loc 3699</ref>

====Role of Indian noncombatants in Custer's strategy====
Custer's field strategy was designed to engage non-combatants at the encampments on the Little Bighorn to capture women, children, and the elderly or disabled<ref name="Fox1993">{{cite book |last=Fox |first=Richard A. |year=1993 |url={{GBurl|id=dpaWb9WmbPUC|pg=297}} |title=Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160624003916/https://books.google.com/books?id=dpaWb9WmbPUC |archive-date= June 24, 2016 |location=Norman |publisher=University of Oklahoma Press |isbn=0-8061-2998-0 }}</ref>{{rp|297}} to serve as hostages to convince the warriors to surrender and comply with federal orders to relocate. Custer's battalions were poised to "ride into the camp and secure non-combatant hostages",<ref name=Donovan2008>{{cite book |last=Donovan |first=James |title=A Terrible Glory |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |year=2008 |page=253 }}</ref> and "forc[e] the warriors to surrender".<ref name=Robinson1995>{{cite book |last=Robinson |first=Charles M. |title=A Good Year to Die |publisher=Random House |year=1995 |page=257 }}</ref> Author Evan S. Connell observed that if Custer could occupy the village before widespread resistance developed, the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors "would be obliged to surrender, because if they started to fight, they would be endangering their families."<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|312}}<ref name=Connell1997>{{cite book |last=Connell |first=Evan S. |title=Son of the Morning Star |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=1997 |page=278 }}</ref>

In Custer's book ''My Life on the Plains'', published two years before the Battle of the Little Bighorn, he asserted:

{{Blockquote|Indians contemplating a battle, either offensive or defensive, are always anxious to have their women and children removed from all danger ... For this reason I decided to locate our [military] camp as close as convenient to [Chief Black Kettle's Cheyenne] village, knowing that the close proximity of their women and children, and their necessary exposure in case of conflict, would operate as a powerful argument in favor of peace, when the question of peace or war came to be discussed.<ref name=Custer1874>{{cite book |last= Custer |first= George Armstrong |title=My Life on the Plains: Or, Personal Experiences with Indians |location=New York |publisher= Sheldon and Company |year=1874 |page=220 |url= http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACP4940.0001.001}}</ref>}}

On Custer's decision to advance up the bluffs and descend on the village from the east, Lt. [[Edward Settle Godfrey|Edward Godfrey]] of Company K surmised:

{{Blockquote|[Custer] expected to find the squaws and children fleeing to the bluffs on the north, for in no other way do I account for his wide detour. He must have counted upon Reno's success, and fully expected the "scatteration" of the non-combatants with the pony herds. The probable attack upon the families and capture of the herds were in that event counted upon to strike consternation in the hearts of the warriors and were elements for success upon which General Custer fully counted.<ref name="godfrey" />{{rp|379}}}}

The Sioux and Cheyenne fighters were acutely aware of the danger posed by the military engagement of non-combatants and that "even a semblance of an attack on the women and children" would draw the warriors back to the village, according to historian John S. Gray.<ref name="Gray, John S 1991 p. 360">{{cite book |last=Gray |first=John S. |title=Custer's Last Campaign |location=Norman |publisher=University of Nebraska Press |year=1991 |page=360 }}</ref> Such was their concern that an apparent reconnaissance by Capt. Yates' E and F Companies at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee (Minneconjou [[Ford (crossing)|Ford]]) caused hundreds of warriors to disengage from the Reno valley fight and return to deal with the threat to the village.<ref name="Gray, John S 1991 p. 360" />

Some authors and historians, based on archaeological evidence and reviews of native testimony, speculate that Custer attempted to cross the river at a point further north they refer to as Ford D. According to Richard A. Fox, James Donovan, and others, Custer proceeded with a wing of his battalion (Yates' E and F companies) north and opposite the Cheyenne circle at that crossing,<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|176–77}} which provided "access to the [women and children] fugitives."<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|306}} Yates's force "posed an immediate threat to fugitive Indian families..." gathering at the north end of the huge encampment;<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|299}} he then persisted in his efforts to "seize women and children" even as hundreds of warriors were massing around Keogh's wing on the bluffs.<ref>Donovan, James, ''A Terrible Glory'', Little, Brown and Company (2008). p. 267.</ref> Yates' wing, descending to the Little Bighorn River at Ford D, encountered "light resistance",<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|297}} undetected by the Indian forces ascending the bluffs east of the village.<ref name="Fox1993" />{{rp|298}} Custer was almost within "striking distance of the refugees" before abandoning the ford and returning to Custer Ridge.<ref name=Bray2006>{{cite book |last=Bray |first=Kingsley M. |title=Crazy Horse – A Lakota Life |location=Norman |publisher=University of Oklahoma Press |year=2006 |page=222 }}</ref>