Editing Argument from nonbelief (section)

==== Noseeum defense ====
The philosophers Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea described the philosopher William Rowe's justification for the second premise of the argument from evil, which is equally applicable to a perception of hiddenness:<blockquote>Some evidential arguments ... rely on a “noseeum” inference of the following sort: NI: If, after thinking hard, we can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason. (The reason NI is called a ‘noseeum’ inference is that it says, more or less, that because we don’t see ‘um, they probably ain’t there.)<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|year=1979|title=The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |volume=16 |pages=335–41}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |year=2005 |title=Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea |url=https://www3.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/In%20Defense%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism.pdf |journal=The Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=83 |pages=241–51 |access-date=2016-10-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161109033308/http://www3.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/In%20Defense%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism.pdf |archive-date=2016-11-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|year=1988|title=Evil and Theodicy|journal=Philosophical Topics|volume=16|issue=2|pages=119–32|doi=10.5840/philtopics198816216}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|title=Ruminations about Evil|journal=Philosophical Topics|volume=5|pages=69–88}}</ref></blockquote>Various analogies are offered to show that the noseeum inference is logically unsound. For example, a novice chess player's inability to discern a chess master's choice of moves cannot be used to infer that there is no good reason for the move.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book|url=http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140407231539/http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |archive-date=2014-04-07 |url-status=live|title=Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology (Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil) |last=Bergmann |first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2009|editor-last=Flint|editor-first=Thomas|location=Oxford|pages=374–99}}</ref> The skeptical theist and noseeum defense place the burden of proof on the atheist to prove that their intuitions about God are trustworthy.