Editing Accountability (section)

=== Selectorates ===
Belsky ''et al.'' point out that whereas, under more democratic governance, accountability is built into the institution of the state by a habit of regular elections, accountability in autocratic regimes<ref name=":28">{{citation|last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|title=Making Autocracy Work|date=May 2007|series=LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS48|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3764/1/Making_Autocracy_Work.pdf}}</ref> relies on a selectorate—a group that legitimizes or delegitimizes the autocrat's powers according to [[selectorate theory]]. Selectorates are those on whom a leader depends in order to hold onto power, and those who have the ability to depose a leader.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bueno de Mesquita |first1=Bruce |last2=Morrow |first2=James D. |last3=Siverson |first3=Randolph M. |last4=Smith |first4=Alastair |date=17 September 2002 |title=Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=559–590 |doi=10.1017/s0007123402000236 |doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |issn=0007-1234 |s2cid=40514840}}</ref> When a selectorate's hold on power is not overly dependent on the leader in office, selectorates can remove poorly performing leaders, and this accountability by selectorates renders it possible for autocracies to perform better for the benefit of all.<ref name=":28" /> Beyond that, institutions{{Specify|reason=what sorts of institutions?|date=July 2023}} can act as credible restraints on autocracy as well.{{How|date=July 2023}}