Editing Battle of Gettysburg (section)

==Second day of battle==
{{Main|Battle of Gettysburg, second day}}
{{further|Battle of Gettysburg, second day|Little Round Top|Culp's Hill|Cemetery Hill}}

===Plans and movement to battle===
[[File:Gettysburg Day2 Plan.png|thumb|[[Confederate States Army|Confederate]] general [[Robert E. Lee]]'s plan for the [[Battle of Gettysburg, second day|second day]] of the Battle of Gettysburg, fought on July 2, 1863]]
[[File:The First Minnesota by Don Troiani (4101092782).jpg|thumb|A bayonet charge by the [[1st Minnesota Infantry Regiment]] against a Confederate brigade on the battle's second day]]
Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Two of Longstreet's divisions were on the road: Brigadier General [[George Pickett]], had begun the {{convert|22|mi|km|adj=on}} march from Chambersburg, while Brigadier General [[Evander M. Law]] had begun the march from Guilford. Both arrived late in the morning. Law completed his {{convert|28|mi|km|adj=on}} march in eleven hours.<ref>Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 365</ref>

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly {{convert|2|mi|km|sigfig=1|spell=in|abbr=out}} along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Map Study of the Battle of Gettysburg {{!}} Historical Society of Pennsylvania |url=https://hsp.org/education/unit-plans/a-map-study-of-the-battle-of-gettysburg/a-map-study-of-the-battle-of-gettysburg |access-date=2022-12-17 |website=[[Historical Society of Pennsylvania]]}}</ref> Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation.<ref>Eicher, p. 521; Sears, pp. 245-246.</ref>

The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about {{convert|1|mi|m|spell=in|abbr=out}} to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Union army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly {{convert|5|mi|km|0|spell=in}} long.<ref>Clark, p. 74; Eicher, p. 521.</ref>

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for a general assault of Meade's positions. On the right, Longstreet's First Corps was to position itself to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the [[Emmitsburg]] Road, and to roll up the Union line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. [[John Bell Hood]]'s and [[Lafayette McLaws]]'s divisions, followed by Major General [[Richard H. Anderson (general)|Richard H. Anderson]]'s division of Hill's Third Corps.<ref name=":0">James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. (Philadelphia, PA: J. R. Lippincott company, 1896), p. 365.</ref>

On the left, Lee instructed Ewell to position his Second Corps to attack Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill when he heard the gunfire from Longstreet's assault, preventing Meade from shifting troops to bolster his left. Though it does not appear in either his or Lee's Official Report, Ewell claimed years later that Lee had changed the order to simultaneously attack, calling for only a "diversion", to be turned into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.<ref>Sears, p. 255; Clark, p. 69.</ref><ref name="Edward Porter Alexander 1907 p. 408">Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 408</ref>

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning, he did not visit Longstreet's position on the Confederate right. Even so, Lee rejected suggestions that Longstreet move beyond Meade's left and attack the Union flank, capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade's escape route.<ref>Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 368</ref>

Lee did not issue orders for the attack until 11:00&nbsp;a.m.<ref name=":0"/>{{#tag:ref|Claims have been made that Lee intended for there to be an attack at sunrise, or at another point earlier in the day, but that the attack was delayed by Longstreet.  Lee allegedly stated "What can detain Longstreet" not long after 9:00&nbsp;am that morning, and Longstreet has been attributed as saying that "[Lee] wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett"; some writers have interpreted these statements as an indication that Lee intended the attack to take place earlier.  Eicher rejects claims that Lee intended for the attack to begin at sunrise, although allowing that it is possible that Lee may have intended for an earlier attack. Eicher concludes that "preparations for the attack did not get underway until between 11 A.M. and noon". Sears notes that Lee "was said to be exasperated" by the late start of the attack, but also states that "having made plain by his orders to McLaws that he was assuming tactical command of the operation, Lee had not issued any earlier start-up order".<ref>Eicher, p. 522; Sears, p. 257</ref> |group=fn}} About noon, General Anderson's advancing troops were discovered by General Sickles's outpost guard and the Third Corps—upon which Longstreet's First Corps was to form—did not get into position until 1:00&nbsp;pm.<ref>Longstreet, From Mannassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 366</ref>

Hood and McLaws, after their long march, were not yet in position and did not launch their attacks until just after 4:00{{nbsp}}p.m. and 5:00{{nbsp}}p.m., respectively.<ref>Pfanz, ''Second Day'', pp. 119–123.</ref>

===Attacks on the Union left flank===
[[File:Gettysburg Battle Map Day2.png|thumb|A map of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg on July 2, 1863]]
As Longstreet's left division, under Major General Lafayette McLaws, advanced, they unexpectedly found Major General [[Daniel Sickles]]'s III Corps directly in their path. Sickles had been dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Seeing ground better suited for artillery positions {{convert|1/2|mi|m|spell=in}} to the west—centered at the Sherfy farm's Peach Orchard—he violated orders and advanced his corps to the slightly higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road, moving away from Cemetery Ridge. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to the Peach Orchard, then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm. This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brigadier General [[Andrew A. Humphreys]]'s division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road) and Major General [[David B. Birney]]'s division (to the south) were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could defend effectively.<ref>Pfanz, ''Second Day'', pp. 93–97; Eicher, pp. 523–524.</ref> The Confederate artillery was ordered to open fire at 3:00&nbsp;pm.<ref>Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 369</ref> After failing to attend a meeting at this time of Meade's corps commanders, Meade rode to Sickles's position and demanded an explanation of the situation. Knowing a Confederate attack was imminent and a retreat would be endangered, Meade refused Sickles' offer to withdraw.<ref>Eicher</ref>

Meade was forced to send 20,000 reinforcements:<ref>Harman, p. 59.</ref> the entire V Corps, Brigadier General [[John C. Caldwell]]'s division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and portions of the newly arrived VI Corps. Hood's division moved more to the east than intended, losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg Road,<ref>Harman, p. 57.</ref> attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws, coming in on Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps in the [[Battle of Gettysburg, Second Day#Wheatfield|Wheatfield]] and overwhelmed them in Sherfy's [[Battle of Gettysburg, Second Day#Peach Orchard|Peach Orchard]]. McLaws's attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of Death") before being beaten back by the [[Pennsylvania Reserves]] division of the V Corps, moving down from Little Round Top. The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle, and [[Daniel Sickles's leg|Sickles's leg]] was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball. Caldwell's division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield. Anderson's division, coming from McLaws's left and starting forward around 6{{nbsp}}p.m., reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, but could not hold the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps, including an almost suicidal bayonet charge by the [[1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry|1st Minnesota]] regiment against a Confederate brigade, ordered in desperation by Hancock to buy time for reinforcements to arrive.<ref>Sears, pp. 312–324; Eicher, pp. 530–535; Coddington, p. 423.</ref>

As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Colonel [[Strong Vincent]] of V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important hill at the extreme left of the Union line. His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by Law's brigade of Hood's division. Meade's chief engineer, Brigadier General [[Gouverneur K. Warren]], had realized the importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade, an artillery battery, and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood's troops arrived. The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the [[20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment|20th Maine]], ordered by Colonel [[Joshua L. Chamberlain]] and possibly led down the slope by Lieutenant [[Holman S. Melcher]], was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Chamberlain into prominence after the war.<ref>Eicher, pp. 527–530; Clark, pp. 81–85.</ref><ref group="fn">{{Cite web |url=http://www.gdg.org/Research/People/Chamberlain/flash.html |title=Who saved Little Round Top? |access-date=February 21, 2016 |publisher=Camp Chase Gazette |last=Morgan |first=James |quote= Morgan addresses and rebuts certain conclusions made in ''With a Flash of His Sword: The Writings of Major Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry.'' Edited by William B. Styple. The full text of Morgan's analysis of Styples's "point number 4" about who ordered and lead the charges is: "Number 4. Col. Chamberlain did not lead the charge. Lt. Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope [according to Styples]. Though directly related to Mr. Styples argument, this is a very minor point and could even be called a quibble. Even granting Melcher the honor of being first down the slope (and such an interpretation is perfectly plausible), he did not "lead" the charge in a command sense, which is what the conclusion implies. Chamberlain probably was standing in his proper place behind the line when he yelled "Bayonets!," so if indeed "the word was enough" to get the men started, he could not have gone first as the entire line would have moved out ahead of him. But it does not matter. The questions, "who was first down the hill?" and "who led the charge?" are different questions which should not be posed as one....The question, therefore, remains: who saved Little Round Top? Given the available historical evidence, the answer likewise must remain: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. |archive-date=March 3, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303231850/http://www.gdg.org/Research/People/Chamberlain/flash.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Attacks on the Union right flank===
[[File:Union breastworks Culp's Hill Gettysburg.jpg|thumb|[[Union army]] [[Breastwork (fortification)|breastworks]] on [[Culp's Hill]] in 1863]]
Ewell interpreted his orders as calling only for a cannonade.<ref name="Edward Porter Alexander 1907 p. 408"/> His 32 guns, along with A. P. Hill's 55 guns, engaged in a two-hour artillery barrage at extreme range that had little effect. Finally, about six o'clock, Ewell sent orders to each of his division commanders to attack the Union lines in his front.<ref name="Alexander409">Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 409</ref>

Major General [[Edward Johnson (general)|Edward "Allegheny" Johnson]]'s division had contemplated an assault on Culp's Hill, but they were still a mile away and had Rock Creek to cross. The few possible crossings would make significant delays. Because of this, only three of Johnson's four brigades moved to the attack.<ref name="Alexander409"/> Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, leaving only a brigade of New Yorkers under Brigadier General [[George S. Greene]] behind strong, newly constructed defensive works. With reinforcements from the I and XI corps, Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, though giving up some of the lower earthworks on the lower part of Culp's Hill.<ref>Eicher, pp. 537–538; Sauers, p. 835; Pfanz, ''Culp's Hill'', pp. 205–234; Clark, pp. 115–116.</ref>

Early was similarly unprepared when he ordered [[Harry T. Hays]]'s and [[Isaac E. Avery]]'s brigades to attack the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill. Once started, fighting was fierce: Colonel [[Andrew L. Harris]] of the Union 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, XI Corps came under a withering attack, losing half his men. Avery was wounded early on, but the Confederates reached the crest of the hill and entered the Union breastworks, capturing one or two batteries. Seeing he was not supported on his right, Hays withdrew. His right was to be supported by Robert E. Rodes's division, but Rodes—like Early and Johnson—had not been ordered up in preparation for the attack. He had twice as far to travel as Early; by the time he came in contact with the Union skirmish line, Early's troops had already begun to withdraw.<ref>Report of Major General R. E. Rodes, CSA, commanding division. June 3 – August 1, 1863. The Gettysburg Campaign. O.R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/2 [S# 44]</ref>

[[Jeb Stuart]] and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day's battle. Brigadier General [[Wade Hampton III|Wade Hampton]]'s brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23-year-old Brigadier General [[George Armstrong Custer]]'s [[Michigan]] cavalry near [[Battle of Hunterstown|Hunterstown]] to the northeast of Gettysburg.<ref>Sears, p. 257; Longacre, pp. 198–199.</ref>