Editing Algerian War (section)

=== Guerrilla war ===
[[File:1956-05-21 France Digs in For Total War in Algeria.ogv|thumb|1956 newsreel about the war]]

During 1956 and 1957, the FLN successfully applied [[hit-and-run tactics]] in accordance with [[guerrilla warfare]] theory. Whilst some of this was aimed at military targets, a significant amount was invested in a terror campaign against those in any way deemed to support or encourage French authority. This resulted in acts of sadistic torture and brutal violence against all, including women and children. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colonial farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside, in accordance with Mao's theories.

Although successfully provoking fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN gained control in certain sectors of the [[Aurès]], the [[Kabylie]], and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and [[Oran]]. In these places, the FLN established a simple but effective—although frequently temporary—military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Paul |first1=Christopher |title=Algerian Independence, 1954–1962: Case Outcome: COIN Loss |date=2013 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |work=Paths to Victory |pages=75–93 |access-date=2023-03-21 |series=Detailed Insurgency Case Studies |publisher=RAND Corporation |isbn=978-0-8330-8109-4 |last2=Clarke |first2=Colin P. |last3=Grill |first3=Beth |last4=Dunigan |first4=Molly |jstor=10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |archive-date=21 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230321173223/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |url-status=live }}</ref> But it was never able to hold large, fixed positions.

The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and through defections and political purges created difficulties for the FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the Aurès. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to settle old scores and engage in private wars against military rivals within the FLN.