Editing Battle of Trafalgar (section)

===Nelson's plan===
The prevailing tactical orthodoxy at the time involved manoeuvring to approach the enemy fleet in a single [[line of battle]] and then engaging broadside in parallel lines.{{sfnp|Fremont-Barnes|2007|p=66}} In previous times, fleets had usually engaged in a mixed mêlée of chaotic one-on-one battles. One reason for the development of the line of battle formation was to facilitate control of the fleet: if all the ships were in line, signalling during battle became possible.{{sfnp|Ireland|2000|p=52}} The line also allowed either side to disengage by breaking away in formation; if the opponent chose to continue, their line would be broken as well.{{sfnp|Fremont-Barnes|2007|p=66}} This often led to inconclusive battles, or allowed the losing side to minimise its losses. Facing a numerically superior Franco-Spanish line, Nelson wanted to break it into a chaotic mêlée which would force his opponents to fight his well-trained crews ship to ship.{{sfnp|Best|2005|p=154}}

Nelson's solution was to cut the opposing line in three. Approaching in two columns sailing perpendicular to the Franco-Spanish fleet's line, one towards the centre of the opposing line and one towards the trailing end, his ships would surround the middle third, and force them to fight to the end.{{sfnp|Best|2005|p=182}} Nelson hoped specifically to cut the line just in front of the French flagship, ''Bucentaure''; the isolated ships in front of the break would not be able to see the flagship's signals, which he hoped would take them out of combat while they re-formed. This echoed the [[Naval tactics in the Age of Sail|tactics]] used by [[Adam Duncan, 1st Viscount Duncan|Admiral Duncan]] at the [[Battle of Camperdown]] and [[Admiral Jervis]] at the [[Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797)|Battle of Cape St.&nbsp;Vincent]], both in 1797.{{sfnp|White|2002|p=238}}
[[File:The Battle of Trafalgar, 21 October 1805 RMG BHC0550.tiff|thumb|''The Battle of Trafalgar'' painted by [[Samuel Drummond]] in 1825]]

The plan had three principal advantages:
* First, the British fleet would close with the Franco-Spanish as quickly as possible, preventing their escape.{{sfnp|White|2005|p=174}}
* Second, it would quickly bring on a mêlée and frantic battle by breaking the Franco-Spanish line and inducing a series of individual ship-to-ship actions, in which the British knew they were likely to prevail. Nelson knew that the superior seamanship, faster gunnery and better morale of his crews were great advantages.{{sfnp|White|2005|p=173}}
* Third, it would bring a decisive concentration on the rear of the Franco-Spanish fleet. The ships in the [[Vanguard|van]] of the French and Spanish fleet would have to turn back to support the rear, which would take a long time.{{sfnp|Best|2005|p=182}} Additionally, once the line had been broken, their ships would be relatively defenceless against powerful broadsides from the British fleet, and it would take them a long time to reposition to return fire.

The main drawback of attacking head-on was that as the leading British ships approached, the Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet would be able to direct [[raking fire|raking]] [[Broadside (naval)|broadside]] fire at their bows, to which they would be unable to reply. To lessen the time the fleet was exposed to this danger, Nelson had his ships make all available sail (including [[Studding sail|stunsails]]), yet another departure from the norm.<ref name=NB215>{{harvp|Tracy|2008|p=215}}</ref> He was also well aware that French and Spanish gunners were ill-trained and would have difficulty firing accurately from a moving gun platform. The Combined Fleet was sailing across a heavy [[Swell (ocean)|swell]], causing the ships to roll heavily and exacerbate the problem. Nelson's plan was a carefully calculated gamble.{{sfnp|Willis|2013|p=266}}

During the blockade off the coast of Spain in October, Nelson instructed his captains, over two dinners aboard ''Victory'', on his plan for the approaching battle. In an animated conversation with his favourite captain, Richard Goodwin Keats, who was expected to be his second in the forthcoming battle, Nelson explained a refined battle plan whilst the two were walking in the garden of Merton in August&nbsp;1805.{{Sfnp|Hannah|2021|loc=ch. 9}} The order of sailing, in which the fleet was arranged when the opposing fleet was first sighted, was to be the order of the ensuing action so that no time would be wasted in forming two lines.{{sfnp|White|2002|p=239}} The first, led by his second-in-command Vice-Admiral [[Cuthbert Collingwood, 1st Baron Collingwood|Cuthbert Collingwood]], was to sail into the rear of the Franco-Spanish line, while the other, led by Nelson, was to sail into the centre and vanguard.{{sfnp|White|2005|p=174}} In preparation for the battle, Nelson ordered the ships of his fleet to be painted in a distinctive yellow and black pattern (later known as the [[Nelson Chequer]]) that would make them easy to distinguish from their opponents.{{sfnp|Best|2005|pp=182–183}}

Nelson was careful to point out that something had to be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea battle, so he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy."{{sfnp|White|2002|p=238}} In short, [[emergence|circumstances]]<!-- so while Nelson had a top-level plan, he allowed for considerable [[emergence]] to occur in action to strengthen his potential outcomes; in system theory also known as [[Bottom-up design]] --> would dictate the execution, subject to the guiding rule that the Franco-Spanish fleet's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the line.{{sfnp|Hannay|1911|p=154}}

Admiral Villeneuve himself expressed his belief that Nelson would use some sort of unorthodox attack, presciently speculating that Nelson would drive right at his line. But his long game of [[cat and mouse]] with Nelson had worn him down, and he was suffering from a loss of nerve. Fearing that his inexperienced officers would be unable to maintain formation in more than one group, he chose to keep the single line that became Nelson's target.{{sfnp|Stilwell|2005|pp=115–116}}