Editing Ahmad Shah Massoud (section)

====Peace and power-sharing agreement (1992)====
With United Nations support, most Afghan political parties decided to appoint a legitimate national government to succeed communist rule, through an elite settlement.<ref name="Amin Saikal"/><ref name="Peter Tomsen 2">{{cite book|last=Tomsen|first=Peter|title=The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=NCoyhgdHHyAC}} |access-date=January 22, 2014|year=2011|publisher=PublicAffairs|isbn=9781586487812}}</ref> While the external Afghan party leaders were residing in Peshawar, the military situation around Kabul involving the internal commanders was tense. A 1991 UN peace process brought about some negotiations, but the attempted elite settlement did not develop.<ref name="Peter Tomsen 2"/> In April 1992, resistance leaders in Peshawar tried to negotiate a settlement. Massoud supported the Peshawar process of establishing a broad coalition government inclusive of all resistance parties, but Hekmatyar sought to become the sole ruler of Afghanistan, stating, "In our country coalition government is impossible because, this way or another, it is going to be weak and incapable of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan."<ref name="Amin Saikal (3)">{{cite book|last=Amin Saikal|author-link=Amin Saikal|title=Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival|date=August 27, 2004|edition=2006 1st|page=215|publisher=I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.|isbn=1-85043-437-9}}</ref>

Massoud wrote:

<blockquote>All the parties had participated in the war, in jihad in Afghanistan, so they had to have their share in the government, and in the formation of the government. Afghanistan is made up of different nationalities. We were worried about a national conflict between different tribes and different nationalities. In order to give everybody their own rights and also to avoid bloodshed in Kabul, we left the word to the parties so they should decide about the country as a whole. We talked about it for a temporary stage and then after that the ground should be prepared for a general election.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (5)">{{cite book|last=Neamatollah Nojumi|title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region|edition=2002 1st|page=112|publisher=Palgrave|location=New York}}</ref></blockquote>

A recorded radio communication between the two leaders showed the divide as Massoud asked Hekmatyar:<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite book|last=Marcela Grad|title=Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader|edition=March 1, 2009|publisher=Webster University Press}}</ref>

<blockquote>The Kabul regime is ready to surrender, so instead of the fighting we should gather. ... The leaders are meeting in Peshawar. ... The troops should not enter Kabul, they should enter later on as part of the government.</blockquote>

Hekmatyar's response:

<blockquote>We will march into Kabul with our naked sword. No one can stop us. ... Why should we meet the leaders?"
</blockquote>

Massoud answered:

<blockquote>"It seems to me that you don't want to join the leaders in Peshawar nor stop your threat, and you are planning to enter Kabul ... in that case I must defend the people.</blockquote>

At that point [[Osama bin Laden]], trying to mediate, urged Hekmatyar to "go back with your brothers" and to accept a compromise. Bin Laden reportedly "hated Ahmad Shah Massoud".<ref name="Faraj Ismail">{{cite book|last=Faraj Ismail in [[Peter Bergen]]'s|title=The Osama Bin Laden I know|page=93}}</ref> Bin Laden was involved in ideological and personal disputes with Massoud<ref name="Johnny Ryan">{{cite book|last=Johnny Ryan|title=Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the Internet|page=133|publisher=Institute of European Affairs}}</ref> and had sided with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against Massoud in the inner-Afghan conflict since the late 1980s.<ref name="Steve Coll (2)">{{cite book|last=[[Steve Coll]]|title=[[Ghost Wars]]|pages=202–203}}</ref> But Hekmatyar refused to accept a compromise, confident that he would be able to gain sole power in Afghanistan.<ref name="Roy Gutman_37">{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008 |page=37|publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref>

On April 24, 1992, the leaders in Peshawar agreed on and signed the [[Peshawar Accord]], establishing the post-communist [[Islamic State of Afghanistan]] – which was a stillborn 'state' with a paralyzed 'government' right from its inception, until its final succumbing in September 1996.<ref name=photius,peshawar>[https://photius.com/countries/afghanistan/government/afghanistan_government_the_peshawar_accord~72.html 'The Peshawar Accord, April 25, 1992']. Website photius.com. Text from 1997, purportedly sourced on The Library of Congress Country Studies (US) and CIA World Factbook. Retrieved December 22, 2017.</ref> The creation of the Islamic State was welcomed though by the [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly of the United Nations]]<ref name="Max Planck Yearbook">{{cite book|title=Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law|edition=2005|page=400}}</ref> and the Islamic State of Afghanistan was recognized as the legitimate entity representing Afghanistan until June 2002, when its successor, the [[Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]], was established under the interim government of [[Hamid Karzai]].<ref name="Columbia World Dictionary">{{cite book|author1=Olivier Roy |author2=Antoine Sfeir |title=The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism|page=25|publisher=Columbia University Press}}</ref> Under the 1992 Peshawar Accord, the Defense Ministry was given to Massoud while the Prime Ministership was given to Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar refused to sign. With the exception of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the other Peshawar resistance parties were unified under this peace and power-sharing accord in April 1992.